Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue (...) that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim. (shrink)

This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

A philosophical position may be characterized in different ways. Here we try to say how the naturalist answers certain . The questions come from very different areas; the spectrum of subjects is therefore quite mixed. There are, however, aspects of order: We start with (questions about) abstract subjects like logic, mathematics, metaphysics, then turn to problems of realism. And since in general naturalists are realists, the following questions on truth, laws of nature, origin of the universe, cosmology, evolution, body-mind-problem, freedom (...) of the will, religion, moral, and pseudoscience, are answered against a realistic background. German Eine philosophische Haltung kann man auf verschiedene Weisen charakterisieren. Hier versuchen wir zu sagen, wie der Naturalist auf bestimmte Kernfragen antwortet. Die Fragen stammen aus sehr verschiedenen Gebieten; das Themenspektrum ist deshalb recht bunt. Es gibt aber durchaus Ordnungsgesichtspunkte: Wir beginnen mit (Fragen zu) eher abstrakten Gegenständen wie Logik, Mathematik, Metaphysik, kommen dann zu Problemen des Realismus. Und da Naturalisten im Allgemeinen Realisten sind, werden die anschließenden Fragen über Wahrheit, Naturgesetze, Weltentstehung, Kosmologie, Evolution, Leib-Seele-Problem, Willensfreiheit, Religion, Moral und Pseudowissenschaften vor einem realistischen Hintergrund beantwortet. (shrink)

The internet has been discussed as a major agent of change for political communication and participation. One important dimension of possible effects is the influence of online communication on the participation habits of citizens. In this article, panel survey data from Germany that cover almost the first decade of this century are used in order to test causal hypotheses about this transformation process. The results highlight that new forms of political communication are mainly a complement to existing forms with few (...) substitution effects. Additionally, the data demonstrate the strong role habitualization plays, particularly in the field of political information seeking and traditional forms of political discussion and participation, while online communication is still evolving with yet less fixed patterns of action. (shrink)

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. (...) After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. (shrink)

English summary: This volume contains controversial views and discussions on the purpose, function, analysis and justification of value judgments and norms in the social sciences and humanities.

This article is a narrative reflection of the author’s perspective on the role of the Church in the unification process of Germany in the last part of the last decade. It is presented from his perspective of being a German citizen, as well a member of the church in Germany. The author situates this experience amidst the political and ideological movements shaping the binary notions ‘East’ and ‘West’.