The purpose of this paper is to e»tahlish some connections between precedent-based reasoning as it is studied in the field of Artificial Intelligence and Law, particularly in the work of Ashley, and two other fields: deontic logic and nonmonotonic logic. First, a deontic logic is described that allows lor sensible reasoning in the presence of conflicting norms. Second, a simplified version of Ashley's account of precedent-based reasoning is reformulated within the framework of this deontic logic. Finally, some (...) ideas from the theory of nonmonotonic inheritance are employed to show how Ashley's account might be elaborated to allow for a richer representation of the process of argumentation. (shrink)

Computational models of legal precedent-based reasoning developed in AI and Law are typically based on the simplifying assumption that the background set of precedent cases is consistent. Besides being unrealistic in the legal domain, this assumption is problematic for recent promising applications of these models to the development of explainable AI methods. In this paper I explore a model of legal precedent-based reasoning that, unlike existing models, does not rely on the assumption that the background set of precedent cases is (...) consistent. The model is a generalization of the reason model of precedential constraint. I first show that the model supports an interesting deontic logic, where consistent obligations can be derived from inconsistent case bases. I then provide an explanation of this surprising result by proposing a reformulation of the model in terms of cases that support a new potential decision and cases that conflict with it. Finally, I show that the reformulation of the model allows us to verify that inconsistent case bases do not make verification that a decision is permissible substantially more complex than consistent case bases and to introduce intuitive criteria to compare different permissible decisions. (shrink)

Taking a Darwinian approach, we propose that people reason to detect free-riders on the Wason Selection task with the sharing-rule; If one receives the resource, one is an in-group member (standard), or If one is an in-group member, one receives the resource (switched). As predicted, taking the resource-provider's perspective, both undergraduates and children (11 to 12 years old) checked for the existence of out-group members taking undeserved resource. Changing the perspective to that of the resource-recipient did not alter the selection (...) pattern in undergraduates, although the prediction was that another type of free-riding -failure to share by resource-provider- would be checked as well. However, by removing confounding factors in the materials, both undergraduates and children checked for both types of free-riding, which fully supports the prediction. These results indicate that the sharing-rule elicits a thematic content effect that cannot be explained by preceding deontic reasoning theories. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are, in some sense, morally better their non-supererogatory alternatives. In this sense, what is it for one option A to be better than an alternative B? I argue for three main conclusions. First, relative rankings are a type of all-in action guidance. If A is better than B, then morality recommends that you A rather than B. Such all-in guidance is useful when acts have the same deontic status. Second, I argue that Right > Wrong: permissible acts (...) are always better than their impermissible alternatives. If Right > Wrong were false, then morality’s deontic verdicts would sometimes conflict with its relative rankings. Such conflict would undermine the thought that morality is a coherent, authoritative guide to action. Third, the All or Nothing Problem is not a counterexample to Right > Wrong as is commonly thought. Instead, it involves an interesting ranking reversal: whether A > B can depend on whether a certain alternative is added as a third option. (shrink)

Jan Österberg (Self and Others, 1988) argues that the most defensible form of egoism should not only tell each of us what to do but also tell us what we ought to do. He also claims that collective norms should take precedence over individual ones. An individual ought to do one's part in an action pattern that is prescribed for the group - provided that other members of the group do their part. question This paper questions Österberg's claim that (...) Collective Egoism, unlike other forms of egoism, avoids violations of the principles which he takes to be analytical adequacy criteria for ethical theories: the principles of "deontic consequence" and "joint satisfiability". Furthermore, it questions his argument that Collective Egoism yields the "right" prescriptions in its main test-case: Prisoners' Dilemma. The improved version of Collective Egoism is able to deal with the two-person Prisoners' Dilemma, but it still misbehaves when we move to the many-persons cases. A certain type of "free rider"-problems proves to be especially troublesome. (shrink)

