The present book comprises thirteen chapters written by Nordic scholars in the human and social sciences, and developed out of conference papers presented at regular winter and summer symposia held by two research groups emanating from the Nordic Summer University. Born within and informed by this specific milieu, the chapters address significant sociopolitical implications for contemporary societies emerging from the ethical reflections of leading 20th century thinkers (e.g. Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas), important procedural as well as substantive aspects of (...) democracy, and pivotal ethico-political issues arising from the abstract logic and concrete manifestations of market economies. Though by no means devoid of their own economic, cultural and political problems, the Nordic countries are still paramount examples of humane prosperity, democratic civility, environmentally sound policy, and peaceful resolution of social and industrial conflicts. Year after year, if not decade after decade, they keep topping the international charts for socio-economic indicators about sostainable development, healthcare quality and accessibility, educational levels, crime control, preceived happiness and much else. As such, the scholarly and scientific reflections orginating within the Nordic Summer University might prove to be useful sources of insight for policy-makers, intellectuals and interested persons outside the Nordic context, and not solely inside it. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with constraints on the interpretation of pronominal anaphora, in particular Condition B effects. It aims to contribute to a particular approach, initiated by Reinhart (Anaphora and semantic interpretation, 1983) and further developed elsewhere. It proposes a modification of Reinhart’s Interface Rule, and argues that the resulting theory compares favorably with others, while being compatible with independently motivated general hypotheses about the interaction between different interpretive mechanisms.

This is the 1991 (2nd) edition of the 1986 book (MIT Press), considered to be the classic defense of Millianism. The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob (...) Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it’s impossible for there to be a single universal theory of meaning for a language. First, I will consider some minimal expressiveness requirements a language must meet to be able to express semantic claims. Then I will argue that in order to have a single unified theory of meaning, these expressiveness requirements must be satisfied by a language which the semantic theory itself applies to. That is, we would need a language which can express (...) its own meaning. It has been well-known since Tarski that theories of meaning whose central notion is truth can’t be expressed in a language which they apply to. Here, I develop Quine’s formulation of the Liar Paradox in grammatical terms and use this to extend Tarski’s result to all theories of meaning. This general version of the paradox can be formalised as a special case of the Lawvere Fixed-Point Theorem applied to a categorial grammar. Taken together with the initial arguments, I infer that a universal theory of meaning is impossible and conclude the paper with a brief discussion on what alternatives are available. (shrink)

This book argues that according to Metaphysics Zeta, substantial forms constitute substantial being in the sensible world, and individual composites make up the basic constituents that possess this kind of being. The study explains why Aristotle provides a reexamination of substance after the Categories, Physics, and De Anima, and highlights the contribution Z is meant to make to the science of being. Norman O. Dahl argues that Z.1-11 leaves both substantial forms and individual composites as candidates for basic constituents, with (...) Z.12 being something that can be set aside. He explains that although the main focus of Z.13-16 is to argue against a Platonic view that takes universals to be basic constituents, some of its arguments commit Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents, with Z.17’s taking substantial form to constitute substantial being is compatible with that commitment.. (shrink)

Written by the preeminent democratic theorist of our time, this book explains the nature, value, and mechanics of democracy. This new edition includes two additional chapters by Ian Shapiro, Dahl’s successor as Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale and a leading contemporary authority on democracy. One chapter deals with the prospects for democracy in light of developments since the advent of the Arab spring in 2010. The other takes up the effects of inequality and money in politics on (...) the quality of democracy, a subject that was of increasing concern to Dahl in his final years. “The late Robert Dahl’s _On Democracy_ is _the_ source for how to govern democratically. Following the methods and channeling the insight of Dahl, Ian Shapiro’s new edition completes Dahl’s project and is must reading for the next generation and essential re-reading for the present.”—Michael Doyle, Columbia University “Dahl’s tersest summary of the lessons of his profoundly influential interrogation of democracy’s strengths and weaknesses. Ian Shapiro shows forcefully what we have learned since its initial publication.”—John Dunn, author of _Breaking Democracy’s Spell_ “Robert A. Dahl’s _On Democracy_ admirably synthesized the contributions of the world’s leading democratic theorist of the twentieth century. Now Ian Shapiro intelligently carries Dahl’s queries and concerns into our own century.”—Robert D. Putnam, author of _Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis_. (shrink)

