Regulatory science is ultimately a matter of trust. You need to trust that certain evidence, when obtained with certain methodologies, is sufficient to inform about a new medical product's safety and/or efficacy.

Argumentation theorists know that their work has real-life application, and similarly, they draw inspiration for that work from real-life experiences. Sometimes, it comes from some public medium – the newspaper, a blog, a debate stage. But we also draw from more private reason-exchanges – a conversation with a neighbor, small-talk with a colleague, or a lovers’ spat. A few worries about publicly theorizing about those more private cases arise. We may be making public something that was unguarded, and so betray (...) a trust. Our theoretical reflections may themselves warp the relationship we’d originally savored, particularly when our partners know about the possibility of them being publicly scrutinized. Novelists and poets regularly struggle with this challenge with their work, and we argumentation theorists should, too. Les théoriciens de l’argumentation savent que leur travail a des applications concrètes et, de la même manière, ils s’inspirent d’expériences réelles. Parfois, ces idées proviennent d’un média public – un journal, un blog, une tribune de débat. Mais nous nous inspirons aussi d’échanges de raisonnement plus privés – une conversation avec un voisin, une petite conversation avec un collègue ou une dispute amoureuse. Nous craignons de théoriser publiquement sur ces cas plus privés. Nous pouvons rendre public des commentaires irréfléchis et ainsi trahir une confiance. Nos réflexions théoriques peuvent déformer la relation que nous avions initialement très appréciée, en particulier lorsque nos partenaires savent qu’ils peuvent être scrutés publiquement. Les romanciers et les poètes sont régulièrement confrontés à ce défi dans leur travail, et nous, les théoriciens de l’argumentation, devrions également le faire. (shrink)

En 1936, F. Chapouthier découvrait sous le sol de la pièce III 2 du palais de Malia deux épées de bronze ; le pommeau d'os de l'une était décoré d'une rondelle d'or portant un acrobate au repoussé. Ces trouvailles étaient rapportées par lui au premier palais, datation contestée depuis par plusieurs savants. Une fouille complémentaire en 1946 amenait la découverte sous le dallage de la pièce voisine III 1 d'un groupe de petits vases de Chamaizi. En 1981 un nouveau nettoyage (...) du niveau antérieur a été réalisé après dépose du dallage de III 1. Une installation caractéristique avec plates-formes stuquées, rigoles et vases collecteurs, qui n'était connue jusqu'ici que par des photographies, a été remise au jour, soigneusement relevée et étudiée. La chronologie proposée par Chapouthier a été confirmée : la salle stuquée et donc l'épée à l'acrobate trouvée sur son sol sont à dater de l'époque protopalatiale. (shrink)

Darstellung des Noema in 12 Thesen.\nverwendete Textstellen: Ideen 1: S. 203, 22-23; S. 204, 20-21; S. 357, 19-20: Handlungen sind zielgerichtet. Dabei bedarf eines keines physischen Objekts. Husserl setzt and diese Stelle das Noema. Somit wird auch zielgerichtetes Handeln aufgrund einer Halluzination m{ö}glich, Zielgerichtet zu sein bedeutet ein Noema zu haben.\n1. Follesdal´sche These: Noema ist eine intensionale Entit{ä}t, eine Generalisierung des Begriffs Sinn/Bedeutung.\n2. These: Das Noema hat zwei Bestandteile, a) der noematische Sinn, der allen thetischen Handlungen (erinnern, sich vorstellen usw.) (...) gem{ä}{ß} desselben Objekts mit denselben Eigenschaften in derselben Gerichtetheit gemeinsam ist und b) die Gegebenheitsweise (hat auch Sinncharakter), die sich unterscheidet in Handlungen mit verschiedenem thetischen Charakter.\n3. These: Der noematische Sinn ergibt sich aus der Art und Weise, wie Bewu{ß}tsein zum Objekt in Relation steht.\n!! 4. These: Das Noema einer Handlung ist nicht das Objekt dieser Handlung\n5. These: Das Objekt einer Handlung ist eine Funktion des noematischen Sinns, d.h. mit einem bestimmten Noema kann nur ein Objekt korrespondieren.\n6. These: Jedoch k{ö}nnen mit einem bestimmten Objekt verschiedene Noemata korrespondieren. (z.B. kann ein Objekt das Ziel verschiedener thetischer Handlunge sein, etwa erinnern, wahrnehmen, daher:)\n6. These a): Mit einem bestimmten Objekt korrespondieren verschiedene noematische Sinne.\n7. These: Jede Handlung besteht aus nur einem Noema. Sie wird durch dieses Noema charakterisiert. (Umgekehrt trifft dies nicht zu.)\n8. These: Noemata sind abstrakte Entit{ä}ten. (Sinne sind nicht real. Sie sind bezogen auf Handlungen in tempor{ä}ren Intervallen.)\n9. These: Noemata werden nicht durch unsere Sinnesorgane wahrgenommen.\n10. These: Noemata gelangen durch ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion ins Bewu{ß}tsein.\n11. These: Eine ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion kann iterativ geschehen (ann{ä}herungsweise; in Schritte gegliedert). Dies ist so, weil schon die Korrespondenz zwischen Sinn und Objekt wieder ein Objekt ergibt. Es folgt ein unendlicher Regress.\nPhysische Objekte sind transzendent in dem Sinne, dass sie unendlich viele Noemata haben. Sinn kann sie nie ersch{ö}pfend erfassen.\nNoemata k{ö}nnen andererseits ein physisches Objekt repr{ä}sentieren in der Form, dass mehr intendiert wird als gesehen wird. So denkt man sich etwa bei einem Stuhl, von dem man nur zwei Beine sieht, die beiden {ü}brigen hinzu.\n12. These: Diese Muster der Vorherbestimmung bilden zusammen mit den Gegebenheitsweisen das Noema (s. These 2). (shrink)

