Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about (...) the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Free Public Reason examines the idea of public justification, stressing its importance but also questioning the coherence of the concept itself. Although public justification is employed in the work of theorists such as John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Thomas Nagel, and others, it has received little attention on its own as a philosophical concept. In this book Fred D'Agostino shows that the concept is composed of various values, interests, and notions of the good, and that no ranking of these is possible. (...) The notion of public justification itself is thus shown to be contestable. In demonstrating this, D'Agostino undermines many current political theories that rely on this concept. Having broken down the foundations of public justification, D'Agostino then offers an alternative model of how a workable consensus on its meaning might be reached through the interactions of a community of interpreters or delegates at a constitutional convention. (shrink)

Among the great ironies of quantum mechanics is not only that its conceptual foundations seem strange even to the physicists who use it, but that philosophers have largely ignored it. Here, Bernard d'Espagnat argues that quantum physics--by casting doubts on once hallowed concepts such as space, material objects, and causality-demands serious reconsideration of most of traditional philosophy. On Physics and Philosophy is an accessible, mathematics-free reflection on the philosophical meaning of the quantum revolution, by one of the world's leading authorities (...) on the subject. D'Espagnat presents an objective account of the main guiding principles of contemporary physics-in particular, quantum mechanics-followed by a look at just what consequences these should imply for philosophical thinking. The author begins by describing recent discoveries in quantum physics such as nonseparability, and explicating the significance of contemporary developments such as decoherence. Then he proceeds to set various philosophical theories of knowledge--such as materialism, realism, Kantism, and neo-Kantism--against the conceptual problems quantum theory raises. His overall conclusion is that while the physical implications of quantum theory suggest that scientific knowledge will never truly describe mind-independent reality, the notion of such an ultimate reality--one we can never access directly or rationally and which he calls "veiled reality"--remains conceptually necessary nonetheless. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 87-101 [Access article in PDF] Collingwood on Re-Enactment and The Identity of Thought Giuseppina D'oro University of Keele Collingwood's The Idea of History is often discussed in the context of the issue of the reducibility/non-reducibility of explanations in the social sciences to explanations in the natural sciences. In the 1950s and 60s, following the publication of Hempel's influential article, "The Function (...) of General Laws in History,"1 many looked at Collingwood's defence of the autonomy of history as providing the appropriate conceptual resources to counter Hempel's claim that explanations in history and in the natural sciences share the same logical structure. Collingwood was recruited as an ally in a number of debates in analytical philosophy of history with a view to clarifying the nature of appropriately historical explanations and the proper subject matter of historical science. In this paper, I wish to consider Collingwood's account of historical understanding from a related but distinct perspective, that is, I wish to consider re-enactment from the perspective of Collingwood's (controversial) claim that thought stands outside time, and that it is because thought stands outside time that it is possible to understand the thoughts of other agents, including those of agents who lived in a distant past. Although Collingwood's account of re-enactment is developed in the context of his philosophy of history, it addresses some very general issues within the philosophy of mind. It is with Collingwood's approach to these general issues that the present paper is concerned: First, I explicate Collingwood's account of re-enactment against the background of his philosophy of mind and, second, attempt to show that one important goal of Collingwood's account of re-enactment is to undermine a certain type of scepticism about the possibility of sharing the thoughts of others, rather than provide a straightforward refutation of this sceptical position. While I believe Collingwood's claim that thought stands outside time to have important repercussions on how to understand [End Page 87] issues more closely related to the philosophy of history, I will not attempt, for reasons of space, to cash out these implications here.In The Idea of History2 the concept of re-enactment is expounded largely via an engagement with an imaginary objector. The position that Collingwood attributes to the imaginary objector can be preliminarily summarized as saying that the objector identifies thoughts with token acts of thinking which can be spatio-temporally located, rather than with the propositional content expressed by those token acts. It is because the objector holds thoughts to be token acts which can be spatio-temporally located that s/he denies that two agents can have or share one and the same thought. Collingwood's reply to the imaginary objector relies on a philosophy of mind that is developed elsewhere3 but whose key elements are presupposed by his discussion of re-enactment in The Idea of History, and essential to an understanding of Collingwood's position.4An important aspect of Collingwood's philosophy of mind concerns his understanding of what is meant by an 'object of thought': When I call a thing subjective I mean that it is or pertains to a subject or conscious mind. When I call it objective I mean that it is or pertains to the object of which such a mind is conscious. I do not call a real rose objective and an imaginary one subjective, or the molecules in it objective and the beauty of it subjective. A real rose I call real and an imaginary rose I call imaginary; and I call them both objective because they are the objects of a perceiving and imagining mind respectively. (SM, 11)5For the sake of clarity I shall refer to the subjective/objective distinction as used by Collingwood as subjective2 and objective2 and to the subjective/objective distinction against which it is contrasted as subjective1 and objective1. Objective1 means existing in... (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers assume that, before one can discuss prayer, the question of whether there is a God or not must be settled. In this title, first published in 1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that to understand prayer is to understand what is meant by the reality of God. Beginning by placing the problem of prayer within a philosophical context, Phillips goes on to discuss such topics as prayer and the concept of talking, prayer and dependence, superstition and the concept (...) of community. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of religion, prayer and religious studies more generally. (shrink)

Full text of erratum: "In the article by D.J. Buller, on p. 278, the y-axis label to Fig. IIb was incorrect. Instead of 'Percentage choosing "Eats cassava root" and "Tattoo," it should have read: 'Percentage choosing "Eats cassava root" and "No tattoo."' We apologise to readers for this error.".

