Like nuclear energy, most technologies could have dual use—for health and well being and disaster and terror. Some research publications have brought to the forefront the tragic consequences of the latter potential through their possible use. Monitoring life science research and development (R&D) to prevent possible misuse is a challenging task globally, more so in developing economies like India, which are emerging as major biotech hubs. As a signatory to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, India has put in (...) motion a process of evolving a series of measures to manage dual-use technology. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has taken a lead in drafting model codes of conduct, ethics and practice for use by other S&T agencies to tailor them as per their requirements. Taking cue from the discussions held by the editors of the various medical and science journals in the developed world, the Indian Journal of Medical Research, the official publication of the ICMR, is working on policy and uniform practice of publication of dual-use research results. The Government of India too has promulgated legal provisions to minimize the risks of misuse of technology, like the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. Clearly, no single agency would be able to manage the dual-use of technology effectively. Multiple agencies have to come together to work in tandem for effective implementation of various measure and also like Janus, ensure that they are neither too restrictive nor intrusive to discourage the development of science. (shrink)

Debates about dual-use research often turn on the potential for scientific research to be used to benefit or harm humanity. This dual-use potential is conventionally understood as the product of the magnitude of the harms and benefits of dual-use research, multiplied by their likelihood. This account, however, neglects important social aspects of the use of science and technology. In this paper, I supplement existing conceptions of dual-use potential to account for the social context of dual-use (...) research. This account incorporates relational and positional concerns that feature in the success or failure of dual-use. I then defend this account against foreseeable objections. (shrink)

The dual-use problem is an ethical quandary sometimes faced by scientists and others in a position to influence the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge. It arises when an agent is considering whether to pursue some project likely to result in the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge, that knowledge could be used in both morally desirable and morally undesirable ways, and the risk of undesirable use is sufficiently high that it is not clear that the agent may permissibly (...) pursue the project or policy. Agents said to be faced with dual-use problems have frequently responded by appealing to a view that I call scientific isolationism. This is, roughly, the view that scientific decisions may be made without morally appraising the likely uses of the scientific knowledge whose production or dissemination is at stake. I consider whether scientific isolationism can be justified in a form that would indeed provide a way out of dual-use problems. I first argue for a presumption against a strong form of isolationism, and then examine four arguments that might be thought to override this presumption. The most promising of these arguments appeals to the idea of a division of moral labour, but I argue that even this argument can sustain at most a highly attenuated form of scientific isolationism and that this variant of isolationism has little practical import for discussions of the dual-use problem. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) seems to be impacting all industry sectors, while becoming a motor for innovation. The diffusion of AI from the civilian sector to the defense sector, and AI’s dual-use potential has drawn attention from security and ethics scholars. With the publication of the ethical guideline Trustworthy AI by the European Union (EU), normative questions on the application of AI have been further evaluated. In order to draw conclusions on Trustworthy AI as a point of reference for responsible (...) research and development (R&D), we approach the diffusion of AI across both civilian and military spheres in the EU. We capture the extent of technological diffusion and derive European and German patent citation networks. Both networks indicate a low degree of diffusion of AI between civilian and defense sectors. A qualitative investigation of project descriptions of a research institute’s work in both civilian and military fields shows that military AI applications stress accuracy or robustness, while civilian AI reflects a focus on human-centric values. Our work represents a first approach by linking processes of technology diffusion with normative evaluations of R&D. (shrink)

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) has been well analyzed regarding the life sciences. This article explores the topic of younger fields of medical research and their potential for misuse, especially in the military context. The areas of research considered are artificial intelligence, neurotechnology, and neuroenhancement. Each of these areas have brought forward highly promising new research. However, in light of the current armed conflicts in Europe and in the Middle East, there is a need to consider what the (...) potential harmful consequences of medical research are. Using the example of war, this article demonstrates various instances of how current medical research could be—or is being—misused and discusses various possible solutions to the dual use dilemma. The main finding is that there needs to be a more concise and international effort to prevent the misuse of research. The raising of awareness in the general medical research community for the topic of DURC is one of the simplest steps that should be undertaken in order to ensure the non-maleficence of global research. Additionally, considering the potentially far-reaching consequences of DURC, it is time to consider the introduction of a new intergovernmental agency to monitor research and establish safeguards in order to cover all fields of research. (shrink)

