This book offers the first comprehensive analysis of the origin and development of the concept of physical continuity in ancient thought before Aristotle, combining a thorough study of Presocratic philosophy with Aristotle's perspective. The concept of continuity plays a fundamental role in Aristotle's philosophy, particularly in his physics; however, nowhere in his corpus does he present his theory of continuity. In this book, readers gain a solid foundation for understanding Aristotle's theory of the continuum through an in-depth exploration of Presocratic (...) views on being and continuity. The book's innovative approach critically analyzes Aristotle's engagement with his predecessors, including the work of Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Eleatic philosophy, and the Atomists. By addressing this gap in existing literature, this volume not only enriches the discourse on Presocratic thought, but also establishes a clearer understanding of Aristotle's contributions to the concept of continuity. This book is suitable for students and scholars of ancient philosophy and the philosophy of science, particularly those working on Presocratic philosophy and Aristotle's thought more broadly. (shrink)

In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17– 21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale. According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything. In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance, John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting (...) for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one. (shrink)

La notion de mesure traverse les traités du corpus d'Aristote en connexion des problèmes qui sont d'une importance centrale. Le recueil est composé d'une série d'études de: Tomàs Calvo, R.Loredana Cardullo, Laura Castelli, Lambros Couloubaritsis, Paolo Crivelli, Sylvain Delcomminette, Giovanna R.Giardina, David Lefebvre, Antonio P.Mesquita, Pierre-Marie Morel, Marco Panza, Fernando Rey Puente. -- Provided by publisher.

In this paper I propose to show: 1) that in Phys. II 8 Aristotle takes Empedocles as a paradigm for a theoretical position common to all philosophers who preceded him: the view that materialism implies a mechanistic explanation of natural becoming; and 2) that, since Empe­docles is regarded as a philosopher who clearly expresses the position of all mechanistic materialists, Aristotle builds his teleological arguments precisely to refute him. Indeed, Aristotle believes that refuting the argu­ments of Empedocles – the champion (...) of mechanism – means refut­ing the mechanistic theory itself. In order to illustrate this point, I will discuss some passages from Phys. II 8, while also turning to consider the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s Physics. I will then endeav­our to explain why in 198b19 ff. Aristotle formulates the argument of rain, which has attracted so much attention from scholars of the Phys­ics: I will consider whether Aristotle believes that rain serves a purpose, contrary to what he claims with regard to meteorological phenomena in Meteorologica. (shrink)

Cette étude est un commentaire du commentaire de Philopon au chapitre II 8 de la Physique, dans lequel Aristote, à l’issue de la discussion sur les causes, le hasard et la chance, énonce un certain nombre d’arguments visant à établir l’existence de la finalité dans la nature. Dans cette partie du commentaire, Philopon utilise différentes notions étrangères au texte aristotélicien, notions que l’article discute dans l’ordre dans lequel elles se rencontrent dans le commentaire, reliant ce qu’on lit dans les theoriai (...) avec ce qu’on lit dans les lexeis. Particulièrement intéressant, par exemple, est l’usage par Philopon de la notion d’ epitedeiotès ou l’identification de la providence naturelle avec la nature universelle. L’intention est à la fois de présenter la pratique exégétique de Philopon et de faire apparaître certaines innovations théoriques auxquelles le commentaire donne lieu. Ces deux lignes d’interprétation convergent dans l’idée que Philopon développe un aristotélisme vivant : les innovations conceptuelles, et même les critiques adressées à l’argumentation du chapitre, se fondent sur une adhésion à toutes les thèses fondamentales d’Aristote et sur le projet de les utiliser pour comprendre le monde et la nature. (shrink)

Commentando Aristotele, Phys. II 4, 6 e 8, Filopono assume costantemente Empedocle come modello di tutta una tradizione filosofica che individua nella materia e nel caso i principi sia dell’universo sia degli enti particolari. Filopono e d’accordo con Aristotele nel ritenere assurda la posizione dei materialisti, che considerano il caso non soltanto come causa degli enti che divengono sempre o per lo piu allo stesso modo, tra i quali talvolta si verificano casi di enti che si generano contro natura, ma (...) anche come causa dei corpi celesti, che si muovono di movimenti sempre identici e tra i quali non si osservano casi di contro natura. Ma se nella Fisica Aristotele ha opposto a questa posizione teorica la sua nozione di natura come causa finale, Filopono oppone al caso dei fisiologi materialisti la provvidenza, che egli chiama anche “provvidenza della natura” e che differenzia come natura universale e natura particolare. Pur utilizzando un concetto non aristotelico, gli argomenti di Filopono sono il frutto di un’eccellente esegesi di Aristotele, e persino l’esclusione del contro natura nell’ambito della natura universale sembra riconducibile a quanto Aristotele insegna nel De generatione animalium. (shrink)

