Discussion regarding education’s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education’s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ‘overriding’ to be explained. The (...) second associates education’s ultimate aims with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education’s ultimate aims. (shrink)

Tasos Kazepides; On Educational Aims, Curriculum Objectives and the Preparation of Teachers, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006.

The educational aims described by educational philosophers rarely embrace the full range of differences in intellectual ability, adaptive behavior, or communication that children exhibit. Because envisioned educational aims have significant consequences for how educational practices, pedagogy, and curricula are conceptualized, the failure to acknowledge and embrace differences in ability leaves open the question of the extent to which students with intellectual disabilities are subject to the same aims as their “typically-developing” peers. In articulating (...) and defending valued aims of education, educational philosophers tacitly or expressly concede that particular aims will be ill suited to many children with intellectual disabilities, and that separate aims will therefore apply to them. This paper evaluates the philosophical reasoning behind this conclusion that some people, by necessity, must be governed by separate educational aims, to be decided separately and secondarily. The author calls this the “deferral stance.” First, the paper outlines concerns about a particular ability-biased social and epistemic context in which theorizing about educational aims takes place. The author then examines assumptions that underpin the logic of deferral, arguing that the logic proves flawed when subjected to conceptual and empirical scrutiny. The paper concludes by outlining an inclusive approach—the affirmative stance—to theorizing about educational aims that resists the logic of exclusion and deferral. (shrink)

Writers on education have frequently contrasted knowledge and understanding as educational aims. I shall be prepared to defend the view that this contrast can mislead us in our thinking about education, and can direct our attention away from facts which are important to take into account in the evaluation of educational procedures.

Should we learn from the past when it comes to the aims of schooling? One is compelled to take a position on the issue of educational aims and on whether the direction of current educational practices should be based on the original goals of schooling. This article deals with the goals of introducing compulsory schooling in two contexts – Prussia and the United States. It then compares these contexts to the current aims of schooling as (...) envisioned by humanists who are critically opposed to the newest educational approaches as well as to the classical ones. This article presents the normative solutions of humanist authors, mostly building on the legacy of Nel Noddings, as well as examples and “anti-examples” in a historical context. Ultimately, the article reopens a neglected yet necessary discussion about educational aims by reaching conclusions about what sort of inspiration can be taken from the historical aims of compulsory schooling. (shrink)

Originally published in 1971, this volume examines the relationship between the history and sociology of education. History does not stand in isolation, but has much to draw from and contribute to, other disciplines. The methods and concepts of sociology, in particular, are exerting increasing influence on historical studies, especially the history of education. Since education is considered to be part of the social system, historians and sociologists have come to survey similar fields; yet each discipline appears to have its own (...) aims and methodology. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight why R. S. Peters' conceptual analysis of ‘education’ was such an important contribution to the normative field of philosophy of education. In the article, I do the following: 1) explicate Peters' conception of philosophy of education as a field of philosophy and explain his approach to the philosophical analysis of concepts; 2) emphasize several (normative) features of Peters' conception of education, while pointing to a couple of oversights; and 3) suggest how Peters' analysis might (...) be used to reinvigorate a conversation on one central educational aim—that of how we might educate citizens for the 21st century. (shrink)

This paper takes aim at strawman characterisations of non-ideal epistemology. To be precise – I pre-empt one objection to the central argument advanced by Robin McKenna in his book, ‘Non-Ideal Epistemology’. The objection I have in mind is this: all forms of choice in non-ideal epistemological settings constitute, to a greater or less extent, cases of ‘epistemic satisficing’. Epistemic satisficing,Footnote1 on my account, approximates to situations in which agents knowingly reject the better for the good enough. She chooses the good (...) enough because it realises this aim. Satisficers thus aim for good enough. Optimisers, in this case, ideal epistemologists, aim for normatively robust purist forms of epistemic rationality, free from contextually contingent constraints on epistemic options, neatly abstracted away from human cognitive limitations. The charge I try to defend non-ideal approaches from is that it permits agents to knowingly reject the better for the good enough. A large part of the problem, as I see it, rests on disambiguating epistemic satisficing, bounded rationality, and idealization projects in epistemology.Footnote2 Might non-ideal epistemologists be accused of validating those who waste their time on ‘good enough’ when they could do better?Footnote3 Contra such mischaracterisations, I defend non-ideal epistemology from the charge of inappropriate epistemic satisficing, a position in which agents knowingly reject the ‘better’ for the ‘good enough’, not because of some countervailing consideration, but because it realises agents’ aim of good enough – good enough fitting some mix of subjective/objective context-specific criterion. (shrink)