Most recent studies of dual use research have focused on the life sciences, although some researchers have suggested that dual use research occurs across many disciplines. This research is an initial investigation into the prevalence of dual use research in other scientific disciplines by surveying senior editors of scientific journals, drawn from Journal Citation Reports. The survey was emailed to 7,500 journal editors with a response rate of 10.1 %. Approximately 4.8 % of life science editors reported (...) they had to consider whether to publish dual use research and 38.9 % said they decided to not publish the research in question. In disciplines other than the life sciences, 7.2 % of editors from other science disciplines reported that they had to consider whether to publish dual use research, and 48.4 % declined to publish it. The survey investigated relationships between dual use and the journal’s source of funding and place of publication, but no relationships were found. Further research is needed to better understand the occurrence of dual use research in other science disciplines. (shrink)

Dual Use Research of Concern constitutes a major challenge for research practice and oversight on the local, national and international level. The situation in Germany is shaped by two partly competing suggestions of how to regulate security-related research: The German Ethics Council, as an independent political advisory body, recommended a series of measures, including national legislation on DURC. Competing with that, the German National Academy of Sciences and the German Research Foundation, as two major professional bodies, presented a strategy (...) which draws on the self-control of science and, inter alia, suggests expanding the scope of research ethics committees to an evaluation of DURC. This situation is taken as an occasion to further discuss the scope and limits of professional self-control with respect to security-related research. The role of RECs as professional bodies of science is particularly analyzed, referring to the theoretical backgrounds of professionalism. Two key sociological features of professionalism – ethical orientation and professional self-control – are discussed with respect to the practice of biomedical science. Both attributes are then analyzed with respect to the assessment of DURC by RECs. In conclusion, it is stated that issues of biosecurity transcend the boundaries of the scientific community and that a more comprehensive strategy should be implemented encompassing both professional self-control and legal oversight. (shrink)

This book deals with the problem of dual-use science research and technology. It first explains the concept of dual use and then offers analyses of collective knowledge and collective ignorance. It goes on to present a theory of collective responsibility, followed by four chapters focusing on a particular scientific field or industry of dual use concern: the chemical industry, the nuclear industry, cyber-technology and the biological sciences. The problem of dual-use science research and technology arises because (...) such research and technology has the potential to be used for great evil as well as for great good. On the one hand, knowledge is a necessary condition, and perhaps a constitutive feature, of technologies that contribute greatly to individual and collective well-being. Consider, for example, nuclear technology that enables the generation of low cost electricity in populations without obvious alternative energy sources. So technological knowledge is a good thing and ignorance of it a bad thing. On the other hand, these same technologies can be extremely harmful to individuals and collectives, as with the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So, at least with respect to some technologies evidently knowledge is a bad thing and ignorance a good thing. Accordingly, the question arises as to whether we ought to limit scientific research and/or the development of technology and, if so, which research or technology, in what manner and to what extent. This book examines the answer to that question. (shrink)

The problem of dual use is characterized by a wide range of activities or types of research and technology utilization. In this article, I explore the phenomenon of dual use in several steps to make it accessible for ethical inquiries: first, I examine the phenomenon in more detail; is it a genuine property of technologies and methods, a fundamental problem for research ethics, or a specific precondition for trade-off situations? Second, I show that various factors contribute to a (...) certain good becoming a real dual use good. Third, I propose to develop a three-dimensional classification and evaluation system for dual use risks. (shrink)

This article argues that due to the difficulty in governing AI, it is essential to develop measures implemented early in the AI research process. The goal of dual use considerations is to create robust strategies that uphold AI’s integrity while protecting societal interests. The challenges of applying dual use frameworks to AI research are examined and dual use and dual use research of concern (DURC) are defined while highlighting the difficulties in balancing the technology’s benefits and (...) risks. AI’s dual use potential is discussed, particularly in areas like NLP and LLMs, and the need for early consideration of dual use risks to ensure ethical and secure development is underscored. In the section on shared responsibilities in AI research and avenues for mitigation strategies the importance of early-stage risk assessments and ethical guidelines to mitigate misuse is emphasized, accentuating self-governance within scientific communities and structured measures like checklists and pre-registration to promote responsible research practices. The final section argues that research ethics committees play a crucial role in evaluating the dual use implications of AI technologies within the research pipeline. The need for tailored ethics review processes is articulated, drawing parallels with medical research ethics committees. (shrink)

