This book is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but that it provides the full intellectual apparatus (...) for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. (shrink)

Kant maintains that the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification, is a good will. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind (...) of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act, good outcome, good attitude, good character, or good person. Nor is it even any more so than something as commonplace as a good laugh or a good cup of coffee. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, a good outcome is an outcome that is good, and so on with the other examples, not one of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This paper thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance. The objection is not that the good will might not turn out to be good after all, which is impossible by definition, designation, or stipulation, but that its goodness is axiomatic and derivative rather than intrinsic or fundamental. (shrink)

Neoliberalism denotes the application of market principles to social phenomena and has impacted every aspect of life since the 1970s, including the educational domain (Harvey, 2005). The Impacts of...

This is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as a fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher, who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is not to glorify utilitarianism, in a full sweep, as the best normative ethical theory, or even to vindicate, on a more specific level, (...) Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is concerned only with Mill’s utilitarianism, and primarily with his proof of the principle of utility. The purpose is to show that Mill proceeds intelligibly and systematically in pursuing a well-defined project in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, and that he successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. (shrink)

This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms, especially of his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution. It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that reconstruction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a “proposal” — his teaser to elicit (...) a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions. (shrink)

Belief in God is a steady epistemic state sustaining an ancient social institution. Not only is it still with us, it is still the same as it ever was. It rests on the same inspiration it did thousands of years ago, commanding the same attention with the same motivation. Deities come and go but the belief stays the same. That is the thesis of this paper. It is more specifically a study of classical Greek polytheism as a paradigm for our (...) longstanding relationship with religious social structures. The main methodological vehicle is a survey of Hesiodic theogony for insight into the monotheism(s) we have adopted in its place. The evidence and implications for meaningful continuity are explored largely through the Judeo-Christian tradition, though that choice is representative rather than exhaustive with respect to the present spectrum of religious affiliation. The overall aim is not to dispute the validity of any particular belief system, past or present, but to expose the prevailing ones as extensions of the abandoned ones originally embraced with the same passion exhibited today. The underlying conviction is that theological explanation and religious orientation are reciprocal parts of a collective work in progress mapping out our common initiative to make sense of the world. (shrink)

Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse is the first comprehensive treatment of Quine’s brief yet memorable foray into ethics. It defends him against his most formidable critics, corrects misconceptions in the reception of his outlook on morality as a social institution and ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and restores emphasis on observationality as the impetus behind his momentous intervention in ethical theory. The central focus is on Quine’s infamous challenge to ethical theory: his thesis of the methodological infirmity (...) of ethics as compared with science. The ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the challenge is not only valid but also valuable insofar as it identifies opportunities for reformation in moral justification. (shrink)

This is a proposal for rethinking the main lines of Plato’s philosophy, including some of the conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Drawing on a new interpretive paradigm for Plato’s overall vision, the central focus is on the so-called Forms. Regarding the guiding paradigm, we propose replacing the dualism of a world of Forms separated from a world of particulars, with the monistic model of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality. Regarding the tools of (...) the trade, we distinguish between three constructs that have come, one and all, and largely indiscriminately, to be regarded as Forms: Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. This recalibration of what we know of Plato’s outlook, tools, and methods, together with a realignment of these with his general aims, will also help restore the philosopher’s emphasis on that which is good, a perspective often blurred in the structure of two worlds. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

This article examines the behavior of religious moderation in Indonesia, concerning local wisdom, social, cultural, and spiritual traditions. A phenomenological approach utilizing Parsons' structural functionalism theory identifies two generic concepts of structural functionalism: the system, function, and culture. These concepts facilitate interactions between actors and personalities, as well as unifying social systems. Culture can and does act as a component of other systemother systemss. The central argument in this article is that the concept of religious moderation, as observed in Palembang (...) and other regions of southern Sumatra, including Lampung, Indonesia, is not a novel phenomenon in religious studies. It can be traced back to Robert Bellah's work on civil religion. Bellah's conceptualization makes it clear that several factors contribute to the formation of religious moderation. These include traditions based on local wisdom, religious symbols, and state commitments. (shrink)

Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, in a setting (...) as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interest places a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit of a mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The difference not only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of nature while leaving a viable way out. (shrink)

