The paper taps the agency of the imaginary interlocutor in the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ of Nāgārjuna to delineate _existential anguish_ in the Madhyamaka. The paper asks whether the protestations of the imaginary interlocutor cannot be recast as _anguished_. It claims that an objection to emptiness (_śūnyatā_) can be voiced even after the metaphysical commitment to _intrinsic existence_ (_svabhāva_) has been relinquished. By interpolating _anguish_ into the Madhyamaka, the paper posits an unorthodox phenomenological objection to _śūnyatā_.

This essay explores the theme of individuation in existential phenomenology, focusing on the contributions of Alfred Schutz and Maurice Natanson, one of Schutz’s students during his tenure at the New School for Social Research in New York. To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Science Archive in Konstanz, I reflect on the theory of multiple realities and its application to issues of mobility and isolation. Following a lead given by Natanson in his critique of “life‑world optimism” sketched in (...) a letter to Schutz, I delve into Natanson’s theory of individuation and his use of the phenomenological method by emphasizing his critical elaboration of Sartre’s non‑egological conception of consciousness and theory of the other. I demonstrate how the existential dimensions of anguish, aloneness, and loneliness, as raised by Natanson, restate the theory of multiple realities, in part through his engagement with phenomenological psychiatry. (shrink)

In existential thought the thinking subject includes itself in its own thinking; this subject is not conceived as a substance that may be objectively determined, for its being lies in a making or constituting itself. Choice is thus the crucial concept of existential thought. Since choice involves awareness of the uncertainty of itspossible outcomes, anguish is inherent in it. Hence anguish in the face of our own freedom is essential to the human reality, and authenticity lies (...) in facing anguish rather than fleeing it. The term metaexistential refers, (1) to those systems that acknowledge absolute authenticity and truth to consist in going beyond existence in all its manifestations—those which are more unauthentic and less conflictive and distressful, as well as those which are less unauthentic and more conflictive and distressful—and (2) to those Paths of Awakening possessing the means for effectively going beyond existence and thus achieving absolute authenticity and truth. In fact, (1) only the Contemplation state of higher bodhisattvas and the state of Buddhahood, which are free from the subject-objectduality and thus beyond the bounds of existence and of the human reality, constitute a genuine surpassing of alienation and delusion, and hence only these conditions are true to our innermost nature; and (2) only a really effective practice of metaexistential methods such as Buddhist Paths can be conducive to these realizations. (shrink)

In chapter one I cover the basic concepts developed in Being and Nothingness, notable those of "temporality," "negation," "anguish" and "bad faith." In chapter two I move from the individual as the center of free action, to the individual in relation to the Other. In chapter three I attempt to unify the perspectives in the first two chapter and present a theory of action. In chapter four I introduce the reader to the Critique and establish its thematic links with (...) Being and Nothingness. In chapter five I analyze the ramifications of the concept of the practico-inert, which, for Sartre, is inseparable from human sociality. In chapter six I deal with the concept of organization, which refers to the contradictions within the social group as it moves into advanced stages of social integration. In chapter seven I cover the concepts of power and authority. Chapter eight deals with the idea of dialectical humanism and highlights essential concepts in the work by way of concluding it. --Introduction. (shrink)

A stunning exploration of the relation between desire and psychopathology, The Death of Desireis a unique synthesis of the work of Laing, Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger that renders their often difficult concepts brilliantly accessible to and usable by psychotherapists of all persuasions. In bridging a critical gap between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, M. Guy Thompson, one of the leading existential psychoanalysts of our time, firmly re-situates the unconscious - what Freud called "the lost continent of repressed desires" - in phenomenology. (...) In so doing, he provides us with the richest, most compelling phenomenological treatment of the unconscious to date and also makes Freud's theory of the unconscious newly comprehensible. In this revised and updated second edition to the original published in 1985, M. Guy Thompson takes us inside his soul-searching seven-year apprenticeship with radical psychiatrist R. D. Laing and his cohorts as it unfolded in counterculture London of the 1970s. This rite de passage culminates with a four-year sojourn inside one of Laing's post-Kingsley Hall asylums, where Laing's unorthodox conception of treatment dispenses with conventional boundaries between "doctor" and "patient." In this unprecedented exploration, Thompson reveals the secret to Laing's astonishing alternative to the conventional psychiatric and psychoanalytic treatment schemes. Movingly written and deeply personal, Thompson shows why the very concept of "mental illness" is a misnomer and why sanity and madness should be understood instead as inherently puzzling stratagems that we devise in order to protect ourselves from intolerable mental anguish. The Death of Desireoffers a provocative and challenging reappraisal of depth psychotherapy from an existential perspective that will be of interest to psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, philosophers, social scientists, and students of the human condition. (shrink)

In the present work we propose to present the way in which Heidegger treats the concept of anguish in his inaugural class What is Metaphysics?, emphasizing the relation between the awakening of anguish and the revelation of being. At the same time, we propose to confront the treatment of the concept of anguish in the lecture and the one that Heidegger gives to the concept in Being and Time. Indeed, in his lecture Heidegger presents anguish as (...) a manifestation of nothingness, in which the revelation of the being as such to the Dasein occurs. On the other hand, in § 40 of Being and Time Heidegger presents anguish as the disposition that removes Dasein from de-cadence and singularizes it, that is, places it before itself. With this, we will show the unfolding of the concept of anguish, from the most existential approach of the major treatise to the more ontological perspective of the lecture. (shrink)

In 1967, Paul Celan, a poet and Holocaust survivor, took part in a reading in Freiburg. There, he personally met the philosopher Martin Heidegger, who was Rector of the University of Freiburg promoted by the politics of National Socialism. Much has been said about the meeting between the two and the friendship and admiration that arose after the poet’s visit to the philosopher’s hut in the Black Forest. The most eloquent as well as the most enigmatic testimony is Celan’s poem (...) Todtnauberg, in which he expects to hear “a coming word” from the philosopher’s lips. We can speculate that, perhaps, this word was “forgiveness.” But Heidegger never apologized. After several encounters over the next three years, Celan eventually threw himself into the Seine. This chapter speculates whether it is possible that it was never hearing the word “forgiveness” for the crimes of Nazism that drove him to suicide. To reconstruct this suicide hypothesis, the chapter leans towards the existing biographical documentation on the author, both studies by specialists and Celan’s own epistolary exchange. It will also turn directly to his poetic work, especially his late work (in which I believe the encounter with Heidegger is important), where he expresses the absurdity of any attempt at communication, confronting existential anguish itself, perhaps that which led him to the abyss because he could not find the word “forgiveness” in the language of extermination, an otherwise impossible encounter. (shrink)