Chez les commentateurs platoniciens de l’époque impériale, l’un des problèmes majeurs liés à la théorie des Idées concernait le domaine d’application de cette doctrine. L’exégèse de la première partie du Parménide de Platon donnait occasion à diverses discussions sur ce sujet. Le Commentaire de Proclus sur le Parménide est sans doute la plus précieuse source qui soit parvenue de l’Antiquité jusqu’à nous pour la reconstitution de ces débats. Alors que la grande majorité des commentateurs anciens étaient convaincus que les Idées (...) ont un domaine assez restreint, le Commentaire de Proclus nous révèle l’existence d’une lecture alternative, selon laquelle il y a des Idées de « toutes choses ». Proclus relie cette interprétation alternative en particulier à l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises et d’individus, probablement parce que ces deux classes d’objets étaient vraiment les dernières choses dont un platonicien orthodoxe voudrait admettre des Idées. Amélius est le seul néoplatonicien connu pour avoir soutenu l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises. Dans cet article j’essaie de montrer que, selon toute vraisemblance, Amélius est également la cible de la réfutation des Idées d’individus par Proclus dans son Commentaire. La conclusion qui s’ensuit naturellement est qu’Amélius était très probablement l’un de ces philosophes qui, d’après Proclus, admettaient des Idées « de toutes choses ». (shrink)

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

A Study of Perennial Philosophy and Psychedelic Experience, with a Proposal to Revise W. T. Stace’s Core Characteristics of Mystical Experience ©Ed D’Angelo 2018 -/- Abstract -/- According to the prevailing paradigm in psychedelic research today, when used within an appropriate set and setting, psychedelics can reliably produce an authentic mystical experience. According to the prevailing paradigm, an authentic mystical experience is one that possesses the common or universal characteristics of mystical experience as identified by the philosopher W. T. Stace (...) in his 1960 work Mysticism and Philosophy. Stace’s common characteristics of mystical experience are the basis for the Hood Mysticism Questionnaire, which is the most widely used quantitative measure of mystical experience in experimental studies of psychedelic experience. In this paper, I trace the historical roots of Stace’s common characteristics of mystical experience back to Christian Neoplatonism and apophatic theology, and I trace those, in turn, back to Plato’s concept of the Good and to Aristotle’s concept of God as active intellect. I argue that Stace’s common characteristics of mystical experience are not universal or culturally invariant but are the product of a specifically Christian religious and moral tradition that has its roots in ancient Greek metaphysics. My paper concludes with a revised list of common characteristics of psychedelic experience that is a better candidate for a list of invariant structures of psychedelic experience than Stace’s common characteristics of Christian mystical experience. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The editors of this volume - Jarvie and D'Agostino - encountered John Watkins at such different times in his career that they have never ...

