It is shown by Parsons [2] that the first-order fragment of Frege's logical system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetic is consistent. In this note we formulate and prove a stronger version of this result for arbitrary first-order theories. We also show that a natural attempt to further strengthen our result runs afoul of Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth.

The traditional understanding of abstraction operates on the basis of the assumption that only entities are subject to thought processes in which particulars are disregarded and commonalities are lifted out (the so-called method of genus proximum and differentia specifica). On this basis Frege criticized the notion of abstraction and convincingly argued that (this kind of) “entitary- directed” abstraction can never provide us with any numbers. However, Frege did not consider the alternative of “property- abstraction.” In this (...) article an argument for this alternative kind of abstraction is formulated by introducing a notion of the “modal universality” of the arithmetical and by developing it in terms of the distinction between type-laws (laws for entities – applicable to a limited class of entities) and modal laws (obtaining for every possible entity without any restriction). In order to substantiate this argument a case is made for the acceptance of an ontic foundation for the arithmetical (and other modes or functions of reality – with special reference to Cassirer, Bernays, Gödel and Wang), which, in the final section, serves to give an ontological account of (i) the connections between the arithmetical and other aspects of reality and (ii) the applicabality of arithmetic. In the course of the argument the impasse of logicism is briefly highlighted, while a few remarks are made with regard to the logical subject- object relation in connection with Frege's view that number attaches to a concept. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(1) 2003: 63-80. (shrink)

I offer in this paper a contextual analysis of Frege's Grundlagen, section 64. It is surprising that with so much ink spilled on that section, the sources of Frege's discussion of definitions by abstraction have remained elusive. I hope to have filled this gap by providing textual evidence coming from, among other sources, Grassmann, Schlömilch, and the tradition of textbooks in geometry for secondary schools . In addition, I put Frege's considerations in the context of a (...) widespread debate in Germany on ‘directions’ as a central notion in the theory of parallels. (shrink)

In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind-Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege's *Grundgesetze*. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege's derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal (...) axiom that (philosophical) logicians implicitly accept. In the final section of the paper, there is a brief philosophical discussion of how the present theory relates to the work of other philosophers attempting to reconstruct Frege's conception of numbers and logical objects. (shrink)

According to Charles Travis, Frege’s principle “always to sharply separate the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective” involves a move called “the fundamental abstraction.” I try to explain what this abstraction is and why it is interesting. I then raise a problem for it, and describe what I think is a better way to understand Frege’s principle.

In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_ (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of _Grundlagen_. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in (...) _Grundlagen_ is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims. (shrink)

Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines (...) a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to G\"odel's constructible universe of sets, which G\"odel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis. More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe as well as to a weak version of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen's fine structure theory). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension. As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting. (shrink)

One of the remarkable results of Frege’s Logicism is Frege’s Theorem, which holds that one can derive the main truths of Peano arithmetic from Hume’s Principle (HP) without using Frege’s Basic Law V. This result was rediscovered by the Neo-Fregeans and their allies. However, when applied in developing a more advanced theory of mathematics, their fundamental principles—the abstraction principles—incur some problems, e.g., that of inflation. This paper finds alternative paths for such inquiry in extensionalism and object theory.

Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. This system is, except for minor differences, second-order logic together with an abstraction operator governed by Frege’s Axiom V. A few years ago, Richard Heck showed that the ramified predicative second-order fragment of the Grundgesetze is consistent. In this paper, we show that the above fragment augmented with the axiom of reducibility for concepts true of only finitely many individuals is still consistent, and that elementary Peano arithmetic (and more) is interpretable in (...) this extended system. (shrink)