Résumé Dans cet article, j’analyse quelques passages des Commentaires sur la Physique de Simplicius, Philopon et Thémistius afin de : 1) démontrer que ces commentateurs interprètent la phrase d’Aristote, Phys. III 1, 200b16-17, comme affirmant que « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement ; 2) identifier la raison pour laquelle ils pensent que parler du mouvement naturel revient à dire que le mouvement est continu, et que, par conséquent, quand Aristote évoque le continu dès le début de sa (...) théorie sur le mouvement, il ne fait qu’affirmer quelque chose d’évident ; 3) montrer que si l’analogie selon laquelle « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement, tout comme « mouvement » est un terme définitoire de la nature et « infini » un terme définitoire du continu, n’est pas parfaite (en effet « continu » n’apparaît pas explicitement dans la définition du mouvement), ceci est dû à l’impossibilité de subsumer le mouvement sous une catégorie de l’être. Pour appuyer ce dernier point, j’utilise une citation d’Alexandre par Simplicius, et un passage de Philopon. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Williams (WS) and Down (DS) syndromes are neurodevelopmental disorders with distinct genetic origins and different spatial memory profiles. In real-world spatial memory tasks, where spatial information derived from all sensory modalities is available, individuals with DS demonstrate low-resolution spatial learning capacities consistent with their mental age, whereas individuals with WS are severely impaired. However, because WS is associated with severe visuo-constructive processing deficits, it is unclear whether their impairment is due to abnormal visual processing or whether it reflects an inability (...) to build a cognitive map. Here, we tested whether blindfolded individuals with WS or DS, and typically developing (TD) children with similar mental ages, could use path integration to perform an egocentric homing task and return to a starting point. We then evaluated whether they could take shortcuts and navigate along never-traveled trajectories between four objects while blindfolded, thus demonstrating the ability to build a cognitive map. In the homing task, 96% of TD children, 84% of participants with DS and 44% of participants with WS were able to use path integration to return to their starting point consistently. In the cognitive mapping task, 64% of TD children and 74% of participants with DS were able to take shortcuts and use never-traveled trajectories, the hallmark of cognitive mapping ability. In contrast, only one of eighteen participants with WS demonstrated the ability to build a cognitive map. These findings are consistent with the view that hippocampus-dependent spatial learning is severely impacted in WS, whereas it is relatively preserved in DS. (shrink)

É que nada é mais imutável, nada é mais firme do que um povo unido pela concórdia e que tudo reporta à sua preservação e à sua liberdade. Em tal Estado é facílimo alcançar a concórdia, na qual a todos con­vém a mesma coisa. Da variedade de interesses, quando a cada um agrada uma coisa diferente, nascem as discórdias. (Cícero, Tratado da República, I. 49) Preâmbulo Cícero, uma das figuras incontornáveis da história de Roma, tem sido admirado pelo seu percurso (...) pessoal e profissional, bem como... (shrink)

Bering's argument that human beings are endowed with a cognitive system dedicated to forming illusory representations of psychological immortality relies on the claim that children's beliefs in the afterlife are not the result of religious teaching. We suggest four reasons why this claim is unsatisfactory.

In eukaryotes, small amounts of nitrite confer cytoprotection against ischemia/reperfusion‐related tissue damage in vivo, possibly via reduction to nitric oxide (NO) and inhibition of mitochondrial function. Several hemeproteins are involved in this protective mechanism, starting with deoxyhemoglobin, which is capable of reducing nitrite. In facultative aerobic bacteria, such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, nitrite is reduced to NO by specialized heme‐containing enzymes called cd1 nitrite reductases. The details of their catalytic mechanism are summarized below, together with a hypothesis on the biological role (...) of the unusual d1‐heme, which, in the reduced state, shows unique properties (very high affinity for nitrite and exceptionally fast dissociation of NO). Our results support the idea that the nitrite‐based reactions of contemporary eukaryotes are a vestige of earlier bacterial biochemical pathways. The evidence that nitrite reductase activities of enzymes with different cellular roles and biochemical features still exist today highlights the importance of nitrite in cellular homeostasis. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to examine the incardination of the critical notion "limit of reason" and the dialectical notion "threshold" within the framework of Walter Benjamin's philosophy. To this end, in the first place, this article investigates Benjamin's determination of rational limits according to the correlation between the weakening of the mimetic experience and the instrumentalization of language. Then, based on an analysis of the dialectic of the media, it indicates why Benjamin's philosophy can be conceived as the (...) attempt to dialectically transform the "limits of reason" into "thresholds" open to another rational experience. In this way, it is hoped to show one aspect of Walter Benjamin's thought: the updating of the critique of reason as one of the foundations of his program for a coming philosophy. (shrink)