In Reconstruction in Philosophy, John Dewey issued an eloquent call for contemporary philosophy to become more relevant to the pressing problems facing society. Historically, the philosophy of a period had been appropriate to social conditions, but despite the vast changes in the contemporary world and the complex challenges confronting it philosophy had remained ossified. Karl Popper also was dissatisfied with contemporary philosophy, which he regarded as too often focusing upon “minute” problems. Both Dewey and Popper, however, were optimistic that the (...) situation could be turned around. In this essay D.C. Phillips argues that the resources they mustered give no basis for this optimism; in particular, Phillips emphasizes that philosophy cannot have traction with closed‐minded or fanatical individuals. Dewey passed over cases where his ideas about democratic processes and free intellectual exchange faced intractable difficulties, according to Phillips, and he further suggests that Popper “waffled” over the so‐called “myth of the framework.”. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Kant’s philosophy of grammar in order to argue that: (a) the formal analysis of language implies that there is a structural correspondence between logical and grammatical form; (b) there is a distinction between the sense in which logic is formal and the sense in which grammar is formal; (c) universal grammar descends from the system of categorial functions that are investigated in the transcendental analytic; (d) transcendental grammar implies that the universal form of human language (...) has its ground in the universal structure of thought; (e) the concept of a grammatical norm is clarified once we combine the theory of universal grammar with how linguistic experience takes place. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS SERIOUSLY: SOME IRONIES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF RELIGJ:ONS * 1GAvIN D'CosTA West London Institute of Higher E'ducation Isleworth, Middlese111 HE QUESTION oi Christian attitudes to the world eligions is becoming increasingly important. An lnterpretatwn of Religion is emblematic of a growing trend, which runs across 1denominational lines, that attempts fo take other,religions seriously. John Hick.argues that for most of its ihistory (...) Christianity has hrud a rpolitioaUy and theologicrully imperialist attitude towards the ireligions of the world. Superiority :and uninformed arrogance have generally prev:ailed with the accompanying attitude that the religions of the world 1aire 1 generally sinful and incapable of being 1 salvific. The 1 time has come foT a change of a;ttitude: the wol"ld reHgions must be taken seriously :and this means ·affil"ming them as alternative paths to salvation, possibly neither worse nor better than·Christianity. This Hick cru1ls a "pluralistic" outlook. The agenda is irrudical and Hick's Vioice is not solitary. Hick'1 s hook!is a ma;gisteri:al 4rn paiges and is ibrused on his Giffol'ld Lectmes of 1986-87. It contains cons!i.derruble indological, philosophicail and theological material, hut in what follows I shall,be dea1ing with one aspect oll!ly, his argument for p1uiialism. Hick is acknowledged :as a leading irepresentative of this pluralistic approach. Initially he began as a conservative,and exclusivist Christian,and has over the years enoompassed a wide!l.'ange of thoofogica1 positions now,culminating *John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 519 520 GAVIN D'COSTA in this p11esent rbook.1 In :this review discussion I propose that many o[ the most mdical strategies in the theology of re1ligions in 'Spite 0£ their wish to take other rreligions seriously have an il'!Onic tendency to do just the opposite! In attempting to be genuinely accommodating to the 11eligions 0£ the world, Hick, I will argue, unwittingly ends up in danger of accommodating none, including Christianity. This tendency, which iI believe to 1be clearly illustrated in Hick's rrecent rbook, is shared in various degrees hy numerous theologians pursuing a, pluralist p111oject similar to that of Hick's.2 It would he foolish to assume they are " all the 'Saime," hut they certainly share common theological and philosophical tendencies which I wish to isolate and comment on. I should 1state dearly that iby such a critique I do not intend to discount the possibility that 1 a:ll religions ma,y lead fo God, but that the stmtegies often employed to a111g111e.for this are deepJy problematic. ~o put Hiok"s new rbook into :perspective it will he helpful to wace its genesis 1briefly. In 1973, using an astronomical analogy, Hick suggested a Copernican revolution in the Christian theoology of rreligions whereby Christians should "shift from the 1 He began, in his own words, as a "strongly evangelical and indeed fundamentalist " Christian: see God Has Many Names (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 2. See also my analysis of his entire pilgrimage in John Hick's Theology of Religions (London/New York: University Press of America, 1987). 2 For some of those on Hick's trajectory, see A. Race, Olllristians and Religious Pluralism (London: SCM, 1983); Paul Knitter, No Other Name'! (New York: Orbis, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. Ruether, Pluralism and Ohristology; the latter three and other influential co-contributors (including Hick) are to be found in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistio Theology of Religions, ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (New York: Orbis, 1987). More recently, we can see the extremely thin line between pluralists and essentialist "inclusivists" in E. Hillman, Many Paths·: A Oatholic Approach to Religious Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1989), who marries K. Rahner and W. C. Smith, divorces faith from history and tradition, and thereby provides an essentialist analysis. See the pertinent comments of K. Surin on Smith's essentialist project in "An Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in Religious Pluralism and Unbelief, ed. I. Hamnett (London, Routledge... (shrink)

The fifth poem in Horace's first book of Epistles takes the form of an invitation to Torquatus to attend a dinner which the poet is preparing for that evening, the eveof the Emperor's birthday. The fare will be simple but Horace will see to it that the furnishings, napkins, vessels and plates will be clean and bright and that the company and the seating-plan will be to Torquatus’ taste. Horace will get Butra and Septicius to be there, and Sabinus, too, (...) as long as he is not kept away by a prior dinner engagement or by a girl he'd rather spend the evening with. With Torquatus and Horace, that makes four or five diners, so that there is room for others before the triclinium is full, although there shouldn't be too many; or, as Horace puts it :locus est et pluribus umbris;sed nimis arta premunt olidae conuiuia caprae. (shrink)

The substance of the authors' disagreement with the views of D. Gutkowski and M. V. Valdes Franco is presented.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans ÉTUDES/INUIT/STUDIES, 24, no 2, 2000, p. 89-113. Québec : Département d'anthropologie de l'Université Laval. Nous remercions Bernard Saladin d'Anglure de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Les rites inuit de la première fois, qui célèbrent les premières performances effectuées par les enfants et les adolescents inuit, ont été souvent mentionnés par les ethnographes de l'Arctique mais jamais véritablement analysés comme « séquence cérémonielle », pour - Anthropologie.

While best known for the immensely popular and controversial novel Uncle Tom's Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe is also the author of an extensive body of additional work on American culture and politics. Playing many roles--journalist, pamphleteer, novelist, preacher, and advisor on domestic affairs--Stowe used the written word as a vehicle for religious, social, and political commentaries, often leavening them with entertainment in order to reach a broad audience. She had a profound effect on American culture, not because her ideas were (...) unique, but because they were common. What made her so radical was that she insisted on putting her ideas into action. The Oxford Harriet Beecher Stowe Reader offers a focused collection of Stowe's writings from the 1830s through the 1860s. Illustrating her broad range, rhetorical strategies, and cultural designs on the world, it is ideal for courses in nineteenth-century American literature, women's literature, and American history. The volume collects those selections best suited for classroom use, reprinting many pieces here for the first time. Editor Joan D. Hedrick provides a substantial introduction that assesses Stowe's vital impact on nineteenth-century American literature, politics, and culture. The readings are divided into three sections: Early Sketches, Antislavery Writings, and Domestic Culture and Politics. Early Sketches presents the finest writing of Stowe's literary apprenticeship. Antislavery Writings includes Uncle Tom's Cabin in its entirety, placing it in the context of Stowe's considerable and often-overlooked body of other antislavery writings. This section also includes a generous selection from A Key To Uncle Tom's Cabin, a companion volume to the novel. Domestic Culture and Politics shows the scope of Stowe's thinking on the Victorian home, for which she was a major propagandist. The inclusion here of "The True Story of Lady Byron's Life," an exposé of male debauchery and incest at the core of a nineteenth-century home, represents Stowe's willingness to tackle the most challenging political and social issues of her time. (shrink)

