In this work, we have investigated the validity of the generalized second law of thermodynamics in logamediate and intermediate scenarios of the universe bounded by the Hubble, apparent, particle and event horizons using and without using first law of thermodynamics. We have observed that the GSL is valid for Hubble, apparent, particle and event horizons of the universe in the logamediate scenario of the universe using first law and without using first law. Similarly the GSL is (...) valid for all horizons in the intermediate scenario of the universe using first law. Also in the intermediate scenario of the universe, the GSL is valid for Hubble, apparent and particle horizons but it breaks down whenever we consider the universe enveloped by the event horizon. (shrink)

In this short paper we make a proposal that the second law of thermodynamics holds true for a closed physical system consisting of pure antimatter in the thermodynamical limit, but in a reversed form. We give two plausible arguments in favour to this proposal: one refers to the CPT theorem of relativistic quantum field theories while the other one is based on general thermodynamical arguments. However in our understanding the ultimate validity or invalidity of this idea can be (...) decided only by future physical experiments. As a consequence of the proposal we argue that the dynamical evolution of pure macroscopic antimatter systems can be very different from that of ordinary matter systems in the sense that sufficiently massive antimatter systems could have stronger tendency to form black holes during time evolution than their ordinary counterparts. Taking into account the various uniqueness theorems in black hole physics as well, as a result, antimatter could tracelessly disappear behind black hole event horizons faster in time than ordinary matter. The observed asymmetry of matter and antimatter could then be explained even if their presence in the Universe was symmetric in the beginning. (shrink)

After the birth of thermodynamics’ second principle—outlined in Carnot's Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu —several studies provided new arguments in the field. Mainly, they concerned the thermodynamics’ first principle—including energy conceptualisation—, the analytical aspects of the heat propagation, the statistical aspects of the mechanical theory of heat. In other words, the second half of nineteenth century was marked by an intense interdisciplinary research activity between physics and chemistry: new disciplines applied to the heat developed (...) in the form of analytical, mechanical and statistical theories. Inside all these theories, entropy—the brand-new function that Clausius coined in his Mechanical theory of heat—started to play a central epistemic role. In the present paper, we analyse some steps of the historical process of conceptualisation of such function from 1850 to 1902. Particularly, we retrace the historical–foundational path that—starting from Clausius’ Second Law—lead Boltzmann and Gibbs to their distinguished formulations of statistical entropy. As usual, our research has been unrolled through the analyses of primary sources and by leaning on critical readings of the secondary literature. As for the methodological approach, text analysis of historical documents constituted our privileged modus operandi. This paper is the expression of a collaborative historical research program focused on the thermodynamic foundations of physics–chemistry relationship; early results have already been published by the same authors upon the concepts of reversibility––and––thermal equilibrium. (shrink)

We introduce a simple model for so-called spin-echo experiments. We show that the model is a mincing system. On the basis of this model we study fine-grained entropy and coarse-grained entropy descriptions of these experiments. The coarse-grained description is shown to be unable to provide an explanation of the echo signals, as a result of the way in which it ignores dynamically generated correlations. This conclusion is extended to the general debate on the foundations of statistical mechanics. We emphasize the (...) need for an appropriate mechanism to explain the gradual suppression over time of the correlations in a thermodynamic system. We argue that such a mechanism can only be provided by the interventionist approach, in which the interaction of the system with its environment is taken into account. Irreversible behavior is then seen to arise not as a result of limited measurement accuracy , but as a result of the fact that thermodynamic systems are limited systems which interact with their environment. A detailed discussion is given of recent objections to the interventionist approach in the literature. (shrink)

In a previous work (M. Campisi. Stud. Hist. Phil. M. P. 36 (2005) 275-290) we have addressed the mechanical foundations of equilibrium thermodynamics on the basis of the Generalized Helmholtz Theorem. It was found that the volume entropy provides a good mechanical analogue of thermodynamic entropy because it satisfies the heat theorem and it is an adiabatic invariant. This property explains the ``equal'' sign in Clausius principle ($S_f \geq S_i$) in a purely mechanical way and suggests that the (...) volume entropy might explain the ``larger than'' sign (i.e. the Law of Entropy Increase) if non adiabatic transformations were considered. Based on the principles of microscopic (quantum or classical) mechanics here we prove that, provided the initial equilibrium satisfy the natural condition of decreasing ordering of probabilities, the expectation value of the volume entropy cannot decrease for arbitrary transformations performed by some external sources of work on a insulated system. This can be regarded as a rigorous quantum mechanical proof of the Second Law. We discuss how this result relates to the Minimal Work Principle and improves over previous attempts. The natural evolution of entropy is towards larger values because the natural state of matter is at positive temperature. Actually the Law of Entropy Decrease holds in artificially prepared negative temperature systems. (shrink)

