This paper examines the contents and institutional context of August Weismann's long essay on Amphimixis (1891). Therein he presented detailed discussions of his on-going studies of reduction division and parthenogenesis, but more to the point, he included an elaborate examination of Émile Maupas's two major publications in protozoology. To understand the relevance of this part to the other two, the author briefly reviews highpoints in earlier nineteenth century protozoology and concludes that only in the mid-1870s and 1880s did protozoa (...) add an important dimension to heredity theory. Otto Bütschli and then Maupas provided Weismann with a deeper understanding of how conjugation and fertilization were related but not identical processes. This allowed him to integrate the two into a fuller understanding of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

In the period 1875-1920, a debate about the generality and applicability of evolutionary theory to all organisms was motivated by work on unicellular ciliates like Paramecium because of their peculiar nuclear dualism and life cycles. The French cytologist Emile Maupas and the German zoologist August Weismann argued in the 1880s about the evolutionary origins and functions of sex (which in the ciliates is not linked to reproduction), and death (which appeared to be the inevitable fate of lineages denied (...) sexual conjugation), an argument rooted in the question of whether the ciliates and their processes where homologous to other cellular organisms. In the beginning of the twentieth century, this question of homology came to be less important as the ciliates were used by the British protozoologist Clifford Dobell and the American zoologist Herbert Spencer Jennings to study evolutionary processes in general rather than problems of development and cytology. For them, homology mattered less than analogy. This story illustrates two partially distinct problems in evolutionary biology: first, the question of whether all living things have common features and origins; and second, whether their history and current nature can be described by identical mechanisms. Where Maupas (contra Weismann) made the ciliates qualitatively the same as all other organisms in order to create a cohesive evolutionary theory for biology, Jennings and Dobell made them qualitatively different in order to achieve the same end. (shrink)

Selections from Durkheim's writings focus on the nature of his conception of society and its moral context.

The vital status of patients who are a part of controlled donation after circulatory death (cDCD) is widely debated in bioethical literature. Opponents to currently applied cDCD protocols argue that they violate the dead donor rule, while proponents of the protocols advocate compatibility. In this article, we argue that both parties often misinterpret the moral implications of the dead donor rule. The rule as such does not require an assessment of a donor’s vital status, we contend, but rather an assessment (...) of whether procurement of organs in cDCD cause the death of the donor or not. We then argue that commonly practiced cDCD protocols do not violate the dead donor rule, since the donation does not trigger or cause the death of the donors. (shrink)

In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals , Emile Durkheim outlined the core of his theory of morality and social rights which was to dominate his work throughout the course of his life. In Durkheim's view, sociology is a science of morals which are objective social facts, and these moral regulations form the basis of individual rights and obligations. This book is crucial to an understanding of Durkheim's sociology because it contains his much-neglected theory of the state as a moral (...) institution, and it provides an understanding of his critique of anomie and egoistic individualism. The growing interest in cultural revolution and moral regulation make this edition of Durkheim's classic work especially timely. The new preface by Bryan Turner sets the book in its intellectual and historical context, and illustrates the relevance of this work to present day debates on the state, society, and moral regulation. (shrink)

Emil Fackenheim’s life work was to call upon the world at large—and on philosophers, Christians, Jews, and Germans in particular—to confront the Holocaust as an unprecedented assault on the Jewish people, Judaism, and all humanity. In this memoir, to which he was making final revisions at the time of his death, Fackenheim looks back on his life, at the profound and painful circumstances that shaped him as a philosopher and a committed Jewish thinker. Interned for three months in the Sachsenhausen (...) concentration camp after Kristallnacht, Fackenheim was released and escaped to Scotland and then to Canada, where he lived in a refugee internment camp before eventually becoming a congregational rabbi and then, for thirty-five years, a professor of philosophy. He recalls here what it meant to be a German Jew in North America, the desperate need to respond to the crisis in Europe and to cope with its overwhelming implications for Jewish identity and community. His second great turning point came in 1967, as he saw Jews threatened with another Holocaust, this time in Israel. This crisis led him on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and ultimately back to Germany, where he continued to grapple with the question, How can the Jewish faith—and the Christian faith—exist after the Holocaust? “An ‘epoch-making’ autobiography.”—Arnold Ages, _Jewish Tribune_. (shrink)