Résumé — Toute vérité est-elle connaissable en principe ? Une réponse négative à cette question suit d’un argument logique dû à F. Fitch, voisin du paradoxe de Moore, et connu sous le nom de paradoxe de la connaissabilité. Le paradoxe de Fitch constitue un obstacle à la conception antiréaliste de la vérité et, plus généralement, semble-t-il, à l’idéal positiviste d’après lequel toute vérité devrait nous être accessible en principe. Dans cet article, j’examine différentes tentatives pour préserver le principe selon (...) lequel toute vérité est connaissable, chacune inspirée d’une forme propre d’antiréalisme . Ces différentes approches sont comparées à une conception réaliste du positivisme, évoquée récemment par Burgess, qui postulerait seulement que toute vérité nécessaire est connaissable. Selon cette conception, certaines vérités contingentes sont effectivement inconnaissables, mais l’accessibilité de principe des vérités nécessaires demeure suffisante pour garantir la confiance positiviste dans la science.— Are all truths knowable ? A negative answer to this question follows from a logical argument related to the Moore Paradox and due to F. Fitch, also known as Fitch’s Knowability Paradox. Fitch’s paradox is widely considered to be an obstacle to the antirealist conception of truth, but even for a realist, it appears to threaten the positivist faith in the accessibility of all truths to our minds. In this paper, I first review different strategies to circumvent the paradox, each of them inspired by a different form of antirealism . I then compare these approaches to a realist version of positivism, discussed recently by Burgess, which would only postulate that all necessary truths are knowable. On that view, some contingent truths are indeed unknowable, but the idea that all necessary truths are within our reach remains sufficient to maintain the positivist faith in scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I shall present three arguments for thc pcrmissibility 0f physician-assisted suicide (PAS), and then examine several objections 0f 21 "K21nti2m" and non-Kantian nature against them. These are really 0bjcctions against certain types of suicide. I shall focus 0n active PAS (eg., when 21 patient takes 21 lethal drug given by E1 physician, in which case both thc physician and patient are active). I shall assume the patient is 21 competent, responsible, rational agent, who gives his being in (...) physical discomfort (pain, nausea, ctc.) as thc reason for intending his death. I am assuming, therefore, thc pain while 21 sourcc of suffering docs not undermine his rational agency in 21 way that threatens responsibility for choice.] Current legal proposals for permitting PAS focus 0n procedures.. (shrink)

