From Dawn till Dusk embraces the conceptual challenges often associated with Bioethics by taking the reader on a journey that embodies the circle of life and what it means to be human. The beginning and the end of life have always been an impossible riddle to humans. Bioethics does not aspire to unveil utter truths regarding the purpose of our existence; on the contrary, its task is to settle controversial issues that arise within this finite, very fragile and vulnerable life, (...) yet a life we still have to live. This book discusses thorny ethical issues that transcend time and are related to the dawn and the dusk of life: abortion and infanticide, genetic engineering, human reproductive cloning, the fear of death, rational suicide, and the right to die. The book's highest aspiration, though, is to both provide the reader with an opportunity to see the world from different perspectives and to showcase the irresistible charms of bioethical debates. (shrink)

I will discuss the prospect of pharmaceutically enhancing human morality and decision making in such a way as to eliminate morally unjustifiable choices and promote desirable ones. Our species in the relatively short period since it has emerged has enormously advanced in knowledge, science, and technical progress. When it comes to moral development, the distance it has covered is almost negligible. What if we could medically accelerate our moral development? What if we could once and for all render our species (...) totally immune to certain vices? I will examine whether pharmaceutically intervening in human morality would compromise the autonomy of moral agents. I will argue that the argument from the autonomy of the moral agent is neither stable nor convincing. In the light of Kantian ethics we might consider moral enhancement by pharmaceutical means to be a perfect duty for moral agents. (shrink)

This article explores how Plato, in his “metaphysical” dialogues, sees the specific properties of motion (and especially of motion in music), which lend themselves to adaptation for the purposes of maintaining or restoring the health of the soul. Plato explores the property of regular or rhythmic motion in particular. The attention has been drawn to the analogy between the calming effect of music, at the human level, and the Demiurge’s achievement in willing the world into existence. The focus of the (...) article lays on the Laws, in which the principle of musical motion plays a central role in resolution of the contradictions between material and spiritual, natural and physiological, medical and educative. (shrink)

Le dualisme de Braïlas (1812–1884) qui fut l’unique partisan de Victor Cousin (1792–1867) à avoir, après lui, constitué un système philosophique complet, est un dualisme modéré, du fait qu’en premier lieu, entre la matière et l’esprit, tout un groupe d’activités de la conscience humaine y est censé s’interpoler; qu’en deuxième lieu, le dogmatisme rationaliste braïlien est fondé sur une correspondance rigoureuse entre l’ordre universel et l’ordre rationnel, qui n’est guère dérangé que par l’intuition d’un ordre supérieur et plus parfait, conçu (...) et reproduit par l’imagination, grâce à des processus créationnels; et qu’en troisième lieu, la philosophie braïlienne, quant à ses caractères dominants, s’avère, surtout du point de vue épistémologique, non pas une application servile, mais, par contre, une considération critique des thèses de l’éclectisme cousinien. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article probes Jonathan Israel’s theory about ‘Radical Enlightenment’ inaugurating political modernity by way of explicating the thought of Joseph Priestley. In Israel’s view, despite the inconsistencies plaguing Socinian thought, Priestley, a monist, emerged as an ardent supporter of religious toleration and democratic republicanism. This article seeks to restore the fundamental coherence of Priestley’s theological and metaphysical views, arguing that they were produced as parts of a system founded on the simultaneous adherence to providentialism and necessitarianism. Prized as a prerequisite (...) of the unfolding of the divine plan, the unobstructed expression of religious opinions was the centre of the conception of civil society and civil liberty that Priestley articulated based on these premises and his forays into politics aimed to secure its permanence. A comparison of Priestley’s stance on the issue of manhood suffrage with that of Richard Price reveals not the materialist Priestley, but Price, a dualist, as an advocate of democratization and casts into doubt the applicability of Israel’s scheme in the case of England. The article closes with some suggestions towards reappraising the relationship between Enlightenment and modernity. (shrink)