In 1996, Manuel Luna Alcoba published a transcription of LH XXXVII, IV, 57 r°-58v°, a manuscript written by Leibniz after 1693 and containing historical and systematic reflections on the problem of the continuum. The present article aims to show that the manuscript, to which Luna Alcoba attributed the title Geschichte des Kontinuumproblems, consists mainly of excerpts from, paraphrases of, and comments on the Labyrinthus sive de compositione continui (1631), a book by the Louvain philosopher and theologian Libert Froidmont to which (...) Leibniz often referred in his writings. By comparing LH XXXVII, IV, 57 r°-58v° with the Labyrinthus, I try to understand which parts of Fromondus’ book attracted Leibniz’ attention and why the latter, as late as 1693, still found it worth brooding over an Aristotelian treatise on the composition of the continuum. (shrink)

Adolescence is a period of several changes and a time when young people are confronted with some difficult tasks of dealing with a diversity of emotions and building their own identity. Therefore, it is a period of higher vulnerability for the development of internalizing problems. The present paper aims to study some constructs considered relevant to adolescents’ adjustment and/or internalizing disorders, emphasizing the role of well-being, emotional regulation and family environment. Therefore, this research aims to test the mediating role of (...) well-being in the relationship between emotional regulation difficulties, the family environment, and internalizing problems, and understand the differences between adolescents with a higher and lower risk of presenting internalizing problems. In the study, 723 adolescents of both sexes from middle to high school completed self-report questionnaires. The results indicated that the mediating role of well-being was partially established between emotional regulation difficulties and internalizing problems, explaining 31% of the variance in these problems. Well-being was also considered a partial mediator between family environment and internalizing problems, explaining 19 and 26% of the variance, respectively. Furthermore, the group with a higher risk of developing internalizing problems revealed higher levels of emotional regulation difficulties and family conflict. In contrast, this group reported less family cohesion and support and lower levels of well-being. The main results of the present study provide relevant data in the context of clinical practice. Important implications are also discussed for the design of psychopathology prevention programs and the promotion of global well-being with adolescents. Considering the limitations of the present study, such as the nonrandom sampling process and the reduced number of participants included in the clinical group, these results need to be deepened in future research in this area. (shrink)

In this lively look at current debates in American philosophy, leading philosophers talk candidly about the changing character of their discipline. In the spirit of Emerson's The American Scholar , this book explores the identity of the American philosopher. Through informal conversations, the participants discuss the rise of post-analytic philosophy in America and its relations to European thought and to the American pragmatist tradition. They comment on their own intellectual development as well as each others' work, charting the course of (...) American philosophy over the past few decades. Giovanna Borradori, in her substantial introduction, explains the history of the analytic movement in America and the home-grown reaction against it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American philosophy was a socially engaged interdisciplinary enterprise. In transcendentalism and pragmatism, then the dominant currents in American thought, philosophy was connected to history, psychology, and public issues. But in the 1930s, the imported European movement of logical positivism redefined philosophical discourse in terms of mathematical logic and theory of language. Under the influence of this analytic view, American philosophy became a professionalized discipline, divorced from public debate and intellectual history and antagonistic to the other, more humanistic tradition of continental thought. The American Philosopher explores the opposition between analytic and continental thought and shows how recent American work has begun to bridge the gap between the two traditions. Through a reexamination of pragmatism, and through an attempt to understand philosophy in a more hermeneutical way, the participants narrow the distance between America's distinctly scientific philosophy and Europe's more literary approach. Moving beyond classical analytic philosophy, the participants confront each other on a number of topics. The logico-linguistic orientations of Quine and Davidson come up against the more discursive, interdisciplinary agendas of Rorty, Putnam, and Cavell. Nozick's theory of pluralist anarchism goes face-to-face with the aesthetic neo-foundationalism of Danto. And Kuhn's hypothesis of paradigm shifts is measured against MacIntyre's ethics of "virtues." Borradori's conversations offer an unconventional portrait of the way philosophers think about their work scholars and students will not be its only beneficiaries, so will everyone who wonders about the current state of American philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism. It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should (...) be enlarged so as to comprise not just brain but also bodily processes. Second, I emphasise that moods are also situated in the world. By this I do not simply mean that moods are influenced by the world, but that they are complexly interrelated with it, in at least three different ways: they are shaped by cultural values and norms; they are materially and intersubjectively “scaffolded”; and they can even “experientially incorporate” parts of the world, i.e., include the experience of parts of the world as part of oneself. (shrink)