Hegel est parfois tenu pour un métaphysicien, à l’encontre de son propre sentiment. Il s’est pourtant livré à une critique constante, minutieuse et acerbe de la métaphysique en laquelle il ne voyait qu’un prolongement de la manière de penser primitive et naïve. Les hommes ne saisissent d’abord que métaphysiquement la réalité objective qui se présente à eux. Intégrant à sa propre logique spéculative des éléments de la métaphysique éclatée, mais se rattachant luimême surtout à la critique kantienne, il tente de (...) surpasser tous les points de vue limités, unilatéraux, antithétiques, pour les réduire au rôle de moments ou d’étapes d’un développement qui les surpasse tous. C’est toutefois à la métaphysique qu’il réserve ses désaveux les plus explicites. (shrink)

Si c’est avec le bouddhisme que l’Inde entre véritablement dans l’histoire, tant dans l’histoire de la philosophie que dans celle des événements et lieux mémorables, pour la première fois gravée sur la pierre et le rocher – une donnée à la fois remarquable et problématique –, la perception d’une Inde compacte et quelque peu isolée dans l’ensemble du monde a longtemps encouragé une vision incomplète de la civilisation indienne et de son passé. On constate que les grands changements s’accompagn...

In this article, the editor and scientific director of Nietzsche Source, Professor Paolo D'Iorio, aims at describing the two editions of Nietzsche’s work currently published on this scientific Web site Firstly, the critical edition, the Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), which provides an electronic version of the German edition of Nietzsche's complete works, based on the critical text established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Secondly, the facsimile edition, the Digitale Faksimile-Gesamtausgabe (DFGA), which reproduces all the documents relating (...) to Nietzsche's life and work. Both editions can be consulted free of charge through the Internet and are regularly used by the German philosopher specialists around the world. (shrink)

À partir du témoignage de Sénèque et d’Épictète, le présent article vise à montrer comment les stoïciens rendent compte des réactions involontaires à partir de leur propre psychologie de l’action. Les références faites à Zénon et les allusions à Chrysippe prouvent qu’une théorie des « affections préliminaires » existait dès les débuts du Portique. Le fragment 9 d’Épictète et l’ouverture du deuxième livre du De Ira sont ainsi interprétés comme deux versions concurrentes se rapportant à deux théories subtilement différentes. À (...) partir du matériau textuel emprunté aux premiers stoïciens, on montre l’influence de Zénon sur le De Ira et celle de Chrysippe sur le passage du livre perdu des Entretiens. Cette hypothèse a pour conséquence d’accorder l’exposé de Sénèque à l’orthodoxie stoïcienne défendant un monisme psychologique, et non à la filiation posidonienne, marquée par un dualisme psychologique à tendance platonico-aristotélicienne. (shrink)

This CQ department is dedicated to bringing noted bioethicsts together in order to debate some of the most perplexing contemporary bioethics issues. You are encouraged to contact department editor, D. Micah Hester, UAMS/Humanities, 4301 W. Markham St. #646, Little Rock, AR 72205, with any suggestions for debate topics and interlocutors you would like to see published herein.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article discute l'idée que la philosophie tardive de Collingwood soit d'orientation historiciste et relativiste. Je soutiens que cette accusation de relativisme historique est basée sur deux erreurs, l'une exégétique et l'autre philosophique. L'erreur exégétique est le résultat de l'hypothèse d'une prétendue «conversion radicale». L'erreur philosophique repose sur la conception selon laquelle il n'y a pas de différences substantielles entre le projet d'une métaphysique descriptive et le projet de la sociologie de la connaissance. L'article essaie de saper à la (...) base l'accusation de relativisme en contestant ces deux préjugés. (shrink)

The work of the lay Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain continues to provoke and inspire readers to engage in a Thomistic approach to many of the questions facing the world today. Maritain’s wide-ranging thought touched on many fields, including aesthetics, anthropology, educational theory, moral philosophy, and ethics, as well as Thomism and its relationship to other philosophical stances._ In _Being in the World: A Quotable Maritain Reader_, Mario O. D’Souza, C.S.B., has selected seven hundred and fifty of the most salient quotations (...) found in the English translations of fifty-four works by Jacques Maritain. Organized into forty thematic chapters, ordered alphabetically, the book serves as an overview of the areas that Maritain's writings addressed. By referring to entries in _Being in the World_, readers can quickly locate key passages in Maritain’s writing on a given topic and then turn elsewhere to the full texts for more in-depth study. Complete with a detailed index of key terms, the _Reader _will be an essential reference tool for the study of Maritain in English. "Fr. Mario O. D'Souza's careful selection from the works of Jacques Maritain provides the reader with an invaluable sampling of Maritain's extensive philosophical work. In it, we find examples of Maritain's almost lyrical gift of expression as well as of his trenchant wit. More than a scholarly contribution, the volume also ably serves as an introduction and entrance into Maritain's corpus." — William Sweet, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada_. (shrink)