Jacob Bekenstein's identification of black hole event horizon area with entropy proved to be a landmark in theoretical physics. In this paper we trace the subsequent development of the resulting generalized second law of thermodynamics (GSL), especially its extension to incorporate cosmological event horizons. In spite of the fact that cosmological horizons do not generally have well-defined thermal properties, we find that the GSL is satisfied for a wide range of models. We explore in particular the case (...) of an asymptotically de Sitter universe filled with a gas of small black holes as a means of casting light on the relative entropic ‘worth’ of black hole versus cosmological horizon area. We present some numerical solutions of the generalized total entropy as a function of time for certain cosmological models, in all cases confirming the validity of the GSL. (shrink)

In quantum statistical mechanics, equilibrium states have been shown to be the typical states for a system that is entangled with its environment, suggesting a possible identification between thermodynamic and von Neumann entropies. In this paper, we investigate how the relaxation toward equilibrium is made possible through interactions that do not lead to significant exchange of energy, and argue for the validity of the second law of thermodynamics at the microscopic scale.

Well known quantum and time paradoxes, and the difficulty to derive the second law of thermodynamics, are proposed to be the result of our historically grown paradigm for energy: it is just there, the capacity to do work, not directly related to change. When the asymmetric nature of energy is considered, as well as the involvement of energy turnover in any change, so that energy can be understood as fundamentally "dynamic", and time-oriented, these paradoxes and problems dissolve. The (...) most basic consequence concerns the particle-wave dualism. For a reversible inter-conversion of a particle into a wave, subject to a dynamic energy, a self-image of information has to be generated: quantum theory has to be complemented by a theory of information. Then, quantum processes can be derived from classical ones and the second law of thermodynamics with the tendency of increasing entropy follows in a straightforward way. (shrink)

The second law results in the growth of the entropy – in superficial interpretation this principle presumes that the sufficient energy inevitably turns into the substandard energy. Order turns into chaos over time; however, chaos also turns into order under certain circumstances. The first research objective is to establish the possible prescientific ideas about the phenomenon – some philosophical intuitions that have preceded the scientific discovery of the second law and have conformed to it in a certain sense. (...) It is essential because there are always certain bonds and continuity in the history of philosophy and science – the correct interpretation of the phenomenon becomes difficult, if not impossible, without the establishment of such bonds.Moreover, the main task is to understand what the second law is and which significance its principal corollaries have. We need to give the second law a correct interpretation that will allow making assumptions about its connection with time in the context of the initial state problem and about the possible new ways of modern physics development – in particular, the creation of the quantum theory of gravity. Two solutions to the entropy and initial state connection problem are proposed in the context of the time arrow discussion (G. Calender’s approach to solving the problem is disputed). (shrink)

Can the second law of thermodynamics explain our mental experience of the direction of time? According to an influential approach, the past hypothesis of universal low entropy also explains how the psychological arrow comes about. We argue that although this approach has many attractive features, it cannot explain the psychological arrow after all. In particular, we show that the past hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the psychological arrow on the basis of current physics. We propose (...) two necessary conditions on the workings of the brain that any account of the psychological arrow of time must satisfy. And we propose a new reductive physical account of the psychological arrow of time compatible with time-symmetric physics, according to which these two conditions are also sufficient. Our proposal has some radical implications, for example, that the psychological arrow of time is fundamental, whereas the temporal direction of entropy increase in the second law of thermodynamics and the past hypothesis is derived from it, rather than the other way around. 1Introduction2A Physical Account of the Psychological Arrow of Time3Necessary Conditions for the Psychological Arrow of Time4The Psychological Arrow of Time via the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the Past Hypothesis5Why the Past Hypothesis Is Insufficient for the Psychological Arrow of Time5.1Stage 1, Version 1: From the past hypothesis to the psychological arrow via typicality5.2Stage 1, Version 2: From the past hypothesis to the psychological arrow via dynamical or causal considerations5.3Stage 2: From entropy gradient in the brain to the psychological arrow of time6Why the Past Hypothesis Is Unnecessary for the Psychological Arrow of Time7A New Reductive Account of the Psychological Arrow of Time. (shrink)

We show that the so-called Multiple-Computations Theorem in cognitive science and philosophy of mind challenges Landauer’s Principle in physics. Since the orthodox wisdom in statistical physics is that Landauer’s Principle is implied by, or is the mechanical equivalent of, the Second Law of thermodynamics, our argument shows that the Multiple-Computations Theorem challenges the universal validity of the Second Law of thermodynamics itself. We construct two examples of computations carried out by one and the same dynamical process (...) with respect to which Landauer’s principle implies contradictory predictions concerning the entropy increase. Our two examples are based on a weak version of the Multiple-Computations Theorem, which is quite uncontroversial, and therefore they amount to a clear refutation of the universal validity of Landauer’s Principle. We consider some responses to this argument that do not attempt to single out one computation over the others, and we show that they do not work. We further consider ways out of the argument by externalist approaches supporting the computational theory of the mind who propose that the interaction of a computing system with the environment is enough to select a single computation over the others. We show on physical grounds that this approach fails too. We then reverse the direction of our challenge and formulate a dilemma for supporters of the computational theory of the mind: they must reject the causal closure of physic; or else they must accept on a priori grounds that Landauer’s Principle and the Second Law of thermodynamics are not universally valid. Finally, we present our version of a type–type mind-brain identity theory called Flat Physicalism, which is based on the paradigm case of statistical mechanics, and we show that it circumvents the challenge from Landauer’s Principle and the Multiple-Computations Theorem and does not fall prey to our dilemma. (shrink)

