Bachs Kunst der Fuge biedt even die samenhang, die harmonie waarnaar wij hunkeren in ons leven.

: Two major philosophers of the twentieth century, the German existential phenomenologist Martin Heidegger and the seminal Japanese Kyoto School philosopher Nishida Kitarō are examined here in an attempt to discern to what extent their ideas may converge. Both are viewed as expressing, each through the lens of his own tradition, a world in transition with the rise of modernity in the West and its subsequent globalization. The popularity of Heidegger's thought among Japanese philosophers, despite its own admitted limitation to (...) the Western "history of being," is connected to Nishida's opening of a uniquely Japanese path in its confrontation with Western philosophy. The focus is primarily on their later works (the post-Kehre Heidegger and the works of Nishida that have been designated "Nishida philosophy"), in which each in his own way attempts to overcome the subject-object dichotomy inherited from the tradition of Western metaphysics by looking to a deeper structure from out of which both subjectivity and objectivity are derived and which embraces both. For Heidegger, the answer lies in being as the opening of unconcealment, from out of which beings emerge, and for Nishida, it is the place of nothingness within which beings are co-determined in their oppositions and relations. Concepts such as Nishida's "discontinuous continuity," "absolutely self-contradictory identity" (between one and many, whole and part, world and things), the mutual interdependence of individuals, and the self-determination of the world through the co-relative self-determination of individuals, and Heidegger's "simultaneity" (zugleich) and "within one another" (ineinander) (of unconcealment and concealment, presencing and absencing), and their "between" (Zwischen) and "jointure" (Fuge) are examined. Through a discussion of these ideas, the suggestion is made of a possible "transition" (Übergang) of both Western and Eastern thinking, in their mutual encounter, both in relation to each other and each in relation to its own past history, leading to both a self-discovery in the other and to a simultaneous self-reconstitution. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as an extreme retributivist, but recently commentators emphasize the importance of deterrence in Kant's basic justification of punishment. Kant's combination of deterrence and retributive elements, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. To interpret Kant as merely adding retributive side-constraints to a basic deterrence aim fails to capture fully the retributive strain in Kant's thought. The basic questions are: who should be punished, how much, in what manner, and why? Kant held that all (...) and only the legally guilty ought to be punished, the legally guilty being also morally guilty, except when the legal requirement was to do something "immoral in itself." This case aside, violations of law also transgress an ethical duty to obey the law. Criminal punishments should be designed to match victims' empirically discernable losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals, which depends on their inner "will." "Punishment" is not a mere disincentive in a "price" system of social control; it has an inherent expressive function, conveying a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct in question. Understanding this together with Kant's basic theory of justice may help to explain his acceptance of ius talionis and condemnation of making exceptions for pragmatic reasons. It also accounts for the retributive "tone" of Kant's remarks, despite his insistence that public courts deal only with "external actions," not overall moral worth and character assessment. Kant wird oft als Vertreter einer extremen Vergeltungstheorie gesehen. Auf der anderen Seite betonen verschiedene Autoren in der letzten Zeit die Abschreckung als grundlegendes Element in Kants Rechtfertigung der Strafe. Ihnen gegenüber muß Kants Verknüpfung von Vergeltung und Abschreckung von anderen ähnlichen Verknüpfungen unterschieden