Die indische Philosophin und Aktivistin Radha d’Souza begegnet dem Begriff Weltzivilgesellschaft mit größter Vorsicht und Skepsis. Selbst jahrelang in existenzielle Auseinandersetzungen um Grundrechte auf natürliche Ressourcen wie Wasser und Ackerland und höchstgerichtliche Entscheidungen verwickelt, sieht d’Souza im Begriff der Weltzivilgesellschaft in der Hauptsache den Versuch, einer neuerlichen Bemäntelung imperialistischer, westlicher Interessen, die sich nun nicht nur durch Entscheidungen von Regierungen legitimieren, sondern gar durch den Willen ihrer zivilen Bevölkerung.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 433-436 [Access article in PDF] Sarah Iles Johnston. Restless Dead: Encounters between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999. xxi + 329 pp. Cloth, $40.00. This book, which focuses on ancient Greek beliefs about how the dead interact with the living, is an important addition to the study of Greek religion. The subject (...) has become unusually popular in recent years, and when Johnston wrote in her preface that "scholars of our generation... have paid the topic little attention" (xi), she had no way of knowing that two other books on the topic were being published nearly simultaneously with her own. Fortunately, there is so much to say about ancient beliefs concerning ghosts that the three studies do not overlap much. Antonio Stramaglia's Res inauditae, incredulae: Storie di fantasmi nel mondo greco-latino (Bari 1999) and D. Felton's Haunted Greece and Rome: Ghost Stories from Classical Antiquity (Austin 1999) take broad views, examining both Greek and Roman ghost stories from literary and folkloric points of view, respectively. Johnston's book focuses only on the Greek dead, and does so in more detail and with more attention to the religious aspects of the living-dead interaction than either of the other books. She uses models developed by cultural anthropology to examine how Greek ideas about the dead changed over time in response to changing social conditions, including contacts with other cultures and the development of the polis.Johnston divides her study into three major parts. Part 1, "A Short History of the Dead in Ancient Greece," covers several aspects of the Greek view of the dead in the archaic and classical periods. First we have a brief chronological overview of the dead in Greek society from the Homeric poems to the fifth century B.C. The information is unfortunately rather scattered and uneven, and Johnston gives much of it simply as introductory material for later parts of her book: "This is a topic that I take up in depth in another chapter" (10); "As we shall see in chapter 6" (18); "This... is analyzed in depth in chapter 3" (19). This brief survey might best have been included in an introduction (there is only a short prologue), since it does not stand well on its own here and does not accomplish much overall other than to provide us with several very general conclusions: that the Greeks, like many other peoples, believed that the unburied or prematurely dead were angry with the living and could harm them; that the dead could be called up by the living to serve them; that other than this, the dead are not particularly active, at least in early Greek belief.Part 1 also includes information concerning rituals to the dead and the role of the goe\s. For this discussion Johnston takes a topical rather than chronological approach to the problem of what the Greeks believed about the dead versus what they did about the dead; "participants need not have believed in a ritual to go through its motions" (37). Johnston briefly describes the nature of rituals for and against the dead, distinguishing funerals and festivals that expressed affection from defensive rituals and festivals held out of fear, to avert the wrath of the dead. One particularly interesting section deals with the relatively recent finds of [End Page 433] the Selinuntine lex sacra, the Cyrenean inscriptions, and the rituals for the dead described thereon: both contain detailed descriptions of real aversion rituals involving the appeasement of ancestral spirits. Johnston is careful to remind the reader of the fragmentary nature of this particular evidence and at times sounds overly defensive or cautious: "although the evidence is too scant for us to be certain" (58); "its brevity makes it impossible for us to be sure" (62). Much of Johnston's argument is therefore highly hypothetical but nonetheless interesting and provocative. She concludes that the dead began to be perceived as a bigger source of problems in the late... (shrink)

It seemed to happen overnight. Not long ago, we were all watching television, and now we are watching something else. Television stations have been replaced by streaming services. Well, not quite replaced, since we still have televisions, but somehow our television screens are not quite what they were. In Netflicks: Conceptual Television in the Streaming Era Tony Hughes-d'Aeth critically considers how our viewing habits, and television shows themselves, have changed over time. This book is about television in the streaming age (...) and it considers some of the continuities that contemporary streamed shows have to other narrative forms such as classic television and classic Hollywood. Long gone are the days when we had to wait a week for the next episode of a tv show to be aired -- now we can binge-watch whole series in one sitting! ABOUT VIGNETTES Series Editors: Sarah Collins and Tony Hughes-d'Aeth The Vignettes Series from UWAP is aimed at sharing the knowledges that are emerging in the contemporary university and which that consider the complexities of modern life. Each book provides an image, or a vignette, of a particular phenomenon and how this is being thought through by intellectual practitioners in today's academy. (shrink)

This is a transcription of Jean d’Ormesson’s speech at UNESCO at the 50th anniversary celebrations of Diogenes in 2003. He describes the journal’s origins, inspirations and editors, and the unique place it occupies in the promotion of international, interdisciplinary scholarship.