Many academics and researchers who publish scholarly articles on Plato’s philosophy of education claim that the ultimate educational goal for Plato is simply the acquisition of virtues. While such a claim may not be entirely incorrect, it is nevertheless substantially wanting; for although the acquisition of virtue is no doubt paramount, for Plato it primarily serves as a means to another end. In this paper, I aim to show that, for Plato, the final summit of all educational enterprise (...) is not really to become virtuous but rather to attain the state of becoming like God, and that is, homoiōsis theōi. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I defend a pairing of the “Epistemic Criterion” and of the “Momentousness Criterion” from a critique in Clayton and Stevens’s advocacy of the “Acceptability Requirement.” I argue that where it is valuable for people to set their own ends, they can only fully meaningfully do this in light of facts and free of misinformation. It is the duty of educators to put them in this position; it is then students' prerogative to fail to live meaningfully. While children (...) have no duty to perfect themselves, they do have a right to invent themselves, but they cannot do this is ignorance: if their life is meaningless because they chose as well as they could without being informed, then they could not truly consent to the life they undertook, and did not have a realistic chance at a meaningful life. (shrink)

For many years, the aims of education have been informed by liberalism, with an emphasis on autonomy. The aim has been to mentally equip students to be autonomous individuals, able to live self-directed lives. In this volume, international philosophers of education explore and question diverse strains of the liberal tradition, discussing not only autonomy but other key issues such as: social justice; national identity; curriculum; critical thinking; and social practices. The contributors write from a variety of standpoints, offering many (...) interpretations of what liberalism might mean in educational terms. The result is a collection of research, which is intended to stimulate debate. (shrink)

This book develops a conception of student flourishing as the overarching aim of education. Taking as its basis the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, it provides a theoretical study of the foundations of flourishing that goes well beyond Aristotle's approach. Flourishing as the Aim of Education argues that the 'good life' of the student, to which education should contribute, must involve engagement with self-transcendent ideals and ignite awe-filled enchantment. It allows for social, individual and educational variance within the concept of (...) flourishing, and it engages with a host of socio-political as well as 'spiritual' issues that are often overlooked in literature discussing character education. Each chapter closes with food for thought for practitioners who can directly facilitate student flourishing. An outgrowth of the author's previous monograph Aristotelian Character Education, this book follows new directions in questioning how to educate young people towards a life of overall flourishing. It will be of great interest to researchers, academics and post-graduate students in the fields of character education, moral education and moral philosophy, as well as to educators and policy-makers. (shrink)

In this volume, international philosophers of education explore and question diverse strains of the liberal tradition, discussing autonomy and other key issues including social justice, national identity, curriculum, critical thinking and social practices.

The aim of this paper is to revive a tradition of educational thought that identifies good judgment as the highest aim of education. It identifies sharply opposed manifestations of this tradition in the works of Aristotle and Locke, and uses these as points of departure in defending and exploring the tradition. The defense rests on the claims that the basic aim of educational institutions should be to enable people to live well and that good judgment is essential to (...) living well. The relationships between good judgment and other widely discussed educational aims are addressed, including autonomy, fulfillment of potential, and acquisition of knowledge. Curricular and pedagogical aspects of the promotion of good judgment are addressed, and the paper concludes by identifying potential benefits as well as limitations associated with the conditions of epistemic dependence. (shrink)