Emerging medical biotechnology, with its dual‐use nature, presents both unprecedented opportunities and challenges for human society. As we benefit from technological innovation, it is crucial for Chinese academics and policymakers to effectively identify and address potential risks. However, the current framework for evaluating dual‐use research faces multiple challenges, including difficulties in identifying dual‐use issues, a lack of consideration for broader impacts in assessments, and a lack of consensus on balancing benefits and risks. Furthermore, inadequacies in the review (...) mechanism, such as uneven progress among institutions, insufficient review capabilities, and lacking specialized knowledge among assessment personnel, hamper the effectiveness of evaluation efforts. This article aims to explore these challenges and propose practical recommendations for strengthening the evaluation and governance mechanisms of dual‐use research. By effectively mitigating the risks associated with dual‐use research, it facilitates the promotion of responsible scientific progress in emerging medical biotechnologies in China and internationally. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore whether and how the concept of dual-use can be applied to philosophical research, as well as its potential for explaining cases of misuse of philosophical theory and for justifying any restrictions on academic freedom. I argue that there are two ways in which philosophical research can be misused: by using its methods for purposes that contradict the general purposes of philosophy, and by using (parts of) a theory against the purposes intended (...) by its author. Philosophical research is dual-use research of concern (DURC) if the theory can be misused without modification, which is the case when a theory is not entirely conclusive. The misuse of philosophical research differs from the misuse in paradigmatic cases of DURC in that its potential to cause harm depends on social conditions. Given these conditions and the lack of relevant research, the risk of harmful misuse of philosophy as of yet does not constitute a sufficient reason to restrict academic freedom in a meaningful way. Instead, researchers should be aware of any potential for misuse, make their arguments as conclusive as possible, and emphasise the aim of their theory. To prevent harmful misuse in the public sphere, scholars should engage in public philosophy and provide an accurate and conclusive account of their research. Institutions should support this. (shrink)

The term dual use technologies refers to research and technology with the potential both to yield valuable scientific knowledge and to be used for nefarious purposes with serious consequences for public health or the environment. There are two main approaches to assessing dual use technologies: pragmatic and metaphysical. A pragmatic approach relies on ethical principles and norms to generate specific guidance and policy for dual use technologies. A metaphysical approach exhorts us to the deeper study of human (...) nature, our intentions, goals, values ideals and social relations when considering dual use technology. Use of science and technology (S and T) is determined by two components of human nature: human intentions and choices. We have drawn a distinction between specific measures, goals and intentions with respect to technologies in order to show that moral judgment about technologies must precede their use. Understanding of our intentionality and values, and our moral ideals, as a measurable, tangible part of the real world is important for the prevention of any possible harm from S and T. In the context of dual use technologies, we stress the importance of three main understandings of human nature: vulnerability, responsibility and narrative identity. These can become a strong ontological “antidote” to technology’s poisoning of modern man. Each new technology can be measured and compared with man’s values, traditions and societal norms. This can be done bearing in mind the concept that human nature is not dualistic, but pluralistic. A system of ethical principles that includes the principles of good intentions, the correspondence of goals and means, the balancing of risks and benefits, simplicity, and contextuality, will help ensure that technologies are more humanistic and friendly to human beings. (shrink)

Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive bioweapons. Many (...) areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel’s biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel’s extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay. (shrink)

AI researchers have developed sophisticated language models capable of generating paragraphs of 'synthetic text' on topics specified by the user. While AI text generation has legitimate benefits, it could also be misused, potentially to grave effect. For example, AI text generators could be used to automate the production of convincing fake news, or to inundate social media platforms with machine-generated disinformation. This paper argues that AI text generators should be conceptualised as a dual-use technology, outlines some relevant lessons from (...) earlier debates on dual-use life sciences research, and calls for closer collaboration between ethicists and the machine learning community to address AI language models’ dual-use implications. (shrink)