Forty years of avid bicycling came to a conclusion for D. Stephen Long in early October, 2020. Fearing his own imminent death required Long to reflect on life, on its beginnings, middle, and endings. This work uses the lessons learned from cycling, and the experience of the rapid onset of illness, to discuss God, friendship, racism, sexuality, justice, virtues, vices, and much more. It offers a moral theology but one more in keeping with how we take it up--not through theories (...) but in the practices that make up everyday life. Attention to everyday life can help us live well and in so doing prepare us to die well. " -- Publisher description. (shrink)

In connection with the "Philosophy of Science" research program conducted by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft a colloquium was held in Munich from 18th to 20th May 1919. This covered basic structures of physical theories, the main emphasis being on the interrelation of space, time and mechanics. The present volume contains contributions and the results of the discussions. The papers are given here in the same order of presentation as at the meeting. The development of these "basic structures of physical theories" involved (...) diverging trends arising from different starting points in philosophy and physics. In order to obtain a clear comparison between these schools of thought, it was appropriate to concentrate discussion on geometry and chronology as the common foundation of classical and quantum mechanics. As a rather simple and "Tell prepared field of study, geochronometry seemed suited to analysing these mutually exclusive positions. vii D. Mayr and G. Sussmann (eds.), Space, Time, and Mechanics, vii. Copyright © 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The editors gratefully appreciate the sponsorship of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the cooperation of the authors and publisher. It is also a pleasure to thank Frau M.-L. Grohmann and Frau I. Thies for their organisational and especially Frau B. Grund for typing and clerical work. D. MAYR G. SUSSMANN 1982 University of Munich viii INTRODUCTION The distinct positions present at the symposium may be roughly divided into three schools that differ in their philosophical interpretation of physics and their meta-... ~. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 AN UNNOTICED ERROR IN HUME'S TREATISE "...the conformity between love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects..." Treatise, Book II, Part II, Sec. X. This passage from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is taken from the first edition of 1739. It can also be found in the Everyman Edition, the editions of Selby-Bigge Mossner, and Green and (...) Grosse, without editorial comment of any kind. Yet it contains a glaring and obvious error. The most superficial reading of Book II will convince one that it is love and pride that conform in the agreeableness of their sensation they are both indirect passions that aire pleasant in feeling. On the other hand, humility and hatred share in being disagree able or unpleasant impressions. This might have been a printer's error, or Hume's own mistake, and the reason for it is not hard to find. This part of Book II was called "Of love and hatred" ; the expression "love and hatred" recurs several times throughout the whole. In ei»ther the writing of the manuscript or the type setting of the text, a habit was established. Habit, which Hume himself used to explain so much else, must here be cited as the explanation of this slip. What is more interesting is the reason why such an obvious error has gone so long unnoticed. Here an ambiguity in Hume's use of the word "object" should be noticed. It is sometimes used simply as a synonym for "thing" and this is the usage in "excited by the same objects". Hume is merely saying that love and pride have the same sorts of cause. When this cause is found in oneself it leads to pride and when in another it leads to love. This of course is connected with the fact that both these passions are aggreeable or pleasant in sensation. 77 "Object" also has a special technical use in Book II when it refers to the person towards whom the passion is directed, as in "the object of the passion". Now love and hatred do have a similar sort of object, i.e. another person, whereas the object of pride and humility is, according to Hume, always oneself. In this usage, the object of a passion is carefully distinguished by Hume from its cause. It is possible that a careless and superficial reading of this passage might lead one to think that Hume meant to say that love and hatred agree in having the same sort of object, i.e. another person. Such inattention is to be deplored, but after all, until very recently, such inattention was typical of the attitude of philosophers towards Book II 2 as a whole. D. W. D. Owen University of Stirling 1.See for instance the previous paragraph; "I have suppos'd all along, that the passions of love and pride, and those of humility and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful." 2.Thanks are due to Mr. Roland Hall for checking the first edition on my behalf.... (shrink)

We obtain a general relativistic unification of gravitation and electromagnetism by simply(1) restricting the metric so that it admits an orthonormal tetrad representation in which the spacelike vectors are curl-free, and(2) identifying the timelike vector as the potential for an electromagnetic field whose only sources are singularities. It follows that: (A) The energy density is everywhere nonnegative, (B) the space is flat if and only if the electromagnetic field vanishes, (C) the vector potential (through which all curvature enters) admits no (...) invariant algebraic decomposition, and satisfies the covariant Lorentz condition identically, (D) the theory is free of “prior geometry,” (E) the electromagnetic self-energy of a spherically symmetric point charge equalsMC 2 , (F) particles deviate from geodesic motion according to the Lorentz force law with radiative reaction, and (G) particles with all electromagnetic multipole structures are included. (shrink)

C’est une évidence : on ne parle plus aujourd’hui d’une crise succédant à d’autres crises – et préludant à d’autres encore –, mais de « la crise », qui plus est d’une crise globale qui touche aussi bien la finance que l’éducation, la culture, le couple ou l’environnement. Ce constat témoigne d’une véritable mutation : si à l’origine le concept de krisis désignait le moment décisif dans l’évolution d’un processus incertain permettant d’énoncer le diagnostic (et donc la sortie de crise), (...) nous vivons actuellement précisément l’inverse – le moment où surgissent les incertitudes quant aux causes, aux effets, à la possibilité même d’une issue. Afin d’éclairer ce renversement, Myriam Revault d’Allonnes se penche sur le mouvement d’arrachement au passé et à la tradition qui caractérise la modernité, et qui dissout d’un même élan les anciens repères de la certitude qui balisaient la compréhension du monde. Privé de toute forme de transcendance, l’homme moderne se trouve face à un monde redoutablement ambigu et auto-référentiel, qui a vu s’évanouir tour à tour l’idée de temps nouveaux, la croyance au progrès et l’esprit de conquête, modifiant profondément le rapport de l’homme à son vécu et à ses attentes. C’est à partir de cette expérience du temps d’un nouveau genre, à la fois coupée de ses référents passés et dépourvue de lendemains qui chantent, que cet essai stimulant nous invite à reconsidérer de façon inédite la « crise » dans laquelle nous sommes plongés et à y puiser de quoi aller de l’avant. (shrink)