The second law of thermodynamics is traditionally interpreted as a coarse-grained result of classical mechanics. Recently its relation with quantum mechanical processes such as decoherence and measurement has been revealed in literature. In this paper we will formulate the second law and the associated time irreversibility following Everett’s idea: systems entangled with an object getting to know the branch in which they live. Accounting for this self-locating knowledge, we get two forms of entropy: objective entropy measuring the (...) uncertainty of the state of the object alone, and subjective entropy measuring the information carried by the self-locating knowledge. By showing that the summation of the two forms of entropy is a conserved and perspective-free quantity, we interpret the second law as a statement of irreversibility in knowledge acquisition. This essentially derives the thermodynamic arrow of time from the subjective arrow of time, and provides a unified explanation for varieties of the second law, as well as the past hypothesis. (shrink)

The second law of thermodynamics and the concept of entropy became one of the most important scientific ideas to influence Western culture in the 19th century. Pessimistic conclusions, such as the concept of the heat death of the universe and the specter of the inevitable decay of everything, inspired philosophical reflection at the fin de siècle. The philosophy of Henri Bergson played a key role in overcoming this pessimistic attitude. In his famous work L’évolution créatrice (1907), he proposed (...) a bold metaphysical vision for the completion of science through a vision of creative evolution driven by the metaphysical factor of élan vital in opposition to destructive (entropic) factors. Bergson’s philosophy appealed specifically to negentropic ideas, so it made an important contribution to the worldview debate of the time. The influence of Bergson’s thought on Polish philosophy has been studied many times, including from a worldview perspective, but no one has yet analyzed the impact of his entropic and negentropic ideas. With research into the cultural significance of these ideas developing today, such research would be particularly relevant. This paper therefore aims to fill this significant research gap and present an initial analysis of the influence of Bergson’s specific entropic and negentropic ideas on Polish thinkers prior to the outbreak of World War II. This paper begins with presenting the historical background for the influence of entropic ideas on Western thought at the turn of the 20th century. Bergson’s philosophical entropic and negentropic ideas are then analyzed. By outlining the background to their reception like this, it becomes possible to illustrate the reception process in Polish philosophy in the next two parts. First, we focus on a group of philosophers who challenged the pessimistic consequences of the established scientific view of the world, while the following part shows the reactions to Bergson’s ideas by philosophers associated with science. Finally, some general conclusions are drawn about Bergson’s influence and the reasons for his failure. Some little-known connections between neo-romanticism and the reflection on entropic ideas are also highlighted. (shrink)

Over the last 10–15 years the second law of thermodynamics has undergone unprecedented scrutiny, particularly with respect to its universal status. This brief article introduces the proceedings of a recent symposium devoted to this topic, The second law of thermodynamics: Foundations and Status, held at University of San Diego as part of the 87th Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the AAAS (June 19–22, 2006). The papers are introduced under three themes: ideal gases, quantum perspectives, (...) and interpretation. Roughly half the papers support traditional interpretations of the second law while the rest challenge it. (shrink)

Recent models of consciousness are reviewed which explore the relationship of consciousness to physical laws; many of these also explore the relationship of consciousness to biological findings. Issues investigated by these models are discussed, with the issues framed in a general way in order to provide a comparison between the models. In Part II the issues discussed include: Does all of the information content of consciousness correspond to neural coding in the brain? Does consciousness follow the brain passively, or can (...) it act independently? Is independent processing by consciousness compatible with the second law of thermodynamics? (shrink)

The search for the statistical mechanical underpinning of thermodynamic irreversibility has so far focussed on the spontaneous approach to equilibrium. But this is the search for the underpinning of what Brown and Uffink have dubbed the ‘minus first law’ of thermodynamics. In contrast, the second law tells us that certain interventions on equilibrium states render the initial state ‘irrecoverable’. In this article, I discuss the unusual nature of processes in thermodynamics, and the type of irreversibility that the (...) second law embodies. I then search for the microscopic underpinning or statistical mechanical ‘reductive basis’ of the second law of thermodynamics by taking a functionalist strategy. First, I outline the functional role of the thermodynamic entropy: for a thermally isolated system, the thermodynamic entropy is constant in quasi-static processes, but increasing in non-quasi-static processes. I then search for the statistical mechanical quantity that plays this role—rather than the role of the traditional ‘holy grail’ as described by Callender. I argue that in statistical mechanics, the Gibbs entropy plays this role. (shrink)