Os heterônimos do poeta português Fernando Pessoa constituem uma das mais fantásticas criações da poesia moderna. Através deles, fingindo-se um deles, o poeta apresenta-se múltiplo, como que habitado por várias pessoas, encerrando vários eus, num jogo literário em que entretanto não se identifica com nenhum deles. Sem desconsiderar a complexidade dessa criação literária, o artigo propõe-se a abordar alguns aspectos da obra do “Pessoa ele-mesmo”. Em certo sentido, Pessoa ele-mesmo é também um heterônimo. Poeta fingidor, nada nele é diretamente confessional (...) ou biográfico. Pessoa ele-mesmo apresenta-se como a expressão dramática de uma busca de identidade, aberta numa constelação de personalidades complexas e sofridas. A dor fingida que finge a dor sofrida e outras representações da dor existencial de Pessoa ele-mesmo podem ser lidas como angústia e mística. Para tecer esse percurso, o artigo se reportará basicamente às poesias inéditas de 1919-1935, basicamente os últimos escritos do grande e múltiplo poeta português. Palavras-chave : Fernando Pessoa. Heterônimos. Angústia. Mística. Teopoética.The heteronyms of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa is one of the most fantastic creations of modern poetry. Through them, and pretending to be one of them, the poet presents himself as multiple, as if inhabited by several people, assuming several selves, in a literary game in which the poet does not identify himself with any of them. Without ignoring the complexity of such literary creation, the paper aims to address some aspects of the work of “Fernando Pessoa-himself”. In a sense, “Fernando Pessoa-himself” is also a heteronomous that carries a message that is neither confessional nor a bibliographic one. “Fernando Pessoa-himself” presents himself as a dramatic expression of an identity search within a constellation of some complex and suffered personalities. The “pretended pain” that pretends to be a true suffering as well other representations of the existential pain of “Fernando Pessoa-himself” can be comprehended as anxiety and mystique. To accomplish this purpose, the article will report primarily to the unpublished last poems of the great poet Fernando Pessoa, written between 1919 and 1935. Keywords: Fernando Pessoa. Heteronyms. Anguish. Mystique. Theopoetic - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n25p93. (shrink)

In a state of existential anguish, Blaise Pascal asked himself a fundamental question: “What is man in infinity?” He tried to answer this question in his unfinished reflections, collected in Thoughts. The conspicuous existential features of Pascal’s anthropology, as well as the deeply personal and passionately religious character of his thought, call for a comparison with the two centuries younger, polemical Danish religious thinker and “founding father” of existential philosophy, Søren Kierkegaard. In my article, I will (...) try to explain the affinity of these thinkers to each other and point out several parallels in their ideas, focusing especially on those fundamental moments in which this affinity is particularly reflected and which, at the same time, underline the existential dimension of their anthropology: the paradox of existence, the concept of distraction as a phenomenon of existential escapism, and the existential situation of choice/wager. Although this article is primarily aimed at revealing the common intersections between the two thinkers, I will conclude it by also highlighting the point where their thinking diverges most markedly: their different understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, where, in the direction of fideism, Kierkegaard shows himself to be a far more radical thinker than Pascal. (shrink)

This article explores the Sartrean concept of the spirit of seriousness so as to better understand contemporary sightseeing tourism. Sartre's spirit of seriousness involves two central characteristics: the first understands values as transcendent, fixed objects, and the second—less acknowledged—understands material, physical objects as instantiating these transcendent values. I interpret the behavior of at least some contemporary tourists who travel to “mustsee” destinations as a subscription to both aspects of the spirit of seriousness and to a belief that the objects and (...) destinations of tourist sites contain these transcendent, immutable values, such as “Art,” “Culture,” “Liberty,” etc. These “must-see” objects and destinations can thereby be understood to make “obligatory demands” of tourists, compelling them to visit. I argue that this serious mode of traveling to “must-see” sites is a form of Sartrean bad faith, as well as an evasion of the potential existential anguish that travel can evoke. (shrink)

The richness of the term “unsettling” has made it readily employable for phenomenological accounts of racism in philosophy of race literature; yet, the term has been left largely under-theorized. Here, I argue that unsettling encounters can be said to occur when the unfamiliar other has come into contact with the boundary of one’s existential home. For many white people, interracial interactions produce an (often unwarranted) feeling of physical danger, but as I hope to show, this habitual (mis)perception of such (...) encounters is not merely a conditioned response; it also functions to subvert situations that might unsettle white identifies partially constituted by phenomenological demarcations of space along racial lines. Drawing on empirical literature and recent developments in critical phenomenology, I suggest that by exercising habitual, racist gestures and perceptions, white people (mis)perceive ontological threats to their worldview—e.g., a bookish Black student or a masculine gay man—as ontically threatening so as to avoid the kind of work and existential anguish that altering one’s normative expectations would require. (shrink)

One scene from Wim Wenders’ film “Alice in the cities” provokes us to think again about childhood. It’s a fresh polaroid snapshot, where we can see the faces of an adult (Phillip Winter) and a child (Alice) blending and mixing. Starting from this image, this paper makes its way through the movie’s plot, reflecting on the power of freedom that arises from an encounter with children and childhood. First, we examine the relationship between Winter and his job as a photo-journalist, (...) discussing the character of his existential anguish and his supposed indisposition to becoming, which seems to be clear in the way that he reads his own photographs. In a second moment of the film, we understand Alice’s arrival on the scene as something capable of dispersing the circumstances that are constraining him by hurling him into the unpredictable. This event is crystallized in one poetic gesture: the girl confronts the adult with her own face by drawing a self-portrait. Facialization and deterritorialization are twoconcepts that we weave into our discussion, working off the philosophical thinking of Georges Didi-Huberman, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Finally, we propose that worry as a value, characteristic of children and travelers, can produce an opening that offers an escape into a freedom of release–or, so to speak, a defacialized freedom. (shrink)