Some fundamental aspects of the lived body only become evident when it breaks down through illness, weakness or pain. From a phenomenological point of view, various breakdowns are worth analyzing for their own sake, and discussing them also opens up overlooked dimensions of our bodily constitution. This book brings together different approaches that shed light on the phenomenology of the lived body—its normality and abnormality, health and sickness, its activity as well as its passivity. The contributors integrate phenomenological insights with (...) discussions about bodily brokenness in philosophy, theology, medical science and literary theory. Phenomenology of the Broken Body demonstrates how the broken body sheds fresh light on the nuances of embodied experience in ordinary life and ultimately questions phenomenology’s preunderstanding of the body. (shrink)

In her paper, The case for physician assisted suicide: not proven, Bonnie Steinbock argues that the experience with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act fails to demonstrate that the benefits of legalising physician assisted suicide outweigh its risks. Given that her verdict is based on a small number of highly controversial cases that will most likely occur under any regime of legally implemented safeguards, she renders it virtually impossible to prove the case for physician assisted suicide. In this brief paper, we (...) suggest some ways that may enable us to weigh the risks and benefits of legalisation more fairly and, hopefully, allow us to close the case for physician assisted suicide. (shrink)

In a recent comment on the HFEA’s public consultation on sex selection, Soren Holm claimed that proponents of family balancing are committed to embrace a laissez faire approach. Given that arguments in support of sex selection for family balancing also support sex selection for other social reasons, advocates of family balancing, he asserts, are simply inconsistent when calling for a limit on access to sex selection. In this paper, I argue that proponents of family balancing are in no way inconsistent. (...) Provided their advocacy of family balancing is aimed at preventing a severe distortion of the natural sex ratio, they are entirely justified in insisting on restrictions to sex selection. The real question is whether a concern for the sex ratio does indeed call for a limit on sex selection. Based on a recent survey on gender preferences and data from several Gender Clinics, I argue that a restriction on sex selection to family balancing is unwarranted. In the absence of any evidence for a pending sex ratio distortion, we are actually required to adopt a laissez faire approach to sex selection. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.

Emotional action and communication are integral to the development of morality, here conceptualized as our concerns for the well-being of other people and the ability to act on those concerns. Focusing on the second year of life, this article suggests a number of ways in which young children’s emotions and caregivers’ emotional communication contribute to early forms of helping, empathy, and learning about prohibitions. We argue for distinguishing between moral issues and other normative issues also in the study of early (...) moral development, for considering a wider range of emotional phenomena than the “moral emotions” most commonly studied, and for paying more attention to how specific characteristics of early emotional interactions facilitate children’s development of a concern for others. (shrink)

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas (...) respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain. (shrink)

L’article aborde le rôle de l’intellectuel dans la société moderne par rapport à l’engagement activiste de la recherche. Un groupe de recherche de l’Université de Roskilde au Danemark constitué par Jacob Dahl Rendtorff et Sandra Frost, en collaboration avec Reidar Due de l’Université d’Oxford, vient d’obtenir une subvention de la Fondation danoise pour la recherche indépendante afin d’effectuer des recherches sur « L’éthique et la politique de la libre pensée. Le rôle de l’intellectuel public ». Ce projet doit être considéré (...) dans un contexte de discussion croissante sur le rôle du chercheur dans la société, qui s’accompagne d’une étude approfondie de l’intellectuel public au sein des sociétés démocratiques. (shrink)

The American philosopher Stanley Cavell is a secular Jew who by his own admission is obsessed with Christ, yet his outlook on religion in general is ambiguous. Probing the secular and the sacred in Cavell’s thought, Espen Dahl explains that Cavell, while often parting ways with Christianity, cannot dismiss it either. Focusing on Cavell's work as a whole, but especially on his recent engagement with Continental philosophy, Dahl brings out important themes in Cavell’s philosophy and his conversation with theology.