Paolo Mancosu provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. A familiar way of introducing concepts in mathematics rests on so-called definitions by abstraction. An example of this is Hume's Principle, which introduces the concept of number by stating that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one-one correspondence. This principle is at (...) the core of neo-logicism. In the first two chapters of the book, Mancosu provides a historical analysis of the mathematical uses and foundational discussion of definitions by abstraction up to Frege, Peano, and Russell. Chapter one shows that abstraction principles were quite widespread in the mathematical practice that preceded Frege's discussion of them and the second chapter provides the first contextual analysis of Frege's discussion of abstraction principles in section 64 of the Grundlagen. In the second part of the book, Mancosu discusses a novel approach to measuring the size of infinite sets known as the theory of numerosities and shows how this new development leads to deep mathematical, historical, and philosophical problems. The final chapter of the book explore how this theory of numerosities can be exploited to provide surprisingly novel perspectives on neo-logicism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:'kvieuJs SELECTED· LETTERS KATHARINE TAIT Carn Voel Porthcurno,- Cornwall TRI9 6LN, England Nicholas Griffin. The Selected Letters ofBertrand Russel~ Vol. I: The Private Years, I884-I9I4. London: Allen Lane the Penguin PreSs, 1992. Pp. xxi, 553.£25.00; C$47.99; US$35·00. Nicholas Griffin has done an admirable job of selecting and explaining the letters in this first volume. It is amazingly to his credit that he 'manages to be so well acquainted with (...) and to understand so well a world so remote from his own. In the whole volume, I found only two small points on which to augment his knowledge. If he had looked up Shakespeare's poem about greasy Joan, which we all know in part, he would have solved for himself the mystery of Marian's nose, referred to on page 93. It was red and raw from the cold, as Russell's always was from sunburn in the summer-and usually peeling besides. And on page 217, perhaps a more esoteric mystery: Milligan is a game of patience played with two packs of cards, which I have seen him playing with a special small set capable of being spread out on a small table. My only other quibble is that I think perhaps Griffin is a trifle too hard on Grandmother Russell, who may have been less calculating and more sentimental than he supposes. That she was not above emotional blackmail is clear from Russell's letter to Alys of 17 August 1894: I went to· my Grandmother, and found her on the sofa in her sitting-room. We embraced in silence for some time and then I looked at her sadly with tears in my eyes and she said "Well I'm worse than you thought I was": not with an air of triumph, but of mild reproof for my heartlessness in having felt so little anxiery. She besought me to consent to an absence; she says everybody who comes thinks it strange I should not be here when she is so ill, and that both thee and I are suffering in reputation in consequence. She gave repeated assurances (which I didn't need) of her absolute unselfishness in urging my home-duties; she really does care only about my moral welfare, which she feels to be imperilled by such neglect. (P. 98) Awful stuff, yet I think she may have rather been seizing any weapon that came to hand than laying deeply cunning schemes; but this is only opinion and I would bow to Griffin's greater knowledge of the facts. His analysis of Evelyn Whitehead's "attacks",their effect on Russell and his relations with russell: me Journal of me Bemand Russell Archives McMaster University Libraty Pr... n.s. I> (winter 1992-9~): 211-24 ISSN OO~6-O1631. 212 Reviews her, on the other hand, I found enlightening and quite the best thing I have read on the subject. Some other fine items must be singled out for special mention. First, the generous tribute to Russell's integrity over Frege on page 245. Russell had spent five years working in almost complete isolation on the Principles only to find, when it had gone to press, that much of what was best and most original in it had been anticipated by Frege. Yet, even in his private correspondence, he never gave so much as a hint of any concern about his loss of priority, but only his delight at having found a thinker with similar ideas. It required an integrity beyond the call of duty to add to the Principles an appendix drawing attention to Frege's work and generally to do what he could to make it better known. Griffin's editorial work is for the most part adlJIirably dispassionate, always informative, sometimes speculative, occasionally critical; but when the occasion warrants (usually over professional matters), he is unstinting in his praise. Russell's comments about The Principles ofMathematics in his letters seem absurdly modest. The book was undoubtedly a wotk of genius; in some ways, the greatest thing he ever wrote.... (I]r offered not merely a new philosophy ofmathematics bur a new way of doing philosophy. Yet Russell... (shrink)

Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can (...) be proven to be equivalence relations in a weak background second-order logic. We show that this predicative Fregean theory interprets second-order Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

The neo-Fregean program in the philosophy of mathematics seeks a foundation for a substantial part of mathematics in abstraction principles—for example, Hume’s Principle: The number of Fs D the number of Gs iff the Fs and Gs correspond one-one—which can be regarded as implicitly definitional of fundamental mathematical concepts—for example, cardinal number. This paper considers what kind of abstraction principle might serve as the basis for a neo- Fregean set theory. Following a brief review of the main difficulties (...) confronting the most widely discussed proposal to date—replacing Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V by Boolos’s New V which restricts concepts whose extensions obey the principle of extensionality to those which are small in the sense of being smaller than the universe—the paper canvasses an alternative way of implementing the limitation of size idea and explores the kind of restrictions which would be required for it to avoid collapse. (shrink)