Dans les années 1920, la théologie de Barth est centrée sur la thématique de la prédication, à la fois point de départ et point d'impact de sa réflexion. Dieu parle, l'Homme écoute. Notre analyse portera sur la possibilité d'une telle audition croyante de la Parole de Dieu, dont Barth affirme la réalité avec force comme seule issue à l'angoisse existentielle humaine qui étreint ses auditeurs, selon le pasteur de Safenwil, et les pousse à se presser " malgré tout " au (...) pied de sa chaire. Nous essaierons également de déterminer la forme concrète que Barth entend donner à sa prédication, à une époque où il s'agit moins pour lui de prêcher " le texte " que de proclamer la résolution en Christ de la contradiction et de l'interrogation dans lesquelles la présence de Dieu place l'Homme. In the twenties, Barth's theology took its start and found its accomplishment in the question of the proclamation of God's Word. God speaks, Man listens. We shall try here to understand why, according to our author, such a faithful listening is possible. According to Barth it is the only solution of man's existential anguish, which explains why women and men go on coming to listen to the sermon. We shall also try to determine what form Barth gave to this preaching, at a time when he would put Man under the weight of the contradiction and interrogation caused by God's presence, and proclaim how Christ's revelation solves it, rather than explain each word of the biblical text. (shrink)

The main goal of this work is to argue that reincarnation can no longer be an answer to existential anguish, as described by philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre, because rebirth was the answer for people who were immerse in a religious or even a metaphysical outlook of life, while modern human condition emerges precisely when those forms of certainty begin to fade away. Nevertheless, we will show that the idea of reincarnation can still be a valuable tool (...) for understanding certain features of western philosophy, such as the thermodynamic model of thought. (shrink)

BackgroundThis article aims to contribute to a better conceptualization of pain and suffering by providing non-essential and non-naturalistic definitions of both phenomena. Contributions of classical evidence-based medicine, the humanistic turn in medicine, as well as the phenomenology and narrative theories of suffering and pain, together with certain conceptions of the person beyond them are critically discussed with such purpose.MethodsA philosophical methodology is used, based on the review of existent literature on the topic and the argumentation in favor of what are (...) found as better definitions of suffering and pain.ResultsPain can be described in neurological terms but cognitive awareness, interpretation, behavioral dispositions, as well as cultural and educational factors have a decisive influence on pain perception. Suffering is proposed to be defined as an unpleasant or even anguishing experience, severely affecting a person at a psychophysical and existential level. Pain and suffering are considered unpleasant. However, the provided definitions neither include the idea that pain and suffering can attack and even destroy the self nor the idea that they can constructively expand the self; both perspectives can b e equally useful for managing pain and suffering, but they are not defining features of the same. Including the existential dimension in the definition of suffering highlights the relevance of suffering in life and its effect on one’s own attachment to the world. An understanding of pain and suffering life experiences is proposed, meaning that they are considered aspects of a person’s life, and the self is the ever-changing sum of these experiences.ConclusionsThe provided definitions will be useful to the identification of pain and suffering, to the discussion of how to relieve them, and to a better understanding of how they are expressed and experienced. They lay the groundwork for further research in all these areas, with the twofold aim of a) avoiding epistemological mistakes and moral injustices, and b) highlighting the limitations of medicine in the treatment of suffering and pain. (shrink)

