Was ist und was leistet Diskursanalyse in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften? Ist sie eine Methode, die explizit vorliegt und - wie andere Methoden - gelehrt und gelernt werden kann?

As Cuba achieves one of the lowest per capita ecological footprints in the world, the country’s overshoot day was on 1 December 2019, while some European countries already reach this limit in February (e.g., Luxembourg), monitoring the environmental preferences of the Cuban younger generation may offer valuable behavioral or pedagogical insights into such a society. As accepted standardized measures exist in the scales of 2-Major Environmental Values (2-MEV) and the General Ecological Behavior (GEB), both measures are following the necessary psychometric (...) requirement, as they have the unique advantage of repeated independent confirmation (and thus provide an external validity). These captured 40 items of reported behavior originating in six subscales that total in a single main cover score. The first one (2-MEV) monitors individual biocentric and anthropocentric preferences with a 20 item-set by relying upon these two higher-order factors of “Preservation” (PRE) and “Utilization” (UTL). Although many language versions already exist (33 in the case of the 2-MEV) for verifying validities and reliabilities of both scales, a country such as Cuba may affirm that this is due to expected cultural differences as well as their exceptionally low global footprint. Additionally, neither the individual connectedness with nature nor the diurnal preferences within the linear structural model showed a substantial relationship to PRE or UTL. Nevertheless, all the regression scores follow the expected positive or negative directions, albeit not all the fit scores turned out as satisfactorily. Apparently, the applied measures secure a good basis for measuring the attitudinal and behavioral framework, but will need further fine tuning to completely monitor the environmental preferences of Cuban adolescents. (shrink)

People with post-stroke motor aphasia know what they would like to say but cannot express it through motor pathways due to disruption of cortical circuits. We present a theoretical background for our hypothesized connection between attention and aphasia rehabilitation and suggest why in this context, Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI) use might be beneficial for patients diagnosed with aphasia. Not only could BCI technology provide a communication tool, it might support neuronal plasticity by activating language circuits and thereby boost aphasia recovery. However, (...) stroke may lead to heterogeneous symptoms that might hinder BCI use which is why the feasibility of this approach needed to be investigated first. In this pilot study, we included five participants diagnosed with post-stroke aphasia. Four participants were initially unable to use the visual P300 speller paradigm. By adjusting the paradigm to their needs, all participants could successfully learn to use the speller for communication with accuracies up to 100%. We describe necessary adjustments to the paradigm and present future steps to further investigate the here presented approach. (shrink)

Environmental education aims to affect environmental knowledge and attitude to ultimately induce pro-environmental behavior. Based on 247 upper elementary school students, we tested the impact of an outdoor-based earth education program on environmental knowledge and attitude with a pre-post design. Both outcome measures were Rasch scales. Environmental knowledge is a composite of 27 system, action, and effectiveness knowledge items, and environmental attitude is a composite of 13 evaluative statements and 11 self-reported behaviors about nature preservation. Our analysis revealed gains in (...) environmental knowledge and attitude. The convergence between knowledge and attitude increased significantly from pre- to post-program, and attitude played a significant role in knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