Cartesian mind body dualism and modern versions of this viewpoint posit a mind thermodynamically unrelated to the body but informationally interactive. The relation between information and entropy developed by Leon Brillouin demonstrates that any information about the state of a system has entropic consequences. It is therefore impossible to dissociate the mind's information from the body's entropy. Knowledge of that state of the system without an energetically significant measurement would lead to a violation of the second law of (...) class='Hi'>thermodynamics. (shrink)

It is argued that if the non-unitary measurement transition, as codified by Von Neumann, is a real physical process, then the ‘probability assumption’ needed to derive the Second Law of Thermodynamics naturally enters at that point. The existence of a real, indeterministic physical process underlying the measurement transition would therefore provide an ontological basis for Boltzmann’s Stosszahlansatz and thereby explain the unidirectional increase of entropy against a backdrop of otherwise time-reversible laws. It is noted that the Transactional Interpretation (...) of quantum mechanics provides such a physical account of the non-unitary measurement transition, and TI is brought to bear in finding a physically complete, non-ad hoc grounding for the Second Law. (shrink)

Spiders’ nests, birds’ wings, airplanes, and scientific theories are all instances of adaptations. Instructionist theories implies that adaptive novelties are imposed directly on an entity by the environment while selectionist theories explains adaptive novelties to be the product of mechanisms including trial and error . This article argues that adaptive novelties are the result of selectionist mechanisms while instructionist production of adaptive novelties is impossible due to the second law of thermodynamics. Even long-term preservation of adaptive information is (...) dependent on selectionist mechanisms. These findings have important implications for both human and societal development because of the prevalence of instructionist theories. (shrink)

Thermodynamic implications of anisotropic gas-surface interactions in a closed molecular flow cavity are examined. Anisotropy at the microscopic scale, such as might be caused by reduced-dimensionality surfaces, is shown to lead to reversibility at the macroscopic scale. The possibility of a self-sustaining nonequilibrium stationary state induced by surface anisotropy is demonstrated that simultaneously satisfies flux balance, conservation of momentum, and conservation of energy. Conversely, it is also shown that the second law of thermodynamics prohibits anisotropic gas-surface interactions in (...) “equilibrium”, even for reduced dimensionality surfaces. This is particularly startling because reduced dimensionality surfaces are known to exhibit a plethora of anisotropic properties. That gas-surface interactions would be excluded from these anisotropic properties is completely counterintuitive from a causality perspective. These results provide intriguing insights into the second law of thermodynamics and its relation to gas-surface interaction physics. (shrink)

We present a Gedankenexperiment that leads to a violation of detailed balance if quantum mechanical transition probabilities are treated in the usual way by applying Fermi’s “golden rule”. This Gedankenexperiment introduces a collection of two-level systems that absorb and emit radiation randomly through non-reciprocal coupling to a waveguide, as realized in specific chiral quantum optical systems. The non-reciprocal coupling is modeled by a hermitean Hamiltonian and is compatible with the time-reversal invariance of unitary quantum dynamics. Surprisingly, the combination of non-reciprocity (...) with probabilistic radiation processes entails negative entropy production. Although the considered system appears to fulfill all conditions for Markovian stochastic dynamics, such a dynamics violates the Clausius inequality, a formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. Several implications concerning the interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism are discussed. (shrink)

The generalized second law of thermodynamics states that entropy always increases when all event horizons are attributed with an entropy proportional to their area. We test the generalized second law by investigating the change in entropy when dust, radiation and black holes cross a cosmological event horizon. We generalize for flat, open and closed Friedmann–Robertson–Walker universes by using numerical calculations to determine the cosmological horizon evolution. In most cases, the loss of entropy from within the (...) cosmological horizon is more than balanced by an increase in cosmological event horizon entropy, maintaining the validity of the generalized second law of thermodynamics. However, an intriguing set of open universe models shows an apparent entropy decrease when black holes disappear over the cosmological event horizon. We anticipate that this apparent violation of the generalized second law will disappear when solutions are available for black holes embedded in arbitrary backgrounds. (shrink)

In a previous paper (Duncan, T.L., Semura, J.S. in Entropy 6:21, 2004) we considered the question, “What underlying property of nature is responsible for the second law?” A simple answer can be stated in terms of information: The fundamental loss of information gives rise to the second law. This line of thinking highlights the existence of two independent but coupled sets of laws: Information dynamics and energy dynamics. The distinction helps shed light on certain foundational questions in statistical (...) mechanics. For example, the confusion surrounding previous “derivations” of the second law from energy dynamics can be resolved by noting that such derivations incorporate one or more assumptions that correspond to the loss of information. In this paper we further develop and explore the perspective in which the second law is fundamentally a law of information dynamics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the relation between the second law of thermodynamics and the so-called arrow of time. For this purpose, a number of different aspects in this arrow of time are distinguished, in particular those of time-reversal (non-)invariance and of (ir)reversibility. Next I review versions of the second law in the work of Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin, Planck, Gibbs, Caratheodory and Lieb and Yngvason, and investigate their connection with these aspects of the arrow (...) of time. It is shown that this connection varies a great deal along with these formulations of the second law. According to the famous formulation by Planck, the second law expresses the irreversibility of natural processes. But in many other formulations irreversibility or even time-reversal non-invariance plays no role. I therefore argue for the view that the second law has nothing to do with the arrow of time. (shrink)