Is there a way to understand--and, more important, to make use of--the experiences and emotions that we usually think of as being entirely negative? How are we to make sense of life's apparent "non-sense": the loneliness, depression, anxiety, frustration, anger, apathy, and anguish that we are certain to encounter in the course of living? William F. Kraft, a practicing psychotherapist, maintains that we can use all of these experiences in the service of life and fulfillment--once we understand that they (...) are part of the process of growth. It is only when people admit to pain and loneliness, he says, that they can begin to lead meaningful lives. The feelings of nothingness are essential for authentic living--inescapable and even necessary. Dr. Kraft discusses the experience of nothingness--as a fundamental life force and as creative suffering. Then he analyzes the language of nothingness: all the sad words for the bad emotions we meet. He explores the dynamics and meaning of "healthy" and "unhealthy," as applied to our feelings. Proposing that man discovers himself in his sense of nothingness at various stages of his life, Dr. Kraft explores the first emergence into a consciousness of nothingness, in adolescence, as a sense of boredom and cynicism. Next, he deals with the depression, loneliness, and frustration of early adulthood. In full adulthood, maintains the author, the sense of nothingness is banished by commitment and a search for authentic living. Then in middle and old age, he suggests, a positive approach must be forged for experiences of depression, guilt, anguish, and death. In his final chapters Dr. Kraft offers a new psychological approach to death and dying, which are the clearest articulations we know of nothingness. For everyone who thinks that alienation is a symptom of illness, an experience to avoid, or a sign of personal failure, this book is happy--and mandatory--reading.--Adapted from dust jacket. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Violence Is Not an Evil”Ambiguity and Violence in Simone de Beauvoir’s Early Philosophical WritingsAnn V. MurphyThe recent translation and compilation of several of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical essays from the 1940s shed new light on Beauvoir’s understanding of the relationship between ethics and violence. While these essays predate the publication of The Second Sex (1949) and do not concern themselves with the subject of feminism per se, Beauvoir’s philosophy (...) of violence as it is outlined in both “Pyrrhus and Cineas” (1944) and “An Eye for an Eye” (1948) speaks to one of the more thoroughgoing concerns in contemporary feminist philosophy; namely, the nature of the relation between corporeal vulnerability, violence, and ethics. Together with The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), these early essays probe the difficulties in moving from an ontology in which violence appears to be inexorable to the terrain of ethical prescription. This essay urges recognition of the continuing relevance of Beauvoir’s philosophy in relation to the renaissance of interest in the theme of vulnerability in contemporary feminist theory. I argue that Beauvoir’s philosophy provides one of the most sophisticated accounts to date of the ethical problems posed by the experiential ambiguities of violence, and that her legacy in this regard is as important and redemptive as ever. More precisely, I read Beauvoir’s early conception of ambiguity as the philosophical predecessor to contemporary deconstructive accounts of corporeal vulnerability.Discourse on the body has governed the evolution of feminist philosophy. Recently, however, the nature of the body under investigation has changed. Whereas previously the critique of the nature/culture distinction dominated [End Page 29] feminist debates regarding the social construction of sex and gender, recent feminist work has consolidated around another conceptual pairing; namely, vulnerability and aggression. In reference to Beauvoir’s philosophical corpus, this recent development is interesting. Her magnum opus, The Second Sex, has attracted more attention because of its centrality in the debates over the social construction of sex and gender, a debate that has dominated feminist philosophy for the last several decades. Indeed, many laud this text for being ahead of its time with regard to the acknowledgement that “one is not born a woman,” but rather becomes one. This essay argues that Beauvoir’s early texts are similarly prescient with regard to the current preoccupation with the philosophical themes of violence and vulnerability. By tracing the development of Beauvoir’s idea of ambiguity, I argue that her conception of the body as the site of both aggression and vulnerability both anticipates and continues to productively address the problem of how one moves from a descriptive ontology to the terrain of ethics. This is a movement that Beauvoir arguably theorized more rigorously than either Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Jean-Paul Sartre, neither of whom published such sustained philosophical work on ethics in his lifetime.1I. Ambiguity in Beauvoir’s Early WorkIn The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir’s reflections on ethics come from a resolutely secular, existentialist perspective. Beauvoir—like her contemporaries in French existential phenomenology—understood human existence to be essentially marked by failure. Importantly, this failure is not vicious; rather, it is the consequence of the fact that human freedom can only ever be determined in scenes of constraint. Despite her resistance to the universal aspirations of Kant’s ethics, Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity as failure is consonant with the Kantian rendering of the ethical agent as a being for whom reason does not infallibly determine the will; indeed, an agent for whom reason is necessarily undone by certain inclinations and contingencies.2 For Kant, it made no sense to speak of the will unless one was referring to a being that had the capacity to act in accord with reason but did not infallibly manage to do so. Hence, ethics is an issue for us precisely to the degree that we are capable of failure. In this sense, ambiguity and failure mark the human condition and our distance from the divine. Only a being whose existence is marked by this inadequacy would ponder right and wrong, would debate the nature of ethical atrocity and recovery, and would anguish over the... (shrink)

: En la analítica existencial de Ser y tiempo no aparece la angustia (Angst)como numero modo de encontrarse en un estado (Befindlichkeit), ni tampoco como numero fenómeno psicológico, si no mucho más que eso: la angustia es presentada como un existenciario fundamental, es decir, un encontrarse básicamente en un estado(Grundbefindlichkeit). Al sentirla, lo que se le revela al Dasein es su propio ser, mas esta experiencia puede desestabilizarlo. Es entonces cuando el Dasein busca y se afana en hallar una seguridad (...) óntica que lo lleva a una huída de sí. A partir de dicha búsqueda,sondearemos cómo la angustia, si bien tiene por un lado la esencial capacidad derevelar el ser del Dasein, tiene sin embargo, por otro lado, el poder de conducirlo a lamás absoluta enajenación de sí mismo, aun cuando se afane en hallar el camino haciasu autenticidad. In the existential analytic of Being and time, anxiety does not appear simply asa state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), nor simply as a psychological phenomenon, but assomething much greater. Indeed, anguish appears as a fundamental existentiale, that is,a basic state-of-mind (Grundbefindlichkeit). By experiencing it, what is revealed toDasein is its very being, yet this same experience may also destabilize Dasein. It isthen that Dasein looks for and strives to find an ontical security which leads it to fleefrom itself. Taking this search as a starting point, we will probe how, whilst on theone hand, anxiety has the essential capacity to reveal Dasein´s being, it neverthelesshas, on the other hand, the power to drive Dasein in turn to the most absolutealienation from itself, even when it is striving to find the path which leads towardsauthenticity. (shrink)