In a time when worlds, communities and subjects are increasingly presented as ‘vulnerable’, much remains to be said about the distinctly feminine shapes of ‘vulnerability’; weakness, softness, permeability, a sense of being affected, imprinted upon, or entered and shattered. While this presumed vulnerability of the feminine body has often been the basis of feminist sexual politics, feminist goals of autonomy often presume an internal and external undoing of vulnerability as such. Drawing on ethnographic research with queer femmes and building on (...) Sara Ahmed’s (2004a) idea that vulnerability is a ‘particular kind of bodily relation to the world’, this experimental article challenges the popularised idea that to queer femininity requires action, intention, agency and strength. Extending the work of femme authors Dorothy Allison and Ann Cvetkovich, the article considers the cracks in such femme politics, and focuses on how femme feelings of vulnerability take shape and figure in movements, and become what sticks between femme bodies of flesh and knowledge. Attending to the sensuous canvas of skin, to high-heeled movement and desire for both sex and sisterhood, these are notes on the work of affect in what is here called femmebodiment towards a somatechnical understanding of femininity. (shrink)

While there is no shortage of philosophical and theological occupations with the problem of evil and theodicy, the phenomenological basis from which the problem arises often gets lost in abstract accounts. In delimiting the case to physical pain, this article attempts to provide a perspective on the problem of evil following the lead from one of the problem’s sources. Through a phenomenological analysis of pain, the article highlights the inner tension that belongs to the experience of pain. This contradiction can (...) be traced on various levels: pain as sensational impression, as bodily occurrence, and as posing a question of meaning. This phenomenology of pain can provide a perspective on the origin and nature of the problem of evil: both why intellectual responses must arise and why it cannot reach an adequate solution. (shrink)

But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...) them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind;but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. (shrink)

Academic cheating, a common and consequential form of dishonesty, has puzzled moral psychologists and educators for decades. The present research examined a new theoretical approach to the perceptions, evaluations, and motivations that shape students’ decisions to cheat. We tested key predictions of this approach by systematically examining students’ accounts of their own cheating. In two studies, we interviewed undergraduates in psychology (n = 68) and engineering (n = 123) classes about their past experiences with plagiarism or other cheating. Interviews assessed (...) students’ perceptions of whether they were cheating, their evaluations of whether their actions were okay, and their motivations for doing what they did. Most students did not initially recognize their acts as cheating. While students generally thought cheating was wrong, they often judged the exceptional cases in which they cheated to be acceptable, citing concerns such as assignment goals and task feasibility. The findings suggest that perceptions, evaluations, and competing motivations play a key role in students’ decisions to cheat. (shrink)

A perceptive and reflective state? Such a state might not exist yet, but it refers to an ideal for state-provided care which can protect both the caregiver and recipient of care from emotional overload and indifference. Such an ideal introduces new lines of enquiry to contemporary theories of care and their sociological orientation. It is argued that theories of care need to be combined with insights from political science concerning power and dilemmas within care. Dilemmas within state-provided care which might (...) temporarily be overcome through an application of an interactive universalism such as more generally advocated by the Turkish-American feminist philosopher Seyla Benhabib. Interactive universalism implies a shift of perspective, a kind of hypothetical moral dialogue, which would bring a stronger element of reflection into caring practices in the welfare state. However, interactive universalism presupposes empathy understood as a kind of emotional attention to the other. If implemented this ideal will introduce a new form of authority: more compassionate and bodily oriented. (shrink)

At the heart of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of religion one discovers a commitment to the diversity of religious expression. This commitment is grounded in his understanding of the linguistic and temporal conditions of religious phenomena. By exploring his contribution to the debate concerning the so-called ‘theological turn’ in French phenomenology in relation to his studies of translation, this essay explores Ricoeur’s understanding of religious phenomenality where meaning is experienced as the simultaneous advance and withdrawal of an originary event in (...) the traces of its interpretations. With such an understanding of religious phenomenality, the way is opened for philosophy of religion to advance a more robust consideration of religious diversity and, therefore, to reconsider notions of universality better suited to the things themselves. (shrink)