Recent developments point to a breakdown in the generalized second law of thermodynamics for theories with Lorentz symmetry violation. It appears possible to construct a perpetual motion machine of the second kind in such theories, using a black hole to catalyze the conversion of heat to work. Here we describe and extend the arguments leading to that conclusion. We suggest the inference that local Lorentz symmetry may be an emergent property of the macroscopic world with origins (...) in a microscopic second law of causal horizon thermodynamics. (shrink)

The arrow of time is a familiar phenomenon we all know from our experience: we remember the past but not the future and control the future but not the past. However, it takes an effort to keep records of the past, and to affect the future. For example, it would take an immense effort to unmix coffee and milk, although we easily mix them. Such time directed phenomena are sub- sumed under the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This law (...) characterizes our experience of the arrow of time in terms of an increase of a theoretical magnitude called entropy. Statistical mechan- ics tries to explain the Second Law as an effect of the behavior of the microscopic particles that make up the universe. Since our senses are too coarse to see this microstructure, statistical mechanics describes our experience in terms of probability, or in terms of the partial information we have about the particles. In this paper we explain the workings of statistical mechanics; how it accounts for probability as an objective feature of the world based on the underlying dynamics; how it accounts for our memories of the past; how the statistical mechanical probability under- writes the Second Law; and how, at the same time, it leads to a violation of the Second Law by the so-called Maxwell’s Demon. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the place of the second law of thermodynamics in Wilhelm Ostwald's physical chemistry. After a brief introduction to his energetic theory, which was supposed to be a generalization of thermodynamics, I contrast Ostwald's understanding of the second law, which ignored entropy and irreversibility, with Max Planck's, which emphasized both. I then consider how Ostwald sought to develop physical chemistry without any concern for irreversibility and little concern for entropy, and I argue that (...) he was mistaken. (shrink)

It was first suggested by Albert that the existence of real, physical non-unitarity at the quantum level would yield a complete explanation for the increase of entropy over time in macroscopic systems. An alternative understanding of the source of non-unitarity is presented herein, in terms of the Transactional Interpretation. The present model provides a specific physical justification for Boltzmann’s Stosszahlansatz, thereby changing its status from an ad hoc postulate to a theoretically grounded result, without requiring any change to the basic (...) quantum theory. In addition, it is argued that TI provides an elegant way of reconciling, via collapse, the time-reversible Liouville evolution with the time-irreversible evolution inherent in master equations. The present model is contrasted with the GRW ‘spontaneous collapse’ theory previously suggested for this purpose by Albert. (shrink)

Entangled quantum systems can be harnessed to transmit, store, and manipulate information in a more efficient and secure way than possible in the realm of classical physics. Given this resource character of entanglement, it is an important problem to characterize ways to manipulate it and meaningful approaches to its quantification. This is the objective of entanglement theory.

In the most of existing cosmological investigations, the isotropic space–time models have been considered. In the present work, we focus on beyond this limitation and discuss the influence of anisotropy from thermodynamical perspective. The main goal of this study is to discuss the first and the generalized second laws of thermodynamics in an expanding anisotropic inhomogeneous model of the cosmos from the teleparallel gravity perspective, which is filled with the baryonic matter interacting with the dark energy and (...) the cold dark matter by assuming the cosmos as a thermodynamical system, which is bounded by a dynamical horizon. (shrink)

This communication is part I of a series of papers which explore the theoretical possibility of generalizing quantum dynamics in such a way that the predicted motions of an isolated system would include the irreversible (entropy-increasing) state evolutions that seem essential if the second law of thermodynamics is ever to become a theorem of mechanics. In this first paper, the general mathematical framework for describing linear but not necessarily Hamiltonian mappings of the statistical operator is reviewed, with particular (...) attention to detailed representations of the Kossakowski conditions for the case of a two-level system. (shrink)

There has recently been a good deal of controversy about Landauer's Principle, which is often stated as follows: The erasure of one bit of information in a computational device is necessarily accompanied by a generation of kT ln 2 heat. This is often generalised to the claim that any logically irreversible operation cannot be implemented in a thermodynamically reversible way. John Norton (2005) and Owen Maroney (2005) both argue that Landauer's Principle has not been shown to hold in general, and (...) Maroney offers a method that he claims instantiates the operation reset in a thermodynamically reversible way. In this paper we defend the qualitative form of Landauer's Principle, and clarify its quantitative consequences (assuming the second law of thermodynamics). We analyse in detail what it means for a physical system to implement a logical transformation L, and we make this precise by defining the notion of an L-machine. Then we show that logical irreversibility of L implies thermodynamic irreversibility of every corresponding L-machine. We do this in two ways. First, by assuming the phenomenological validity of the Kelvin statement of the second law, and second, by using information-theoretic reasoning. We illustrate our results with the example of the logical transformation 'reset', and thereby recover the quantitative form of Landauer's Principle. (shrink)

