The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ and ‘activity’ that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics. Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without being in (...) motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone indagar el caso de Leopoldo Castedo dentro del más amplio contexto de la variada reflexión politológica del republicanismo español en el exilio que siguió a la derrota en la Guerra civil española. Castedo, exiliado en Chile tras el conflicto, desarrolló una intensa actividad cultural entre Chile y los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, uniendo en ella, en lo que fue siempre signo identitario de su quehacer intelectual, la reflexión teórica con la praxis, las ideas con su (...) traducción concreta en el mundo y en la sociedad de su tiempo. (shrink)

Se defiende una política de lo común a partir de las aportaciones ontológicas y epistemológicas de Espinosa y de Deleuze. Una política capaz de articular las diferentes reivindicaciones de las minorías buscando escapar de la caída en los esencialismos identitarios excluyentes que definen de forma rígida quien es un verdadero proletario o una verdadera mujer, etc. Una política de lo común que partiendo de las diferencias se orienta hacia una política “de todo el mundo” y “para todo el mundo”, a (...) través de devenires minoritarios que concluyen en un “devenir imperceptible”; es decir, es una política de las diferencias que desemboca en la indiferencia de cada cual, ya que se refiere a lo que tienen de común los individuos más que en aquello que los separa. Es una política basada en la razón, pero una razón que hace las cuentas con las pasiones, en la estela espinosiana, y con los factores inconscientes, en la estela deleuziana. Una razón, pues, situada y abierta a la sensibilidad, los afectos y los sentimientos, pero sin caer en retóricas irracionalistas o sensibleras. (shrink)

Quisiera asumir el título de este panel -"Pluralismo y éticas de la vida buena"- no como un tema, sino como un problema. ¿Son, o al menos pueden ser pluralistas las éticas de la vida buena (EVB)? Se trata, con toda evidencia, del pluralismo ético, que, en nuestra época, sigue -y a veces acompaña- al pluralismo político, el cual, por su parte, tiene sus más lejanos antecedentes en el pluralismo físico-ontológico de los presocráticos e implica siempre algún tipo de pluralismo epistemológico. (...) El ético intenta integrar una diversidad de intereses, dentro y fuera del sujeto moral. Dentro, atendiendo a las múltiples capacidades, tendencias y actitudes de dicho sujeto. Fuera, volviendo compatibles e incluso complementarios, no sólo los intereses de los sujetos individual y social, sino también los de los múltiples sujetos sociales, con sus diversas concepciones y tendencias en torno a lo que es bueno y correcto. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

Out of a folklore–like fact about the counterexample function to P=NP, a function which grows about as fast as the Busy Beaver function, we review the consequences of our exotic formalization for P=NP and then speculate about possible ways to extend our work.

Edith Stein (1891-1942) is a clear example of a philosopher, since she dedicated her entire life and effort to the conquest of Truth, of Being. The path she follows begins with her personal experience and her desire to find an answer to the existence of man. In phenomenology, she will find a means of confronting reality, free of prejudices. During her intellectual and existential journey, she meets a God that becomes living experience and quenches her thirst for Truth. She completes (...) her contemplation of the philosophical being by means of a mystic contemplation of Being. Her philosophical activity is a road that leads "from finite being to eternal being". (shrink)

The notion of responsibility seeks to establish a connection between agents and some harm or injustice, imposing on them the duty to make things right. The identification of responsibilities is therefore a fundamental step in the work of fighting against injustices, by imposing concrete obligations on particular agents. However, our globalizing world puts in crisis the traditional assumptions on which this idea is based. In this article I examine the reasons for this crisis and I offer alternative interpretations to avoid (...) the problems identified. I argue in favour of adopting a structural perspective that leaves aside the interactional point of view of ethics. (shrink)

In the Nile excursus of his Bellum Civile (10.172-333), Lucan portrays Caesar's inquiry into the source of the river, a well-known topos of human ambition, as an act of aggression, an imperialistic push to transgress natural boundaries. This aggressive drive is foiled by the duplicitous response of both the priest Acoreus and the divinity who inspires him. The digressive quality of the episode offers a redirection and setback for the character of Caesar, which are achieved through the momentary transference of (...) the conflict of the epic to the field of didactic exposition. (shrink)

In attempting to integrate the authors' proposed model with results from analogous human event-related potential (ERP) research, we found difficulties with: (1) its apparent disregard for supraordinate representations at posterior multimodal association cortices, (2) its failure to address contextual task effects, and (3) its strict architectural dichotomy between memory storage and control functions.