Membaca buku yang terbit dalam Brills Series in Church History ini mempesona. Buku ini begitu menarik karena menggariskan perjalanan intelektual dan teologis Gereja Katolik sejak Revolusi Prancis (1789-95) dan kekalahan Napoleon (1815) sampai ke tahun 2013, tahun Paus Benedikt XVI mengundurkan diri. Padahal 200 tahun itu adalah tahun-tahun terwujudnya modernitas. Maka buku ini memaparkan dan menganalisa bagaimana Gereja Katolik dan teologinya menghadapi modernitas. Di atas hanya 220 halaman para penulis memperkenalkan pembaca secara ketat, tetapi jelas dan rinci, dengan perkembangan amat (...) dramatis teologi Katolik, dengan peranselalu peran kuncipara Paus, para teolog dan aliran-aliran teologi Katolik utama. Suatu perjalanan yang mulai dengan penolakan total Gereja terhadap modernitas, melalui tu-nas-tunas pembaruan sesudah perang dunia pertama yang akhirnya bermuara dalam pembukaan diri Gereja terhadap cita-cita manusia masa kini dalam Konsili Vatikan II (1962-65), namun pembukaan mana justru membawa Gereja ke dalam suatu krisis baru. Modernitas yang dibahas dalam buku ini mulai dengan revolusi intelektual yang namanya pencerahan dengan segala macam kejutan: Rasionalisme, liberalisme dan sekularisme sebagai ideologi politik baru. Nasionalisme sebagai kekuatan politik amat dahsyat. Restorasi monarki-monarki sesudah kekalahan Napoleon, gerakan-gerakan populis-nasionalisseperti Risorgimento yang akan mempersatukan Italia, dengan sekaligus menghapus Negara Kepausan yang sudah berumur seribu tahun. Dua perang dunia di abad ke-20 yang mengubah wajah Eropa dan akhirnya membongkar kolonialisme dan imperialisme Eropa. Munculnya ideologi-ideologi sekuler keras seperti komunisme dan fasisme. Perang dingin dan anarki sesudah perang dingin selesai. Para penulis berhasil menempatkan Gereja dalam pusaran global itu. Mereka menunjukkan bagaimana Gereja di bawah Paus Gregor XVI (1831-46), di bawah syok Revolusi Prancis, mengambil sikap konfrontatif total terhadap modernitas, menolak tuntutan demokrasi, kebebasan beragama dan perpisahan antara Gereja dan Negara. Konsili Vatikan I (1869-70) di mana penolakan itu memuncak dibahas secara rinci dengan latar belakangnya dan keanekaan aliran teologis yang sebenarnya kompleks, dan bagaimana Gereja Katolik mendefinisikan diri sebagai Gereja Kepausan. Kita mengikuti bagaimana Gereja kemudian mau mengamankan diri dari tantangan pemikiran filsafat modern dengan menetapkan neo-skolastik sebagai filsafat dan teologi resmi Gereja, bagaimana obsesi anti-modernisme mencapai puncaknya di bawah Paus Pius X (1903-14). Kita membaca tentang ultramontanisme, gerakan Oxford, perhimpunan ekstrem kanan Prancis Action Catholique (yang akhirnya dibubarkan oleh Paus Pius XI [1922-1939]), dan juga tentang Sodalitium Pianum (Persaudaraan Pius), suatu jaringan rahasia yang memata-matai para dosen teologi dan filsafat, yang kalau dicurigai ketularan modernisme dilaporkan ke Roma, lalu dipecat (ada sekitar lima puluh dosen yang disingkirkan sebagai terjangkit modernisme). Kita menyaksikan gerakan-gerakan pembaruan yang muncul sesudah PD I seperti gerakan liturgis, gerakan biblis, gerakan ekumenis, para imam buruh dan nouvelle theologie (teologi baru, yang meski 1949 dilarang oleh Paus Pius XII (1939-58) namun akan memberi dorongan-dorongan kunci pada pembaruan Gereja dalam Konsili Vatikan II).... Gambaran Gereja 2013 pada permulaan Kepausan Fransiskus dalam buku ini berkesan ambivalen. Sebenarnya pimpinanPaus, para Uskupmendasarkan diri pada paham Gereja Konsili Vatikan II. Tetapi reformasi struktur pemerintahan Gereja tetap macet. Tentang banyak masalah rincikeluarga berencana, selibat wajib, kemungkinan pe-nahbisan perempuan menjadi imam, desentralisasi kekuasaan, peng-angkatan uskup atau peresmian teks-teks liturgi bagi Gereja lokal, misalnya terdapat perbedaan-perbedaan pandangan serius antara banyak teolog Katolik dengan Vatikan. Padahal Gereja adalah komunitas ber-iman yang dibangun atas keyakinan bahwa Gereja adalah ruang di mana kita bertemu dengan, dan dibimbing oleh, Yesus Kristus. Kekuasaan yang dipegang oleh Paus semata-mata harus demi menunjang panggilan Gereja itu. Kalau dalam umat terjadi kesan bahwa pimpinan Gereja memakai kekuasaan yang ada di tangannya untuk mempertahankan struktur-struktur kekuasaan yang tidak lagi dapat dilegitimasi atas dasar Injil, kredibilitas Gereja sendiri bisa mengalami kemerosotan. Barangkali keengganan Vatikan untuk mengadakan reformasi nyata bukan karena Vatikan masih, untuk sebagian, terperangkap oleh gambaran Gereja Vatikan I, sebagaimana disindir dalam buku ini, melainkanmengikuti kritik ideologi Karl Marxkarena Vatikan, seperti setiap aparat, seakan-akan dengan sendirinya mati-matian mau mempertahankan kekuasaan. Apakah Paus Fransiskus yang telah membawa angin baru ke dalam Vatikan akan membawa perubahan? (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Program Pascasarjana, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