This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same op-position. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in (...) the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby render-ing the procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of champi-oning a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress. (shrink)

Michael H. Mitias argues that friendship is a central moral value constituting an integral part of the good life and therefore deserving a prominent place in ethical theory. He consequently calls upon ethicists to make immediate and decisive adjustments toward accommodating what he regards as a neglected organic relationship between friendship and morality. This is not a fanciful amendment to our standard conception of morality but a radical proposal grounded in a unifying vision to recapture the right way of doing (...) ethics. While the assessment is compelling, and the plea well-placed, neither has been fully understood in the scholarly reception of Mitias. This paper clarifies both. What sets it apart from other reactions to Mitias is a holistic approach drawing on literary considerations as well as philosophical ones. The combined aim is to demonstrate that Mitias is not seeking simply to restore friendship to its rightful place in normative ethical theory, which is indeed the full extent of his formal mission, but that he is seeking to do so specifically within virtue ethics. This interpretation rests on a broad engagement with Mitias’s publications beyond the recent treatise often taken understandably yet erroneously to be his only work on the subject. (shrink)

John Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. He has developed and polished both in conjunction over the course of half a century. Yet the moral principles he advocates have always been more doctrinaire than the corresponding justification model should have ever allowed with design details explicitly promising objectivity. This article goes to the beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it, in the “Outline of a Decision (...) Procedure for Ethics,” with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. (shrink)

Discussion piece on a book of the same name: Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse. Published online as part of the “Book in Focus” program of Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2021).

Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake (...) of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The purpose of this paper is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to the Form of the good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I analyze, interpret, and defend John Stuart Mill's proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. My purpose is not to glorify utilitarianism, in a full sweep, as the best normative ethical theory, or even to vindicate, on a more specific level, Mill's universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. I am concerned only with Mill's utilitarianism, and primarily with his proof of the principle of utility. My overarching purpose guiding (...) the entire work is to show that Mill proceeds intelligibly and systematically in pursuing a well-defined project in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, and that he successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. To this end, I devote the bulk of my efforts to studying and responding to traditionally popular and persistently enduring objections to the proof that are handed down from one generation to the next in the philosophical community as a standard companion to Utilitarianism. The primary objections to which I respond at length are the charges that Mill commits the naturalistic fallacy, the fallacy of equivocation, and the fallacy of composition in his proof. Secondary literature on the subject consists of journal articles and book chapters that treat one or another but not all of these problems. My research has convinced me that, although these commentaries are generally quite good, they are mutually incompatible, and they are neither severally nor jointly sufficient to produce the kind of comprehensive defense that would do justice to Mill's proof of the principle of utility. This kind of comprehensive defense is what I intend to contribute to secondary literature on the subject. Specifically, my ultimate contribution to secondary literature is an interpretation of Mill's proof of the principle of utility in its entirety, absolved of the three fallacies commonly attributed to the proof, yet faithful to the text at all points. (shrink)

Mill’s Principle of Utility: Origins, Proof, and Implications (Leiden: Brill, 2022) is a scholarly monograph on John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism with a particular emphasis on his proof of the principle of utility. Originally published as Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1994), the present volume is a revised and enlarged edition with additional material, tighter arguments, crisper discussions, and updated references. The initiative is still principally an analysis, interpretation, and defense of (...) the controversial proof, which has yet to attract a scholarly consensus on how it works and whether it succeeds. Well over a century and a half after Mill’s contribution, the subject matter continues to figure prominently in classroom discussions, where the principle and its proof are presented and debated in connection with the critical baggage of logical problems and conceptual confusions wrongly attributed to Mill from the beginning. The overarching aim of the book, now supplemented by a comprehensive historical background and salient philosophical implications, remains the vindication of Mill’s reasoning in pursuit of what he promises as a proof of the principle of utility. (shrink)

This is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. The aim is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have corresponding Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have corresponding things. Both questions have come up before. But the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive (...) to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers but also with better insight into the questions. (shrink)

Neoliberal forces have been hijacking a number of linguistic features so as to ease their way to exploiting education for their own ends. Words such as ability and employability, which are now beco...