RésuméCette étude retrace l'évolution des recherches de von Wright en logique déontique depuis 1951 jusqu'à la fin des années 70. J'ai préféré, à une suite d'exposés isolés et indépendants à propos de chaque système, m'attacher à la mise en évidence des différences et des similitudes; je montre en quoi chaque étape est originale. Je reléve d'abord les traits saillants du système de 1951 et ceux de la construction de 1963, après avoir analysé les raisons du passage du premier à la (...) seconde. Ensuite, j'expose le profil essentiel de la généralisation métalogique de 1968. Enfin, je décris les tentatives de réduction de la logique déontique à des logiques plus familieres et j'examine à propos de positions très recentes ce qui va dans le sens de la reprise de l'ancien et ce qui marque des ruptures radicales avec tout ce qui précéde.SummaryThis study describes the evolution of von Wright's investigations about deontic logic from 1951 until the late 70. Rather than isolated expositions of a series of independent systems, I prefered to attach myself to differences and similitudes. I strived to show the originality of each conception. First, I call attention to the 1951 system principal features; I analyse the reasons which compelled von Wright to construct the 1963 logico‐philosophical system. Then I describe the essential profile of the 1968 metalogic generalisation. So, I come to the reductionnist tentations, concluding with the examination of very recent positions. In the conceptions of the late 70, we find a lot of things which repeat the past, but also extreme originality on many points. (shrink)

An arithmetical language, whose words are natural numbers written in hexadecimal numeration system, is defined and its applications for the representation, analysis and decision of formulae of some logical and normative systems are described and illustrated.The formulae, operations and relations of the represented system are associated as follows respectively to the numbers and the arithmetical operations and relations of the proposed language:1. Each well-formed-formula of the system is associated to a number of a set of natural numbers between zero (associated (...) to all tautologies and theses) and the binary supremum Φ of the set (Φ is associated to all contradictions and antitheses and his value is 2n-1, n depending on system’s dimensions and structure).2. Negation of a formula and disjonction and conjonction of t wo other more formulae of the system are associated respectively to the binary complement Φ-N(f) of the number associated to the first and to the binary infimun and supremum of the numbers associated to the last.3. The logical relations “f1 implies f2” (f1 -> f2), “f1 is incompat.ible with f2” (f1|f2), “f1 is the contradictory opposite of f2” (f1wf2) and “f1 is alternative to f2” (f1vf2) are true in the represented system if and only if the associated arithmetical relations, respectively “N(f1) absorbs arithmetically N(f2)”, “binary supremum of N(f1) and N(f2) is equal to Φ”, “sum of of N(f1) and N(f2) is equal to Φ” and “binary infimum of N(f1) and N(f2) is equal to 0”, are true.The applications of the proposed arithmetical language as very rapid and simplified tool of analysis and decision method are shown for the following systems: propositional logic, syllogistic, some deontic and alethic modal systems and some normative systems of statutory law:1. In the propositional logic, after fixing the maximum of variables considered, the numbers associated to these variables and to the contradictions are calculated. On this permanent basis, the evaluation of a farmula (especially in the case of many occurrences of many variables) is performed by the calculation of the associated number faster as in the traditional way.2. In the syllogistic, after the calculation of the number associated to each type of premise or conclusion, an arithmetical table of syllogisms shows that a proposed syllogism is valid if and only if the binary supremum of the numbers associated to the premises absorbs arithmetically the number associated to the conclusion. It is well-known that the search of this sort of arithmetization of syllogistic and the study of its possibilitiy has been a recurrent topic in modern logic, from Leibniz to Łukasiewicz and to-day.3. In a deontic equivalent:ial system who includes Von Wright’s deontic system of 1982 far norms of the first order, the calculation of the numbers associated to an types of permission and obligation sentences allows the im mediate arithmetical verification of an the classical relations between those sentences. The same is shown for an alethic modal system including the modlities of the first order of Lewis’s S5.4. For normative systems of statutory law, the arithmetical verification of the logical and normative relations is shown in precedent author’s papers -especially in recent “The ‘Ars Judicandi.’ Programme”-, though not yet in hexadecimal numeration system but only in binary and decimal ones.In all the represented systems, the arithmetical verification of the metalogical properties of the system -consistency and completeness- is performed in a very easy and rapid manner, after the arithmetic representation of the axiomatic basis of the latter by a system of equations. (shrink)