The paper ‘Biodefence and the production of knowledge’ by Buchanan and Kelley1 is an extremely valuable addition to the scientific and bioterrorism defence literature. It points out the myriad of ways that the structure of current debates about the dual use problem neglects important values, and discussions of how these values should be considered in policy making. In this commentary, I will focus on only one of these areas: what the authors characterise as ‘dual use opportunity’. My goal (...) is not to challenge the authors’ main points , but to draw out the complicated set of value conflicts that this single area of bioterror defence policy has neglected.Buchanan and Kelley characterise the concept of ‘dual use opportunity’ as the idea that ‘research undertaken for biodefence may contribute, or might be made to contribute, to the alleviation of the burden of disease among the world's worst-off people.’ I have argued for a similar idea of dual use opportunity in a different context by suggesting that we should prioritise global public health infrastructure over narrowly defined research on specific agents and/or projects that seek to prevent altogether biological attacks—a goal that, I have argued, is futile given the almost limitless number of forms of, and mutations to, disease bacteria and viruses that might be employed by biological terrorists.2–5 Effective control of an epidemic requires a fundamental infrastructure of surveillance and reporting. Because the …. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the various dual-use concepts applied in national and international non-proliferation and anti-terrorism legislation, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and national export control legislation and in relevant codes of conduct. While there is a vast literature covering dual-use concepts in particular with regard to life sciences, this is the first paper that incorporates into such discussion the United Nations Security (...) Council Resolution 1540. In addition, recent developments such as the extension of dual-use export control legislation in the area of human rights protection are also identified and reviewed. The discussion of dual-use concepts is hereby undertaken in the context of human- and/or national-security-based approaches to security. This paper discusses four main concepts of dual use as applied today in international and national law: civilian versus military, peaceful versus non-peaceful, legitimate versus illegitimate and benevolent versus malevolent. In addition, the usage of the term to describe positive technology spin-offs between civilian and military applications is also briefly addressed. Attention is also given to the roles civil society and research ethics may play in the governance of dual-use sciences and technologies. (shrink)

The majority of papers in this special issue were presented at a conference, ‘The Advancement of Science and the Dilemma of Dual Use: Why We Can’t Afford to Fail’ held on 9–10 November 2007. The conference chairman was Andrzej Górski and its patrons were UNESCO and the President of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Three additional papers on the subject of Dual Use have been included in this issue; the authors are T. A. Cavanaugh , J. Forge and (...) D. Koepsall. (shrink)

The fact that information and communication technologies (ICTs) increasingly shape our online and offline lifeworlds has lead to the emergence of a new societal threat in the form of vulnerabilities in critical ICT systems that may be exploited by malicious actors. Cybersecurity researchers work on finding such vulnerabilities and on identifying new attack vectors, i.e. they systematically step into the role of attackers. Normatively, however, the goal of this research is to strengthen ICTs against cyberattacks and, thus, to reduce the (...) societal threat. However, this implies a dual-use potential: as in any discipline, results in cybersecurity research need to be published at some point and the disclosure of vulnerabilities to software companies and ICT administrators is an integral part of ensuring that ICT vulnerabilities are closed; such a disclosure, however, can be misused by attackers, as well. Thus, instruments for ethical orientation in regard of these dual-use issues seem to be necessary to identify potential issues and to guide researchers in dealing with them. While corresponding resources, such as codes of conduct, already exists for cybersecurity research, we will show that they currently do not adequately address the need for ethical orientation in the academic context. This, we argue, creates the need for a new research ethics culture in cybersecurity research. (shrink)