We discuss Boltzmann’s probabilistic explanation of the second law of thermodynamics providing a comprehensive presentation of what is called today the typicality account. Countering its misconception as an alternative explanation, we examine the relation between Boltzmann’s H-theorem and the general typicality argument demonstrating the conceptual continuity between the two. We then discuss the philosophical dimensions of the concept of typicality and its relevance for scientific reasoning in general, in particular for understanding the reduction of macroscopic laws to microscopic (...) laws. Finally, we reply to various common criticisms of the typicality account. (shrink)

Abstract.Growing interest in the origin of life, the physical foundations of biological theory, and the evolution of animal social systems has led to increasing efforts to understand the processes by which elements or living systems at one level of organizational complexity combine to form stable systems of higher order. J. Bronowski saw the need to extend or reformulate evolutionary theory to deal with the hierarchy problem and to account for the evolution of systems of “stratified stability.” The hierarchy problem has (...) become a matter of great interest also in nonequilibrium thermodynamic theory.An effort is made here to develop an abstract, phenomenological model, based on the laws of thermodynamics, to account for the origin and hierarchical evolution of living systems. It is argued that the principle of minimum entropy production, developed by I. Prigogine, applies generally to all thermodynamic systems and processes and is implicit in an extended and more complete formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. From this are derived a thermodynamic criterion and a principle of thermodynamic selection governing the formation of stable systems of “elements” of various levels of organization. Thermodynamic selection gives rise to the creation of “elements” having increasingly “open” characteristic structures which may combine spontaneously to form “social” or crystalline systems capable of growing and reproducing themselves through processes of fissioning or budding. Such simple, self‐reproducing systems are capable of evolving by natural selection, which is seen to be a special case of the more general process of thermodynamic selection. The principle of natural selection, thus formulated, has the character of a fundamental physical law. Self‐reproducing systems with suitably open hereditary programs may combine to form stable social systems, which may grow and reproduce as a unit. In this way self‐reproducing systems of increasing hierarchical order, size, and organizational complexity may evolve through processes of thermodynamic (natural) selection. Some implications of this open‐ended model and opportunities for testing its empirical and theoretical utility are explored. (shrink)

After deconstructing the thermodynamic concepts of work and waste, I take up Howard Odum’s idea of energy quality, which tallies the overall amount of energy needed to be dissipated in order to accomplish some work of interest. This was developed from economic considerations that give obvious meaning to the work accomplished. But the energy quality idea can be used to import meaning more generally into Nature. It could be viewed as projecting meaning back from any marked work into preceding energy (...) gradient dissipations that immediately paved the way for it. But any work done by an abiotic dissipative structure, since it would be without positive economic significance, would also be difficult to mark as a starting point for the energy quality calculation. Furthermore, any destructive work as by hurricanes or floods, with negative economic significance, would not seem to merit the quality calculation either. But there has been abiotic work of keen interest to us—that which mediated the origin of life. Some kind of abiotic dissipative structures had to have been the framework that fostered this process, regardless of how it might come to be understood in detail. Since all dissipative structures have the same thermodynamic and informational organization in common, any of them might provide the material context for the origin of something. So we can pick any starting point we wish, and calculate backward what sequence of energy usages would have been necessary to set it up. Given such an open ended project, we could not find an obvious place in any sequence to stop and start the forward the calculation, and so we would need to take it right back to an ultimate beginning, like the insolation of some area, or the outpouring of Earth’s thermal energy. Any energy dissipation might be the beginning of something of importance, and so Nature is as replete with potential meanings as it is with energy gradients. (shrink)

In the history of science, the birth of classical chemistry and thermodynamics produced an anomaly within Newtonian mechanical paradigm: force and acceleration were no longer citizens of new cited sciences. Scholars tried to reintroduce them within mechanistic approaches, as the case of the kinetic gas theory. Nevertheless, Thermodynamics, in general, and its Second Law, in particular, gradually affirmed their role of dominant not-reducible cognitive paradigms for various scientific disciplines: more than twenty formulations of Second Law—a sort (...) of indisputable intellectual wealth—are conceived after 1824 Sadi Carnot’s original statement and a multitude of entropy functions are proposed after 1865 Clausius’ former definition. Furthermore, at the end of nineteenth century, thermodynamics extended its cognitive domain to chemistry. Mainly thanks to Gibbs, a brand new discipline—chemical thermodynamics or physical chemistry—gradually affirmed its role inside the scientific community. This paper reports the former results of collaborative research program in the History and Epistemology of Science as well as Nature of Science Teaching aimed at retracing the foundations of the physical chemistry. Specifically, the research is structured in three parts: historical-epistemic reflections on fundamental thermodynamic concepts and principles—such as reversible process, heat, temperature, thermal equilibrium and Clausius’ Second Law—that play a structural role inside modern physical chemistry; panoramic overview on the entropy, whose polysemy makes it one of the most demanding concepts for scholars, teachers and students while approaching thermodynamics; conceptualization of chemical equilibrium as complex entity according to the dual epistemological approach offered by Gibbs’ thermodynamic model and the kinetic standpoint by Guldberg and Waage. In particular, the present work details an original reading of thermodynamic principles with the aim of setting forth a rationalized multidisciplinary substrate whereon the foundational concepts of reversible process and thermal equilibrium can be set. (shrink)