Publishers love titles that begin How or Why. Better still, How and Why, combining edification with utility. The target group is that overlap between the self-help audience and the idly curious—which is to say, most of us. And since emotions are very much about self-help and self-harm, they offer rich pickings in a burgeoning market. Flanagan's How to Do things with Emotions is a philosopher's take on moral emotions, the allusion to J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (...) chiming with the self-help milieu. Reviewing cases, Flanagan points out that most scientific work in this field derives from experiments on psychology students, about as unrepresentative a slice of humanity as you could find. For Flanagan, they are too WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) to tell us much about the non-weird majority. To learn to “do emotions better,” he argues, we have to look farther afield. Although the emotional lives of cultural others are surely different from those taking Psychology 101, at some functional level they might be similar. Work out the conceptual logic and practical rationale of culturally elaborated emotions—Minangkabau “shame,” Ifaluk “righteous anger,” American “road rage”—and there is scope for comparison. Indeed, anthropology has shown as much, and it is from anthropology that Flanagan takes his cues. To mention two famous cases, what can we learn about anger management from Utku igloo-dwellers and Ilongot headhunters? Mutually dependent for survival in their snowy isolation, the Utku cannot risk getting angry. (They mercilessly tease their children into learning the futility of anger.) In the jungles of Luzon, Ilongot youths cast away their anger in externally directed violence: headhunting as cathartic sport. We can think of parallels closer to home.Flanagan's vigorously argued book, a tour de force of its kind, is both an anatomizing of anger and shame—two moral emotions we tend to “do badly”—and a proposal to “change how we do these emotions.” Indignation is fine, but anger that is vengeful or “pain-passing,” rather than righteous, is irrational and socially harmful. Shame can be incapacitating and cruel (the undeserved burn of a Twitter pile-on). What we need is reflective anger directed at injustice and a “mature sense of shame” that reminds us of the social contract and stops us misbehaving.In its How-and-Why format, the book combines theory and practice, metaethics with moralism. Here is how a prof should do self-help. But if the diagnosis is well made, the remedy is hard to imagine. As Flanagan recognizes, moral sentiments and practices are embedded in intricate forms of life and not readily detachable. Anger Utku-style is not a transferable skill, nor are educative routines forged in social ecologies remote from our own. Lacking serviceable models, Flanagan falls back on the anthropological justification that knowledge of cultural diversity expands our sense of human possibility, of other roads taken. In a globalizing world, difference is its own reward. For me, an anthropologist, that maxim is enough. Yet difference bedevils comparison, jinxing the units, warping criteria. Most languages lack a word for emotion or an equivalent umbrella concept; nor do emotion words translate well across languages. Emotion may be an incoherent notion, or at best a heuristic.Flanagan's use of the WEIRD tag makes things a bit too easy. Does it cover farmhands and factory workers? Are we so democratic, anyway? More damagingly, a typological approach blurs the circumstances of family, community, and biography that define an emotional episode and shape its phenomenology, the way it is felt and experienced—what a violent outburst or fearful exit means in the context of a life. Take Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim, who flees a scene of failure and derails his life. It requires a long narrative to unravel the implications of his jumping ship and the paralyzing shame he experiences before the judgment of society. Or consider the scene in Anna Karenina in which the dignified and self-important Karenin, apprised of Anna's adulterous liaison, agonizes over the threat to his existence. To call his response jealousy would not scratch the surface. Characteristically for Tolstoy, the emotions go unnamed. Instead, we witness Karenin's fervid deliberations (emotions involve thoughts), vacillations (emotions have action tendencies), anguished calculations of impending scandal (emotions are appraisals), and bodily changes (emotions are cognized feelings). We shudder at the brutal metaphors through which he grasps his predicament and its cure: like rooting out a bad tooth, he decides. That welter of particularities escapes the theorist who needs clear-cut, comparable units, formulaic instances of jealousy or anger. But what are you left with if you omit the details? What would remain of Karenin's existential crisis?The novelist's privileged access to subjectivity is, of course, unavailable to the scientist, but the larger context of plot and character—a history of relations that gives emotional episodes their shape and power—has its analog in the ethnographic domain. Emotions are public as well as private events, their meanings and effects depending on a fit with social reality, a clash of perspectives. In thought and feeling, we are never really alone. All of which suggests that narrative, fictional or nonfictional, can capture the ongoing moment in a way that eludes other methods. If what we are after is living emotion, it is the movie, not the snapshot, that surely matters. No point in comparing “emotions” no one ever really experienced outside of an experiment.But there's the rub. In generalization—the goal of emotion theory—an emotion's social meaning, personal significance, pragmatic function, and narrative context get stripped out. All that makes it what it is! Even in doggedly empirical anthropology, detailed emotional episodes are rare (Jean Briggs's Utku ethnography Never in Anger, published in 1970, is still unsurpassed). Instead we get recollections and summary examples, lacking the constitutive detail, real-time evolutions, and consequences of the real thing. Yet these must serve for comparison, fodder for countless theoretical speculations. Are we at risk of analyzing faux emotions and building theories on cardboard constructions?An empty Arctic stage, a handful of characters, life simplified to survival: Briggs is a hard act to follow. Bare life does not make for basic emotions. On the white set, emotions prove hard to parse. That gruff hesitation, that flashing glint—are they tokens of anger? Empathy will not suffice. As Briggs shows, narrative context is all. And in our more cluttered emotional worlds, the value of backstory, interwoven biographies, and emotional plots is all the greater. Flanagan is right; we must do emotions better. (shrink)

The article is devoted to context specific of folk songs from the collection “Songs of people of Galicia” by polish folklorist Z. Pauli. General and subjective problems and issues of Ukrainian society in 17th and 18th centuries were revealed. Song’s lyrics were analyzed and actual problems of baroque Ukrainian’s life were highlighted. Each of these problems and issues has it’s specific worldview expression. This worldview response to society and subjective problems of Baroque was presented in folk songs. Thus, the problems (...) of Ukrainian community and personal issues was considered in terms of worldview specific. So, in our point of view the main problems of Ukrainian Baroque society were “cossachyna” and conscription. Attitude of ordinary people to cossacks, their life and role in the state’s fate presented in historical songs, epic songs and Cossack songs. Context of these songs from Z. Pauli collection showed us some important worldview responses to the Cossacks. As a response to the historical events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries formed the cult of the warrior’s force. So the main virtues were agility and courage of the warrior. “Cossack glory” was one of the main values in the mass perception of Ukrainians. And was defeating during the battle was the most threat in terms of the relatives of warrior. In the song’s lyrics of 18th century the theme of soldier’s military duty hade wide spreading. Many families had to say good bye to their close relatives. That’s why the frequently motives of soldier songs are farewell, anguish and sorrow. Social problems such as insecurity, orphanhood and gender imbalance, caused by man’s military service, became a relevant for ordinary citizens. Personal existential problems presented in lyric songs and ballads. Widespread subjective problems such as freedom of someone own choice, choice contrary to the social or family opinion, contradictory feelings, emotions and actions outlined in folk-song’s lyrics. Frequently such song’s lyrics expressed metaphysical meditations about loneliness, person’s place in the world, happiness and desire to be happy, the influence of fate on human life etc. This group of songs present a typical Baroque pessimism. So, us our research showed ancient folk songs are real rich source for understanding worldview of our ancestors. (shrink)