Buku berjudul Franz Magnis Suseno: Sosok dan Pemikirannya, berisi tiga belas artikel yang terdiri dari empat artikel mengenai sosok Franz Magnis-Suseno, lima artikel mengenai pemikiran Magnis, dan empat artikel sebagai catatan, ditulis oleh beliau-beliau yang tidak diragukan lagi profesionalisme mereka. Baiklah kini dimulai dengan mengulas dahulu lima pokok pemikiran yang secara singkat dapat disebut secara tematis: 1) tentang Pancasila, 2) tentang Etika Dialog, 3) tentang sosok agama modern, 4) tentang menalar Tuhan dari dunia, 5) tentang pendekatan ilmiah sesuai (...) teori multijagat dan celah kuantum bagi Tuhan. Ternyata urutan pengulasan tidak sesuai dengan urutan dalam buku, agak mengalami perubahan karena pertimbangan tematik yang runtut.... Komaruddin Hidayat menyebut Magnis sebagai pejuang moral dan pembela hak azasi manusia. Bukankah kekuatan agama menjadi sumber moral dan penggerak masyarakat dalam bidang pendidikan, ekonomi dan lingkungan hidup demi timbulnya kelas menengah yang mandiri? Anjurannya sebaiknya ormas-ormas agama mengambil jarak dari per- mainan politik praktis, dan tidak menjadi bagian birokrasi dan politisi Lele yang sangat menikmati kondisi air keruh yang berlumpur. Kami ingat pepatah memancing di air keruh. Salah satu pemakalah F. Budi Hardiman menyebutkan bahwa Magnis tidak menempuh spiritualitas jalan mistik, meskipun mengawali pengalaman hidup intelektual di Indonesia lewat etika Jawa dan mau tidak mau berurusan dengan wayang, tetapi lebih wayang purwa terkait dengan kejawen atau kebatinan. Pada makalah perihal Etika Dialog pula disebutkan oleh Budi Hardiman bahwa di Indonesia ada jalan lain untuk mengupayakan titik temu agama-agama, yaitu jalan mistik. Memang bila dikembalikan pada bentuk bentuk spiritualitas, spiritualitas mistik yang tidak menjadi pilihan, lebih pada spiritualitas religius, kosmik dan humanistik. Ini merupakan catatan pada ulasan Sudiarja. Kini pemakalah pertama yang disebut terakhir ialah Al. Andang L Binawan yang menarik ulasannya perihal riwayat hidup dan panggilan Magnis, dan penting menyebutkan pada usia 11 tahun sudah berniat menjadi Jesuit, meskipun sempat diuraikan dengan simpatik Magnis kurang suka latihan doa panjang-panjang malah lebih suka latihan musik, dan hobby naik gunung hingga sekarang masih tapi sudah berkurang. Ia juga menguasai dua hal yang perlu baginya ialah Marxisme dan Kromo Inggil. Baginya Tuhan adalah kebenaran, keadilan dan kasih. (Toeti Heraty N. Roosseno, Guru Besar Emeritus Ilmu Filsafat, Universitas Indonesia). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence LINDA L. McALISTER FRANZBRnrCrXr~O,in his important early work Psychologie vom empirischen Stand, punkt (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena,x It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the Psychologie, he devotes him.self to this (...) task, and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction. After enumerating examples of men~l phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several charac, teristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one whdch has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence," 2 (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rathor location, indicating existence in the mind). As examples of mental phenomena Brentano lists first ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen), whether sensory or issuing from the imagination, and by this he meam not the objects which are presented or which one has before one's mind, but rather the condition or, what Brentano; broadly speaking, calls the act of having such an idea or presentation.3 Thus the acts of hearing something, or seeing or perceiving something would be mental phenomena regardless of whether the object which is, e. g., seen, ds perceived through the visual organs or seen in the mind's eye, so to speak. Other examples are acts of judgment, amongwhich Brentano includes ~:emembering, inferring, believing, doubting; and emotions.such as being happy or sad, lovi~,g and hating, along with which Brentano includes such things as willing, intending, choosing, etc.4 i Oskar Kraus, e.d.,2nd ed. (Leipzig,1924),I, 109. Psych. I, 137. Psych. I, 111. " Psych. I, 112. [423] 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ExamFles of physical phenomena which Brentano mentions are "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I perceive; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination." s It appears from the examFles, then, that mental phenomena are all mental acts, in a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of sensible qualities, the inclusion of "a landscape" being, apparently, a slip on Brentano's part, as his student, friend and editor Oskar Kraus points out. 6 As mentioned above, Brentano thought that there is one partieula~ mark of mental phenomena which characterizes them better than any other: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affmned or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.7 Commentators, perhaps not surprisingly, have disagreed as to the precise nature of the view which Brentano is enunciating in this passage,s Some have supposed that since you can think of, hate, or judge, etc., things which do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, then the immanent object of which Brentano speaks i,s not Pegasus but a "thoughtof Pegasus" (gedachtes Pegasus) which exists in one's mind whenever someone th'mks of Pegasus. Apparently H6fler interpreted the doctrine in this way in a paper which he presented to the Fifth International Psychology Congress in 1905.9.In the light of some passages from Brentano's early writings it appears to be a plausible interpretation. Consider, for example, the following passage: There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely.... The two concepts are not identical but they... (shrink)

