Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a (...) novel version of epistemic consequentialism which avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least in part on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive makeup places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.

En esta ponencia nos proponemos mostrar que ciertas tesis o consensos recibidos sobre pseudoprocesos causales , procesos cuya característica prominente parece ser superar la velocidad de la luz, deben ser cuestionados o seriamente modificados. Dos de dichos consensos son, primero, que los PSP deberían ser tratados simplemente como "basura espacio-temporal" y, segundo, que ellos no cumplen, aparte de permitir aislar procesos causales genuinos, ninguna función epistémica o metodológica en la descripción de cualquier estado físico, en particular, al interior de la (...) relatividad especial . Para ello, apelaremos a procedimientos de medición física bien conocidos tanto en física clásica como en RE. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, argumentamos que, una vez que los PSP son integrados en toda la escena física, se revela que ellos juegan un rol fundamental y más complejo en la física experimental de lo que hasta ahora se ha pensado. In this paper we show that some received contentions about causal pseudo processes , processes of which the most salient aspect seems to be travelling faster than the speed of light, must be rejected o seriously modified. Two of such contentions are, first, that PSPs should be considered just "spatiotemporal junk" and, second, that they do not meet, besides allowing us to isolate proper genuine causal processes, any other epistemic or methodological role in the description of a physical state of affair, in particular, in a special relativity setting. In order to do that, we are going to appeal to physical measure procedures, well known both in classic and relativistic physics. As a consequence of that, we contend that, once PSPs are integrated into the whole physical scenario, a fundamental and more complex role for them in experimental physics is revealed. (shrink)

Rebecca Brown and Julian Savulescu argue in ‘Responsibility in Healthcare Across Time and Agents’ that if responsibility should play a crucial role in healthcare, then we need a concept of responsibility that reflects that an individual’s behaviour is sometimes, if not routinely, influenced by external factors in various ways. As Brown and Savulescu convincingly show, health-related behaviour in particular is often affected by other agents and typically involves multiple decisions on different occasions. Smoking and a poor diet are but two (...) examples where these factors are salient. Since health-related behaviour is often influenced by others, and often spread out over time, a notion of responsibility that does not take these two factors into account will be inadequate. In this comment to their paper I wish to raise an issue concerning Brown and Savulescu’s characterisation of individual responsibility for health-related behaviour that involves multiple choices by the same agent over a period of time. For simple acts—smoking a cigarette or eating some junk food for example—Brown and Savulescu assume two necessary conditions for responsibility: a ‘control condition’ and a ‘epistemic condition’. These conditions are intended to capture the plausible idea that …. (shrink)

Epistemologists have recently proposed a number of norms governing rational inquiry. My aim in this paper is to unify and explain recently proposed norms of inquiry by developing a general account of the conditions under which inquiries are rational, analogous to theories such as evidentialism and reliabilism for rational belief. I begin with a reason-responsiveness conception of rationality as responding correctly to possessed normative reasons. I extend this account with a series of claims about the normative reasons for inquiry that (...) we possess. I apply the account to shed light on two classes of norms that have featured prominently in recent discussions: norms of clutter avoidance forbidding agents from engaging in trivial inquiries, and norms of logical non-omniscience governing properties such as the deductive closure and consistency of an agent's belief state. I conclude with a discussion of the sense in which norms of inquiry should be regarded as epistemic norms. (shrink)

Despite being a major theorist of post-war Marxism in the German-speaking world, Leo Kofler remains largely unknown outside of it. This volume introduces his work and life and presents six of Kofler’s essays in English for the first time.

Ziel des PVS Sonderheftes ist es, die seit einiger Zeit boomende Konjunktur des Verantwortungsbegriffs zu reflektieren, die Relevanz dieses Begriffes zu analysieren und seinen Wandel angesichts gesellschaftlicher und technischer Veranderungen zu erfassen. Eines der wichtigsten Kriterien zur Beurteilung politischer Entscheidungen ist deren Verantwortlichkeit. Der Begriff der Verantwortung bezieht sich auf einen Rahmen normativer Erwartungen, die je nach Politikfeld starker rechtlich oder moralisch ausgepragt sind. Verantwortung bedeutet insbesondere, einem Akteur die Folgen seines Handels zuschreiben zu konnen. Ein Kernproblem aktueller Verantwortungskonzeptionen besteht (...) in der Diffusion von Verantwortung. Einerseits sind immer mehr Akteure an immer mehr Handlungszusammenhangen beteiligt, aber gleichzeitig sind immer weniger Akteure fur ihre Handlungsfolgen allein verantwortlich. Die Beitrage des Heftes diskutieren die Folgen dieser Dilemmata sowohl in ihren theoretischen Konsequenzen als auch empirisch anhand verschiedener Felder lokaler, nationaler und internationaler Politik. Der Band versammelt Expertinnen und Experten aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen: von der Politikwissenschaft uber die Rechtswissenschaft bis hin zur Soziologie und Philosophie. (shrink)