The first part of the article examines how Augustine’s notion of the everyday is mediated by his mystical ascensions, which give him the sense of height against which everydayness appears as oriented downward or fallen. These are the coordinates that make up the fundamental verticality of Augustine’s view. Heidegger’s understanding of everydayness was influenced by Augustine, particularly its inherent tendency to fall. In the article’s second part, it is argued that Heidegger explicitly avoids all references to metaphysical or religious heights. (...) For his reason, his notion of falling appears problematic as it both invokes and abandons verticality. Arguably, Heidegger’s turning from verticality to horizontality comes with a cost, as it must renounce the possibility of conceiving the radicality of the fall from a perspective from above. However, as the article’s final part shows, Heidegger and Augustine do not only provide a view of everydayness as falling, but they both share the conviction that there is more to it: Heidegger speaks of the enigmas rooted in everydayness itself, which, however, do not point above, but toward its overlooked sense of Being; Augustine invokes ordinary events as traces of wonder that point from the lowly up to the transcendence of God. (shrink)

This article examines a historical work which depicts the history of women and the women’s movement in Sweden, written in 1933 by Swedish historian Lydia Wahlström. Through the theoretical concept of the modern time regime, this article reveals how modern time-structures were integral to Wahlström’s conception of women’s history and the manner in which she constructed the historical development of women’s collective identity. In Wahlström’s work, women as a category for historical analysis harboured facets which shifted during the course of (...) time at multiple durations. However, the category itself acquired a fixed or eternal status, by which it was placed beyond or outside historical time and modern development. In this sense, the time-structure of Wahlström’s category exhibits similarities with the sex/ gender distinction that emerges within feminist historiography in 1970. Through the exposition of this finding, the article seeks to demonstrate how theories of temporality can serve to enforce a critical analysis of feminist historiography. In the specific case of Wahlström’s text, this particular finding also subscribes to the historisation of the sex/gender distinction within feminist historiography. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, the continental phenomenological tradition has been marked by what has been termed “the theological turn.” Major figures such as Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Lacoste have moved beyond the restrictions of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology and have opened up phenomenology to distinctly theological themes. But such a “turn” has not been uncontested. The relation between phenomenology and theology has been at the heart of the discussion, raising the question of what constitutes philosophical description, as well as (...) of theology’s possible claim on phenomenology.Felix Ó Murchadha’s book, A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night, situates itself within this discussion and does not hesitate to take sides. Indeed, Ó Murchadha has written a remarkable contribution to the ongoing debate, advocating the possibility of a distinctly Christian phenomenology. Far from confining himself to a commentary on key contributions to the recent debate, Murchadha’s. (shrink)