It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite (...) objection to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through. (shrink)

:This essay argues that the territorial rights of states derive from the property rights of the individuals that make up those states. The argument draws from the Lockean tradition of justification of political powers. Persons in the state of nature have natural rights. Those rights are first-order substantive rights, and second-order executive rights In the social contract, individuals transfer to the state their executive rights, not their substantive rights. The state can thus define the boundaries of property rights and adjudicate (...) property disputes, but does not legitimately own land itself. The article discusses and rejects, for deontic and consequentialist reasons, positions that justify collective and state ownership of territory. Some important consequences follow from the argument: First, no actual state has territorial rights, since no actual state wields delegated powers in land. Second, notwithstanding the preceding conclusion, actual states have an obligation to exercise their territorial powers consistently with the respect for private property. (shrink)

I first provide an accessible overview of the DWE (Doing Well Enough) logical and semantic framework for representing going beyond the call and its family of kindred concepts in a tightly intergraded way. Next, a module, for representing some basic agent-evaluative notions is developed (“AA” for “Aretaic Assessment”), and then it is integrated with the more act-evaluative notions of DWE, thereby allowing for a representation of suberogation and supererogation (as distinct from going beyond the call) and many other combined (...) class='Hi'>deontic and agent-evaluative notions. I then probe more deeply into how the semantic structures for the DWE framework might themselves be generated and then offer some brief reflections on the classic supererogation puzzle, as well as that of supererogatory holes and the all or nothing problem, framing options via the preceding reflections. (shrink)

The article provides a moral analysis of the commercial trade of financial claims against private debtors. Secondary debt markets process a type of object that differs from regular commodities. The specificity of debt lies in its peculiar relationality that is in tension with its legal constitution as a commercial object, or with its treatment as a mere thing. The constitution of a credit claim presupposes a corresponding financial liability. Thus, debt relations are constituted by polar correlates of deontic modalities. (...) Debt buyers do not obtain mere monadic objects, but intersubjective rights of action against debtors. In turn, they arguably do not become mere owners of abstract claims, but successors to a position in a preceding social relation that is imbued with moral limitations and responsibilities. Markets for debt should thus be subjected to the deontic logic of credit relations, not to the norms of ownership in things. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic (...) Logic. The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: W exists\' or W exists for the sake of set of norms\'. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false. The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word \'norm\', the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms. (shrink)