Reportedly ever since Pythagoras, but possibly much earlier, humans have been concerned about the way non human animals (henceforward “animals” for convenience) should be treated. By late antiquity all main traditions with regard to this issue had already been established and consolidated, and were only slightly modified during the centuries that followed. Until the nineteenth century philosophers tended to focus primarily on the ontological status of animals, to wit on whether – and to what degree – animals are actually rational (...) beings; accordingly they allowed – or denied – them some kind of moral standing. This modus operandi was for the first time seriously questioned by Jeremy Bentham, who put the issue on a different track. If the question, as Bentham suggested, is not if animals can think or speak, but if they can suffer1, then it seems plausible that moral agents ought to abstain from inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals; in other words, humans might have at least one – even limited – moral duty towards animals. And if this, in turn, is true, then animals should arguably be allowed the commensurate moral right, namely the right not to be inflicted unnecessary pain. Then, if animals possess this right, they could probably possess others, as well. This is how grosso modo the issue of animal rights became a pivotal part of the discussion concerning animal ethics. Bentham himself, of course, wouldn’t have gone that far; to him even the idea of human rights sounded like “simple… rhetorical nonsense upon stilts”.2 It was mostly due to his views, however, that the debate was moved from the way things actually are to the way things should ideally be – thus merging into what, in my view, should always have been: one primarily concerning ethics. (shrink)

The debate concerning abortion abounds in miraculous narratives. Judith Jarvis Thomson has contrived the most celebrated set among related ones, to wit the “violinist analogy,” the “Good Samaritan” narrative, and the “Henry Fonda” allegory, by virtue of which, she intends, on the one hand, to argue that women’s right to autonomy outweighs the alleged fetus’s right to life, and on the other, to prove that no positive moral duties can be derived towards other persons alone from the fact that a (...) moral agent is ascribed certain rights. What this short paper endeavors to prove is that Thomson’s argumentation by analogy is a weak one, since neither the number nor the relevance of similarities invoked is adequate or satisfactory, while crucial parameters concerning the morality of abortion are being totally overlooked. (shrink)

Climate change – and its most dangerous consequence, the rapid overheating of the planet – is not the offspring of a natural procedure; instead, it is human-induced. It is only the aftermath of a specific pattern of conomic development, one that focuses mainly on economic growth rather than on quality of life and sustainability. Since climate change is a major threat not only to millions of humans, but also to numerous non-human species and other forms of life, as well as (...) to the equilibrium and the viability of the very planet, addressing it is of dire importance. In this chapter it will be argued that addressing the threat of climate change is primarily a task and a challenge for ethics, since the stabilization and gradual amelioration of the situation requires abandoning an up to now dominant model of life, longestablished customs and a so far cogent system of moral values. It will be further maintained that this for ethics might – or, even, should – become a new categorical imperative, since preserving the viability of the planet is a fundamental moral duty not only towards the existing members of the moral community, but also towards future generations. (shrink)

Since the inception of the euthanasia debate, the differentiation be-tween active and passive euthanasia – distinguishing between “let-ting die” and “actively killing” – has emerged as a central point of contention. In this paper, we will contend that: a) the boundary be-tween active and passive euthanasia is inherently nebulous, b) there exists no morally substantive disparity between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if such a disparity could be admitted, it would probably favor active euthanasia over passive. We will seek (...) support for this final claim of ours in the three principal traditions of norma-tive ethics, namely deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

A common metaphor on our planet portrays it as a rescue boat for life that travels in an endless see of cosmic darkness. If this metaphor is to be considered a precise one, this would mean that the earth is the only chance for life to survive the journey – at least as far as animal life is concerned. Apart from this, however, the metaphor implies that our planet is also very fragile, and that its carrying capacity is limited. Now, (...) imagine that this boat is invulnerable to external threats; imagine, also, that it is self-sufficient and self-regulated. It is only a tiny fraction of its numerous passengers that has the power to put in danger the boat’s safety: they can do this either by multiplying uncontrollably and thus adding excessive weight to the boat, or by undertaking certain actions that could completely destroy the boat, and this despite the palpable fact that the boat’s failure will unavoidably lead all passengers to their doom, the saboteurs included. What should be done with such a bunch of foolish saboteurs, then? Why shouldn’t they just be forced out into the sea? Well, here comes an impossible inconvenience: the only ones who are entitled to judge this – and the only ones who can execute the sentence – are these very same saboteurs. (shrink)

In this short essay I intent to discuss the moral standing of autonomy in the field of Medical Ethics and the way it affects individual decision making as well as health care policies. To this purpose I will employ a real life scenario, namely administering placebo medication to a patient without letting him know, by means of which I will challenge not only the effectiveness and the feasibility of autonomy in the Kantian sense, but also its desirability. I will argue (...) that the Kantian notion of autonomy when it comes to Medical Ethics is in some cases self-defeating and, therefore, confusing and misleading. I will conclude with the view that, at least as Medical Ethics is concerned, we should rethink and, maybe, revise the meaning we usually assign to autonomy, so as to take into account the particular nature of the doctor-patient relationship. (shrink)