The idea that some objects are metaphysically “cheap” has wide appeal. An influential version of the idea builds on abstractionist views in the philosophy of mathematics, on which numbers and other mathematical objects are abstracted from other phenomena. For example, Hume's Principle states that two collections have the same number just in case they are equinumerous, in the sense that they can be correlated one‐to‐one:. The principal aim of this article is to use the notion of grounding to develop this (...) sort of abstractionism. The appeal to grounding enables a unified response to the two main challenges that confront abstractionism. First, we must explicate the metaphor of metaphysical “cheapness.” Second, we must rebut the “bad company” objection, which rejects abstraction principles like (HP) as tarnished by their similarity to inconsistent principles like Frege's Basic Law V. By enforcing a simple requirement that all abstraction be properly grounded, we propose a unified solution to these two hard, and prima facie unrelated, problems. On our view, grounded abstraction simultaneously ensures “cheap” abstracta and permissible abstraction. (shrink)

In this three-part essay, I investigate Frege’s platonist and anti-creationist position in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and to some extent also in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. In Sect. 1.1, I analyze his arithmetical and logical platonism in Grundgesetze. I argue that the reference-fixing strategy for value-range names—and indirectly also for numerical singular terms—that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I gives rise to a conflict with the supposed mind- and language-independent existence of numbers and logical objects in general. In Sect. 1.2 and 1.3, (...) I discuss the non-creativity of Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze and the case of what I call weakly creative definitions. In Part II of this essay, I first deal with Stolz’s and Dedekind’s (intended) creation of numbers. In what follows, I focus on Grundgesetze II, §146, where Frege considers a potential creationist charge in relation to the stipulation that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §3 with the purpose of partially fixing the references of value-range names. I place equal emphasis on the related twin stipulations that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §10. In §10, Frege identifies the truth-values with their unit classes in order to fix the references of value-range names (almost) completely. He does so in a piecemeal fashion. Although in Grundgesetze II, §146 Frege refers also to Grundgesetze I, §9 and §10 in this connection, he does not explain why he thinks that the transsortal identifications in §10 and also the stipulation that he makes in §9 regarding the value-range notation may give rise to a creationist charge in addition to or in connection with the stipulation in §3, and if so, how he would have responded to it. The two main issues that I discuss in Part II are: (a) Has Frege created value-ranges in general in Grundgesetze I, §3? (b) Has he created the unit classes of the True and the False in §10? In Part III, I discuss, inter alia, the question of whether in developing the whole wealth of objects and functions that arithmetic deals with from the primitive functions of Grundgesetze by applying the formation rules Frege creates special value-ranges and special functions. This procedure is fundamentally different from the reference-fixing strategy regarding value-range names that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I, §3, §10–12. It is just another aspect of his anti-creationism. In Grundgesetze II, §147, Frege makes a concession to an imagined creationist opponent which might suggest that he was fully convinced neither of the defensibility of his anti-creationist position regarding the syntactic development of the subject matter of arithmetic nor of his actual defence in §146 of the non-creativity of the introduction of value-ranges via logical abstraction in Grundgesetze I, §3 and the twin stipulations in §10. I argue that not only in Grundgesetze II, §146 but also in Grundgesetze II, §147 Frege falls short of defending his anti-creationist position. I further argue that on the face of it his creationist rival gains the upper hand in the envisioned debate in more than one respect. (shrink)

One of the more distinctive features of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism about arithmetic is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint – roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. In particular, they maintain that, if adopted, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation – Hume’s Principle – and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind-Peano axioms. In what follows we establish two main claims. First, we show (...) that, if sound, Hale and Wright’s arguments for Frege’s Constraint at most establish a version on which the relevant application of the naturals is transitive counting – roughly, the counting procedure by which numerals are used to answer “how many”-questions. Second, we show that this version of Frege’s Constraint fails to adjudicate in favor of Hume’s Principle. If this is the version of Frege’s Constraint that a foundation for arithmetic must respect, then Hume’s Principle no more – and no less – meets the requirement than the Dedekind-Peano axioms do. (shrink)

I present a novel interpretation of Frege’s attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege’s proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege’s proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which (...) it may successfully be applied. (shrink)

Neo-logicism is, not least in the light of Frege’s logicist programme, an important topic in the current philosophy of mathematics. In this essay, I critically discuss a number of issues that I consider to be relevant for both Frege’s logicism and neo-logicism. I begin with a brief introduction into Wright’s neo-Fregean project and mention the main objections that he faces. In Sect. 2, I discuss the Julius Caesar problem and its possible Fregean and neo-Fregean solution. In Sect. 3, I raise (...) what I take to be a central objection to the position of neo-logicism. In Sect. 4, I attempt to clarify how we should understand Frege’s stipulation that the two sides of an abstraction principle qua contextual definition of a term-forming operator shall be “gleichbedeutend”. In Sect. 5, I consider the options that Frege might have had to establish the analyticity of Hume’s Principle: The number that belongs to the concept F is equal to the number that belongs to the concept G if and only if F and G are equinumerous. Section 6 is devoted to Frege’s two criteria of thought identity. In Sects. 7 and 8, I defend the position of the neo-logicist against an alleged “knock-down argument”. In Sect. 9, I comment on Frege’s description of abstraction in Grundlagen, §64 and the use of the terms “recarving” and “reconceptualization” in the relevant literature on Fregean abstraction and neo-logicism. I argue that Fregean abstraction has nothing to do with the recarving of a sentence content or its decomposition in different ways. I conclude with remarks on global logicism versus local logicisms. (shrink)