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was one of the founders of modern sociology. Ethics and the Sociology of Morals (La science positive de la morale en Allemagne) laid the foundation for Durkheim's future work. More than a review of current thought, it was a proclamation that ethics needed to be liberated from its philosophical bondage and developed as a distinct branch of sociology. Written when Durkheim was charting the course of his own research, it provides a unique key to the interpretation (...) of his earlier work and presents a number of points of Durkheim's ethical theory which are of considerable interest in light of current ethical theory. This volume makes available in English a crucial essay by a master of social thought. (shrink)

Emile Durkheim's "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale," written in 1899 during the Dreyfus Affair in France, is introduced. The introduction summarizes the principal contributions that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" makes to the sociology of anti-Semitism, relates those contributions to Durkheim's broader theoretical assumptions and concerns, situates his analysis of anti-Semitism in its social and historical context, contrasts it to other analyses of anti-Semitism (Marxist and Zionist) that were prominent in Durkheim's time, indicates some of the revisions and additions that a (...) fuller and more complete Durkheimian theory of anti-Semitism would entail, and highlights the significance of Durkheim's ideas for the contemporary study of ethnic and racial antagonism. While noting the limitations of Durkheim's analysis, the introduction concludes that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" has sadly regained its relevance in the light of a revival of anti-Semitism at the turn of the millennium. (shrink)

_Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings in Social Theory_ includes reissues of three seminal works by eminent French thinker Emile Durkheim, one of the founding father s of Sociology. This collection brings together the following import sociological works: _Sociology and Philosophy_, which first appeared in English in 1953; the hugely influential _Socialism and Saint-Simon_, first published in English in 1959; and Durkheim’s book with Marcel Mauss on sociological classification, entitled _Primitive Classification_, whose first English publication was in 1969.

We show that \, the basic theory of bounded arithmetic corresponding to the complexity class \, proves the \ axiom expressing the totality of iterated multiplication satisfying its recursive definition, by formalizing a suitable version of the \ iterated multiplication algorithm by Hesse, Allender, and Barrington. As a consequence, \ can also prove the integer division axiom, and the \-translation of induction and minimization for sharply bounded formulas. Similar consequences hold for the related theories \ and \. As a side (...) result, we also prove that there is a well-behaved \ definition of modular powering in \\). (shrink)

We show that $$VTC ^0$$, the basic theory of bounded arithmetic corresponding to the complexity class $$\mathrm {TC}^0$$, proves the $$IMUL$$ axiom expressing the totality of iterated multiplication satisfying its recursive definition, by formalizing a suitable version of the $$\mathrm {TC}^0$$ iterated multiplication algorithm by Hesse, Allender, and Barrington. As a consequence, $$VTC ^0$$ can also prove the integer division axiom, and (by our previous results) the $$RSUV$$ -translation of induction and minimization for sharply (...) bounded formulas. Similar consequences hold for the related theories $$\Delta ^b_1\text{- } CR$$ and $$C^0_2$$. As a side result, we also prove that there is a well-behaved $$\Delta _0$$ definition of modular powering in $$I\Delta _0+ WPHP (\Delta _0)$$. (shrink)

Positive ignorance is the putting in to question of, and sometimes moving on from, the knowledge we think we have, and asking where it might be just or helpful to do so. Drawing primarily on the work of Barbara Johnson, this article shows how the notion of positive ignorance might be offered as a tool in the context of education and educational research. Partly a critical development of Richard Smith's argument in ‘The Virtues of Unknowing’, I attempt to understand ‘unknowing’ (...) as an active rather than passive form of ‘not knowing’, in a manner that challenges some aspects of ‘the virtues of unknowing’ and its concomitant epistemological and ethical positions, not least those tied to Smith's advocacy for what he calls the ‘well-stocked mind’. Unknowing, in my reading, is not a dispositional acceptance of the desirability of nonknowledge, instead, unknowing is a means of epistemological resistance, especially against that which, often with very real social and political consequences, is presented as self-evident. (shrink)