Corrective intervention in Plato's metaphysics replacing the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with a novel and revolutionary paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing (...) on the text and focusing on the problem. No doubt, doing both is not only possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and further, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead. (shrink)

This is a defense of Pyrrhonian skepticism against the charge that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence in question. The apparent conflict has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an (...) epistemic inconsistency, perhaps by both, because the determination and affirmation of equipollence is itself a judgment of sorts, one that is not suspended. The practical challenge is that, independently of any conceptual confusion or contradiction, suspending judgment in reaction to equipollence evinces doxastic commitment to equipollence, if only because human beings are not capable of making assessments requiring rational determination without believing the corresponding premises and conclusions to be true. The two analytic sections addressing these challenges are preceded by two prefatory sections, one laying out the epistemic process, the other reviewing the evidentiary context. The response from the conceptual perspective is that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is not a reasoned conclusion adopted as the truth of the matter but a natural reaction to an impression left by the apparently equal weight of opposing arguments. The response from the practical perspective is that the acknowledgment of equipollence is not just an affirmation of the equal weight of arguments but also an admission of inability to decide, suggesting that any assent, express or implied, is thrust upon the Pyrrhonist in a state of epistemic paralysis affecting the will and the intellect on the matter being investigated. This just leaves a deep disagreement, if any, regarding whether equipollence is an inference based on discursive activity or an impression coming from passive receptivity. But this, even if resolved in favor of the critic (which it need not and ought not be), is not the same as confusion or inconsistency on the part of the Pyrrhonist, the demonstration of which is the primary aim of this paper. (shrink)

This book is a defense of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism with a particular emphasis on his proof of the principle of utility. The overarching aim of the book is the vindication of Mill's reasoning in the proof and the restoration of his reputation as one of the clearest thinkers of his time.

Defensive medicine is defined as a doctor’s deviation from standard practice to reduce or prevent complaints or criticism. The objectives of this study were to assess the prevalence of the practice of defensive medicine in the UK among hospital doctors and the factors affecting it.

The Sharī‘ah ‘Committee is a board which is independent in directing, reviewing and supervising an Islamic Financial Institution. It consists of those who are specialised in Fiqh Mu‛āmalāt or those who know it with expertise in other fields. In conjunction with IFIs emergence, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions was established and has issued numerous standards on accounting, auditing and also governance for IFIs. The researchers intend to review the duties and decision-making guidelines of the Sharī‘ah Committee (...) prescribed by the AAOIFI in 2010. The review undergoes a thorough search and critical analysis of any related content about the topic throughout the whole standard. Some important results are: AAOIFI mentions directly the duties of the Sharī‘ah Committee along with the definition of this Sharī‘ah Committee. These duties are directing, reviewing and supervising. On the other hand, decision-making guidelines are indicated indirectly and they are scattered throughout the AAOIFI governance standards. (shrink)

While the concept of human rights is becoming more prevalent in educational policy and curricula, as well as in school subjects (Suárez, 2007), the best way to incorporate human rights in education...

Historical study of philosophical movements from ancient times to 19th century.

"أما ما نحن فيه، نحن أولاً نجعل الكتاب والسنة هي الثوابت الأصول، والمراجع التي نريد أن نستمد منها فكرنا وثقافتنا ونجعلها مرجعنا في كل شيء، نرجع إلى تراثنا الإسلامي ونقومه، ما انسجم منه مع توجيهات الكتاب والسنة ومناهجهما أخذ منه، ما صادم شيئاً من ذلك أهمل. كذلك نرجع من إيجابيه، وننبذ سليبة. إنا نتعامل مع الموجود الفكري والحضاري والثقافي من نظرة الإنسان المستنير الذي له مراجعة ومصادر هدايته يحاكم كل شيء إليها، وبالتالي فإن لدينا الحماية الكافية وعندنا الأمن الكافي الذي (...) يحمينا من أي انحراف أو ما يمكن أن يشكل خطراً على عقيدتنا وحضارتنا". (shrink)

Islamic education; Islamic ethics; security education; culture conflict; influences; families; Saudi Arabia; intellectual life; 20th century.