The formulation of the second law of thermodynamics in the frame of general relativity is reconsidered in the case of an istotropic homogeneous universe. We show that there appears then a direct link between the cosmological state of the universe, as expressed in terms of conformal coordinates, and quantities such as energy density, pressure, and entropy associated with the description of nature. In the early universe there appears a kind of phase transition due to transfer of gravitational energy (...) to matter associated with the cosmological expansion if the universe starts with a non-Euclidian (space) state. As a result, we may envisage the possibility of a “cold big-bang model,” in which the universe would start at zero temperature and entropy. The temperature goes then through a maximum before entering the present area of cooling related to adiabatic expansion. (shrink)

There has recently been a good deal of controversy about Landauer's Principle, which is often stated as follows: The erasure of one bit of information in a computational device is necessarily accompanied by a generation of kTln2 heat. This is often generalised to the claim that any logically irreversible operation cannot be implemented in a thermodynamically reversible way. John Norton (2005) and Owen Maroney (2005) both argue that Landauer's Principle has not been shown to hold in general, and Maroney offers (...) a method that he claims instantiates the operation Reset in a thermodynamically reversible way. In this paper we defend the qualitative form of Landauer's Principle, and clarify its quantitative consequences (assuming the second law of thermodynamics). We analyse in detail what it means for a physical system to implement a logical transformation L, and we make this precise by defining the notion of an L-machine. Then we show that logical irreversibility of L implies thermodynamic irreversibility of every corresponding L-machine. We do this in two ways. First, by assuming the phenomenological validity of the Kelvin statement of the second law, and second, by using information-theoretic reasoning. We illustrate our results with the example of the logical transformation 'Reset', and thereby recover the quantitative form of Landauer's Principle. (shrink)

Maxwell’s Demon is a thought experiment devised by J. C. Maxwell in 1867 in order to show that the Second Law of thermodynamics is not universal, since it has a counter-example. Since the Second Law is taken by many to provide an arrow of time, the threat to its universality threatens the account of temporal directionality as well. Various attempts to “exorcise” the Demon, by proving that it is impossible for one reason or another, have been made (...) throughout the years, but none of them were successful. We have shown (in a number of publications) by a general state-space argument that Maxwell’s Demon is compatible with classical mechanics, and that the most recent solutions, based on Landauer’s thesis, are not general. In this paper we demonstrate that Maxwell’s Demon is also compatible with quantum mechanics. We do so by analyzing a particular (but highly idealized) experimental setup and proving that it violates the Second Law. Our discussion is in the framework of standard quantum mechanics; we give two separate arguments in the framework of quantum mechanics with and without the projection postulate. We address in our analysis the connection between measurement and erasure interactions and we show how these notions are applicable in the microscopic quantum mechanical structure. We discuss what might be the quantum mechanical counterpart of the classical notion of “macrostates”, thus explaining why our Quantum Demon setup works not only at the micro level but also at the macro level, properly understood. One implication of our analysis is that the Second Law cannot provide a universal lawlike basis for an account of the arrow of time; this account has to be sought elsewhere. (shrink)

I began this study with Laudan's argument from the pessimistic induction and I promised to show that the caloric theory of heat cannot be used to support the premisses of the meta-induction on past scientific theories. I tried to show that the laws of experimental calorimetry, adiabatic change and Carnot's theory of the motive power of heat were independent of the assumption that heat is a material substance, approximately true, deducible and accounted for within thermodynamics.I stressed that results and (...) were known to most theorists of the caloric theory and that result was put forward by the founders of the new thermodynamics. In other words, the truth-content of the caloric theory was located, selected carefully, and preserved by the founders of thermodynamics.However, the reader might think that even if I have succeeded in showing that laudan is wrong about the caloric theory, I have not shown how the strategy followed in this paper can be generalised against the pessimistic meta-induction. I think that the general strategy against Laudan's argument suggested in this paper is this: the empirical success of a mature scientific theory suggests that there are respects and degrees in which this theory is true. The difficulty for — and and real challenge to — philosophers of science is to suggest ways in which this truth-content can be located and shown to be preserved — if at all — to subsequent theories. In particular, the empirical success of a theory does not, automatically, suggest that all theoretical terms of the theory refer. On the contrary, judgments of referential success depend on which theoretical claims are well-supported by the evidence. This is a matter of specific investigation. Generally, one would expect that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence or turn out to be independent of the evidence at hand, are not compelling. For simply, if the evidence does not make it likely that our beliefs about putative theoretical entities are approximately correct, a belief in those entities would be ill-founded and unjustified. Theoretical extrapolations in science are indespensable, but they are not arbitrary. If the evidence does not warrant them I do not see why someone should commit herself to them. In a sense, the problem with empricist philisophers is not that they demand that theoretical beliefs must be warranted by evidence. Rather, it is that they claim that no evidence can warrant theorretical beliefs. A realist philosopher of science would not disagree on the first, but she has good grounds to deny the second.I argued that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence must not be taken as belief-worthy. But can one sustaon the more ambitious view that loosely supported parts of a theory tend to be just those that include non-referring terms? There is an obvious excess risk in such a generalisation. For there are well-known cases in which a theoretical claim was initially weakly supported by the evidence. (shrink)