In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to 'sink (...) virtually all orthodox solutions', and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds. (shrink)

This paper asks the question of how we can situate the educational subject in what Luciano Floridi has defined as an ‘informational ontology’. It will suggest that Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler offer paths toward rethinking the educational subject that lend themselves to an informational future, as well as speculating on how, with this knowledge, we can educate to best equip ourselves and others for our increasingly digital world. Jacques Derrida thought the concept of the subject was ‘indispensable’ as a (...) function but did not subscribe to or accept any particular theory of how a subject could be defined or developed because it was always situated in and as a context. Following Derrida, Bernard Stiegler explains in Technics and Time: 1 that ‘the relation binding the “who” and the “what” is invention’. As such, the separation between self and world can be seen as artificial, including if this world is perceived wholly or partly as technological, digital or informational. If this is the case, a responsibility is placed on the educator and their part in ‘inventing’ this distinction for future generations. How this invention of the educational subject is negotiated is therefore one the many philosophical tasks for digital pedagogy. (shrink)

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is a genuine conflict between the views of geometry defended by Hume in the Treatise and in the Enquiry: while the former work attributes to geometry a different status from that of arithmetic and algebra, the latter attempts to restore its status as an exact and certain science. A closer reading of Hume shows that, in fact, there is no conflict between the two works with respect to geometry. The key to understanding Hume's view (...) of geometry is the distinction he draws between two standards of equality in extension. (shrink)

S'il est vrai qu'aucune passion, aucun souci ne résistent à la sérénité qu'apporte à l'esprit la discipline mathématique, c'est faire une cure de sérénité que lire le nouvel ouvrage d'Émile Borel, qui s'est proposé de raconter, dans ses traits essentiels, l'histoire des relations entre les mathématiciens et la notion d'infini. La première partie du livre relate les circonstances où s'est produite la rencontre des mathématiciens et de l'infini, en Grèce, quelques siècles avant l'ère chrétienne (Zénon, cruel Zénon!). La deuxième partie (...) expose la conquête et l'organisation de l'infini par les mathématiciens modernes, du XVIe au XIXe siècle. La troisième partie, enfin, étudie les plus importantes des difficultés et les divergences de vues qui se sont présentées dans les temps actuels lorsqu'on a cherché à préciser et à approfondir les résultats acquis sur l'infini mathématique. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION In ita original form the present paper was presented to the American Mathematical Society, April 2k,, as a companion piece to the writer's ...

In this contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium on Richard Rorty, the author attempts to identify what he calls “the heart of Rortyism.” Beginning with Rorty's query, as an undergraduate, about “what, if anything, philosophy is good for,” Višňovský associates this question, as Rorty did throughout his career, with the question of the meaning of human life. On the basis of this association—the association of a seriously, consistently pursued metaphilosophy with a defense of humanity against all comers, including theology and (...) science—Rorty moved methodically through the arguments of the “Linguistic Turn” analysts, the pragmatists, the antirepresentationalists, and postmodernists until he achieved an anti-absolutist, antiauthoritarian humanism all his own. (shrink)

In his book The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan Kvanvig argues that there is an interchangeability of personal and doxastic justification, which ‘blocks the quick route to virtue epistemology’. To prove that personal justification is reducible to doxastic justification, he utilizes λ-calculus expressions that aim to show the logical equivalence of the two notions of justification. In this paper, I argue that he has made an illegitimate move (...) in his translation of the ordinary talk of personal justification into λ-expressions because his translation involves both an elimination from and an addition to the ordinary language. Pace Kvanvig, there is no logical equivalence of personal to doxastic justification. So, his argument for the reducibility of personal to doxastic justification founders. More importantly, since he has failed to disprove that personal justification is irreducibly primitive, he hasn’t shown that the prospects for virtue epistemology are ‘hopeless’. (shrink)