Abstract I argue against the two most influential readings of Frege's methodology in the philosophy of logic. Dummett's ?semanticist? reading sees Frege as taking notions associated with semantical content?and in particular, the semantical notion of truth?as primitive and as intelligible independently of their connection to the activity of judgment, inference, and assertion. Against this, the ?pragmaticist? reading proposed by Brandom and Ricketts sees Frege as beginning instead from the independent and intuitive grasp that we allegedly have on the latter (...) activity and only then moving on to explain semantical notions in terms of the nature of such acts. Against both readings, I argue, first, that Frege gives clear indication that he takes semantical and pragmatical notions to be equally primitive, such that he would reject the idea that either sort of notion could function as the base for a non-circular explanation of the other. I argue, secondly, that Frege's own method for conveying the significance of these primitive notions?an activity that Frege calls ?elucidation??is, in fact, explicitly circular in nature. Because of this, I conclude that Frege should be read instead as conceiving of our grasp of the semantical and pragmatical dimensions of logic as far more of a holistic enterprise than either reading suggests. (shrink)

Kripke’s notion of groundedness plays a central role in many responses to the semantic paradoxes. Can the notion of groundedness be brought to bear on the paradoxes that arise in connection with abstraction principles? We explore a version of grounded abstraction whereby term models are built up in a ‘grounded’ manner. The results are mixed. Our method solves a problem concerning circularity and yields a ‘grounded’ model for the predicative theory based on Frege’s Basic Law V. However, the (...) method is poorly behaved unless the background second-order logic is predicative. (shrink)

This paper presents a new interpretation of Frege's context principle on which it applies primarily to singular terms for abstract objects but not necessarily to singular terms for ordinary objects.

Frege’s Basic Law V and its successor, Boolos’s New V, are axioms postulating abstraction operators: mappings from the power set of the domain into the domain. Basic Law V proved inconsistent. New V, however, naturally interprets large parts of second-order ZFC via a construction discovered by Boolos in 1989. This paper situates these classic findings about abstraction operators within the general theory of F-algebras and coalgebras. In particular, we show how Boolos’s construction amounts to identifying an initial F-algebra (...) in a certain category, we identify a natural coalgebraic dual to Boolos’s axiom which naturally interprets large parts of Aczel’s non-well-founded set theory via the construction of a certain terminal F-coalgebra, and we suggest a coalgebraic way forward for an abstraction-theoretic axiomatization of the real numbers. (shrink)

In his "Grundgesetze", Frege hints that prior to his theory that cardinal numbers are objects he had an "almost completed" manuscript on cardinals. Taking this early theory to have been an account of cardinals as second-level functions, this paper works out the significance of the fact that Frege's cardinal numbers is a theory of concept-correlates. Frege held that, where n > 2, there is a one—one correlation between each n-level function and an n—1 level function, and a one—one correlation (...) between each first-level function and an object. Applied to cardinals, the correlation offers new answers to some perplexing features of Frege's philosophy. It is shown that within Frege's concept-script, a generalized form of Hume's Principle is equivalent to Russell's Principle ofion — a principle Russell employed to demonstrate the inadequacy of definition by abstraction. Accordingly, Frege's rejection of definition of cardinal number by Hume's Principle parallels Russell's objection to definition by abstraction. Frege's correlation thesis reveals that he has a way of meeting the structuralist challenge that it is arithmetic, and not a privileged progression of objects, that matters to the finite cardinals. (shrink)