The concept of dual-use encapsulates the potential for well-intentioned, beneficial scientific research to also be misused by a third party for malicious ends. The concept of dual-use challenges scientists to look beyond the immediate outcomes of their research and to develop an awareness of possible future (mis)uses of scientific research. Since 2001 much attention has been paid to the possible need to regulate the dual-use potential of the life sciences. Regulation initiatives fall under two broad categories—those that (...) develop the ethical education of scientists and foster an awareness and responsibility of dual-use issues, and those which assess the regulation of information being generated by current research. Both types of initiatives are premised on a cautious, risk-adverse philosophy which advocates careful examination of all future endpoints of research endeavors. This caution advocated within initiatives such as pre-publication review of journal articles contrasts to the obligation to share underpinning data sharing discussions. As the dual-use debate has yet to make a significant impact on data sharing discussions (and vice versa) it is possible that these two areas of knowledge control may present areas of ethical conflict for scientists, and thus need to be more closely examined. This paper examines the tension between the obligation to share exemplified by data sharing principles and the concerns raised by the risk-cautious culture of the dual-use debates. The paper concludes by reflecting on the issues of responsibility as raised by dual-use as relating to data sharing, such as the chain of custody for shared data. (shrink)

Most life science research entails dual-use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual-use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges (...) against the principle exist – for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague – the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy-makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context-dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness-raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes. (shrink)

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing (...) of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher’s work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of “experiments of concern” in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. (shrink)

In recent years, the publication of the studies on the transmissibility in mammals of the H5N1 influenza virus and synthetic genomes has triggered heated and concerned debate within the community of scientists on biological dual-use research; these papers have raised the awareness that, in some cases, fundamental research could be directed to harmful experiments, with the purpose of developing a weapon that could be used by a bioterrorist. Here is presented an overview regarding the dual-use concept and its (...) related international agreements which underlines the work of the Australia Group Export Control Regime. It is hoped that the principles and activities of the AG, that focuses on export control of chemical and biological dual-use materials, will spread and become well known to academic researchers in different countries, as they exchange biological materials and scientific papers. To this extent, and with the aim of drawing the attention of the scientific community that works with yeast to the so called Dual-Use Research of Concern, this article reports case studies on biological dual-use research and discusses a synthetic biology applied to the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, namely the construction of the first eukaryotic synthetic chromosome of yeast and the use of yeast cells as a factory to produce opiates. Since this organism is considered harmless and is not included in any list of biological agents, yeast researchers should take simple actions in the future to avoid the sharing of strains and advanced technology with suspicious individuals. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost life science research entails dual‐use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual‐use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges (...) against the principle exist – for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague – the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy‐makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context‐dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness‐raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes. (shrink)

This paper considers multiple meanings of the expression ‘dual use’ and examines lessons to be learned from the life sciences when considering ethical and policy issues associated with the dual-use nature of nanotechnology (and converging technologies). After examining recent controversial dual-use experiments in the life sciences, it considers the potential roles and limitations of science codes of conduct for addressing concerns associated with dual-use science and technology. It concludes that, rather than being essentially associated with voluntary (...) self-governance of the scientific community, codes of conduct should arguably be part of a broader regulatory oversight system. (shrink)

Due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of a few weeks later, the concept of dual use has spread widely in the life sciences during the past decade. This article is aimed at a clarification of the dual use concept and its scope of application for the life sciences. Such a clarification would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers seeking to ensure security while avoiding undesirable interventions of government in the conduct of science. The (...) article starts with an overview of the main developments in life sciences in relation to dual use. This is illustrated by discussions on synthetic biology and dual use. The findings lead to a reconsideration of the dual use concept. An area in need of further attention is to what extent threats and intentions should have impact on the definition of dual use. Possible threats are analyzed against the background of the phenomenon of securitization of health care and life sciences: considering these sectors of society in security terms. Some caveats that should be taken into account in a dual use policy are described. An acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept could help researchers, universities, companies and policy makers. Such a definition should build upon, but go beyond, the view developed in the influential Fink-report, which concentrates on the so-called ‘experiments of concern’, e.g. experiments that enhance the virulence of pathogens (National Research Council of the National Academies 2004) It will be argued that—in addition to these more technical aspects—a definition of dual use should include the aspect of threats and intentions. (shrink)

Biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security is termed dual use. In Poland there are adequate conditions for conducting experiments that could be qualified as dual use research, and therefore, a risk of attack on Poland or other countries exists. Optimal solutions for limiting such threats are required, and the national system of biosecurity should enable early, reliable, and complete identification of this type of (...) research. Scientists should have a fundamental role in this process, their duty being to immediately, upon identification, report research with dual use potential. An important entity in the identification system of dual use research should also be the Central Register of Biological and Biomedical Research, which gathers information about all biological and biomedical research being conducted in a given country. Publishers, editors, and review committees of journals and other scientific publications should be involved in evaluating results of clinical trials. The National Council of Biosecurity should be the governmental institution responsible for developing a system of dual use research threat prevention. Its role would be to develop codes of conduct, form counsel of expertise, and monitor the problem at national level, while the Dual Use Research Committee would be responsible for individual cases. In Poland, current actions aiming to provide biological safety were based on developing and passing an act about genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) and creating a GMO Committee. Considering experiences of other nations, one should view these actions as fragmentary, and thus insufficient protection against dual use research threats. (shrink)

Significant attention is paid to what is coined _dual use research (DUR)_, or research that has the potential to benefit and harm humanity, and _dual use research of concern (DURC)_, a particular subset of DUR that is reasonably anticipated to be a safety and security concern if misapplied. Despite growing attention to DUR and DURC, there is entrenched and often overlooked ambiguity over these terms, and thereby, the challenges they pose. Conceptual clarity is much needed and is the rationale behind (...) this paper. We begin by explaining existing overlooked disagreement surrounding the nature of DURC in particular, highlighting how various organizations and scholars understand DURC differently. We then set out and defend an account of DURC that captures its necessary and sufficient conditions and which sets it apart from DUR. We argue that scientifically valid research counts as DURC if it is suspected that its misuse, intentional or otherwise, can have a significant adverse effect on public health. (shrink)

Central to the argument of ‘Biodefense and the Production of Knowledge: Rethinking the Problem’ are claims that the vast majority of ethical debate about biodefense research to date has focused on the dual use problem, and the focus of ethical discussion of dual-use research has been on the need to strike ‘a proper balance of only two dominant values: biosecurity and “open science”’ —the idea being that ‘under current conditions other values can and ought to be ignored because (...) the stakes are so high’.1With regard to , Buchanan and Kelley's main point is that policy making regarding biodefense and dual use should be seen as an ‘optimisation problem’—the aim should be to achieve the greater good of society, where all relevant values are taken into account, rather than limiting attention to just two values—security and open science—in particular. While, as other commentators have argued, it is questionable whether these authors have provided an accurate account of ethical discussion of biodefense and dual use to date, in this brief commentary my purpose is to argue that the values of security and open science should themselves be seen as proxies for other values and that solution to …. (shrink)

The dual-use issue is often framed as a series of paralyzing ‘dilemmas’ facing the scientific community as well as institutions which support innovation. While this conceptualization of the dual-use issue can be useful in certain contexts its usefulness is more limited when reflecting on the governance and politics of the dual-use issue. Within this paper, key shortcomings of the dilemma framing are outlined. It is argued that many of the issues raised in the most recent debates about (...) ‘dual-use’ bird flu research remain unresolved. This includes questions about the trajectories of certain lines of research, as well as broader trends in the practice and governance of science. This leads to difficult questions about current approaches to the dual-use issue within the US, as well as internationally. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how the responsibilities for addressing the risks of dual use research ought to be divided. We begin by presenting the maximalist claim that proposes that since scientists are well placed to judge the potential for misuse of their studies, they alone are responsible for addressing these risks. Before assessing this position, we consider a claim that rejects the maximalist position, namely that scientists need not consider the possibility that their studies might be misused (...) because the goods of science are so important, they should not spend time on anything but generating valuable knowledge. This claim, we argue, fails, as these goods do not always outweigh the risks of misuse. Given this conclusion we turn to assess two versions of the maximalist claim. The first suggests that when a possibility of misuse arises, scientists ought to adopt the precautionary principle (PP) to discharge their moral responsibilities. We argue that PP is problematic as it does not give much guidance on what scientists should do. An alternative to meeting scientists’ moral responsibilities is through applying a risk-benefit analysis; however, due to epistemic biases and limitations, scientists are prone to make mistakes in their analysis. We thus suggest an alternative approach, in which responsibilities are divided between scientists and agents that can conduct an analysis that is more likely to generate unbiased and comprehensive conclusions on how the risks of dual use research, should be addressed. (shrink)