The enthusiasm for research in an Indigenous context has led to the introduction of formal guidelines for researchers to visit communities. While welcome, this has not been achieved without increased bureaucratization of research relationships. It appears that many Indigenous communities, with their limited resources, are ill-equipped to deal with the administrative imperatives of Indigenous research protocols. Based on the experiences of anthropological field research in the Innu context, this article shows how respectful research relationships could be established outside the bureaucratic (...) and administrative framework generally advocated by research protocols. The heart of this approach lies in the researcher’s radical participation in social life, and more specifically in taking seriously the social premises of the people with whom he works. The mistake would be to think that this collaborative approach is situated in informality: rather, it takes place within an eminently formal framework that corresponds to the criteria and values of the researcher’s Indigenous collaborators. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Continuum Companion to PragmatismEmil VišvovskýSami Pihlström, ed. The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism London and New York: Continuum, 2011, xv + 307 pp., includes index.The scholarship on pragmatism has been burgeoning over the past few decades, and a host of books and papers is being published all over the globe, not only within the US, the country of its origin. One of the results (and motivations) has been (...) that pragmatists themselves have started to understand their own philosophy better, which is not to be wondered since pragmatism over the course of its more than a century-long history has been causing confusion even among its own proponents, let alone outsiders. What still is required are new readings of pragmatism, both historical and systematic.Within the context of several recently published volumes that can serve as companions to pragmatism (or American philosophy) of various kinds,1 the present book is special in a number of ways. First of all, [End Page 234] the fact that this companion has been edited by a non-American pragmatist (when there certainly must have been many American candidates for the editorship) is unusual and may serve as a timely "Europeanization" of pragmatism, not only because of its strong emphasis on the Kantian link but also as a companion that finally depicts pragmatism as a school of Western philosophy not so far removed from the interests and intentions of the traditional Continental as well as the British analytic school. This timely volume definitely shows it is high time to close the gap dividing the most relevant Western philosophies. The old story of pragmatism as an exclusively American philosophy should be overturned as should the story of pragmatism as rival to those other philosophical "adversaries," mostly Continental metaphysics and Analytic epistemology. Pragmatism is not an anti-philosophy that aims to do away with all the others, as well as itself, in the final battle at the end of philosophy. Pragmatism is neither menace nor jeopardy for the rest of philosophy (despite the fact that such sentiments toward it might still be felt elsewhere). Rather, pragmatism is the continuation of philosophy via its transformation, more or less radical. And, as must be stressed at this point, the philosophical spirit of pragmatism is cooperative while its philosophical style is via media.Further, it is important to develop pragmatist scholarship outside the US, especially in Europe, where resistance toward pragmatism (no matter whether for good or bad reasons) is considerable even today. Thus pragmatism will have no chance unless it shows its ability and competence to provide its own philosophical outlook on all traditional philosophical issues. And this, again, is perhaps more important especially without the US, because the question "how to be a pragmatist in a non-pragmatist milieu?" is very pertinent there. Europeans are still philosophically Eurocentric and unfavorably inclined toward other schools and styles of thought, let alone "American pragmatism", which is tinged with the hint of a bad name, American cultural and political imperialism, etc. If you want to work on pragmatism in Europe, you will have to demonstrate (if possible) that you are not an American agent (or worse, a spy) and that via pragmatism you do not propagate anything of "Americanism" through which you intend to colonize and conquer all those Europeans. Since philosophy is a cultural phenomenon, it is always difficult to delineate the two, but it must be done because philosophy is not identical with any culture and can stand in critical opposition to it. The latter is certainly the case with pragmatism and its relationship to its domestic culture. In this context, the distinction that James Campbell (p. 69) makes at the beginning of his short chapter on the history of pragmatism, peppered with interesting and fresh insights, is crucial. The following caveat should be borne in mind every time the term "pragmatism" is used: pragmatism outside philosophy means two things: 1. "the simple practicalism of the traditional [End Page 235] American lifestyle" involving "popular anti-intellectualism that sees action as more important than thinking," or simply activism in opposition to idleness; and 2. "shallow opportunism," whose only goal is personal success, which is present... (shrink)