This article draws upon the work of contemporary French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray in developing a post‐structuralist analysis of travel within the autobiographies of the second wave feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. Travel and the experience of wonder at the otherness of the world figure as important self shaping experiences within the four volumes of Beauvoir's life narrative. Travel has a metonymic relation to the passage of Beauvoir's life, in which the existential extremes of anguish and ecstasy are (...) played out in a quest for self knowledge. Through a close reading of Beauvoir's writing I analyse the different formations of desire that structure the experience of wonder in relation to the otherness of the world and death. I also draw upon debates within feminist philosophy about the nature of subjectivity and knowledge that were, in Beauvoir's time, ordered around an Hegelian opposition between immanence and transcendence. I take up Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental to explore another way of conceptualising the feminine subject's desire to know and value the world differently. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the perspective of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) on death, as well as to explore the concept of "Dasein" in his work Being and Time (1927). Heidegger introduces Dasein as a being that projects itself toward the future, with death being one of those futures. He asks: "What would death be? Does it have a merely biological or an ontological-existential character?" (HEIDEGGER, 2005, p. 16). The article unfolds as follows: a (...) brief explanation of the search for being and what it represents as Dasein, or "being-there," understood as a being in time and as presence. Furthermore, it addresses the existential analytic, highlighting Dasein's inauthentic existence, the anguish characteristic of this being, and the quest for authentic existence. It also discusses how Dasein relates to others, to the world, and especially to death, analyzing the different ways Heidegger conceptualizes death in Being and Time. (shrink)

The idea of ‘hope’ has received significant attention in the political sphere recently. But is hope just wishful thinking, or can it be something more than a political catch-phrase? This book argues that hope can be understood existentially, or on the basis of what it means to be human. Under this conception of hope, given to us by Gabriel Marcel, hope is not optimism, but the creation of ways for us to flourish. War, poverty and an absolute reliance on technology (...) are real-life evils that can suffocate hope. -/- Marcel’s thought provides a way to overcome these negative experiences. An ethics of hope can function as an alternative to isolation, dread, and anguish offered by most existentialists. This book presents Marcel’s existentialism as a convincing, relevant moral theory; founded on the creation of hope, interwoven with the individual’s response to the death of God. Jill Hernandez argues that today’s reader of Marcel can resonate with his belief that the experience of pain can be transcended through a philosophy of hope and an escape from materialism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"A Mother's Love"Katie L. GholsonWho is going to teach my daughter about becoming a woman?" S said to me. S was 38 and diagnosed with ovarian cancer. She and her husband were high school sweethearts, and she had a young son and a daughter. She had been told that there was no cure for her cancer, and at the point of meeting her, very little was able to be (...) done to manage her symptoms.As a mother of a young daughter, I was humbled by the question she asked me. Her daughter was 12 and was just beginning to learn about becoming a woman. The anticipatory grief of not having the opportunities to care for one's own children in the crucial moments of their development was devastating to S. Her ability to name what she grieves the most was profoundly sad to me and the other team members who witnessed it.As a palliative care chaplain, I am used to sad and tragic cases, but this one felt different. S and I had [End Page 80] a lot in common. I am also 38, married to my high school sweetheart, and I have a son and a daughter. Of course, it was not just these reasons that I felt a connection to S. It was also the tangible despair I felt when I was with her. As a chaplain, I am trained to meet people where they are and not to hurry them from a place of despair and anguish. I visited with S nine different times and watched the progression of her existential distress. Her distress was not always linear. Some days, it took a backseat and other days, it was front and center, but I was there to be a witness to whatever she was thinking and feeling, and a lot of times, it was inexpressible grief.S did not want to meet with "palliative care" initially. She was terrified of her diagnosis and believed that there were treatments that would give her back the life she desired. She was fierce and determined. S was also religious and believed that there was a miraculous cure for her that would allow her the time she desired to spend with her children and her husband. S was a softball mom and loved to watch her daughter play. While in the hospital, she missed many games, and this weighed on her.Along with being an athlete, S's daughter was very artistic and made S a bouquet of paper flowers. Each flower contained an encouraging phrase. S opened one while I was in her room. She had lost her hair, much of her body weight, and was wearing a hospital gown, but when she opened the flower, her daughter had written, "You are beautiful, Mom." In that moment, two 38-year-old women understood that beauty transcends outward appearances. S was beautiful: her story, her life, and her courage.S loved to walk around the hallway of her unit. I think she felt if she could keep moving, she could stay alive. She was able to take a walk outside a few times while she was inpatient and getting fresh air was very positive to her. These walks not only gave her the ability to widen her environmental space, but they also gave her space to think and consider the difficult situation she was faced with. I accompanied her on one of her walks. It was while we walked next to each other that she was able to finally share with me that she was afraid. She told me that the fear of not getting home, and the fear of death was overwhelming. I find that sometimes people can be vulnerable when they are not feeling interrogated by a medical team staring at them as they lay in a hospital bed. The "normal" activity of taking a walk and being side-by-side humanized the experience and I think S felt that at that moment, she could talk to me human-to-human—like friend-to-friend.When S finally decided to go home on hospice, I collected some legacy project supplies. I went to the hospital... (shrink)

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) was born into an aristocratic family with strong political connections. He served as a representative in the French Chamber of Deputies starting in 1839 and was briefly Minister of Foreign of Affairs in 1849. As an author, he attained instant fame after publishing the first part of Democracy in America in 1835 (the second part appeared in 1840). In 1838, he was elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and, in 1841, to the even (...) more prestigious French Academy whose forty members were, in principle, the greatest living writers in the French language, known as 'the immortals.' In spite of these achievements, his was an anguished life. He was tormented by the depressing fluctuations of his country between revolution and Bonapartism, and by his own political ineffectiveness. Yet, it was not a failed life. Although he was unable to modify the course of history, he succeeded in articulating a new set of terms for the comprehension of political regimes and how they change. His cultivation of paradoxical theses (for example, that revolutions often occur when improving social conditions create rising expectations), his perception of how cultural values affect government and vice versa, and finally, his capacity to dramatize why the understanding of social institutions is an important part of our search for meaning in life, all this made him a profound historical and sociological thinker. The existential problem at the heart of Tocqueville's identity was that he was a democratically inclined aristocrat. (shrink)