SummaryThis article has been concerned with the possibilities and limitations in two different approaches to general revelation prevalent in current philosophy of religion. Werner Jeanrond follows Rahner in his emphasis of experience in encountering revelation, but he wants to supplement Rahner's contribution with critical resources found in Paul Ricœur's hermeneutics. This suggestion, however, calls for a more thorough investigation of the relation between experience and interpretation, phenomenology and hermeneutics with regard to revelation. Ricœur's own accounts of revelation focus on readers' (...) encounters with sacred texts. As it turns out, such focus is not one among many in Ricœur's accounts of the revelation, but rather their very paradigm. When turning to Ricœur's treatment of phenomenology it becomes clear that Ricœur firmly rejects any phenomenological appeal to immediate experience; every experience must be mediated by language, speech, and subjected to interpretation. What is lost when hermeneutics assimilates phenomenology in this way, is the sensibility to the transcendence or foreignness inherent in general revelations. Such experience of foreignness is not understood as Levinas' excessivealterity, which Ricœur rightly discards, but rather a foreignness found in the middle of everyday familiarity. In order to offer an adequate philosophical response to such understanding of revelation, this article argues that the autonomy of phenomenology over against hermeneutics must be granted.ZusammenfassungDieser Artikel behandelt die Möglichkeiten und Begrenzungen zweier unterschiedlicher, in der gegenwärtigen Religionsphilosophie vorherrschender Annäherungen an allgemeine Offenbarung. Werner Jeanrond folgt Rahner in dessen Gewichtung der Erfahrung in der Begegnung mit Offenbarung, möchte aber den Beitrag Rahners kritisch mit Elementen aus der Hermeneutik Paul Ricœurs ergänzen. Sein Vorschlag verlangt jedoch nach einer vollständigeren Untersuchung der Beziehung zwischen Erfahrung und Interpretation, zwischen Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik in Bezug auf Offenbarung. Ricœurs eigene Konzepte von Offenbarung konzentrieren sich auf die Begegnungen der Leser mit heiligen Texten. Wie es sich zeigt, kommt diesem Fokus in Ricœurs Darstellungen von Offenbarung ein nicht etwa beiläufiger, sondern geradezu paradigmatischer Status zu. An Ricœurs Behandlung der Phänomenologie wird deutlich, daß Ricœur jede phänomenologische Behauptung einer unmittelbaren Erfahrung nachdrücklich abweist; alle Erfahrung ist durch Sprache, Rede und subjektive Deutung vermittelt. Eine derartige Assimilierung der Phänomenologie durch die Hermeneutik verliert allerdings die Sensibilität der Transzendenz oder Fremdheit gegenüber, die der allgemeinen Offenbarung zueigen ist. Die erfahrene Fremdheit ist dabei nicht als Levinas'sche exzessive Alterität zu verstehen, die Ricœur zu Recht verwirft, sondern eher als Fremdheit, die in der Mitte der Alltagsvertrautheit erfahrbar ist. Für eine adäquate philosophische Untermauerung dieses Verständnisses von allgemeiner Offenbarung als Erfahrung des Fremden im Vertrauten ist es dann allerdings zwingend, die Autonomie der Phänomenologie gegenüber der Hermeneutik zu gewährleisten. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics Z 6: The Pale Man ArgumentNorman O. Dahlin general Aristotle’s account of substance in the Categories is clear. Primary substances, the basic constitutents of the world, are independently existing individuals, paradigm examples of which are particular living organisms. However, the later use to which Aristotle puts matter and form provides him with two new candidates for primary substance.1 A (...) reconsideration of substance is in order, and Aristotle begins it in Metaphysics Z. The status of matter soon becomes clear. It can’t be substance because it isn’t a “this” and separate (Z 3, 1029a26–28). The status of form, however, is another story. Aristotle argues in Z 6 that substances are the same as their essences. While the evidence isn’t unequivocal, Z 4, 10, 11, and 15 take essence to be form, where form is universal. Z 13, however, argues that no universal is substance. Aristotle thus appears caught in an inconsistency. Substance is universal form because it is the same as universal form; however, no universal is substance. This and other problems have led to as wide a variety of interpretations of Metaphysics Z as one will find of any philosophical text. Virtually all of them end up attributing to Aristotle one of [End Page 1] three views about substance—substances are universal forms, particular forms, or composites of matter and form.2This paper takes a first step in a project that promises to remove the above inconsistency while allowing but not requiring Aristotle to take concrete particular substances (composite substances involving both matter and form) to be substances. The project looks at the first of the three claims that lead to the above apparent inconsistency and asks whether the sameness relation in it should be understood as identity or a weaker relation that could hold between concrete particular substances and their universal essences. It is the latter possibility that promises to avoid the above contradiction. If concrete particular substances can be the same as their universal essences, then the essences of substances can be universals without necessarily turning substances into universals. Nevertheless, granting this possibility wouldn’t require Aristotle to take concrete particular substances to be substances. Forms of concrete particular substances will also be the same as their essences in this weaker sameness relation, and considerations other than those at work in Z 6 could still lead Aristotle to rule out concrete individuals as substances.1Although Aristotle has standardly been interpreted as arguing in Z 6 that substances are identical with their essences,3 two considerations allow the question of this paper to be raised. [End Page 2]The first is the variety of uses to which Aristotle puts such notions as the same (tauto) or one (hen). Aristotle’s concern in Z 6 is with whether certain things are or are not the same (tauto), one (hen), or one and the same (hen kai auto and to auto kai hen) as their essences.4 He argues that kata sumbebēkos legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to an accident) are not the same as their essences, but that kath’ hauta legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to themselves), a class of things that includes substances,5 are the same as their essences. However, when Aristotle says that one thing and another are the same or one, there is more than one kind of claim he can be making. Some of them apply to things that are identical; others do not.For example, things can be the same in number, species, and genus. A doublet and a cloak are the same in number, a man and another man are the same in species, and a man and a horse are the same in genus.6 Although a doublet and a cloak are identical, a man and another man, and a man and a horse, are not.Things can also be accidentally the same, or the same in definition, substance, or essence,7 where these two ways of being the same cut across the previous ways of being the same. For example... (shrink)