In this paper, I deal with socio-pragmatics and pragmemes, and propose that we need to take into account societal and cultural considerations in order to develop a persuasive theory about utterance meaning and language use. In particular, I deal with pragmemes and propose that they depart considerably from speech act theory, which is more or less a kind of armchair linguistics, as they can be combined with the notion of language games Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell) and with the notion of (...) the triadic structure of language. In this view, culture plays a predominant role. As Wong says: To attain a more holistic picture of language, one would need to see beyond form and even meaning to consider the cultural context of the language under study. This is because, as numerous studies have argued persuasively, people use language to express not only meaning but, consciously or subconsciously, culture as well – values, attitudes, biases, etc. A pragmeme is, therefore, best viewed as a “culturally situated speech act” and when we study pragmemes, we should ideally study them with respect to the culture in which they are used. In this paper, I explain why culture plays a predominant role in the pragmeme and should be a component of the definition of this type of unit of language use. I provide certain examples of pragmemes which require the notion of pragmatic competence and clearly show that a certain cultural dimension is important in determining rules of use. Then I consider a special kind of pragmemes: pragmemes at the market place. Pragmemes at the market place can be seen in the light of Mey’s Pragmatics. An introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.) ideas on adaptability. Language users develop ways to adapt to reality by making use of pragmatic acts that exploit contextual considerations and, given that they are to be seen as responses to the changing circumstances of life, may establish a path of language use and norms that constitute precedents from which subsequent language users can inherit ways to adapt to the circumstances of life. Sellers at the market develop techniques for shouting, surprising their clients, attracting attention, advertising their products through imaginative and poetic ways. These clearly require techniques, social practices and rules of use that are very different from those involved in other forms of communication, in that they are to be seen as responses to specific circumstances, specific purposes, and specific needs to adapt to the new circumstances of life. I propose that the poetic function Closing statements. Linguistics and poetics. In T. Sebeok, Style in language. Cambridge: MIT) in these language games merges with other functions. Both the poetic and the phatic function are subordinated to the conative function. I consider cases of expansion, in which knowledge of the cultural background and the situational context can guide interpretation and, in particular, the calculation of syntactic relations, which is made particularly difficult because we are confronted with fragments. I then consider pragmemes and deontic modality, arguing that the cultural context ensures that the right interpretation is arrived at through cultural ethical norms. Next, I consider the pragmeme ‘selling fish at the market place’. We can see that a particular pragmeme has its own norms that are dedicated to it and determined by the situational needs of the seller. The seller specializes in selling this product and, thus, best knows how to advertise it. Why should there be these forms of specialization? Probably, the answer is that the seller knows which questions the client has for him and he is prepared to answer them in advance, having developed poetic techniques for this task. I finally provide a series of common features which pragmemes of selling things at the market place display. We may consider them the topoi of the specific pragmemes. I am aware that there is a lot more work to be done, but this is not always easy because this kind of language use is gradually being lost due to changes in the structure of society. The data collected by anthropologists do not suffice in any way because they are focused on folklore more than on language use. The attempt to focus on the core features of pragmemes or, in the case in point, the pragmemes of selling fish at the market place is thwarted by the scarcity of the data. (shrink)

In his new book, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International, celebrated criminal law theorist George Fletcher excavates criminal law doctrine across a number of countries and cultures to reveal a small number of basic shared structures. Among these structures Fletcher argues that it is a criminal law justified by Kantian legal morality, in contrast to perfectionist or communitarian theories, that is legitimate. Thus, Fletcher proposes, along with legal positivists, that the validity of legal norms does not turn (...) on the moral claims that may underlie a perfectionist or virtue theory of law. Fletcher's claims about the shared structure of law do more than propose an analytical model of valid criminal law. Most importantly, Fletcher draws attention to the often under explored normative implications of proposed models of law in analytical jurisprudence. Virtue theories of law challenge Fletcher's view of legitimate criminal law by proposing a fundamentally different jurisprudential model of valid law. Rather than liberalism's commitment to preserving autonomy or the neutrality of the state as primary, virtue theories forward competing models of law grounded in preserving sound practical reason or the promotion of human flourishing. And while these models find a distinct and mediated role for morality to play in the determination of legitimate law, they ultimately deny Fletcher's claim that morality cannot be incorporated into law without being referenced by the law and that our political commitments must precede our moral commitments. This article places Fletcher's model of criminal law within the positivist jurisprudential landscape and connects that model of law to Kantian legal duties. The piece then explores the particular resources virtue theories of law forwarded by Lawrence Solum and Kyron Huigens have to address the role of political concerns within a virtue theory of law. It examines whether a sophisticated virtue theory finds a place for political concerns that are sufficient to defeat liberal philosophical critiques and undermine Fletcher's claims for criminal law. More importantly, rather than simply exploring the competing jurisprudential models, this article explores the important normative commitments that stem from competing jurisprudential models. Ultimately, the article concludes that understanding certain factors about the very nature of law generally and criminal law particularly leads one to affirm Fletcher's claims and limits the justification of law to our deontic duties. (shrink)

A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical analysis offers the study of legal systems. The volume is divided into two sections: the first covers the basic aspects of classical and deontic logic and its connections, advancing (...) an explanation of the most important topics of the discipline by comparing different systems of deontic logic and exploring some of the most important paradoxes in its domain. The second section deals with the role of logic in the analysis of legal systems by discussing in what sense deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions are useful tools for a proper understanding of the systematic structure of law. (shrink)

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of (...) the paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way. (shrink)

Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic.

Situationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms (...) is a necessary prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated the contrasting predictions of the evolutionary and decision-theoretic approaches to deontic reasoning. Two experiments embedded a hazard management (HM) rule in a social contract scenario that should lead to competition between innate modules. A 3rd experiment used a pure HM task. Threatening material was also introduced into the antecedent, p, of a deontic rule, if p then must q. According to the evolutionary approach, more HM responses (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) are predicted when p is (...) threatening, whereas decision theory predicts fewer. All 3 experiments were consistent with decision theory. Other theories are discussed, and it is concluded that they cannot account for the behavior observed in these experiments. (shrink)

Since the middle of the last century, normative language has been much studied. In particular, the normative function performed by certain sentences and by certain speech acts has been investigated in depth. Still, the normative function performed by certain physical artifacts designed and built to regulate human behaviors has not yet been thoroughly investigated. We propose to call this specific type of artifacts with normative intent ‘deontic artifacts’. This article aims to investigate this normative phenomenon that is so widespread (...) in our daily reality, but so often forgotten by scholars of norms and normativity. (shrink)

We provide a description and informal analysis of the commonalities in moral discourse concerning issues in the field of information and communications technology, present a logic model (DEAL) of this type of moral discourse that makes use of recent research in deontic, epistemic, and action logic, and indicate – drawing upon recent research in computer implementations of modal logic – how information systems may be developed that implement the proposed formalization.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We will consider 16 different pure dyadic deontic tableau systems and 32 different alethic dyadic deontic tableau systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Some relationships between our systems and well known dyadic deontic logics in the literature are pointed out and soundness results are obtained for every tableau system. Completeness results are obtained (...) for all 16 pure dyadic deontic systems and for 16 alethic dyadic deontic systems. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power. I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequences. In Section (...) 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperintensionality. In Section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are illfitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In Section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

According to deontic justice theory, individuals often feel principled moral obligations to uphold norms of justice. That is, standards of justice can be valued for their own sake, even apart from serving self-interested goals. While a growing body of evidence in business ethics supports the notion of deontic justice, skepticism remains. This hesitation results, at least in part, from the absence of a coherent framework for explaining how individuals produce and experience deontic justice. To address this need, (...) we argue that a compelling, yet still missing, step is to gain further understanding into the underlying neural and psychological mechanisms of deontic justice. Here, we advance a theoretical model that disentangles three key processes of deontic justice: The use of justice rules to assess events, cognitive empathy, and affective empathy. Together with reviewing neural systems supporting these processes, broader implications of our model for business ethics scholarship are discussed. (shrink)

Modality and negation, as two important linguistic features used to realise subjectivity, have been investigated within various disciplines, such as logic, linguistics and philosophy, and law. The interaction between modality and negation, as a relatively new and undeveloped domain, has however not been paid due attention in scholarship. This corpus-based study investigates three aspects of their interaction: the differentiation of the deontic value by negation, the categorization of deontic modality in Hong Kong legislation via negation, and distribution patterns (...) of deontic modality, especially distribution patterns of the negation of modality, in Hong Kong legislation. This study shows that negation is a powerful linguistic mechanism not only for determining the nature and functions of modality, but also for determining the value of modality. This study also reveals that negation helps us to investigate the distribution of deontic modality in Hong Kong legislation and hence revisit the legal framework in Hong Kong. A study taking into account the discursive and professional aspects of the interaction between deontic modality and negation will provide a theoretical basis for the natural language processing of modality and negation in legislation and also offer important implications for the study of negation and modality in general contexts. (shrink)

When a conflict of duties arises, a resolution is often sought by use of an ordering of priority or importance. This paper examines how such a conflict resolution works, compares mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and gives preference to one developed by Brewka and Nebel. I distinguish between two cases – that some conflicts may remain unresolved, and that a priority ordering can be determined that resolves all – and provide semantics and axiomatic systems for accordingly defined (...) dyadic deontic operators. (shrink)

Relevant to philosophy, law, management, and artificial intelligence, these papers explore the applicability of nonmonotonic or defeasible logic to normative reasoning. The resulting systems purport to solve well-known deontic paradoxes and to provide a better treatment than classical deontic logic does of prima facie obligation, conditional obligation, and priorities of normative principles.