Understanding Existentialism provides an accessible introduction to existentialism by examining the major themes in the work of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir. Paying particular attention to the key texts, Being and Time, Being and Nothingness, Phenomenology of Perception, The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, the book explores the shared concerns and the disagreements between these major thinkers. The fundamental existential themes examined include: freedom; death, finitude and mortality; phenomenological experiences and 'moods', such as anguish, angst, (...) nausea, boredom, and fear; an emphasis upon authenticity and responsibility as well as the denigration of their opposites ; a pessimism concerning the tendency of individuals to become lost in the crowd and even a pessimism about human relations more generally; and a rejection of any external determination of morality or value. Finally, the book assesses the influence of these philosophers on poststructuralism, arguing that existentialism remains an extraordinarily productive school of thought. (shrink)

The article discusses the criteria for authentic humanity within the moral paradigm of Russian philosophy. In Russian philosophy, the disciplines of ethics and anthropology are intertwined, as the question of human nature is primarily addressed from a moral perspective. The article primarily focuses on the interplay between faith and conscience, a topic that is approached and resolved differently within the context of Russian philosophy compared to Western European philosophy. For instance, the concept of “elimination of the ethical,” a fundamental aspect (...) of S. Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy, is discussed. The transcendence of ethical rationalism through a leap of faith, exemplified by Abraham’s act, forms the essence of authentic Christian ethics. It explores how faith is challenged by ethics, which requires not blind faith, but rational behavior in accordance with the widely accepted norms of social morality. The article highlights the conflict between existential faith and social ethics as the primary contradiction identified by S. Kierkegaard. The author revisits the ideas of F.M. Dostoevsky, N.A. Berdyaev, and others to illustrate that within the context of Russian philosophy, the critical situation is less about the anticipation of death and more about the moral anguish of conscience arising from the evil and falsehood prevalent in the world, a sentiment shared by diverse individuals like V.S. Solovyov and V.M. Shukshin. This perspective significantly redefines the concept of the existential in Russian philosophy, equating it with profound moral reflection. In discussing philosophical and anthropological issues under the “post-human threat,” the author introduces the concept of “conscientious faith.” This concept, serving as a fundamental anthropological unit, posits that it is the conscience, with its appeal to personal moral responsibility, that reveals the moral essence of an individual, thereby establishing human uniqueness. (shrink)

The author, a professor of psychiatry and religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, is interested in developing a religious consciousness which is in many ways opposed to that of the existentialists, at least the more anguished existentialists. "Many contemporary Christians appear to be taking the advice of the Apostle Paul to 'work out your salvation with fear and trembling' out of context." And again: "Modern man's nibbling on intellectual fodder and breathing of 'existential' complaints has led him (...) far astray from his true destiny and rendered him a caricature of his true nature." Play is neither deadly serious nor mere fun, but these are the only alternatives of which modern man is aware. Modern man has forgotten the unique character of play and since this belongs to the essence of religion and liturgy, he has forgotten the essence of Christianity. True religion is playful. And the age of leisure has the time to cultivate play if it would set about doing so. In the course of his argument the author surveys the views of Freud, Erikson, Brown, Eliade, Otto, Huizinga, and Callois.--J. D. C. (shrink)

In his struggle to vindicate the religious enterprise from the charge that it is unfalsifiable and meaningless, McKinnon reduces both science and religion to distorted caricatures, ignores the centrality of the problems of evil, anguish, absurdity, and the egocentric predicament for religion, and asserts that religion and science are fundamentally one and the same. He builds his thesis on a distinction between "assertional," "self-instructional," and "ontological-linguistic" intentionality of utterances. By equivocating about whether these usages are logically independent, McKinnon holds (...) that, as "self-instructional," utterances are outside the positivist's arena. He presses the noteworthy point--that utterances sometimes are intended to report an existential stance--in such a way as to divert attention from the vast differences between religious and scientific methods and subject matter. Not content with leaving religious utterances restricted to mere reporting, McKinnon builds a case for bypassing positivistic attack under the other two usages by trading on a supposed incommensurability between particulars and universals. E.g., he holds that "God is love" must be indeterminate and unfalsifiable since both nouns are universals and since God is incomprehensible. And so it goes, a battle between straw men on a shifting field of honor for a prize of dubious worth. Notwithstanding, this is a thought provoking treatment of a difficult topic.--M. D. P. (shrink)

El presente artículo parte de exponer y analizar dos niveles en el camino metafísico de Heidegger, diferentes mas relacionados recíprocamente: de una parte, el de la crítica al presente, marcado por la cultura del pesimismo que se nutre del desprecio de la civilización técnico-industrial; y, de otra parte, el de la desesperación ontológico existencial anclado en la pérdida epocal de la pregunta por el sentido del ser, la cual comporta, en consecuencia, la imposibilidad de una apropiación individual e histórica de (...) la verdad del ser. (shrink)

As an environmental philosopher I had long been aware of dilemmas between animal ethics and ecological ethics, but now, as the manager of my own biodiversity reserve, I was facing these dilemmas in a more gut-wrenching and complex form than I had ever encountered in the classroom. Pressured by environmental authorities to cull kangaroos on my property, in the name of ecological ethics, I started thinking about the very meaning of ethics, its origins in the evolution of society and its (...) material and metaphysical presuppositions. Two different conceptions of the normative root of society emerged, the deontic conception, appropriate within the material and metaphysical framework of hunter-gatherer societies, and the axial conception, appropriate within the framework of ’civilization’, viz the agrarian societies that evolved into the urban-industrial formations of the modern era. The axial conception, based on empathy, aligned with our modern conception of ethics, and underlay our contemporary sense of animal ethics. ’Ecological ethics’, on the other hand, seemed to be obscurely underpinned by the deontic conception, and was not ethical at all in the axial sense, and was moreover mismatched, normatively speaking, with the material and metaphysical realities of modern societies. A different set of practices from those currently prescribed by environmental authorities needs to be devised to meet both the ethical and ecological requirements of our contemporary natural environment. (shrink)