Objective The UK Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine programme commenced in the autumn of 2008 for year 8 (age 12–13 years) schoolgirls. We examine whether the vaccine should be given when there is a difference of opinion between daughters and parents or guardians. Design Qualitative study using semi-structured interviews. Participants A sample of 25 stakeholders: 14 professionals involved in the development of the HPV vaccination programme and 11 professionals involved in its implementation. Results Overriding the parents' wishes was perceived as problematic (...) and could damage the relationship between school and parents. A number of practical problems were raised in relation to establishing whether parents were genuinely against their daughter receiving the vaccine. Although many respondents recognised that the Gillick guidelines were relevant in establishing whether a girl could provide consent herself, they still felt that there were significant problems in establishing whether girls could be assessed as Gillick competent. In some areas school nurses had been advised not to give the vaccine in the absence of parental consent. None of the respondents suggested that a girl should be vaccinated against her consent even if her parents wanted her to have the vaccine. Conclusions While the Gillick guidelines provide a legal framework to help professionals make judgements about adolescents consenting to medical treatment, in practice there appears to be variable and confused interpretation of this guidance. Improved legal structures, management procedures and professional advice are needed to support those who are assessing competence and establishing consent to vaccinate adolescents in a school setting. (shrink)

Let g E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction s s, with s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn s(m) s.t. g E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable function, (...) one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions. (shrink)

F. LeRon Shults explores DeleuzeOCOs fascination with theological themes and shows how his entire corpus can be understood as a creative atheist machine that liberates thinking, acting and feeling."e.

This paper, accessible for a general philosophical audience having only some fleeting acquaintance with set-theory and category-theory, concerns the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the bearing of category-theory on the foundations of mathematics. We argue for six claims. (I) A founding theory for category-theory based on the primitive concept of a set or a class is worthwile to pursue. (II) The extant set-theoretical founding theories for category-theory are conceptually flawed. (III) The conceptual distinction between a set and a class can be (...) seen to be formally codified in Ackermann's axiomatisation of set-theory. (IV) A slight but significant deductive extension of Ackermann's theory of sets and classes founds Cantorian set-theory as well as category-theory, and therefore can pass as a founding theory of the whole of mathematics. (V) The extended theory does not suffer from the conceptual flaws of the extant set-theoretical founding theories. (VI) The extended theory is not only conceptually but also logically superior to the competing set-theories because its consistency can be proved on the basis of weaker assumptions than the consistency of the competition. (shrink)

The use of genomic selection in agricultural animal breeding is in academic literature generally considered an ethically unproblematic development, but some critical views have been offered. Our paper shows that an important preliminary question for any ethical evaluation of genomic selection is how the scope of discussion should be set, that is, which ethical issues and perspectives ought to be considered. This scope is determined by three partly overlapping choices. The first choice is which ethical concepts to include: an ethical (...) discussion of genomic selection approaches may draw on concepts central to applied ethics, but some critical views have been based on concepts from critical animal studies and continental philosophy. A related choice is to what extent discussion should focus on new ethical issues raised or on existing ethical issues that will be ameliorated, perpetuated or aggravated by an innovation in genomic selection. The third choice is to treat an innovation in genomic selection either as a technique on itself or as a part of specific practices. We argue that ethical discussion should not limit attention to new issues or ignore the implications of particular ways of applying genomic selection in practice, and this has some consequences for which ethical concepts ought to be included. Limiting the scope of discussion may be defensible in some contexts, but broader ethical discussion remains necessary. (shrink)

F. Russell Sullivan analyzes the relationship between faith and reason in Kierkegaard's philosophy. Kierkegaard is widely considered to be an irrationalist. Sullivan argues that he views faith as reasonable in a distinct way that must be uncovered. In some of his pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard speaks of the movement of faith as paradoxical and absurd. There is evidence from his non-pseudonymous works that Kierkegaard does not consider faith irrational. He denigrates reason only in that he wishes to impress upon nominal Christians (...) (who look upon faith only as a body of doctrine) that more and more understanding of the tenets of faith can never yield logical certainty.The doctrines of faith can be argued pro and contra. For Kierkgaard, faith in this context is illogical, but not irrational. (shrink)

We applaud the authors’ efforts to provide a theoretical basis for and more clearly link clinical ethics support services (CESS) to organisational-level quality improvement (QI). We agree that additional theorising and testing of the resultant theoretical frameworks is of benefit to the field of clinical ethics and that the outcome of a CESS is more valuable than the sum of the individual cases that it handles. We would suggest that the authors have emphasised the output of the CESS without fully (...) considering the process by which it happens. While moral case deliberation does provide an example pathway for QI, such improvements do not necessarily need to occur through the mechanism of moral case deliberation. Further engagement with QI literature could provide valuable insights to quality within the field of clinical ethics. For example, combining the QI concepts of organisational culture and high reliability organisations (HROs) with the clinical ethics... (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas" verfügbar.