This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deontic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. In particular, we need probabilistic (...) structure that interacts directly with the compositional semantics of deontic modals. However, I reject theories that provide this probabilistic structure by claiming that the semantics of deontic modals is linked to the Bayesian notion of expectation. I offer a probabilistic premise semantics that explains all the data that create trouble for the rival theories. (shrink)

Deontic logic is devoted to the study of logical properties of normative predicates such as permission, obligation and prohibition. Since it is usual to apply these predicates to actions, many deontic logicians have proposed formalisms where actions and action combinators are present. Some standard action combinators are action conjunction, choice between actions and not doing a given action. These combinators resemble boolean operators, and therefore the theory of boolean algebra offers a well-known athematical framework to study the properties (...) of the classic deontic operators when applied to actions. In his seminal work, Segerberg uses constructions coming from boolean algebras to formalize the usual deontic notions. Segerberg’s work provided the initial step to understand logical properties of deontic operators when they are applied to actions. In the last years, other authors have proposed related logics. In this chapter we introduce Segerberg’s work, study related formalisms and investigate further challenges in this area. (shrink)

The Deontic Transfer Principle states that if it is permissible for a person A to cause another person B harm H then, other things being equal, it is permissible for A to impose a risk of harm H on B. In this article we show that the Deontic Transfer Principle is vulnerable to counterexamples, and that the same is true of a range of closely related principles. We conclude that the deontic status of a risk imposition is (...) not directly inherited from the deontic properties of deterministic acts. (shrink)

In this paper we present an executable approach to model interactions between agents that involve sensitive, privacy-related information. The approach is formal and based on deontic, epistemic and action logic. It is conceptually related to the Belief-Desire-Intention model of Bratman. Our approach uses the concept of sphere as developed by Waltzer to capture the notion that information is provided mostly with restrictions regarding its application. We use software agent technology to create an executable approach. Our agents hold beliefs about (...) the world, have goals and commitment to the goals. They have the capacity to reason about different courses of action, and communicate with one another. The main new ingredient of our approach is the idea to model information itself as an intentional agent whose main goal it is to preserve the integrity of the information and regulate its dissemination. We demonstrate our approach by applying it to an important process in the insurance industry: applying for a life insurance. In this paper we will: (1) describe the challenge organizational complexity poses in moral reasoning about informational relationships; (2) propose an executable approach, using software agents with reasoning capacities grounded in modal logic, in which moral constraints on informational relatio nships can be modeled and investigated; (3) describe the details of our approach, in which information itself is modeled as an intentional agent in its own right; (4) test and validate it by applying it to a concrete ‘hard case’ from the insurance industry; and (5) conclude that our approach upholds and offers potential for both research and practical application. (shrink)

The semantics for a deontic action logic based on Boolean algebra is extended with an interpretation of action expressions in terms of sets of alternative actions, intended as a way to model choice. This results in a non-classical interpretation of action expressions, while sentences not in the scope of deontic operators are kept classical. A deontic structure based on Simons’ supercover semantics is used to interpret permission and obligation. It is argued that these constructions provide ways to (...) handle various problems related to free choice permission. The main result is a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics. (shrink)

This paper describes and compares the first step in modern semantic theory for deontic logic which appeared in works of Stig Kanger, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Montague and Saul Kripke in late 50s and early 60s. Moreover, some further developments as well as systematizations are also noted.