"L'irruption récente de la notion de "post-vérité", désignée comme mot de l'année 2016 par le dictionnaire d'Oxford, a suscité d'innombrables commentaires journalistiques, notamment sur le phénomène des fake news, mais peu de réflexions de fond. Or, cette notion ne concerne pas seulement les liens entre politique et vérité, elle brouille la distinction essentielle du vrai et du faux, portant atteinte à notre capacité à vivre ensemble dans un monde commun. En questionnant les rapports conflictuels entre politique et vérité, Myriam Revault (...) d'Allonnes déconstruit nombre d'approximations et de confusions. Elle montre que le problème majeur de la politique n'est pas celui de sa conformité à la vérité mais qu'il est lié à la constitution de l'opinion publique et à l'exercice du jugement. L'exploration du "régime de vérité" de la politique éclaire ce qui distingue fondamentalement les systèmes démocratiques, exposés en permanence à la dissolution des repères de la certitude, à la tentation du relativisme et à la transformation des "vérités de fait" en opinions, des systèmes totalitaires, où la toute-puissance de l'idéologie fabrique un monde entièrement fictif. Loin d'enrichir le monde, la "post-vérité" appauvrit l'imaginaire social et met en cause les jugements et les expériences sensibles que nous pouvons partager. Il est urgent de prendre conscience de la nature et de la portée du phénomène si nous voulons en conjurer les effets éthiques et politiques."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Le théâtre, au lendemain même de la prise de la Bastille, s'était affirmé comme tribune révolutionnaire et « école du citoyen ». La décision, de la part des assemblées révolutionnaires, de transporter les cendres de Voltaire au Panthéon, ne pouvait manquer d'être une occasion pour célébrer le philosophe au théâtre et cinq pièces, toutes sur l'Affaire Calas, furent représentées entre le 17 décembre 1790 et le 31 juillet 1791. Les cinq auteurs centrent leur action sur le drame familial et sur (...) le climat de fanatisme religieux dans lequel elle s'était déroulée. Deux mots, fanatisme et fanatique, représentent la pierre de touche et font le passage entre l'époque réelle de l'Affaire Calas et l'époque de sa représentation théâtrale . Ils recouvrent l'événement et son moment historique précis, ils constituent une notion pour laquelle les philosophes s'étaient battus et prennent la valeur d'un symbole paradigmatique que la Révolution prétendait achevé. Les pièces s'articulent selon un continuel renvoi entre le temps réel et le temps de la représentation : le passé — le temps du fanatisme et du despotisme — annonce l'avenir — l'anéantissement de l'un et de l'autre — qui est le présent des spectateurs.The morning after the fall of the Bastille, theatre imposed itself as both a revolutionary pulpit and an "école du citoyen" . The revolutionary assemblies' decision to transfer Voltaire's ashes to the Panthéon was the occasion to celebrate the philosopher at the theatre : five plays, all regarding the Affaire Calas, where offered to the public between 17 December 1790 and 3 July 1791. All five authors based their plays on both the family drama and on the climate of religious fanaticism in which the former occurred. Fanaticism and fanatic are the words which act as the touchtone and which allow the transition from the historical period which is that of the Affaire Calas to its presentation on the stage . The plays acquire structure through constant cross-reference opposing the historical period and the time of the dramatic representation : the past, a time of fanaticism and despotism, foreshadows the abolishment of both in the future; that is, the spectator's present. (shrink)

L'essai de Piaget est de ceux qu'on ne peut négliger, car il pose en termes lucides et incisifs l'un des problèmes essentiels de la philosophie. Ses conclusions sont nettes, et il faudra bien que l'on prenne position à leur égard. Il nous semble pourtant que l'on pourrait discerner dans ses propos deux conclusions distinctes, et qu'il ne serait dès lors pas impossible d'en accepter l'une sans pour autant souscrire à l'autre. La séparation des deux thèmes devrait en tout cas clarifier (...) le problème, et permettre une assimilation plus aisée du contenu complexe et tourmenté de cette œuvre profondément engagée. (shrink)

In recent years, the starting-dates of both the Historiae and the Annales of Tacitus have been criticized. In the case of the Historiae, Hainsworth has claimed that Tacitus chose to start his narrative with the events of A.D. 69, because for various reasons the events of A.D. 68 were an embarrassment to him. Syme has suggested, in the case of the Annales, that by starting with the accession of Tiberius, Tacitus has barred himself from a proper understanding of that principate.

Commentaire sur les Sentences de Pierre le Lombard (Selections) -- Commentaire de douze livres de la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Selection) -- Commentaire des dix livres de l'Éthique à Nicomaque d'Aristote (Selections) -- Commentaire des huit livres de la Politique d'Aristote, ou Traité de la vie civile (Selections) -- Commentaires de l'Écriture. Sur Mt 20, 24-26 ; Mt 22, 15-22 ; Rm 13, 1-7 ; Jn 8, 3-11.

What happened in the aftermath of Caligula's assassination in January A.d. 41 in relation to the client kings of the period has been the subject of a stimulating note by A. A. Barrett. He has argued that a rescission of Caligula's acta invalidated the legal position of the client kings appointed by Caligula, and that Claudius’ regularising of their position has been misunderstood by the ancient literary sources and has given rise to several apparent inconsistencies in their accounts.