Nomina Sacra : Versuch einer Geschichte der christlichen Kürzung. Von Ludwig Traube, o. ö. Professor der Philologie an der Universitat, München. . Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1907. Pp. x + 295. M. 15.Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen. Von Ludwig Traube. Herausgegeben von Franz Boll. Erster Band. Zur Paläographie und Handschriftenkunde. Herausgegeben von Paul Lehmann. Mit biographischer Einleitung von Franz Boll. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1909. Pp. lxxv+263.

Franz Huber’s book addresses beliefs and counterfactuals and their relationship. Using a normative approach, the author explores how agents should believe and change their beliefs, given they have...

Nicholas Magni of Jawor (de Jawor/Jauer, von Heidelberg) (1355–1435), a Silesian professor of theology, preacher, and diplomat, was one of the most interesting figures of the first generation of scholars from the University of Heidelberg. Of all his output, it is the treatise De superstitionibus that has attracted the greatest attention so far, while his less known anti-Hussite writings have long been only a research postulate. The work of Jiří Petrášek is, therefore, a long-awaited analysis of the insufficiently recognized writing (...) by Nicholas Magni: Contra epistolam perfidiae Hussitarum, which is a response to the Taborite Manifesto from 1430. In his work, Petrášek draws new conclusions: regarding Nicolas Magni’s views on indulgences, the author points to the borrowings from Henry of Langenstein, and he does not share the earlier statement of Franz X. Bantle about the originality of the Heidelbergian theologian’s views on indulgences and their essence confined to the notion of “communication”. Thus, we receive a work that verifies the previous findings on the anti-Hussite views of Nicholas Magni, and which thoroughly introduces us into the less known areas of the 15th century Catholic anti-Hussite polemics. (shrink)

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and (...) nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225. (shrink)

On Jewish Learning collects essays, speeches, and letters that express Rosenzweig's desire to reconnect the profound truths of Judaism with the lives of ordinary people.

This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set (...) of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 Much of this article was written while the author was a fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (SCASSS) in Uppsala. I want to thank the Collegium for providing me with excellent working conditions. Wlodek Rabinowicz and other fellows gave me valuable comments at a seminar at SCASSS when an early version of the paper was presented. I also want to thank Luc Bovens, Franz Dietrich, Christian List and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments on a later version. The final version was prepared during a stay at Oxford University for which I am grateful to the British Academy. (shrink)

How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...) to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement. (shrink)

According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind (...) of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski. (shrink)