Individuals differ in their ability to feel their own and others’ internal states, with those that have more autistic and less empathic traits clustering at the clinical end of the spectrum. However, when we consider semantic competence, this group could compensate with a higher capacity to imagine the meaning of words referring to emotions. This is indeed what we found when we asked people with different levels of autistic and empathic traits to rate the degree of imageability of various kinds (...) of words. But this was not the whole story. Individuals with marked autistic traits demonstrated outstanding ability to imagine theoretical concepts, i.e., concepts that are commonly grasped linguistically through their definitions. This distinctive characteristic was so pronounced that, using tree-based predictive models, it was possible to accurately predict participants’ inclination to manifest autistic traits, as well as their adherence to autistic profiles – including whether they fell above or below the diagnostic threshold – from their imageability ratings. We speculate that this quasi-perceptual ability to imagine theoretical concepts represents a specific cognitive pattern that, while hindering social interaction, may favor problem solving in abstract, non-socially related tasks. This would allow people with marked autistic traits to make use of perceptual, possibly visuo-spatial, information for “higher” cognitive processing. (shrink)

The purpose of the book is to clarify the notion of existential dependence and cognate notions, such as supervenience and the notion of an internal relation. I defend the view that such notions are best understood in terms of the concept of metaphysical grounding, i.e. the concept of one fact obtaining in virtue of other facts, where ‘in virtue of’ has a distinctively metaphysical meaning.

This article constitutes a brief exegesis of the first part of the work Being and Time, in which Heidegger discusses the fundamental dispositions that open existence (Dasein) as being-in-theworld, and which are determined as: anguish, fear and boredom. As fundamental dispositions, they are distinguished from their surface factual manifestations, such as fears and panic (derived from the fundamental disposition of fear), restlessness and anxieties (derived from structural anguish), disinterest and even the apparent “opposite” of the latter, the overwhelming (...) curiosity (derived from boredom). These here are, for Heidegger, all phatic modes derived from fundamental (structural) dispositions that can thus be appreciated ontically (phatically). This article proposes, therefore, to succinctly elaborate an exegesis on this issue in Heidegger’s phenomenology, so that maybe we can take one more step in understanding what the philosopher thinks with respect to the very structure of the Being-man. (shrink)

Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of one’s (...) life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness. (shrink)

This paper outlines and defends a notion of tragic-remorse. This moral emotion properly accompanies those actions that involve unavoidable moral wrongdoing in general and dirty hands scenarios in particular. Tragic-remorse differs both phenomenologically and conceptually from regret, agent-regret and remorse. By recognising the existence of tragic-remorse, we are better able to account for our complex moral reality which at times makes it necessary for good persons to act in ways that although justified leave the agent with a moral stain and (...) a particular emotional response. (shrink)

Purpose. To examine the existential anthropology of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in order to demonstrate the necessity of distinguishing the universal-spiritual, as human in human being, apart from the individual-existential in him, and to reveal the hierarchical correlation of biosocial, existential and spiritual spheres in personality. Theoretical basis. Within existential philosophy the author differentiates two separate traditions and proceeds from the insufficiency of the distinction of existential sphere, proposed by phenomenological tradition, showing the necessity (...) of its correlation with the spiritual sphere as a sphere of humanity, proposed by non-phenomenological tradition of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski. Originality. The author presents the anthropological conception of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in which human personality is understood as unity of individual-existential and universal-spiritual, which requires a special trans-empirical field of culture, which contains senses, images and symbols of humanity. Also, the author presents the recent developments of existential thinkers in distinguishing existential and spiritual dimensions, both not reducible to the physical and social dimensions. Conclusions. In both existential traditions, the specifically human was founded as a trans-biological and trans-social phenomenon, which appears as indefinable and non-predetermined. But in first tradition, humanity is understood as an existence, as a unique individuality, "project", variant of humanity, equivalent to other variants, and universal is understood as a community of human condition in the world. While in the second tradition, the universal is understood as spiritual. Thus, horizontal level of our private existence, as the process of movement from birth to death, is supplemented by vertical of human, universal ideals and images. Humanity appears as a task, on the way to which human being transcends beyond the limits of his individual "self" to the "super-individual", through inclusion into spiritual community, into universal culture. (shrink)

The standard argument to the conclusion that artificial intelligence (AI) constitutes an existential risk for the human species uses two premises: (1) AI may reach superintelligent levels, at which point we humans lose control (the ‘singularity claim’); (2) Any level of intelligence can go along with any goal (the ‘orthogonality thesis’). We find that the singularity claim requires a notion of ‘general intelligence’, while the orthogonality thesis requires a notion of ‘instrumental intelligence’. If this interpretation is correct, they cannot (...) be joined as premises and the argument for the existential risk of AI turns out invalid. If the interpretation is incorrect and both premises use the same notion of intelligence, then at least one of the premises is false and the orthogonality thesis remains itself orthogonal to the argument to existential risk from AI. In either case, the standard argument for existential risk from AI is not sound.—Having said that, there remains a risk of instrumental AI to cause very significant damage if designed or used badly, though this is not due to superintelligence or a singularity. (shrink)

This paper outlines and defends a notion of ‘tragic-remorse’. This moral emotion properly accompanies those actions that involve unavoidable moral wrongdoing in general and dirty hands scenarios in particular. Tragic-remorse differs both phenomenologically and conceptually from regret, agent-regret and remorse. By recognising the existence of tragic-remorse, we are better able to account for our complex moral reality which at times makes it necessary for good persons to act in ways that although justified leave the agent with a moral stain and (...) a particular emotional response. (shrink)

In ancient China, a revered Taoist sage named Zhuangzi told many parables. In Existential Psychology and the Way of the Tao, a selection of these parables will be featured. Following each parable, an eminent existential psychologist will share a personal and scholarly reflection on the meaning and relevance of the parable for psychotherapy and contemporary life. The major tenets of Zhuangzi's philosophy are featured. Taoist concepts of emptiness, stillness, Wu Wei (i.e. intentional non-intentionality), epistemology, dreams and the nature (...) of reality, character building in the midst of pain, meaning and the centrality of relationships, authenticity, self-care, the freedom that can come from one's willingness to confront death, spiritual freedom, and gradations of therapeutic care are topics highlighted in this book. (shrink)