The importance of this book, which appeared in the original German in 1969 under the title Zur Sache des Denkens, 743), is attested to by the rapidity with which it has been translated into English. The title of the English translation is that of the lead essay, the highly celebrated lecture which Heidegger gave in 1962 and which bears the same title as the never published "third division" of the "first half" of Being and Time. This lecture is perhaps the (...) most significant document to be added to the Heideggerian corpus since the Letter on Humanism. It is of course dramatically different from Being and Time and so cannot be regarded as a "continuation of the text of Being and Time." "Time and Being" thematizes the central notion of Heidegger’s later work, "Das Eregignis," [[sic]] translated happily by Miss Stambaugh as "Event of Appropriation". The "Event of Appropriation" is the "It" which "gives" Being and time in the sequence of epochs which constitute the history of Western metaphysics. The lecture is followed by an instructive "seminar" conducted by Heidegger on the text of "Time and Being." There is found here also a penetrating essay entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," as well as a fascinating piece of autobiography entitled "My Way in Phenomenology." Miss Stambaugh’s translation is superb, something readers of the "Heidegger, Works" series which she edits with J. Glenn Garay have become accustomed to.—J. D. C. (shrink)

Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache is one of his most important books and this English translation is a timely addition to the English edition of his "Works." No other single topic is of more interest to the current commentators on Heidegger than that of language. There is a growing sense of a kinship between Heidegger and Wittgenstein and an increasing number of efforts to link continental and Anglo-American thought more closely together--all of which should be stimulated by the appearance of this (...) translation. The work is also interesting from another perspective. The central document in the attempt to relate Heidegger to the East is found in this work in the opening dialogue between Heidegger and Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo about the nature of the experience of language in the East and in Western "metaphysical" Europe. The other essays, particularly "The Way to Language," offer an excellent presentation of the later Heidegger's general view of language. Original language itself, according to Heidegger, is Being and it is this which stirs man into speaking. Human utterance is the revelation or expression of Being rather than, as in the traditional view, a representation or "picture" of "objects" symbolized by sounds or words. If man is "open" to Being then Being will find in language its "house"--implying thereby that the dimensions of the house are the limits of the revealability [[sic]] of Being. Human utterance is "closed off" from "original language" insofar as "Logos" is reduced to "logistics," that is, insofar as all other talk than the mathematico-logical talk of the age of Technik is dismissed as belonging to "unreason." The translation itself is well-done. The Editors of the "Works," in consultation with Heidegger, have chosen to omit the first essay in the 1959 German original in order to publish it in another volume yet to appear. The translators have supplied us with no index, only a few footnotes, explaining their decisions, no "Introduction," no bibliography--all of which can only be regretted.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This book is a sort of junior search for the historical Jesus. The authoress throws in a dash of dialectic by interlarding the cursory text with questions for the reader. The presentation of complex exegetical and theological problems is so oversimplified that this book should prove equally embarrassing for both the liberals and the orthodox.—D. J. B.

An appropriate kind of curved Hilbert space is developed in such a manner that it admits operators of $\mathcal{C}$ - and $\mathfrak{D}$ -differentiation, which are the analogues of the familiar covariant and D-differentiation available in a manifold. These tools are then employed to shed light on the space-time structure of Quantum Mechanics, from the points of view of the Feynman ‘path integral’ and of canonical quantisation. (The latter contains, as a special case, quantisation in arbitrary curvilinear coordinates when space is (...) flat.) The influence of curvature is emphasised throughout, with an illustration provided by the Aharonov-Bohm effect. (shrink)

Five essays of which two deserve special mention: Edward Ballard's survey and interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity in Husserl, showing Husserl's place in the heritage of Kant, and a critical presentation by Andrew Reck of the social philosophy of Elijah Jordan. The other essays are: "The Impact of Science on Society," by James K. Feibleman; "The Social Import of Empiricism," by Paul G. Morison; and "The Case for Sociocracy," by Robert C. Whittemore. Careless printing proves distracting.--C. D.

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Complete works of Maṇḍanamiśra, Indian philosopher; includes study on his work also.

K. T. Fann, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the man and his philosophy. New Jersey, Humanities Press; Sussex, Harvester Press: 1967. 415 pp. 10.50.Gerd Brand, The central texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Translated and with an introduction by Robert E. Innis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. xxv + 182 pp. £ 10.00 /£3.95.Joseph Warren Dauben. Georg Cantor: his mathematics and philosophy of the infinite. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979. xiii + 404 pp., 4 plts. $25 US.S. Poggi, I sistemi dell'esperienza. Psicologia, logica (...) e teoria della scienza da Kant a Wundt. Bologna: il Mulino, 1977.679 pp., Lit. 12.000.Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds. An introduction to logic and its philosophy. Indianapolis and New York; Hackett Publishing Company: Oxford; Blackwell: 1979. xxi + 391 pp. £15.00 /£4.95.S. Haack, Philosophy of logics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. xiv + 276 pp. £ 13.50.F. J. Pelletier, Mass terms: some philosophicalproblems. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Reidel, 1979. xiii + 303 pp. Dfl. 70/$34.00.Theo A. F. Kuipers, Studies in inductive probability and rational expectation. Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, USA.: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978. xii + 145 pp. Dfl. 50/$22.50. (shrink)

This is a standard selection of readings taken from Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and James. The introduction and commentary are not sufficient to distinguish this anthology from similar introductions—D. J. B.