A technocratic model of curriculum design that has been highly influential since the middle of last century assumes that the aims of education can be, and should be: 1. Causally brought about by administering educational experiences; 2. Specified as objectives that can be attained, reached or completed; 3. Changes in students that are described in advance. Richard S. Peters argued against the first of these three tenets by making a distinction between aims that are causally brought about (...) by the means and aims that are constituted by the means. I argue that further distinctions between ways in which ends and means can be related throw doubt on the remaining two tenets. My argument against the second one rests on a distinction between open aims that cannot be completed and closed aims that can be reached. I use a third distinction, between aims as principles of design and aims as principles of reform, to show that the third tenet of the technocratic model is also suspect. I conclude that a realistic view of educational aims must take into account that they are more multifarious than envisaged by the technocratic model of curriculum design. (shrink)

Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel’s position intuitively more plausible than Goldman’s, we also find Siegel’s defence of it wanting. We (...) suggest novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel’s own arguments but look to us more promising. (shrink)

Educational Leadership and Moral Literacy situates the reader in a conversation that examines the meaning and nature of moral leadership through the lens of moral literacy and the dispositional aims of moral leadership in educational settings.

This paper considers the place of freedom in discussions of the aims of education. Bearing in mind remarks of R.S. Peters to the affect that the singling out of aims can ‘fall into the hands of rationalistically minded curriculum planners’, it begins by considering the views of Roland Reichenbach regarding Bildung and his account of this in ateleological terms. The particular place of freedom is examined in the light of the writings of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy. The (...) meaning of education in terms of ‘the leap of freedom’ is discussed. This opens the way to an account of education that is different from classical notion of educational aims. Finally, in the leap of freedom, educational practices are considered as a form of translation. (shrink)

Objectives To develop and test two educational programmes (interactive and passive) aimed at improving family doctors' (FD) prescribing practices and patient's knowledge and use of non-opioid analgesics (NOA).Methods The educational programmes were conducted in two family medicine clinics by using a three-stage approach: baseline evaluation, design, and implementation of educational activities, and post-programme evaluation. An interactive educational programme (IEP) was compared with a passive educational programme (PEP); both were participated by FDs and patients. The IEP (...) for FDs comprised of workshops, discussion groups, in-service training and guidelines, while for patients the IEP consisted of an interactive session with a video, leaflets and a discussion. The PEP consisted in delivering the guidelines to the FDs and the leaflets to patients. The effect of the programmes on the FDs was measured through the appropriateness of prescriptions and analysed using the differences-in-differences estimator (D-in-D), and on patients through changes in self-medication and in their knowledge about the proper use and adverse events by analysing the inter- and intra-group differences before and after the programmes.Results The IEP obtained better results to improve appropriate FDs prescription of NOA than PEP (D-in-D = 15%). Regarding the patients, the PEP group reached higher reduction of self-medication than the IEP group (13.4% vs. 9.1%); the knowledge of proper NOA use increased by 8.5% in both groups, whereas knowledge of NOA-related adverse events was better in the IEP (39.6%) than in the PEP group (9.2%).Conclusions The IEP was better to improve the doctors' abilities to prescribe NOAs, and both programmes improved patients' knowledge. (shrink)

This book examines education and the aim of life through the ages; how the conception of progress is the primary driving force in the modern world; and how this limited understanding of progress has failed to satisfy the deepest aspirations of humanity, bringing modern civilisation to its present crisis and highlighting the limitations of today's education to meet this crisis. The author presents the free progress system at the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education and explains how the views of (...) Sri Aurobindo and the Mother on integral education can prepare the children of today to consciously and luminously participate in the evolutionary destiny of the future. (shrink)

This book examines education and the aim of life through the ages; how the conception of progress is the primary driving force in the modern world; and how this limited understanding of progress has failed to satisfy the deepest aspirations of humanity, bringing modern civilisation to its present crisis and highlighting the limitations of today's education to meet this crisis. The author presents the free progress system at the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education and explains how the views of (...) Sri Aurobindo and the Mother on integral education can prepare the children of today to consciously and luminously participate in the evolutionary destiny of the future. (shrink)