This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:736 Feminist Studies 44, no. 3. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Carol Giardina MOW to NOW: Black Feminism Resets the Chronology of the Founding of Modern Feminism The first meeting of feminist protest in the 1960s was called to order by Dorothy Height, the president of the 800,000-member National Council of Negro Women (NCNW), in Washington, DC, on August 29, 1963. It was the day after the (...) historic March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (MOW).1 “We could hardly believe that after all we were doing in the Civil Rights Movement,” Height recalls, “the women came to feel that they were getting a kind of runaround” as they sought and were denied fair representation in the march because of their sex.2 “I was determined,” she said in her 2003 memoir, “to bring wise women together to learn and gather strength from the experience.”3 As “women talked freely of their concern about women’s participation,” Height observed, “we began to realize that if we did not... demand our rights, we were not going to get them. The women became much more aware and much more aggressive in facing up to sexism in our dealings with 1. Dorothy Height, Open Wide the Freedom Gates: A Memoir (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 146. 2. Dorothy Height, “We Wanted the Voice of a Woman to Be Heard,” in Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement, ed. Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 88. 3. Height, Open Wide, 146. Carol Giardina 737 the male leadership in the movement.”4 “That moment,” Height recalled, “was vital to awakening the women’s movement.”5 Black women’s fight for representation in the MOW appears narrowly framed in scholarly literature as a specific and isolated reaction to the sexism of male MOW planners. I argue, however, that the campaign of feminist protest meetings surrounding the MOW—and the political lessons that emerged—was a starting point in the chronology of the rebirth years of feminist upheaval in the 1960s. Why? Because the lessons of that campaign provided the crucial conceptual model of an “NAACP for women” that would be consciously and purposely adopted by the newly forming National Organization for Women (NOW). Together with Height, Anna Arnold Hedgeman, the only woman on the MOW planning committee, and longtime co-conspirator Pauli Murray, who spearheaded the MOW protests, were critical actors in NOW’s formation and brought the model to NOW’s more well-known white organizers. This model, and the Black women who developed it, opened the trajectory that led to NOW’s establishment in 1966, the first feminist organization of the decade. Black scholar activist Bernice Johnson Reagon called the Civil Rights Movement the “borning” struggle of its time.6 By the early 1960s, the impact of this phase of civil rights mobilization was felt nationwide from lunch counters in small towns to Congress and the Supreme Court. Since at least the 1955–1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott, many thousands of African American women had been protesting, organizing, staging sit-ins and jail-ins, writing treatises, and giving speeches for Black civil rights. Although some white women did participate in the Civil Rights Movement, there were far fewer of them than African American women. Because of African American women’s collective confrontation with white supremacy, more of them were positioned to grasp the systemic nature of male supremacy and the need to fight it collectively. They understood sexism sooner than most white women because they 4. Height, “We Wanted the Voice,” 88–89. 5. Height, Open Wide, 145. 6. Mary King, Casey Hayden, Jean Wheeler Smith, Joyce Ladner, Prathia Hall, Kathie Sarachild, Michael Thelwell, and Bernice Johnson Reagon, “SNCC Women and the Stirrings of Feminism,” in A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC, ed. Cheryl Lynn Greenberg (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 150. 738 Carol Giardina had already learned the operations of power and exploitation. They were best prepared to challenge female oppression, as were the white women who participated in the Civil Rights Movement. After all, if the established order could be pushed back when it... (shrink)

The idea for _Philosophy in a Time of Terror_ was born hours after the attacks on 9/11 and was realized just weeks later when Giovanna Borradori sat down with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida in New York City, in separate interviews, to evaluate the significance of the most destructive terrorist act ever perpetrated. This book marks an unprecedented encounter between two of the most influential thinkers of our age as here, for the first time, Habermas and Derrida overcome their (...) mutual antagonism and agree to appear side by side. As the two philosophers disassemble and reassemble what we think we know about terrorism, they break from the familiar social and political rhetoric increasingly polarized between good and evil. In this process, we watch two of the greatest intellects of the century at work. (shrink)

Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.

In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...) considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world affectively. (shrink)

A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.

How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...) between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness. (shrink)

Dummett's logic LC quantified, Q-LC, is shown to be characterized by the extended frame Q+, ,D, where Q+ is the set of non-negative rational numbers, is the numerical relation less or equal then and D is the domain function such that for all v, w Q+, Dv and if v w, then D v . D v D w . Moreover, simple completeness proofs of extensions of Q-LC are given.

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...) using the intentional binding effect as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility. (shrink)