Tras reconocer el papel decisivo que juega en el pensamiento husserliano la intersubjetividad en su estructura trascendental, y, respecto a la Einfühlung y la Fremderfahrung, el importante papel que desempeña la Umfiktion, el presente artículo desarrolla la posibilidad experiencial y de senti-do que supone ese extraño personaje que es la Voz Narrativa heterodiegética. En concreto, la Voz Narrativa como Otro subsidiario en el caso de que los personajes duerman o hayan muerto. Esto permite pensar al Testigo como dativo de manifestación (...) en off en soporte último del continuum de la fenomenalidad. Con ello, se trata de profundizar en la tesis husserliana acerca de la inmortalidad de la subjetividad trascendental y extraer algunas conclusiones metafísicas y éticas. El artículo se basa en un texto de Muñoz Molina en el que comentaba un pasaje de Al faro, de V. Woolf.Recognizing the decisive role in Husserl's thought of the intersubjectivity in its transcendental structure, and, for the Einfühlung and Fremderfahrung, the important role of Umfiktion, this article develops the experiential possibility and the possibility of meaning that assumes the Strange character who is the heterodiegetic Narrative Voice. Specifically, the narrative voice as subsidiary Other in the event that the characters sleep or have died. This suggests the Witness as dative of manifestation in off as last stand of the continuum of phenomenality. With this, it is deepening the Husserlian thesis about the immortality of transcendental subjectivity and draw some metaphysical and ethical conclusions. The article is based on a text by Muñoz Molina that commented a passage from To the Lighthouse, by Virginia Woolf. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to show the right concern of phenomenology (specially of husserlian type) in the exploration of the textures of consciousness that explain themselves in the noetic-noematic structure of the phenomenological-transcendentally reduced world (within inverted commas). Therefore, the undoubtfulness of “immanent perception” takes, for instance, great importance in the virtual realm, as long as, in that realm, consciousness opens itself more radically to the intentional “otherness” than to what natural attitude calls “reality”. Nevertheless, although phenomenology is able (...) to justify the emergence of virtual reality (or of “real virtuality”), phenomenology has strategies ruling out the possibility that virtualization becomes simulation (deception). In this paper, this situation is presented as the ideal of the technical-virtual manipulation of what is given to consciousness. For this very reason, virtual attitude must keep an indispensable distance (strangeness effect), so that the sense of “reality” can continue to be a valid one. (shrink)