Bradley succeeded in conceptualizing biological productivity in terms—monetary investment vs. profit—that could be applied to organisms as different in form and habitat as trees, grapevines, and crayfish.41 This form of measurement was not precise enough to have served as a basis for actual comparisons of production rate. His way of thinking, however, could have been applied with other terms of measurement once the usefulness of such measurements had been realized. The realization that production rate is an important factor is implicit (...) in his discussions, but for his purposes, yearly yields were generally sufficiently precise determinations.Although Bradley drew substantially upon the contributions of others, his writings represent a significant beginning for productivity ecology. All of the kinds of investigations that he reported could have been extended, rendered more precise, and formed the basis of ecological generalizations during the eighteenth century.There were, however, certain conceptual limitations imposed by a lack of relevant knowledge in physiology and in physical science. A good understanding of productivity ultimately depends upon an understanding of metabolism, which in turn depends upon an understanding of photosynthesis, respiration, biochemistry, and the first and second laws of thermodynamics. The essential knowledge of these subjects would not be available until decades after Bradley's time. (shrink)

Landauer’s principle is the loosely formulated notion that the erasure of n bits of information must always incur a cost of k ln n in thermodynamic entropy. It can be formulated as a precise result in statistical mechanics, but for a restricted class of erasure processes that use a thermodynamically irreversible phase space expansion, which is the real origin of the law’s entropy cost and whose necessity has not been demonstrated. General arguments that purport to establish the unconditional validity of (...) the law fail. They turn out to depend on the illicit formation of a canonical ensemble from memory devices holding random data. To exorcise Maxwell’s demon one must show that all candidate devices—the ordinary and the extraordinary—must fail to reverse the second law of thermodynamics. The theorizing surrounding Landauer’s principle is too fragile and too tied to a few specific examples to support such general exorcism. Charles Bennett’s recent extension of Landauer’s principle to the merging of computational paths fails for the same reasons as trouble the original principle. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the clarification of the concept of “typicality” discussed in contemporary philosophy of physics by conceiving the nomological status of a typical behaviour such as that expressed in the Second Law of Thermodynamics as a “minutis rectis law”. A brief sketch of the discovery of “typicality” shows that there were ideas of typical behaviour not only in physics but also in sociology. On this basis and in analogy to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, (...) it is shown that the nomological status of sociological laws such as Gresham’s Law can also be conceived as “minutis rectis laws”. (shrink)

In recent papers the authors have discussed the dynamical properties of “large Poincaré systems” (LPS), that is, nonintegrable systems with a continuous spectrum (both classical and quantum). An interesting example of LPS is given by the Friedrichs model of field theory. As is well known, perturbation methods analytic in the coupling constant diverge because of resonant denominators. We show that this Poincaré “catastrophe” can be eliminated by a natural time ordering of the dynamical states. We obtain then a dynamical theory (...) which incorporates a privileged direction of time (and therefore the second law of thermodynamics). However, it is only in very simple situations that this time ordering can be performed in an “extended” Hilbert space. In general, we need to go to the Liouville space (superspace) and introduce a time ordering of dynamical states according to the number of particles involved in correlations. This leads then to a generalization of quantum mechanics in which the usual Heisenberg's eigenvalue problem is replaced by a complex eigenvalue problem in the Liouville space. (shrink)

When considering controversial thermodynamic scenarios such as Maxwell's demon, it is often necessary to consider probabilistic mixtures of states. This raises the question of how, if at all, to assign entropy to them. The information-theoretic entropy is often used in such cases; however, no general proof of the soundness of doing so has been given, and indeed some arguments against doing so have been presented. We offer a general proof of the applicability of the information-theoretic entropy to probabilistic mixtures of (...) macrostates, making clear the assumptions on which it depends, in particular a probabilistic version of the Kelvin statement of the Second Law. We briefly discuss the interpretation of our result. (shrink)