Pax genes are a family of development control genes that encode nuclear transcription factors. They are characterized by the presence of the paired domain, a conserved amino acid motif with DNA‐binding activity. Originally, paired‐box‐containing genes were detected in Drosophila malenogaster, where they exert multiple functions during embryogenesis. In vertebrates, Pax genes are also involved in embryogenesis. Mutations in four out of nine characterized Pax genes have been associated with either congenital human diseases such as Waardenburg syndrome (PAX3), Aniridia (PAX6), Peter's (...) anomaly (PAX6), renal coloboma syndrome (PAX2), Small eye (Pax6), (Pax21Neu), which all show defects in development. Recently, analysis of spontaneous and transgenic mouse mutants has revealed that vertebrate Pax genes are key regulators during organogenesis of kidney, eye, ear, nose, limb muscles, vertebral column and brain. Like their Drosophila counterparts, vertebrate Pax genes are involved in pattern formation during embryogenesis, possibly by determiing the time and place of organ initiation of morphogenesis. For most tissues, however, the nature of the primary development action of Pax transcription factors remains to be elucidated. One predominant theme is signal transduction during tissue interactions, which may lead to a position‐specific regulation of cell proliferation. (shrink)

This article discusses the importance of geopolitical specificity in discussions about waves in feminism and investigates the queer potential of Marilyn Frye's second-wave work on sexism and white supremacy. It argues that Frye's understanding of sexism relies on the figure of the genderqueer individual and that Frye's critique of reproductive heterosexuality has implications for analyses of both sexism and racism. Finally, it asks what would happen to the contemporary #metoo movement in Sweden if it returned to Frye's radical lesbian feminism (...) as emblematic of the second wave, rather than to the figure of the white, middle-class, heterosexual woman. (shrink)

Despite the divide between American formalism and theoreticians of minimalism, Barnett Newman’s art received great acclaim from both schools of thought. Attempting to unearth the philosophical preconditions of this strange constellation, this article argues that the closeness between minimalism and formalism is due to their mutual reliance upon phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy. However, their proximity also conveys their distance, since they imply different interpretations and applications of the philosophical schools in question. Such theoretical differences shed light on Newman’s paintings: (...) both minimalism and formalism are right in their accounts – yet not exclusively so. What arguably makes up the distinctive fascination of Newman’s paintings is their incessant oscillation between empty physicality and powerful meaning. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss some ethical issues in the internet encounter between customer and bank. Empirical data related to the difficulties that customers have when they deal with the bank through internet technology and electronic banking. The authors discuss the difficulties that customers expressed from an ethical standpoint.Design/methodology/approachThe key problem of the paper is “how does research handle the user's lack of competence in a web‐based commercial environment?” The authors illustrate this ethical dilemma with data from (...) a Danish Bank collected in 2002. The data have been structured by an advanced text analytic method, Pertex.FindingsThe authors can conclude that the experience of lack of competency in internet banking implies a severe damage on the experience of the ethics of the good life and of the respect for the basic ethical principles of customer autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability. However, increased experience of competency may imply experience of increased feeling of ethical superiority and of the good life among customers.Research limitations/implicationsThe important implication for managerial research of this study would be for banks to focus on customer competency with an ethical concern instead of only being concerned with technical solutions for effective internet operations.Practical implicationsSince more and more businesses are digitally based, the authors can foresee a potential generic problem of lack of competence for certain age groups and also of people from different social groups.Originality/valueThe paper provides an analysis of the ethics of on‐line banking on the basis of Pertex methodology and with the use of basic ethical principles of autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability. (shrink)