In an earlier paper by the author, Åqvist , I presented an approach to the logic of historical necessity, or inevitability, in the sense of a “two-dimensional” combination of tense and modal logic for worlds, or histories, with the same time order, known as T × W logic. Distinctive features of that approach were, apart from its two-dimensionality, its being based on discrete and finite time, and its use of so-called systematic frame constants in order to enable us to indicate (...) longitudes and latitudes of any points in the co-ordinate systems under consideration. This led us to study and axiomatize an infinite hierarchy HTWxy of two-dimensional modal tense logics with the characteristic operators for historical necessity and possibility added to the original basic vocabulary. The main purpose of the present paper is then twofold: to extend the logics HTWxy to the interesting branch of philosophical logic constituted by deontic logic as combined with tense logic; and to deal with a curious puzzle known as the so-called epistemic obligation paradox – a well known stumbling-block in this area of research in philosophical logic. We argue for a solution to both these problems, which appeals to a new infinite hierarchy DHTWxym of extensions of the HTWxy in the sense of logics combining dyadic deontic modalities with temporal ones such as those for historical necessity and other two-dimensional modalities. (shrink)

John Horty has proposed an approach to reasoning with ought-propositions which stands in contrast to the standard modal approach to deontic logic. Horty’s approach is based on default theories as known from the framework of Default Logic. It is argued that the approach cannot be extended beyond the most simple kinds of default theories and that it fails in particular to account for conditional obligations. The most plausible ways of straightening out the defects of the approach conform to a (...) simple theory of default reasoning in standard deontic language. (shrink)

In Meyer’s promising account [7] deontic logic is reduced to a dynamic logic. Meyer claims that with his account “we get rid of most (if not all) of the nasty paradoxes that have plagued traditional deontic logic.” But as was shown by van der Meyden in [4], Meyer’s logic also contains a paradoxical formula. In this paper we will show that another paradox can be proven, one which also effects Meyer’s “solution” to contrary to duty obligations and his (...) logic in general. (shrink)

It has been recently suggested that a semantic theory for deontic modals should be neutral between a very large range of normative and evaluative theories. This article aims to clarify this talk of neutrality, in particular its scope and motivation. My thesis is that neutrality is best understood as an empirical thesis about a fragment of natural language that includes deontic modals – not as a new, sui generis methodological constraint on natural language semantics.

There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work has put the deontic logic tradition in contact with natural language semantics, resulting in significant increase in sophistication on both ends. This chapter surveys the main motivations, achievements, and prospects of this work.

The article offers an overview of the deontic theory developed by the philosophical school of Mīmāṃsā, which is, and has been since the last centuries BCE, the main source of normative concepts in Sanskrit thought. Thus, the Mīmāṃsā deontics is interesting for any historian of philosophy and constitutes a thought-provoking occasion to rethink deontic concepts, taking advantage of centuries of systematic reflections on these topics. Some comparison with notions currently used in Euro-American normative theories and metaethical principles is (...) offered in order to show possible points of contact and deep divergences. In more detail, after an introduction explaining the methodology and aims of our work, we discuss how Mīmāṃsā authors distinguished and defined some fundamental deontic concepts, such as different types of prescriptions and prohibitions. We then discuss how Mīmāṃsā authors approached the problem of conflicts among commands without jeopardising the validity of the normative text issuing them. In the second part of the article we introduce our formal apparatus, which is construed around the main taxonomic and conceptual distinctions used in the first part. Our formal rendering captures the most important features of the Mīmāṃsā theory and can thus serve as a concise and rigorous presentation of it for scholars working in deontic logic. (shrink)

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case (...) study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

This is the latest volume in the Workshops in Computing series and contains papers to be presented at the Third International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON '96) to be held in Sesimbra, Portugal 11 - 13 January 1996. It contains a variety of contributions covering the relationship between deontic logics, logics of action and normative systems (i.e. systems of or about interacting agents whose behaviour is subject to ideal constraints that may not always be fulfilled (...) in practice). The papers range from the theoretical studies of the logical and conceptual tools needed, to studies of various applications. The resulting volume will be of interest to researchers working in a variety of fields from philosophy, logic and legal theory, through to artificial intelligence and computer/management sciences. (shrink)