Acceptance of elderly or marginal health individuals as kidney donors is debated, with practices varying between centres. Transplant recipients, live kidney donors and health-care professionals caring for patients with renal failure were surveyed regarding their views on live donor kidney transplantation (LDKT) of marginal health (diabetes, hypertension, atherosclerosis, obesity, etc.) and elderly donors. Participants were recruited within a tertiary renal and transplant centre and invited to participate in focus groups and structured interviews. They also completed an anonymous questionnaire. Of 464 (...) participants who completed the questionnaire (36% health-care professionals and 64% patients), 49% and 64%, respectively, stated that marginal and elderly donors should be accepted for LDKT. In the structured interviews, emphasis was given to presenting to donor, recipient and their respective families a calculated risk regarding the effect that either a nephrectomy or transplant has on long-term quality of life. Participants stated that an independent third party in addition to the transplant team should discuss involved risks. Issues of ‘how desperate’ the recipient's situation is should also be considered. Health-care professionals stated that regardless of the strength of will of an individual to donate a kidney (despite age, health problems or personal risk), they should always have the right to say ‘no’ if performing a specific LDKT was against their professional and ethical values. About half of those surveyed considered that marginal health and elderly donors were acceptable for LDKT. Emphasis was given to the explanation to donors and recipients of the risks involved in such transplantation. (shrink)

It is proposed that the rhetoric of the discourse on science and Buddhism exhibits an often non-deliberate predisposition to establish and perpetuate a kind of compartmentalization which consigns both science and Buddhism to two different and irrelevant to each other realms in the minds of the wider, general, and non-scientifically involved Western Buddhist population. This emerges non-deliberately, for the purpose of avoiding any essential influence between the two subjects, despite the sincerely expressed aims of the proponents of science— Buddhism complementarity (...) to avoid that separation. However, this paper will also argue for the importance of the continuation of science—Buddhism collaboration as this provides evidential instances of actually practicing the Buddhist emphatic belief in the importance of not separating the pursuit of knowledge from the aim of understanding, producing, and maintaining happiness. Indeed, it is the epistemological incompatibility between the two disciplines, and the compartmentalization effectuated by the notion of complementarity between them, that makes the Buddhist emphasis on attaching the aim of happiness to scientific pursuit all the more real, persuasive and potentially imitable. (shrink)

In this short paper I will discuss the ambiguous and, even, controversial term ‘right to die’ in the context of the euthanasia debate and, in particular, in the case of passive euthanasia. First I will present the major objections towards the moral legitimacy of a right to die, most of which I also endorse myself; then I will investigate whether the right to die could acquire adequate moral justification in the case of passive euthanasia. In the light of the Kantian (...) tradition I will argue that since rights are understood as based upon duties, the right to die should also presuppose a corresponding duty, which to me could be either an imperfect, solidarity-related duty, or an autonomy-related one, at least as far as the unwanted prolongation of life is concerned. I will conclude with the view that the right to die could actually be considered a legitimate one in the case of passive euthanasia, when the application of life-supporting techniques is against the wishes and the best interests of the patient. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The cooperation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial (...) for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or sympathetic to – the duality of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. That is inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the intrinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which anything but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory or the Valhalla. (shrink)

The European ideals – as well as the idea of Europe per se – are faced with a serious challenge due to recent migration crisis: it is not just the reflexes, the effectiveness and the policies, but also the consistency, the principles and the justification of the notion of the European Union that is in stake. Kant’s concept of universal hospitality could probably provide a good way out of this conundrum: while hospitality has largely been viewed as a solidarity-related imperfect (...) duty towards others, that is, a less compelling duty that allows moral agents for certain latitude concerning the occasions and the degree of its implementation, Kant’s views allow for a totally different perspective, and, in my view, a much more philosophically nuanced one: hospitality might also be considered as an autonomy-based duty owed to others, and in this respect could count as a perfect, morally compelling duty. To the extent that the concept of Europe consists in humanitarian ideals that are based upon a strong philosophical humanistic tradition, I consider my claim to be in perfect harmony with the true spirit of Europe. (shrink)