We now know of a number of ways of developing real analysis on a basis of abstraction principles and second-order logic. One, outlined by Shapiro in his contribution to this volume, mimics Dedekind in identifying the reals with cuts in the series of rationals under their natural order. The result is an essentially structuralist conception of the reals. An earlier approach, developed by Hale in his "Reals byion" program differs by placing additional emphasis upon what I here term (...) class='Hi'>Frege's Constraint, that a satisfactory foundation for any branch of mathematics should somehow so explain its basic concepts that their applications are immediate. This paper is concerned with the meaning of and motivation for this constraint. Structuralism has to represent the application of a mathematical theory as always posterior to the understanding of it, turning upon the appreciation of structural affinities between the structure it concerns and a domain to which it is to be applied. There is, therefore, a case that Frege's Constraint has bite whenever there is a standing body of informal mathematical knowledge grounded in direct reflection upon sample, or schematic, applications of the concepts of the theory in question. It is argued that this condition is satisfied by simple arithmetic and geometry, but that in view of the gap between its basic concepts (of continuity and of the nature of the distinctions among the individual reals) and their empirical applications, it is doubtful that Frege's Constraint should be imposed on a neo-Fregean construction of analysis. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...) reference. In this paper, I will present a rigorous version of Frege’s theory of sense and denotation and show that it leads to antinomies. I am also going to discuss ways of modifying Frege’s semantical and ontological framework in order to avoid the paradoxes. In this connection, I explore the possibility of giving up the Fregean assumption of a universal domain of absolutely all objects, containing in addition to extensional objects also abstract intensional ones like propositions and singular concepts. I outline a cumulative hierarchy of Fregean propositions and senses, in analogy with Gödel’s hierarchy of constructible sets. In this hierarchy, there is no domain of all objects. Instead, every domain of objects is extendible with new objects that, on pain of contradiction, cannot belong to the given domain. According to this approach, there is no domain containing absolutely all propositions or absolutely all senses. (shrink)

Abstract Though it has been claimed that Frege's commitment to expressions in indirect contexts not having their customary senses commits him to an infinite number of semantic primitives, Terrence Parsons has argued that Frege's explicit commitments are compatible with a two-level theory of senses. In this paper, we argue Frege is committed to some principles Parsons has overlooked, and, from these and other principles to which Frege is committed, give a proof that he is indeed committed to an (...) infinite number of semantic primitives?an intolerable result. (shrink)

Frege's views regarding analysis and synomymy have long been the subject of critical discussion. Some commentators, led by Dummett, have argued that Frege was committed to the view that each thought admits of a unique ultimate analysis. However, this interpretation is in apparent conflict with Frege's criterion of synonymy, according to which two sentence express the same thought if one cannot understand them without regarding them as having the same truth–value. In a recent article in this journal, Drai (...) attempts to reconcile Frege's criterion of synonymy with unique ultimate analysis by holding that, for Frege, if two sentences satisfy the criterion without being intensionally isomorphic, at most one of them is a privileged representation of the thought expressed. I argue that this proposal fails, because it conflicts not only with Frege's views of abstraction principles but also with slingshot arguments (including one presented by Drai herself) that accurately reflect Frege's commitment to the view that sentences alike in truth–value have the same Bedeutung. While Drai helpfully connects Frege's views of abstraction principles with such slingshot arguments, this connection cannot become fully clear until we recognise that Frege rejects unique ultimate analysis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages, are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for (...) a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although Frege’s theory of real numbers in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. II, is incomplete, it is possible to provide a logicist justification for the approach he is taking and to construct a plausible completion of his account by an extrapolation which parallels his theory of cardinal numbers.

Quantifiers in Frege's Grundgesetze like are not well-defined because the part Fx & Gx stands for a concept but the yoking conjunction is horizontalised and must stand for a truth-value. This standard interpretation is rejected in favor of a substitutional reading that, it is argued, both conforms better to the text and is well-defined. The theory of the horizontal is investigated in detail and the composite reading of Frege's connectives as made up of horizontals is rejected. The sense (...) in which the Grundgesetze has a many-valued but classical logic is explained by proving that its propositional fragment (under the standard interpretation) and Bochvar's 3-valued logic are instances of the same metatheoretic methods. Historically, the paper argues for a more naive but well-defined reading of the text. Theoretically, it provides a formally adequate statement of that semantics, as well as developing the abstract metatheory which embraces Bochvar's language and the Fregean fragment. (shrink)