All parts of mereologically ‘gunky’ entities have proper parts. All parts relevant to mereologically ‘junky’ entities *are* proper parts. This essay explores the application of gunk and junk beyond the standard category of material object. One such application yields what is here dubbed ‘deep’ gunk and junk: a material entity x all of whose intrinsic elements from any fundamental ontological category C either have proper parts from C that also are intrinsic elements of x, or are proper parts (...) of entities from C that also are intrinsic elements of x. In addition to being independently interesting, these mereological structures pose a challenge to the bare particular ontology of substance. For bare particulars standardly are assumed to be mereologically simple, yet a deep gunky or junky entity requires any associated bare particulars to be complex. The essay closes by examining the bare particular theorist’s prospects for answering this challenge. (shrink)

Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn [2009], which proceeds from the incompatibility of junk with universalism and the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on ; however, recent authors have cast doubt on . This paper undertakes a defence of premise against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the (...) effect that Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa [2012], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Noël Carroll THE PARADOX OFJUNK FICTION Perhaps on your way to some academic conference, if you had no papers to grade, you stopped in die airport gift shop for something to read on the plane. You saw racks of novels authored by die likes of Mary Higgins Clark, Michael Crichton, John Grisham, Danielle Steele, Sidney Sheldon, Stephen King, Sue Grafton, Elmore Leonard, Sara Paretsky, Tom Clancy, and so on. (...) These are the kinds of novels that, when you lend them to friends, you don't care, unless you live in Bowling Green, Ohio, whether you ever get them back. They are mass, popular fictions. In another era, they would have been called pulp fictions. Following Thomas Roberts,1 I will call diem junk fictions, under which rubric I will also include things like Harlequin romances; sci-fi, horror, and mystery magazines; comic books; and broadcast narratives on either the radio or TV, as well as commercial movies. There are a number of interesting philosophical questions diat we may ask aboutjunk fiction. We could, for example, attempt to characterize its essential features. However, for the present, I will assume that the preceding examples are enough to provide you with a rough-andready notion of what I am calling junk fiction, and I will attempt to explore anotiier feature of the phenomenon, viz., what I call the paradox ofjunk fiction. Thejunk fictions that I have in mind are all narratives. Indeed, dieir story dimension is die most important thing about diem. Stephen King, for instance, makes diis point by saying that he is primarily a story teller rather than a writer. Junk fictions aspire to be page-turners—the blurb on the cover of Stillwatch by Mary Higgins Clark says that it is "designed to be read at breatiitaking speed"—and what motivates turning die page so quickly is our interest in what happens next. We do not dawdle Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 225-241 226Philosophy and Literature over Clark's diction as we might over Updike's nor do we savor die complexity of her sentence structure, as we do widi Virginia Woolfs. Radier, we read for story. Moreover, junk fictions are die sort of narratives that commentators are wont to call formulaic. That is, junk fictions generally belong to well-entrenched genres, which diemselves are typified by tiieir possession of an extremely limited repertoire of story-types. For example, as John Cawelti has pointed out, one such recurring Western narrative is diat of the recendy pacifist gunfighter, like Shane, who is forced by circumstances to take up his pistols again, widi altogedier devastating effect.2 Junk fictions tell diese generic stories again and again with minor variations. Sometimes diese variations may be quite clever and unexpected. Agatiia Christie was the master of this; she was able to use the conventions of the mystery genre in order to "hide" her murderers. In TheMurderofRogerAckroyd, she "secrets" the murderer in the personage of the narrator; in Ten Little Indians, die murderer is a "dead man"; while in Murder on the Orient Express, all the suspects did it. In each of these cases, Christie's brilliance hinges upon her playing (and preying) upon conventional expectations. Neverdieless, even diese surprising variations require a well-established background of narrative forms. That is, in order to appreciate diese variations, die reader must in some sense know die standard story already. And with junk fiction, it is generally fair to say that in some sense, the reader—or, at least, the reader who has read around in die genre before—knows in rough oudine how die story is likely to go. Readers and/or viewers of Jurassic Park surmised, once die dinosaur enclosures were described, diat in fairly short order die dinosaurs would trample them down and go on the rampage—after all we had already seen or read The Lost World, King Kong, and their progeny. So, junk fictions are formulaic. They rehearse certain narrative formats again and again. And, furthermore, in some very general sense, the audience already knows die story in question. But this knowledge on die part of die audience provokes a question, specifically, why if the reader, viewer or listener already... (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 44-61, March 2022.