İslam hukuku tarihine baktığımızda fıkıh usûlünün bir süreç içerisinde geliştiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu süreç içerisinde, mezhep imamları de-diğimiz müçtehitler başta olmak üzere birçok âlimin, fıkıh usûlü ilminin yapısını oluşturan katkılarından bahsedilebilir. Örneğin İmam Ebû Hanîfe’nin istihsana başvurması, İmam Mâlik’in amel-i ehli Medine ile amel etmesi ve İmam Şafiî’nin hem Ehl-i rey hem de Ehl-i hadisin fıkhını mezcederek elde ettiği formasyonla “er-Risâle” adlı eserinde bir usûl ortaya koyması fıkıh usûlü ilminin yapısını oluşturan katkıların başında gelmektedir. Bu katkıların yanında özellikle mezheplerin kurumsallaştığı (...) dönem ve sonrasında Gazalî, İbn Teymiyye, öğrencisi İbn Kayyım ve Şâtıbî gibi âlimlerin, fıkıh usulüne dinamizm kazandırmak adına söz konusu ilme yönelik birtakım yenileme çabaları ortaya koydukları bilinmektedir. Modern dönemde ise fıkıh usûlünü yenileme çabalarının klasik döneme göre daha net ve yaygın olduğu görülmektedir. Bu dönemde fıkıh usulüne yönelik yenileme çabalarını iki merhalede değerlendirmek mümkündür. Bu merhalelerin birincisi, fıkıh usûlünü yenilemeye çağrı merhalesi, ikincisi ise fıkıh usûlünü yenilemenin amelî merhalesidir. İkinci merhalede âlimlerin dinî, siyasî, sosyal ve felsefî eğilimlerine bağlı olarak kendi içinde de farklı tezler içeren “fıkhî ve usûlî yaklaşım” ve “fikrî ve felsefî yaklaşım” olmak üzere iki temel yaklaşımdan bahsedilebilir. Bu çalışmada kendi içinde de farklı eğilimlere sahip fikrî ve felsefî yaklaşımın fıkıh usûlünü yenilemeye dair görüşlerini, Fazlurrahman,, Hasan Turabî ve Muhammed Müctehid Şebusterî örnekliğinde sunmaya çalıştık. (shrink)

الفكر، والتَّفكير، والتَّفكُّر، والتَّدبُّر، والتَّذكُّر،... مفاهيمُ أساسية رافقت الوجود الإنساني، منذ بدء الخليقة، وسوف تبقى معه إلى نهايتها، دون أن تثبت مادتها وموضوعاتها ومستوياتها عند حد معين، في حياة الفرد البشري أو الجيل البشري. فكيف يمكن لكتاب أن يستقصي ذلك؟! هذا الكتاب إذاً، مدخل إلى الفكر وحسب؛ مدخل في مفاهيمه ومستوياته وخرائطه... تضمن تجوالاً فكرياً: في موضوع الفكر؛ وفي مصادره في الأصول والتراث والخبرة المعاصرة، وموضوعاته، وأدواته، ونصيب أصناف أهله منه، والمؤسسات المتخصصة فيه، وعلاقته بالعلم جملة، وبالعلوم النفسية والتربوية والاجتماعية (...) واللغوية والسياسية... وهو كذلك مدخل إلى عملية البناء الفكري؛ كيف تبدأ، ثم تتواصل مرحلة بعد أخرى؟ وكيف تترقى من مستوى إلى آخر؟ وكيف تتنوع في المحتوى الذي تبنيه؟ وهو قبل ذلك وبعده، أسئلة كثيرة، وإجابات قليلة؛ فقيمةُ التَّفكُّر في إثارة الأسئلة لا تقلُّ عن التفكر في البحث عن إجاباتها، وبعض الإجابات عارضة مؤقتة، تتغير وتتعمق مع مزيد من الفكْر والذِّكْر، والتَّفكُّر والتَّذكُّر. قد يجد القارئ في الكتاب بعض مواطن المتعة والطرافة، لكنه سوف يجد كذلك مواطن كثيرة تضطره إلى التَّفكُّر والتَّدبُّر، فإذا نجح الكتاب في الأمرين، فذلك ما كان يهدف إليه!. (shrink)