Self destruction, inapprehensible an option as it might be, has been a challenging issue for philosophers and scholars since the dawn of time, forcing meditation into a vigorous and everlasting debate. The core question is: could suicide ever be deemed rational a choice? And if so, could it count as a moral alternative, if the circumstances call for it? The Stoics from Zeno up to Epictetus and Seneca regarded suicide as the ultimate resort, as the utmost opportunity for a rational (...) being to maintain his virtue, when all other bridges are burnt. For an act to be moral, it has to be deliberate, as well as the manifestation of an established evaluative hierarchy, however spontaneous and instantaneous might the latter be. In other words, a moral act is one that agents rationally opt for over other possible alternatives, on the subjective basis of their alleged best interests. Modern philosophers as Tom Beauchamp, Margaret Battin and Jacques Choron stress the criterion of rationality as a key issue regarding the ethics of suicide. Utilizing Rorty’s second definition of rationality, the article examines whether self destruction can be the outcome of proper evaluative assessment and deliberation, given that, as T. N. Pelegrinis suggests, such an evaluation seems to rest on a symmetry case, which might hardly be based on sound foundation. (shrink)

Human cloning until recently has been considered to belong to the domain of science fiction; now it is a tangible possibility, a hopeful as well as a fearsome one. One of the fears that necessarily come along with it is about the peril cloning might represent for human uniqueness, since the clones are expected to be identical to their prototypes; this would unavoidably compromise moral agents’ right to a unique identity. In this paper I will put under examination the argument (...) against cloning that is based upon the right to a unique identity; I will argue that cloning represents no actual threat for anybody’s unique identity, therefore this argument is futile. I will also support the view that the so-called right to a unique identity is not as indisputable as to serve as the basis of a moral argument against human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

Ecofascism as a tradition in Environmental Ethics seems to burgeoning with potential. The roots of Ecofascism can be traced back to the German Romantic School, to the Wagnerian narration of the Nibelungen saga, to the works of Fichte and Herder and, finally, to the so-called völkisch movement. Those who take pride in describing themselves as ecofascists grosso modo tend to prioritize the moral value of the ecosphere, while, at the same time, they almost entirely devalue species and individuals. Additionally, these (...) ecofascists are eager to reject democracy, the idea of progress in its entirety, as well as industrialization and urbanization. They also seem to be hostile towards individual autonomy and free will. In this short essay I will present and discuss Kaarlo Pentti Linkola’s approach to environmental ethics, one that could be well described as the epitome of Ecofascism. I will argue that his arguments are neither sound nor documented, and I will conclude that Linkola’s overall approach is, in my view, contrary to the purpose as well as to the very essence of morality. (shrink)

This study examines the possible common characteristics between human and non-human consciousness. It mainly addresses animal consciousness and, to a certain extent, intelligent AI. It provides an overview of the main theories regarding consciousness, more specifically those of neuroscience and cognitive science, and also their materialistic base at a neuroanatomical and neurophysiological level, emphasizing the role the prefrontal cortex plays, both in humans and animals. Then, it considers particular aspects of consciousness, such as emotion, and presents the three broad traditions (...) considering human emotions, which are emotions as feelings, evaluations, and judgments, as well as studies on animal emotions. Then, it continues with the proposed models of metacognition and memory to deepen the analysis regarding common characteristics of human and non-human consciousness. It also touches on the platform theory, which may bridge human, animal, and AI consciousness, although this theory is under consideration. It ends with references to animals’ social behavior, their interactions with humans, their possible ontogenic proximity as expressed in biolinguistics, and the findings of computational ethology, which help to establish models of mental human disorders. The study concludes that findings support proximities between humans and animals, consciousness at the level of neurophysiology, and emotion and metacognition. Contrary to animals and AI, human consciousness is more complicated and far from cybernetic and computational models since it is linked with various kinds of malleability, reconsolidation, neural plasticity, different conceptions of emotions, and certain mental pathologies. (shrink)

Philosophy, as Aristotle said, originates in wonder. And nonhuman animals have long been a source of wonder to humans, especially in regard to the treatment they deserve. The upshot is that Western philosophy has been concerned with the way in which we ought to treat nonhuman animals since its origins with the pre-Socratic philosophers. -/- Animal ethics is a highly challenging field, as well as one of the liveliest areas of debate in ethics in recent years. Not only has this (...) area issued in a range of attention-grabbing controversies but it has also led to the exploration of novel and imaginative approaches to worn-out issues. -/- This book is roughly evenly divided between the presentation and discussion of a range of influential past approaches to animal ethics and an equally significant range of contemporary approaches. We need to understand the legacy of the past and the resources that it offers us while also forging new views that are appropriate to our increasingly developed understanding of the nature of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Action can only be spontaneous and impulsive if not guided by contemplation; contemplation, on the other hand, may only be luxurious playfulness if not either purposed - or suitable - to motivate action. This volume seeks to prove what may seem self-evident to common sense, but adhering to common sense is never pointless nor excessive. Next to this, Thinking in Action is the offspring of friendship, respect and commitment between two academic communities, the Hellenic and the Serbian philosophical communities, that (...) admittedly have a lot in common, especially with regard to philosophy, and hopefully as many differences as needed in order to secure a long-lasting and fertile exchange of ideas; it is also the natural-born child of necessity: philosophy is about argumentation, debate and confrontation. Thinking in Action inaugurates Hellenic-Serbian Philosophical Dialogue Series that entertains no hesitation in being as ambitious as any philosophical series could be: it seeks to establish a permanent, wide and rich channel of fruitful philosophical interaction between the two philosophical communities. Having high aspirations is one thing; meeting these aspirations as well as the expectations of the reader is a totally different one. We wish Thinking in Action, the first volume of the Hellenic-Serbian Philosophical Dialogue Series, apart from being the initial step of a long journey, will also be a fascinating one to the reader. (shrink)