Summary. This article develops two principal points. First, the so-called rivals of logical foundations, associated with Zermelo, Hilbert, and Brouwer, are here regarded as variants; specifically: to simplify, refine, resp. extend Frege’s scheme. Each of the variations is seen as a special case of a familiar strategy in the pursuit of knowledge. In particular, the extension provided by Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic concerns the class of propositions considered: about incompletely defined objects such as choice sequences. In contrast, Frege or, for (...) that matter, Aristotle thought that only propositions about precisely defined terms lent themselves to anything like logical theory.. This view of intuitionistic logic is fairly consistent with the mature Brouwer’s own research practice, but not at all with his rhetoric. Secondly, the article explains the silent majority’s scepticism about all variants of logical foundations, and, in note 7, sketches a genuine alternative which is almost explicit in the manifesto [#3] of Bourbaki with the aim of exploring the architecture of mathematics and our intuitive resonances to it. The alternative sees the weakness of logical foundations not in any logical defects, such as lack of precision, but in its sterility: stress on the logical elements of mathematics and mathematical reasoning draws attention away from discoveries of more significant features; more significant even for validity and reliability, though these matters are less prominent here than in logical foundations. The weakness in question is relevant beyond the present topic of foundations because this kind of weakness affects the whole analytic tradition in philosophy. Finally, for reasons explained there, an Appendix goes into some relations between the present paper and [17]. (shrink)

Wright claims that “the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference”. In this paper I follow Wright’s recommendation, but I consider a different epistemology of logic, namely anti-exceptionalism. Anti-exceptionalism’s main contention is that logic is not a priori, and that the choice between rival logics should be based on abductive criteria such as simplicity, adequacy to the data, strength, fruitfulness, and consistency. This paper’s goal is to lay down the foundations (...) for an application of the anti-exceptionalist methodology to abstraction principles. In Sect. 1 I outline my strategy. I show that anti-exceptionalism has a bearing on the so-called Bad Company problem (Sect. 2), and explore some versions of anti-exceptionalism about abstraction (Sect. 3). I then consider new criteria for choosing between rival abstraction principles, and, in particular, between consistent revisions of Frege’s Basic Law V (Sect. 4). I finally consider how the abstractionist can compare between competing criteria (Sect. 5), and argue that anti-exceptionalists should be pluralists about abstraction (Sect. 6). (shrink)

According to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show that (...) the Horizontal is innocent: Aczel’s diagnosis is based on a mistaken view of the structure underlying Frege’s ideal language. (shrink)

In Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Frege attempted to introduce cardinalnumbers as logical objects by means of a second-order abstraction principlewhich is now widely known as ``Hume's Principle'' (HP): The number of Fsis identical with the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous.The attempt miscarried, because in its role as a contextual definition HP fails tofix uniquely the reference of the cardinality operator ``the number of Fs''. Thisproblem of referential indeterminacy is usually called ``the Julius (...) Caesar problem''.In this paper, Frege's treatment of the problem in Grundlagen is critically assessed. In particular, I try to shed new light on it by paying special attention to the framework of his logicism in which it appears embedded. I argue, among other things, that the Caesar problem, which is supposed to stem from Frege's tentative inductive definition of the natural numbers, is only spurious, not genuine; that the genuine Caesar problem deriving from HP is a purely semantic one and that the prospects of removing it by explicitly defining cardinal numbers as objects which are not classes are presumably poor for Frege. I conclude by rejecting two closely connected theses concerning Caesar put forward by Richard Heck: (i) that Frege could not abandon Axiom V because he could not solve the Julius Caesar problem without it; (ii) that (by his own lights) his logicist programme in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik failed because he could not overcome that problem. (shrink)

This paper aims to determine what kind of problem Frege's famous “Julius Caesar problem” is. whether it is to be understood as the metaphysical problem of determining what kind of things abstract objects like numbers or value‐courses are, or as the epistemological problem of providing a means of recognizing these objects as the same again, or as the logical problem of providing abstract sortal concepts with a sharp delimitation in order to fulfill the law of excluded middle, or as (...) the semantic problem of fixing the referents of the corresponding abstract singular terms. It is argued that, for Frege, the Caesar problem is a bundle of related problems of which the semantic problem is the most basic one. (shrink)

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of "logical objects" and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the 'eta' relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the 'eta' relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted (...) Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: the theory of extensions, the theory of directions and shapes, and the theory of truth values. (shrink)

Objects which philosophers have traditionally categorized as abstract are standardly referred to by complex noun phrases of certain canonical forms, such as ‘the set of Fs’, ‘the number of Fs’, ‘the proposition that P’, and ‘the property of being F’. It is no accident that such noun phrases are well-suited to appear in ‘Fregean’ identity-criteria, or ‘abstraction’ principles, for which Frege’s criterion of identity for cardinal numbers provides the paradigm. Notoriously, such principlesare apt to create paradoxes, and the most (...) intuitively plausible ‘Fregean’ identity-criterion for properties is afflicted by this problem. In this case, it may be possible to overcome the difficulty by modifying the criterion in a way which requires an independent account of the existence-conditions of properties, but it appears that such a strategy demands acceptance of the doctrine of immanent realism—the view that a property exists only if it is exemplified by some object. (shrink)