There is a widespread practice of using evidence obtained from conceiving/imagining for establishing possibility claims. As a case study. I offer a critical reconstruction of an influential conceivability argument, Bohn’s (Philosophical Quarterly 59:193-201, 2009a, Analysis 70:296–298, 2009b, Analysis 70:296-298, 2010) argument for junk (there are proper parts forming wholes, but there is no whole that is not a proper part itself). The most influential scenario used by Bohn and his successors is purported to be junk but not ensured (...) to be junk. This finding calls for an explanation. I distinguish ways of conceiving/imagining that are insufficient to establish modal claims from positive conceiving/imagining, which is more promising. Positive conceiving/imagining often works by a partial structural isomorphy to its target, and it is sufficiently detailed. In order to be sufficiently detailed, it has to properly integrate theoretical considerations. I outline a concern about extant ways of conceiving/imagining junk: they do not yet include a metaphysical understanding of what it takes for there to be proper parts and wholes without a whole that is not a proper part itself, for instance in terms of a non-gerrymandered principle of composition. (shrink)

In Being and Time the broken piece of equipment (§ 16) or the dead body of an Other (§ 47) were seen as resulting from a process of transition (Übergang) between an original state and a position not so removed from it that one had to do with something entirely different. ‚The Origin of the Work of Art‘ takes a more radical approach: rather than leading toward a ‚no longer, but not yet‘, the movement here is toward a ‚no longer, (...) but already‘. Hence its famous thesis: either art is at work, or it is no longer art and already a mere object of art, a piece of art. Contrary to those of Heidegger’s readers who have suggested that his earlier views on transition would have saved him some of the (i.e. political) trouble the art essay runs into, the present paper aims to show that both the earlier and the later view fail to come to terms with what happens in transition as such. This is illustrated by an analysis of the corpse (ad BT § 47), and of junk (ad BT § 16) and leads us to a different approach to what is at stake in art and in the kind of Darstellung exemplified by it. (shrink)

Recently, Jonathan Tallant has argued that we should reject priority views, which hold that some objects are fundamental and others are dependent. Tallant’s argument relies on two proposed mereological possibilities: a gunky world, where everything has a proper part, and a junky world, where everything is a proper part. In this paper, I criticise Tallant’s argument and argue that neither of these possibilities threaten priority views per se; at most, they threaten only particular forms of priority views that contain a (...) certain independently controversial assumption. First, I defend priority pluralism against the gunk argument: the genuine conceivability of gunk can be plausibly doubted on the basis of a certain principle concerning metaphysical possibility, and even if this principle is false, the possibility of a gunky world poses no devastative problem for pluralism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonatomism. Second, I defend priority monism against the junk argument: the possibility of a junky world poses no devastative problem for monism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonholism in a twofold sense. Finally, I show that even monism as defined as genuinely holistic can be plausibly defended against the junk argument once the claim of the possible nonexistence of the maximal whole is reinterpreted based on the priority-based conception of existence. (shrink)

The distinction between causal role and selected effect functions is typically framed in terms of their respective explanatory roles. However, much of the controversy over functions in genomics takes place in an investigative, not an explanatory context. Specifically, the process of component-driven functional investigation begins with the designation of some genetic or epigenetic element as functional —i.e. not junk— because it possesses properties that, arguably, suggest some biologically interesting organismal effect. The investigative process then proceeds, in a bottom-up fashion, (...) to search for those effects. I argue that this process encounters a problem reminiscent of one that Gould and Lewontin associated with the adaptationist program. Just as their stereotypical adaptationst became trapped in the myopic pursuit of one selectionist hypothesis after another, so can the investigation of CR functions in genomics lead to an unending series putative organism-level CR functions for junk DNA. This is an acute problem for genomics, because eukaryotic genomes are littered with transposable elements and their deactivated descendants which often masquerade as interesting CR-functional components and it is experimentally onerous to determine whether they lack such a function. I further argue that selectionist reasoning about TE-host coevolutionary dynamics can greatly streamline the investigative process. Importantly, selectionist hypotheses need not be well confirmed to be illuminating in this context. Informed selectionist reasoning about the strategic roles of TEs in the genome offers a corrective to the idea that most of our DNA is somehow CR functional for the organism. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 59-61, December 2011.