Summary Husserl’s notion of horizon plays a decisive role in his phenomenological analysis of perception. It is nevertheless striking that prominent philosophers of the “theological turn” in phenomenology, such as Levinas and Marion, attach no religious significance to the phenomenological horizon; on the contrary, they tend to regard the horizon as an obstacle to the experience of the religious. This article argues, however, that if divinity is somehow implied in the proximity of things and yet stretches out to the most (...) remote, horizontality neatly captures the divine givenness. Far from imposing restrictions on experience, the horizon opens the possibility for meaningful experience in the first place; and far from being closed in on itself, the horizon remains inherently open to revision and change. Moreover, the horizon unfolds according to a double movement of what can be called its humility and its generosity: it withdraws from the actual presence of intentional objects in order for such objects to emerge. Arguably, revelation does not cancel the non-objective givenness of the horizon, but reveals the divine horizontality by enacting its double movement: Christ is driven out of the world in order to save it. (shrink)

One staple of living in our information society is having access to the web. Web-connected devices interpret our queries and retrieve information from the web in response. Today’s web devices even purport to answer our queries directly without requiring us to comb through search results in order to find the information we want. How do we know whether a web device is trustworthy? One way to know is to learn why the device is trustworthy by inspecting its inner workings, 156–170 (...) 1995; Humphreys 2004, Episteme, 6, 221–229 2009). But ordinary users of web devices cannot inspect their inner workings because of their scale, complexity, and the corporate secrecy which enshrouds both the procedures by which the devices operate and the companies that make them. Further piling on this predicament, authors have criticized web technology on the grounds that the invisibility of the web devices’ inner workings prevents users from critically assessing the procedures that produce a given output, in some cases, barring users from fulfilling their epistemic responsibilities, 343–355 2010; Miller and Record Episteme, 10, 117–134 2013). I consider four broad kinds of reasons which we can acquire without inspecting the inner workings of black-boxed technology: individual understanding, expert testimony, testing through experience, and social vetting; and show how each is a viable method of appraising black-boxed technology. By deploying these methods, we can remain responsible inquirers while nonetheless benefitting from today’s epistemic resources on the web. (shrink)

In _Plato on Democracy and Political technē_ Anders Dahl Sørensen offers an in-depth investigation of Plato’s discussions of democracy’s ‘epistemic potential’, arguing that this question is far more central to his political thought than is usually assumed.

I argue that the act-based accounts of propositions, like the one defended by Soames, cannot be used to address Frege’s Puzzle without also giving up the Millian view of names. I begin by identifying two puzzles—both of which have been called Frege’s puzzle—and discuss the act-based theorist’s solution to the first puzzle. I then raise an objection against the solution and argue that it cannot be overcome unless a concession is made. Making the concession, however, would make (...) it impossible for the act-based theorist to solve the second puzzle. I further argue that any attempt to solve the puzzle while also maintaining a commitment to the Millian view will force such theoretical commitments on the act-based theorist which seriously undermine the scope and motivation of the act-based approaches. Thus, any solution to Frege’s puzzle on the act-based account is bound to conflict with the Millian view of names. (shrink)

Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not (...) wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay. (shrink)

This article argues that Cavell's key concept of acknowledgement is of great theological significance. Acknowledgement is meant as a particular interpretation of knowledge, which emphasises the personal responsiveness and responsibility to the human other and to the world. As Cavell himself indicates, acknowledgement also overlaps with faith. However, what such acknowledgement of God amounts to, is not yet satisfactorily understood in the growing literature on Cavell. This article argues that Cavell's treatment of confessions (Augustine, Wittgenstein) and acceptance of promise (Luther) (...) provides important clues to a more elaborate understanding of acknowledgement in general, and of acknowledging God in particular. (shrink)

The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.

Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.

A traditional argument is often used against Mill's theory of names (the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent). Mill's theory implies transparency of proper names (coreferring proper names are substitutable salva veritate); but examples like Frege's and Quine's show that proper names are not transparent in belief contexts. This could be thought to be a reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory. In " A puzzle about Belief" (1979; 1988) Kripke builds up an argument which aims to (...) show that the same problems, given by the principle of transparency of proper names, can also be generated without the use of that principle, but with some weaker and more general principles, which seem to be difficult to reject. (see Donellan) Therefore, the traditional argument against Mill's theory does not work. If you want to reject Mill's theory with some reductio ad absurdum, you should reject two very intuitive and apparently valid principles. The well known puzzle is based on the assumption that our speaker is normal non omniscient, sincere, reflective and not conceptually confused. The two principles used are the Disquotational Principle (DP) and the Translation Principle (TP). (shrink)