In this note the claim is defended that Frege was a realist in the sense that he attributed causal efficacy to certain abstract objects. The arguments of Dummett and Sluga (cf. Inquiry, Vols. 18, 19, and 20 [1975–77]) to the contrary are criticized.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken (...) by Peter Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

Commentators regularly attribute to Frege realist, idealist, and quietist responses to metaphysical questions concerning the abstract objects he calls ‘thoughts’. But despite decades of effort, the evidence offered on behalf of these attributions remains unconvincing. I argue that Frege deliberately avoids commitment to any of these positions, as part of a metaphysical separatist policy motivated by the fact that logic is epistemologically autonomous from metaphysics. Frege’s views and arguments prove relevant to current attempts to argue for epistemological autonomy, particularly that (...) of ethics. (shrink)

Kit Fine’s book is a study of abstraction in a quite precise sense which derives from Frege. In his Grundlagen, Frege contemplates defining the concept of number by means of what has come to be called Hume’s principle—the principle that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs. Frege’s discussion is largely conducted in terms of another, similar but in some respects (...) simpler, proposal—to define the concept of direction by laying down the principle that the direction of a line a is the same as that of line b if and only if lines a and b are parallel. Such principles have come to be known as abstraction principles. More generally, abstraction principles are ones of the shape: ∀α∀β ↔ α ≈ β), where ≈ is an equivalence relation on entities of the type over which α and β vary and, if the principle is acceptable, § is a function from entities of that type to objects. Since ‘the direction of’ is intended to stand for a function from objects of a certain sort to other objects, the Direction Equivalence is a first-order, or in Fine’s terminology objectual, abstraction; since ‘the number of’ is intended to stand for a function from concepts to objects, Hume’s principle is a higher-order, or as Fine says conceptual, abstraction. As is well-known, Frege himself abandoned the idea of defining number implicitly or contextually by means of Hume’s principle—adopting instead an explicit definition of the number of Fs as the extension of the concept concept equinumerous to the concept F— because he thought that an adequate definition should settle the question whether Julius Caesar, for example, is or is not the number of some concept, but that the proposed implicit definition cannot do so. But interest in abstraction principles has revived in the last couple of decades, largely as a result of Crispin Wright’s attempt to show that in spite of the many difficulties confronting it—including the notorious Julius Caesar problem— Hume’s principle can after all serve as a foundation for arithmetic. (shrink)

We compare Fregean theorizing about sets with the theorizing of an ontologically non-committal, natural-deduction based, inferentialist. The latter uses free Core logic, and confers meanings on logico-mathematical expressions by means of rules for introducing them in conclusions and eliminating them from major premises. Those expressions (such as the set-abstraction operator) that form singular terms have their rules framed so as to deal with canonical identity statements as their conclusions or major premises. We extend this treatment to pasigraphs as well, (...) in the case of set theory. These are defined expressions (such as ‘subset of’, or ‘power set of’) that are treated as basic in the lingua franca of informal set theory. Employing pasigraphs in accordance with their own natural-deduction rules enables one to ‘atomicize’ rigorous mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

This article derives from a project attempting to show that Western formal logic, from Aristotle onward, has both been partially constituted by, and partially constitutive of, what has become known as racism. In the present article, I will first discuss, in light of Frege’s honorary role as founder of the philosophy of mathematics, Reuben Hersh’s What is Mathematics, Really? Second, I will explore how the infamous section of Frege’s 1924 diary (specifically the entries from March 10 to April 9) supports (...) Hersh's claim regarding the link between political conservatism and the (historically and currently) dominant school of the philosophy of mathematics (to which Frege undeniably belongs). Third, I will examine Frege’s attempt at a more reader-friendly introduction to his philosophy of mathematics, The Foundations of Arithmetic. And finally, I will briefly analyze Frege’s Begriffsschrift to see how questions of race arise even at the heights of his logical abstraction. (shrink)

Michael Dummett has attempted to give an account of the semantics of abstract singular terms which steers a middle course between reductionism and full-blown Platonism concerning their references: according to this middle position, reference, in the case of abstract singular terms, becomes "a matter wholly internal to the language." My main aim in this paper is to show that Dummett's arguments are in some considerable tension with more general features of his interpretation of Frege's philosophical semantics, so that given (...) a reiteration of his arguments against the reductionist, the Platonist position seems to be the only available alternative. (shrink)