Although ecumenical dialogue has highlighted many commonalities between Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox, many issues still remain contentious. One often recurring suspicion is that the Protestant idea of sola scriptura inevitably leads to an individualistic religiosity, neglecting the importance of the divinely guided Christian tradition and Christian church teaching for understanding the Bible. In this article, I relate this critique to the idea of “epistemic egoism”, as defined by Linda Zagzebski, and develop an alternative Protestant social epistemology based on tradition (...) as the “democracy of the dead”, error-corrected by sola scriptura. I test this Protestant theological epistemology against two recent criticisms: (1) the “Conciliar Argument Against Protestantism” (CAAP), arguing that Protestantism fails to provide consistent criteria for valuing conciliar authority as a guide to biblical interpretation, and (2) the “Scriptural Argument Against Dogmatic Protestantism”, arguing that sola scriptura, when understood in light of theological disagreement, ultimately becomes self-refuting in the absence of properly guiding theological authority. I argue, however, that sola scriptura is compatible with assigning an important epistemic role to both tradition and community, and that Protestant principles of theological reasoning can be defended further using recent theories in social epistemology. (shrink)

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created (...) by the default skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

In recent years, identity theft has been growing in the academic world. Cybercriminals create fake profiles for prominent scientists in attempts to manipulate the review and publishing process. Without permission, some fraudulent journals use the names of standout researchers on their editorial boards in the effort to look legitimate. This opinion piece, highlights some of the usual types of identity theft and their role in spreading junk science. Some general guidelines that editors and researchers can use against such attacks (...) are presented. (shrink)

The article considers the thesis of epistemic dependence, which problematizes the current ideas about the nature of knowledge, its historical and methodological premises. It shows both undesirable consequences of its uncritical acceptance (such as a possible gap between knowledge and understanding) and the possibility of its interpretation in a more general social context, as a conflict of epistemic interests. It also highlights the need to consider this phenomenon in the analysis of collective knowledge and collective rationality.

A classic challenge for any theory of physical causation based on conserved quantities and formulated within the framework of special relativity theory, has been to distinguish two regions, that of genuine causal relationships and that of those spurious or noncausal ones. In the causal processes theory defended by P. Dowe, this is done by introducing a criterion based on the possession of a conserved quantity, which would seem to efficiently demarcate between causal processes and causal pseudoprocesses. However, faced with criticism (...) about the inadequacy of his criteria, Dowe has proposed modifying his physical ontology and introducing, along with processes and pseudo-processes, two types of physical gerrymander entities, both temporal and spatial. In this article, we analyze and criticize, from the perspective of ERT, Dowe’s characterization of these quasi-entities and the theoretical need to make a clear-cut distinction between them. This implies a fundamental modification of Dowe's ontology and raises other doubts about its original motivation. (shrink)

The predominant use of junk food in our societies is continuously held responsible for the obese body physiques and overweight among the kids and adolescents. The current supportive environments where organic foods are limited, and new processed foods have been brought to the market with more variant tastes and acceptability for the kids and adolescents that have diverged their eating patterns. It has significantly contributed to the health issues and growth discrepancies of the users. However, the awareness of the (...) food contents is an important milestone for understanding the risks associated with the usage of junk foods. A quantitative approach has been used in this study to measure the effect of perceived severity, vulnerability and fear on the junk food eating behaviors and ultimately on the obesity. The moderating role of product knowledge hiding has also been measured on the relationship of junk food eating and obesity. Structural equation modeling is used using the software Smart-PLS for measuring the hypothesis with a sample size of 228 selected through purposive sampling. The sample consisted of kids and adolescents who were reached on purpose for data collection. The current study has explored the role of perceived severity, vulnerability and the fear of using junk foods which have been found as a negative effect on junk food eating behavior which is positively associated with obesity among the kids and adolescents. The result of study shows that perceived threat has a negative effect on the junk food eating behavior of the adolescents. However, the positive relationship of junk food eating behavior with obesity can be decreased if the information about the products is not hidden. This study will be useful for making the consumers aware of the product knowledge hiding of the junk food usage. Moreover, it will help the users in creating understanding of risks allied with the use of junk food which may be addressed in order to avoid obesity issues in the kids and adolescents globally. (shrink)