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set (...) ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP r. (shrink)

We discuss three aspects of the intuitionistic reformulation of Mally’s deontic logic that was recently proposed ). First, this reformulation is more similar to Standard Deontic Logic than appears at first sight: like Standard Deontic Logic, it is Kanger reducible and Anderson reducible to alethic logic and it has a semantical interpretation that can be read in deontic terms. Second, this reformulation has an extension that provides 100% of the theorems stated by Mally himself. Third, it (...) is interesting to view Mally’s original deontic logic as an extension of this reformulation. (shrink)

In everyday life it is common to judge people morally responsible for their actions, but there is a time-honored philosophical challenge to this practice with which we are all familiar. The challenge can be put briefly as follows: moral responsibility requires that agents have a certain kind of control that is compatible with neither causal determinism nor its contradictory, causal indeterminism; hence moral responsibility is impossible. Haji notes that judgments about moral responsibility- which I will call hypological judgments—are not the (...) only category of moral, or morally relevant, judgments. There are also deontic judgments, which have to do with moral obligation, right, and wrong; aretaic judgments, which have to do with moral virtue and vice; and axiological judgments, which have to do with intrinsic and extrinsic value. In principle, a challenge to all such judgments can be made that parallels the challenge to hypological judgments: that they presuppose a certain kind of control that is compatible with neither determinism nor indeterminism and are therefore to be rejected. It is a surprising fact that, whereas the challenge to hypological judgments has been the subject of intense debate for centuries, the analogous challenges to the other kinds of judgments have received comparatively little, if any, attention. In this book, Haji seeks to rectify this omission. He concerns himself primarily with the challenge to deontic judgments. During the course of his discussion he deals in depth with the original challenge to hypological judgments, devotes a chapter to the challenge to aretaic judgments, and makes certain remarks in passing about the challenge to axiological judgments. (shrink)

This article contains an overview of the author's long‐standing involvement with deontic logic, both from a technical and from a wider philosophical point of view. As far as the formal aspects of deontic logic are concerned, the author describes his intellectual development from the original discovery of the analogy between modal (and deontic) notions on the one hand, and quantifiers on the other, through the formulation of a systematic theory of dyadic deontic concepts, to the proposal (...) of a formal logic of action as a foundation for deontic logic. In a more philosophical vein, the author discusses such questions as the very possibility of deontic logic if norms have no truth‐value, the relation between the descriptive interpretation of classical deontic logic and the logic of norm‐propositions, the correct representation of conditional or hypothetical norms, the distinction between moral obligation and practical necessity, and the interdefinability of permission and obligation. (shrink)

A problem related to theWason selection task is that only some thematic versions of it are executed correctly. Fodor raises the thesis that the versions that are adequately solved are those that refer to deontic situations. In his opinion, there is a deontic logic that is different to classical logic and that allows reasoning appropriately in deontic contexts. In this paper, I review Fodor’s arguments, question his assumptions, and propose an alternative explanation, based on the mental models (...) theory, of why only some versions of the selection task with thematic content offer optimal results. (shrink)

A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about (...) rationality—wherein someone cannot have stronger reason to do A than B, B than C, and C than A—and commonsense morality. (shrink)

It is an appealing idea that deontic modality is a modality of the open future, and that the indeterminacy of the open future is the key, within natural language, to understanding the deontic modal puzzles that form the traditional subject-matter of deontic logic. In this paper, I pull together three well-studied strands of indeterminism—Thomason (1980)’s settledness operator, the modal base of Kratzer (1981, 1991)’s analysis of modals, and Stalnaker (1978)’s notion of diagonal acceptance—to argue for two theses (...) governing a deontic logic for natural language. -/- The first thesis makes a claim about postsemantic truth, and is couched in terms of Stalnaker’s dagger operator. The second concerns what it is for an act to be permissible, when agents exercise partial control over their obligations as well as their bodily movements. (shrink)