werden, die weniger plausibel sind. Kant so zu interpretieren, als füge er zum Hauptziel der Abschreckung nur einige nebensächliche Elemente der Vergeltung hinzu, verfehlt den Vergeltungsaspekt in Kants Straftheorie. Die grundlegenden Fragen sind: Wer soll bestraft werden, wie schwer, in welcher Weise und warum? Kant war der Ansicht, daß alle, aber auch nur diejenigen bestraft werden sollen, die sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht haben. Wer sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht hat, hat sich auch moralisch schuldig gemacht, es sei denn, das vom Recht Geforderte sei etwas "an sich selbst Unmoralisches". Sieht man von diesem letzteren Fall einmal ab, dann enthält jede Übertretung des juridischen Gesetzes immer auch eine Verletzung der ethischen Pflicht, dem juridischen Gesetz zu gehorchen. Strafe sollte darauf angelegt sein, den empirisch erkennbaren Verlusten des Opfers nach Art und Ausmaß zu entsprechen, außer, wenn dies unmöglich oder erniedrigend wäre; Gerichte können die tatsächliche moralische Schuld von Verbrechern, die von ihrem inneren "Willen" abhängt, nicht messen. "Strafe" ist kein bloßes Abschreckungsmittel in einem "Preis"-System sozialer Kontrolle. Statt dessen hat sie die ganz wesentliche und ausdrückliche Funktion, die moralische Mißbilligung des jeweiligen verbrecherischen Verhaltens öffentlich zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Diese Interpretation, zusammen mit Kants grundlegender Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, kann helfen zu verstehen, warum Kant das ius talionis akzeptiert hat und warum er Ausnahmen, die aus pragmatischen Gründen gemacht werden, mißbilligt. Sie erklärt auch den "Tonfall" in Kants Äußerungen, der mir seiner Vergeltungstheorie zusammenhängt, auch wenn Kant darauf beharrt, daß staatliche Gerichte sich immer nur mit "äußeren" Handlungen befassen, nicht mit dem moralischen Wert insgesamt oder mit einer Beurteilung des Charakters einer Person. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Text zur 'Ungeschriebenen Lehre' Platons gehört zum ersten Teil eines grösseren Projektes. Ich möchte ihn bereits jetzt vorlegen, da die Vollendung des Projektes noch sehr viel Zeit brauchen wird und infolge meines bereits fortgeschrittenen Alters sehr unsicher ist. -/- Der dritte Teil des Projektes mit der Darstellung der Sedimente der mittalterlichen Rezeption im heutigen Standard-Verständnis von Aristoteles ist 2024 als Band 61 der BOCHUMER STUDIEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE erschienen unter dem Titel -/- ZUR MITTELALTERLICHEN HERKUNFT EINIGER THEOREME IN DER (...) MODERNEN ARISTOTELES-INTERPRETATION -/- Eine Fallstudie anhand der Kommentare von Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin zu Aristoteles’ Metaphysik Λ -/- Das Buch enthält die Auswertung des Materials, das bei philpapers unter demselben Titel heruntergeladen werden kann. -/- Die Darstellung der 'Ungeschriebenen Lehre' Platons ist ein Teil der Darstellung der Rezeption von Aristoteles im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Ich füge dem Text Inhaltsverzeichnis und die Übersicht über das ganze Projekt bei, damit der grössere Zusammenhang dieses Fragments sichtbar wird. Das Ganze ist als Entwurf zu betrachten. -/- . (shrink)

Martin Heidegger rarely explicitly dealt with the topic of music. The Heraclitus lectures, delivered in 1943 and 1944, offer a notable exception. Heidegger here speaks openly of the “Lied der Erde” (“Earth’s song”). Most intriguing, perhaps, though, is the use of Fügung in relation to ἁρμονία (harmonia), which he links to understanding φὑσις (physis; the “emerging” character of the world) and being. Translated by Assaiante and Ewegen as “jointure,” Fügung bears a connection with the German Fuge, which contains the (...) double meaning of joint and fugue. Drawing on a close reading of the Heraclitus lectures, this paper will explore the dual nature of Fügung with an eye towards laying the groundwork for understanding a latent musicality within Heidegger’s larger corpus, centering around perceiving, fugue, and their implications for listening to the “Earth’s song,” which will be read in literal, environmental terms as the soundscape or, perhaps, musical manifold. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Horace and the Dialectic of Freedom: Readings in Epistles 1Barbara K. GoldW. R. Johnson. Horace and the Dialectic of Freedom: Readings in Epistles 1. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. xiv 1 172 pp. Cloth, $27.50. (Townsend Lectures)A colleague once expressed shock that I was reading Horace’s Epistles. They are, she said, the most boring works in all of Latin literature. It seems likely that this was not an (...) idiosyncratic pronouncement: the Epistles are rarely the subjects of critical work and even less frequently taught.But now we have the second book to appear in the past decade on the first book of Horace’s Epistles. Ross Kilpatrick’s 1986 volume on The Poetry of Friendship: Horace, Epistles 1 focused closely on the theme of amicitia in these poems. Now Ralph Johnson has produced a new appreciation of Horace by tracing another theme through Horace’s letters to his friends: freedom. The book is less a critical exegesis of the Epistles than a highly personal and emotionally charged meditation on what drove Horace to write these so-called letters in the twilight of his composing years. The chapter headings indicate the unorthodox approach Johnson has chosen: “Running on Empty,” “In the Rag and Bone Shop,” “Gardens.”Johnson presents us with a Horace who is engaged in a “messy” and irresoluble dialectic with himself, his friends, and his readers. Neither Horace nor Johnson offers any comforting or banal bipolarities; Johnson cautions often against the sic et non approach whereby we, like boll weevils, bore through the haze of confusions looking for the “nugget” (Virginia Woolf’s word) behind the complexities instead of accepting the power of antinomies and their meaning for human experience (144). Johnson’s Horace is thus an ambivalent and protean creature: still a satirist, but somewhat softer now than he was in the 30s; an outsider looking in but never really a part of the hive; a man suffused with anger and resentment, yet capable of a dry and impartial skepticism and a sanguine hope about our ability to live our lives well; carnal and crazy, but mature and clear-headed; an Orphic shaman figure, who mediates between lowly humans and figures of the great (Augustus) or nature herself and delivers the truth from his lofty position, but also a poet of lowly beginnings, caught in embarrassing positions and forced to kowtow to his superiors; a man absolutely insistent on his [End Page 335] freedom and individuality yet part of a court circle of sorts; a wry picaro who nonetheless sometimes plays the role of Stoic progrediens: a naughty scarecrow in the garden, an agrarian sophist, with one foot in the city and one on his Sabine farm, trying to figure out how to be a proper gardener.But, for me, there are too many Horaces here, and they cannot all exist simultaneously. It is hard to see the spontaneous, wry picaro next to the poet who desires a return to civility and decorum or the committed city dweller who develops a love for the rural life. While it may be true that Horace changed masks when the occasion suited, his representations of himself seem to me to be fairly consistent by Ep. 1.20. The Horace I see here is more comfortable with himself than Johnson’s Horace is. He has come to terms with Maecenas, with his father, and with his life in Rome. He understands why it is necessary to avoid chasing after wealth (fuge magna, 10.32) in order to achieve the internal peace and true freedom that he seeks. But he is always a city dweller and never comfortable with his Sabine farm as more than a symbol of what the rural life could offer. (In an interesting aside, Johnson admits that he might be sentimentalizing Horace’s view of the farm: “I’m an ardent urbanite without even a window box” [150 n. 5].) Horace saw and used elements of nature throughout his poetry as evocative symbols of the place of human life in the larger natural universe, but I’m certain that he never got his hands dirty.It is, however, no wonder that so... (shrink)

