Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications (...) for the debate on public reason. (shrink)

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

Ranking functions have been introduced under the name of ordinal conditional functions in Spohn (1988; 1990). They are representations of epistemic states and their dynamics. The most comprehensive and up to date presentation is Spohn (manuscript).

Not only does this book further our understanding of Rosenzweig's daunting work, The Star of Redemption -- a seemingly inexhaustible text -- but of Rosenzweig's ...

Was ist und was leistet Diskursanalyse in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften? Ist sie eine Methode, die explizit vorliegt und - wie andere Methoden - gelehrt und gelernt werden kann?