This dissertation argues for a metaethical theory I call "Expressive-Assertivism." Expressive-Assertivism is a distinctive, substantial refinement of dual-use metaethical theories traditionally associated with R. M. Hare, C. L. Stevenson, and, more recently, with David Copp. If true, Expressive-Assertivism clarifies, resolves, or dissolves---without, in turn, raising additional difficulties---a number of philosophical problems, including what Michael Smith calls "The Moral Problem," which many consider to be the central organizing problem in contemporary metaethics. The following are the three most important features of (...) Expressive-Assertivism. ;1. The central tenet. The proper, literal use of an ethical sentence, such as 'Donating to charity is right', is the performance of a direct expressive illocutionary act and a direct assertive illocutionary act. Recognizing that ethical sentences can be used to both directly express a speaker's attitude and directly assert something about the world captures what is intuitively compelling about "expressivist" theories---namely, that there is some strong connection between a speaker's sincere moral utterance and his or her motivations to act---and what is intuitively compelling about "descriptivist" theories---namely, that moral utterances appear to have descriptive or cognitive content and, therefore, are truth-evaluable. The Central Tenet is the feature of Expressive-Assertivism that dissolves The Moral Problem. ;2. The generality principle. The proper, literal use of an ethical sentence directly expresses an attitude, not toward the subject of the sentence, but toward things of a more general kind, namely, things that have the property picked out by the ethical predicate . ;3. The extensionality principle. A speaker directly expresses an attitude toward things that have the property picked out by an ethical predicate whenever that predicate appears in any extensional context. Together, the Extensionality and Generality Principles shield Expressive-Assertivism from many objections to traditional expressivist theories, including "The Embedding Objection," which many consider to be the most difficult problem faced by expressivists. (shrink)

Claims about the transformations enabled by modern science and medicine have been accompanied by an unsettling question in recent years: might the knowledge being produced undermine--rather than further--human and animal well being? On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics examines the potential for the skills, know-how, information, and techniques associated with modern biology to serve contrasting ends. In recognition of the moral ambiguity of science and technology, each chapter considers steps that might be undertaken to prevent the deliberate (...) spread of disease. Central to achieving this aim is the consideration of what role ethics might serve. To date, the ethical analysis of the themes of this volume has been limited. This book remedies this situation by bringing together contributors from a broad range of backgrounds to address a highly important ethical issue confronting humanity during the 21st century. (shrink)

In considering how to weigh the risks and benefits of synthetic biology, Kaebnick, Gusmano, and Murray pose the question of whether there is scientific re­search that should not be funded or performed, or if there are potentially dangerous results that should not be wide­ly disseminated. Such questions, they propose, require a new set of rules and norms for knowledge generation—an “ethics of knowledge.” They identify two examples of research that might fall into a nonpermissible category, including “research that is aimed (...) at producing and dis­seminating knowledge of... how to produce more dan­gerous forms of H5N1 and smallpox.” There are already rules and norms to guide the funding and generation of scientific knowledge, however, including research on in­fluenza and smallpox. Even if more rules and guidance were added to the practice of science, potentially prob­lematic, “dual‐use” research would still occur, and as a practical matter, it is unlikely that results from those stud­ies can be contained, particularly if the research is of wide interest. (shrink)

Humanity entered the twenty-first century with revolutionary achievements in biomedical research. At the same time multiple “dual-use” results have been published. The battle against infectious diseases is meeting new challenges, with newly emerging and re-emerging infections. Both natural disaster epidemics, such as SARS, avian influenza, haemorrhagic fevers, XDR and MDR tuberculosis and many others, and the possibility of intentional mis-use, such as letters containing anthrax spores in USA, 2001, have raised awareness of the real threats. Many great men, including (...) Goethe, Spinoza, J.B. Shaw, Fr. Engels, J.F. Kennedy and others, have recognized that liberty is also a responsibility. That is why the liberty to decide now represents an acknowledged necessity: biomedical research should be supported, conducted and published with appropriate measures to prevent potential “dual use”. Biomedical scientists should work according to the ethical principles of their Code of Conduct, an analogue of Hippocrates Oath of doctors; and they should inform government, society and their juniors about the problem. National science consulting boards of experts should be created to prepare guidelines and control the problem at state level. An international board should develop minimum standards to be applicable by each country. Bio-preparedness is considered another key-measure. (shrink)

