In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 315-335 Reid: Conception, Representation and Innate Ideas ROGER D. GALLIE Section I of this paper begins with a presentation of Thomas Reid's doctrine of the signification of words, of what words signify or represent. That presentation serves to introduce a problem of interpretation, namely, what Reid thinks the connection is between conceiving something and grasping what a term for it (...) signifies. It is pointed out that even if Reid maintains that what a word signifies is conceived by both speaker and hearer when that word is understood, this is a far cry from the position that he takes the stronger view, whether for all or only for some things, that their being conceived involves the understanding of a term or terms. The position that he does indeed take this stronger, although moderate, view is defended in sections II, III and IV. In sections II and III it is argued that, in Reid's view, for an adequate conception of an individual, real or imaginary, a conception of its attributes is needed. In section IV it is argued that the possession of general conceptions (in distinction from their formation), without which conception of attributes is impossible, requires appropriate understanding of general terms. So since for the conception of an individual a conception of its attributes is needed, and since for the conception of attributes appropriate understanding of general terms is required, we arrive at a textually well-founded position: for the conception of most things, in Reid's view, understanding of terms is indispensable. Roger D. Gallie is at the Department of Philosophy, Nottingham University, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD UK. email: [email protected] 316 Roger D. Gallie The remainder of the paper considers the following question: to what extent, if any, Reid is committed to acceptance of nativist views on concept possession? To answer, in section V we consider to what extent Reid's moderate position on the possession of conceptions commits him to accepting Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM) for propositional attitudes. It is clear that the view that a propositional attitude state such as belief involves some relation between a person and a representation such as a significant word, phrase or sentence of a natural language such as English can fairly be attributed to Reid. But it is also clear that Reid cannot be an adherent of the view that persons have a functional cum computational relation to Fodorean mental representations, so he cannot be an adherent of any nativism ex- plicitly contained in such a view. But it is to be noted that in his Inquiry, Chapter IV, Reid argues by a different route that in order to acquire a language such as English prior mastery of a system of significant signs is required. In section VI Keith Lehrer's argument in criticism of a reductionist interpretation of a position such as Fodor's is presented: that for a sign to signify something to someone presupposes that that person has a conception of what is signified. It is however pointed out that since there is a case for not viewing Fodor's position as reductionist overall Fodor can accept Lehrer's argument. Lehrer's innatist position, which he both claims to follow easily from this critical argument and to be a correct interpretation of Reid, is then presented: that we must presuppose an innate understanding of some signs to account for our learning the meaning of any signs. The objection that Reid too must accept the alleged innatist implications of Lehrer's critical argument in view of the implications of his moderate position on the possession of conceptions is considered and rebutted. In section VIII argue that while Lehrer makes a respectable case for innate principles of formation of conceptions such as that of hardness, something that Reid clearly endorses in his Inquiry, Chapter V, he does not succeed in making a case for there being any innate possession of conceptions. Finally, in section VIII, Reid's mature views in the Intellectual Powers, Essay VI, on how conceptions come to be possessed are expounded, and are fleshed out with some... (shrink)

Summary For the study of the first year of life, Sander, Stern, and Gomez each chose the adult–infant relationship as the unit of analysis; they followed its development, respectively, in moments of meeting, in the proto-conversation and in the focus of attention. The authors explicitly refer to the Gestalt theory and support the need to interpret the behavior of the child as part of a wider context, as the experiences of a person in relation since birth.

Based on a speech delivered before the Asociación de Abogados de Buenos Aires, December 11, 1969.

In this note an allusion recreated from Seneca’s De providentia is rescued as it was hidden in the Octavius of Minucius Felix, which recovers and adapted some topics from the Senecan text in a few brief lines which have been hitherto practically unnoticed; if the allusion is verified, a more recent reading of Seneca’s writing would make full argumentative sense.

Recently, José María Ariso and Samuel Laves have critically debated whether killing innocent and non‐threatening people [=WK] is a universal moral certainty. One of the main topics of their discussion concerns the case of the pisa‐suaves, children born in the context of the Colombian civil war who grew up with the FARC guerrillas. While Laves argues that such children hold WK, Ariso rejects his claim and stresses that pisa‐suaves have no moral code of conduct. In my work, I side with (...) Laves and contend that WK is a universal moral certainty. Accordingly, I maintain that (i) either pisa‐suaves possess WK and thereby count as human moral agents, or (ii) if they do not possess any moral code of conduct, then they cannot count as human moral agents and, in turn, their existence does not undermine WK's universality. (shrink)