Some time ago I noted that the generally accepted emendations a! fuge , and a! ducere are suspect , 71–2). In his recent Loeb edition , Goold in the latter passage restores the MSS. reading adducere; in the former, quisquis es assiduas aufuge blanditias, he prints Tappe's tu fuge for MSS. aufuge. The best solution, it seems to me, is one which the modern editions, Propertiana included, are of a mind to ignore: Markland's heu fuge.

Gerold Tietz was born in 1941 in Horka (north Bohemia) in a family of Sudeten Germans. Germans lived in this village together with Czechs, Roma people and Jews. The family also involved Czech relatives and many of German relatives spoke good Czech and kept relations with Czech cultural groups. After the war Gerold Tietz and his family were expelled to Swabia. He studied history, French and political science. From 1969 the graduated historian lived in Esslingen where he taught in the (...) grammar school for thirty years. In the autobiographically oriented novels _Böhmische Fuge _(1997), _Böhmisches Richtfest _(2007) and in _Böhmische Grätschen _(2009) Tietz tried to depict official social-political events connected with famous political and cultural figures as well as the stories of ordinary days of “small people” who had to face the consequences of historic changes which influenced their lives. The paper analyses the conditions of Czech and German coexistence and confronts the authentic historic context. Nevertheless, negative features of these ethnic groups are not overlooked and the positive ones are presented as a positive contribution to the current European multiculturalism. (shrink)

Von der Auffassung des Raumes bei Kant ausgehend, entwickelt der Autor einige Motive der Erwagungen Finks uber die Welt. Das Raumganze geht notwendig allen konkreten Beschrankungen voraus, die Beschrankung als solche gehort jedoch zum Ganzen mit derselben Notwendigkeit. Dieses Ganze bildet gemeinsam mit der Zeitdimension eine Fuge, die allem Einzelnen die Stelle und Weile seines Aufenthalts gewahrt. Das Seiende erscheint auf dem Hintergrund dieser Fuge, die selbst keine Gestalt, welche in Erscheinung treten konnte, sondern herrschendes Gesetz des Erscheinens (...) und Wiedersinkens des Seienden in die Verborgenheit ist. In dieser "Phanomenologie des Weltganzen" nimmt der Mensch eine Sonderstellung ein: er ist eins der zufalligen Seienden und zugleich ein Zentrum, dem alles, einschliesslich des Notwendigen, erscheint. Im Rahmen des gesamten Erscheinens gibt es also noch einen anderen Typ des Erscheinens, der in der Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz grundet; das Weltganze wird einerseits fur diese Existenzbewegung zur Heimat, andererseits gewinnt es in ihr Transparenz und Verstandlichkeit. (shrink)

현대의 철학적 사유는 탈-체계적 성격을 띠고 있지만 하이데거는 독특하게 차이를 포함한 이음을 사유하려 했었다. 그는 근대의 체계를 넘어서는 이음구조를 모색했다. 이 글은 그의 이음구조를 고찰하려고 한다. 이 글은 하이데거의 이음구조에 대해서 외적으로 기술하고, 내적으로 고찰하며, 최종적으로 심층적으로 숙고하려고 한다. 외적 기술이란 파편적으로 흩어져 있는 하이데거의 이음 관련구절들을 함께 모아 전반적인 이음구조의 상을 그려보려는 시도이다. 내적 고찰은 새로운 체계인 이음구조를 존재 및 생기의 차원에서 해명함을 뜻한다. 마지막으로 심층적 숙고는 하이데거의 존재 사유의 심층으로 더 깊이 들어가 이음구조를 사이-나눔과 서로-나름에서 생각해 보는 것을 (...) 의미한다. 이 세 가지 단계를 거쳐서 하이데거의 이음구조를 고찰해보면 하이데거의 이음구조는 fug이라는 개념에서 출발하여 이음의 작용이 완성되어 총체적으로 이어져 모인 상태인 Gefüge의 상태를 의미한다. 그러나 이러한 완벽한 이음구조의 건립은 아직 성취되지 않았으며 하이데거 사유의 목표로 남아있다. 하이데거의 이음구조를 내적으로 고찰해보면 존재 자체가 이음의 특성을 가지고 있음을 알 수 있다. 존재는 차이이면서 이음이고, 줌이면서 모음으로 사유된다. 심층적 숙고의 단계로 나아가면서 하이데거의 이음사유는 더 급진적인 형태를 취하게 된다. 중심으로서의 존재는 ‘사이’로 밝혀진다. 존재와 존재자 사이의 서로 나뉨과 서로를 향함이 숙고된다. 이음구조의 사유가 진행되면 될수록 그의 이음구조는 전통적인 체계의 형태를 벗어나게 된다. 체계의 중심이 탈중심화되고, 체계의 중심과 요소의 사이가 오히려 중심이 되는 그러한 전례 없는 특이한 형태의 체계가 되는 것이다. 이 이음구조에서 존재는 존재자를 포괄하지 못한다. 중심으로서의 존재라고 할 때 그 중심은 존재자를 다 아우른다는 의미에서 중심이 아니다. 중심과 체계 내 요소의 사이가 중심이 되어 이제 양자 사이에 원운동과 맴돎이 발생하는 그러한 체계가 발생한다. 중심은 내밀하다. 그것은 벌어져 있으며 서로 연결된다. 이음구조는 이런 방식으로 사유될 수 있다. 우리는 여기서 하이데거의 체계사유라 할 수 있는 이음사유의 핵심적 의미를 확인할 수 있다. 전통적인 의미의 동일성의 체계도 그렇다고 모든 종류의 연결과 이음을 부정하는 극단적인 차이의 철학도 아닌 바로 그 사이에 자리하고 있는 것이 바로 하이데거의 이음사유인 것이다. 이러한 이음사유에서 우리는 차이와 단절, 균열과 벗어남을 긍정하면서도 이어짐과 연결을 사유해낼 수 있는 새로운 사유의 지점을 찾아낼 수 있다. (shrink)