Resumo: o propósito desse artigo é circunscrever e discutir a autocrítica, feita por Wittgenstein no período de 1933-39, a uma das teses mais fundamentais do Tractatus (TLP): ”Há uma e apenas uma análise completa da proposição” (3.25). Chamaremos esse procedimento peculiar de a “Grande análise”. Os argumentos de Wittgenstein contra a sustentabilidade da sua antiga tese podem ser encontrados em algumas passagens do livro Investigações Filosóficas (IF), bem como em passagens do Grande Datiloscrito (BT). Conforme será argumentado nesse artigo, essa (...) autocrítica é uma consequência direta da preocupação de Wittgenstein, no período intermediário, com duas importantes propostas feitas por Frege nos §§18-24 do Os Fundamentos da Aritmética (FA) em relação o seu entendimento da noção de “atribuição numérica”. Nosso objetivo principal será mostrar de que maneira o movimento de autocrítica feito por Wittgenstein em relação a sua antiga concepção de “Grande Análise” teria sido influenciado por suas preocupações, no período intermediário de sua obra, com essas duas propostas feita por Frege no FA a respeito da noção de “atribuição numérica”. A fim de completar tal tarefa, será apresentada inicialmente de modo breve uma versão de como seria a “Grande análise” no TLP. Em seguida, selecionaremos e discutiremos algumas passagens do IF nas quais Wittgenstein recusa a completude e unicidade envolvida em sua prévia concepção tratariana de “análise”. Procuraremos destacar com clareza uma noção que estaria envolvida de um modo essencial na autocrítica de Wittgenstein: a noção de “ver como/ver aspectos”. Como será argumentado, essa noção, assim como a autocrítica feita por Wittgenstein, foram ambas diretamente influenciadas pela noção fregiana de “atribuição numérica”. Para completar essa segunda tarefa, teremos de revisitar e discutir algumas noções pertencentes ao período inicial da filosofia de Wittgenstein -- como a de “propriedades internas e externas” e a distinção entre “dizer e mostrar” -- ambas noções discutidas no TLP. No decorrer de nossa discussão, apresentaremos uma crítica feita por Wittgenstein a Russell, mas também a Frege, sobre a concepção de generalidade, ou mais especificamente, sobre o uso do quantificador existencial, proposta por ambos. Abstract: The purpose of this article is to discuss Wittgenstein 1933-39 self-criticism of one of the most fundamental tractarian theses: There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition (3.25). Wittgenstein's arguments against his previous thesis can be found in some passages of the Philosophical Investigation (PI) as well as in the Big Typescript (BT). As we shall argue, Wittgenstein's self-critique is directly related to two important ideas proposed by Frege in §§18-24 of The Foundations Arithmetic (FA) with respect to his construal of “number attributions”. Our main goal in this paper will therefore be to show how Wittgenstein's self-criticism of his old conception of the tractarian “analysis” would have been influenced by his concerns in the middle period of his work with these two proposals made by Frege in FA regarding the notion of “numerical attribution”. Our first task will then be to connect Wittgenstein's self-criticisms to his former conception of “analysis” in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). To accomplish this first goal, we will have to briefly present a version of how such analysis would look like in TLP. Our next task will be to pinpoint some passages of the PI in which Wittgenstein rejects the completeness and uniqueness involved in his previous construal of the analytical process. We will try to circumscribe clearly a crucial notion involved in Wittgenstein's self-critique: the idea of “seeing as/seeing aspects”. Our claim is that this notion, as well as Wittgenstein's self-criticism, were both directly influenced by Frege's construal of the “number attribution” presented in FA. To accomplish this second task, we will have to revisit and discuss some further concepts from an early period of Wittgenstein's philosophy, like “internal and internal properties” and the “saying/showing distinction” in TLP. On our way towards accomplishing this goal, we will present a curious complaint by Wittgenstein regarding Russell's, as well as Frege's conception of generality, or more specifically, on the usage of the existential quantifier suggested by both these authors. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured (...) that the more encompassing Δ₁¹-comprehension schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

The spiritus asper as used by Frege in a letter to Russell from 1904 bears resemblance to Church’s lambda. It is natural to ask how they relate to each other. An alternative approach to functional abstraction developed by Per Martin-Löf some thirty years ago allows us to describe the relationship precisely. Frege’s spiritus asper provides a way of restructuring a unary function name in Frege’s sense such that the argument place indicator occurs all the way to the right. Martin-Löf’s (...) alternative approach shows that this is only half of what lambda does. The other half is the deletion of the argument place indicator, resulting in what Frege would have called an isolated function name. (shrink)