This article analyses the inner structure of the argumentum orationis pro Milone in order to evaluate how Asconius arranges his narration of events. The analysis focuses on how the various sections unwind, on the use of connectives and temporal indicators, as well as on the use of tenses, and argues that the argumentum proceeds according to the chronological succession of events in its general outlines, within which minor events are inserted by association of ideas regardless of the chronological order. A (...) most striking example is provided by the episodes narrated at 36. 18-38. 13, which form a long digression on the topic of metus Milonis and, subsequently, of constantia Ciceronis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to apply properties of the double dual endofunctor on the category of bounded distributive lattices and some extensions thereof to obtain completeness of certain non-classical propositional logics in a unified way. In particular, we obtain completeness theorems for Moisil calculus, n-valued Łukasiewicz calculus and Nelson calculus. Furthermore we show some conservativeness results by these methods.

In this work I characterize Darwinian approaches to human behavior and mind, especially evolutionary psychology, and analyze the main criticisms that these approaches have received. To this end I resort to Jean Marie Schaeffer’s criticism of the thesis of human exceptionality and the semantic perspective of scientific theories of Ronald Giere. I conclude that the main criticisms are not applicable to evolutionary psychology as a research program. I also conclude that it cannot be held a priori that the Darwinian approach (...) is not applicable to the human mind and behavior. Finally, I discuss some educational implications of these debates. (shrink)

Giuseppe Gallis konsequentes Streben nach einer angemessenen Berücksichtigung beider Pole, des Subjektpols ebenso wie des Objektpols, sowohl in der Forschung als auch in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Lebens kommt im vorliegenden Sammelband in allen Arbeiten zum Tragen. Galli eröffnet damit auch neue Felder f8r die gestalttheoretische Forschungs- und Anwendungspraxis. Er erschließt Themen, die nicht zuletzt auch f8r die medizinischen, philosophischen, psychologischen und psychotherapeutischen Aufgabenstellungen zentral sind. Er plädiert nicht nur allgemein für einen dialogischen Ansatz in der zwischenmenschlichen Begegnung, er (...) führt in einer Reihe von Aufsätzen in diesem Sammelband auch sehr konkret die Fruchtbarkeit eines solchen Dialogs mit der Gedankenwelt eines Norbert Elias, Szvetan Todorovic und Paul Ricoeur für eine Bereicherung und Weiterentwicklung der Gestalttheorie vor Augen. (shrink)

W. B. Gallie; I *—The Presidential Address: Rationality and the Use of Force, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 1–.

I think it will be generally admitted that if Oxford philosophers have any claim to have added in recent years to the store of our philosophical ideas, it lies in their published works on the theory of conduct. I don’t think it can be claimed that, even in this sphere, they have given us many new and illuminating positive truths. After reading Mr. Ross, Professor Prichard, and Mr. Joseph, we are left, I think, with the impression that the whole subject (...) is much more intricate and puzzling than we should have thought possible. I intend in this paper to try and discover what is true in the theories of these three moralists on one of the most difficult and puzzling of ethical problems, viz., “What Renders a Right Act Right?” Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in the main, stand together; it is regrettable that Professor Prichard's published work is so very meagre. And if in quoting from his article in Mind , 1912, on “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake,” I am doing him an injustice in attributing to him any views which he no longer holds, I am sorry; but modesty in publishing has its penalties, and anyhow, the article is too guilty an offender to get off free, for its annoying subtleties started the whole trouble, and led indirectly to Some Problems in Ethics and the Right and the Good. (shrink)

One Morality or many? Liberal morality and Socialist morality; bourgeois morality and Georges Sorel's “morality of producers”; Protestant morality and Catholic; Greek morality and Christian; “aristocratic” morality and “slave” morality, “open” morality and “closed” morality—what, if any, is the relevance of such distinctions as these to moral philosophy?

En este artículo se analizan los cambios en la postura del filósofo Michael Ruse en relación con el problema de la naturaleza y legitimidad de la teleología en la Biología. A tal fin, se comparan los análisis de Ruse sobre este tema en su libro Filosofía de la Biología de 1973 con aquellos posteriores a 1989. Los cambios en la perspectiva de Ruse sobre este tema se relacionan con las corrientes dominantes en Filosofía de la Ciencia en las distintas épocas (...) analizadas. Los últimos análisis se centran en entender la teleología como ligada a la metáfora del diseño, por lo que se presta especial atención al rol de dicha metáfora en la Biología. Finalmente, se discute el valor de los análisis de Ruse para Biólogos y profesores de Biología. (shrink)