The relation of Isocrates and Aristotle has mostly been defined by scholars as a competition or rivalry between them in a debate over the ends of rhetorical education. This essay investigates Isocrates-quotations in the Rhetoric of Aristotle and calls for a re-evaluation of the relation of Aristotle to Isocrates and to Demosthenes. Aristotle studied thoroughly the Isocratic speeches (especially Helena, Evagoras, Panegyricus, De pace, Antidosis, Philippus) and Isocrates is the only of the canon of ten Attic orators, who is quoted (...) regularly in the Rhetoric. For textual criticism the quotations of Aristotle should be used with caution, as Aristotle often quoted from memory, but his readings must not be excluded a priori. Aristotle recognizes the leading role of Isocrates as a master of literary prose in the development of rhetoric, particularly the epideictic speech. In Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics Isocrates, who exerts influence on the ethos of the reader, has a prominent position, unlike Demosthenes, who is characterized by his ability to arouse emotions. In this judgement political reasons (promacedonian - antimacedonian) are also visible. (shrink)

Several stepping up lemmas are proved which are then used to investigate the connection between definable partition relations and admissible ordinals.

Mid-distance runners are subject to intense cognitive and somatic anxiety, not only during competition but also during practice. An important variable which may influence athletes’ performance is perceived behavioral control on anxiety. The aim of the present study was to examine whether aspects such as sex, sport/competition experience and weekly practices, differentiated the participants respectively. The participants consisted of 110 athletes, 61 male and 49 female athletes, between the ages of 15 and 28.They all completed the Greek version of the (...) “Pre- Race Questionnaire”. Results indicated differences between the less experienced and more experienced athletes in almost all factors of the questionnaire, for both sport/competition experience, and weekly practices. No gender differences were shown. Overall, results could help sport professionals such as coaches and the athletes themselves, become more familiar with the sport-specific psychological aspects involved in their unique sport. (shrink)

The later Stoics, especially – and most notably – Posidonius of Apamea, allegedly the greatest polymath of his age and the last in a celebrated line of great philosophers of the ancient world, gradually developed the belief that all parts of the universe, either ensouled or not, were actually interconnected due to the omnipresent, corporeal, primordial kosmikon pyr which, according to Stoicism, pervades each being as the honey pervades the honeycomb. As for reasonable beings, in particular, kosmikon pyr takes the (...) form of logos. Due to that power, Posidonius believes, the phases of moon, for instance, can affect the succession of tides and ebb–tides; on the same grounds, the signs can have major effect on the course of events and, therefore, allow for divination. That kind of interconnectedness, apart from justifying the interdependentness of all beings to each other, testifies for an utter kinship between them, for sympatheia. In this short paper I intent to show that Posidonius’s approach has been promptly adopted and utilized by modern holistic theories concerning Environmental Ethics, especially by Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology and Ecosophy T, in the context of which notions such as kinship, interconnectedness, interdependentness and identification of all beings are key parameters for the articulation of their argumentation. I also intent to outline some essential – in my opinion – differences in the way Posidonius and Naess make use of the notion of interconnectedness, together with some inconsistencies which can be potentially fatal, at least as far as a system of ethics is concerned. This is because notions such as cosmic sympathy may possibly establish an interesting, even charming and influential cosmology or metaphysics, but when it comes to ethics, in my opinion, they can only provide shaky grounds for establishing a firm one, since they allow for deterministic views, which more or less leave no room for personal responsibility, to wit for personal praise or blame. (shrink)

Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it seems to (...) favor active instead of passive euthanasia. Therefore, while the distinction between active and passive euthanasia might be meaningful in terms of description, if it is considered to be endowed with moral weight and used on purpose of justifying one type of euthanasia instead of the other, it becomes morally problematic and misleading. (shrink)