At first sight, Isocrates’ use of the term “sophist” may appear contradictory as it is associated with both a positive and a pejorative meaning. The article contends that Isocrates was not being unintentionally vague or imprecise as he deliberately used the term to refer to two disparaging groups of professional teachers or writers who, in his opinion, had nothing in common. Isocrates tended to privilege the positive meaning of the term over the negative one, considering the latter as a contemporary (...) deviation of the former. (shrink)

Scientific research that could cause grave harm, either through accident or intentional malevolence, is known as dual-use research. Recent high-profile cases of dual-use research in the life sciences have led to debate about the extent to which restrictions on the conduct and dissemination of such research may impede scientific progress. We adapt formal models of scientific networks to systematically explore the effects that different regulatory schemes may have on a community’s ability to learn about the world. Our results (...) suggest that, contrary to common wisdom, some restrictions on the conduct and dissemination of dual-use research do not inhibit scientific progress and may actually aid communities in learning. (shrink)

The technological advances of the 20th century resulted in the creation of the Internet and its introduction into everyday life on a global scale. The Internet provides access to information and the sale and purchase of goods. Medications are also subject to trade. Their sale is conducted by online pharmacies and their global turnover amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars. Medications ordered over the Internet are sent by mail all over the world. Considering the events of recent years, we (...) cannot exclude the risk of a terrorist attack through online pharmacies. Terrorists can establish such companies, legally or illegally, or acquire ones already existing. Parcels, which are highly trusted by the customers of online pharmacies, can, for example, be contaminated with dangerous materials. The sale of online medications in the international system is potentially dangerous and requires international regulation. (shrink)

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities (...) and willingness to make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Biological Weapons Convention Experiments of Concern Dual‐Use Research: The Ethical Issues Dissemination of Dual‐Use Research Results The Regulation of Dual‐Use Research An Independent Authority Conclusion.

Zusammenfassung Dual Use bezeichnet zunächst die Verwendbarkeit eines eigentlich für andere Zwecke intendierten Forschungsergebnisses oder -verfahrens für Zwecke, die die innere oder äußere Sicherheit einer Gesellschaft betreffen. Darunter fällt Forschung, die für militärische, geheimdienstliche, terroristische oder kriminelle Zwecke verwendet werden kann. _Dual Use_ stellt seit über einem Jahrzehnt ein sich beständig verschärfendes Problem für viele Bereiche der Lebenswissenschaften und der Medizin dar, weil viele von deren Ergebnissen geeignet sind aufzuzeigen, wie Menschen, aber auch (Nutz‑)Tiere und Pflanzen manipuliert und attackiert (...) werden können und welche Werkzeuge dafür besonders geeignet sind. Die Digitalisierung in den Lebenswissenschaften hat im Hinblick auf das _Dual-Use-_Problem zwei voneinander unterscheidbare Einflüsse, nämlich einen verschärfenden und einen erweiternden. Dadurch, dass die Digitalisierung schnellere und umfangreichere Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprozesse ermöglicht, verschärft sie das bestehende _Dual-Use_-Problem, weil zugleich das Tempo steigt, in dem die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung für sicherheitsrelevante Zwecke nutzbar gemacht werden können. Zudem erweitert die Digitalisierung der Lebenswissenschaften das _Dual-Use-_Problem, denn einige der digitalen Werkzeuge, die in den Lebenswissenschaften entwickelt und gebraucht werden, können selbst militärische oder sicherheitsrelevante Verwendung finden. Deshalb bedarf es einer breit angelegten Governance inklusive einer breiten Beteiligung der Stakeholder im Forschungsprozess und eines Informationsangebots zu _Dual Use_ in der Ausbildung in guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis über Institutionen, Karrierestufen und Disziplinen hinweg. (shrink)

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional (...) design principles and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. (shrink)