This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world.

The main aim of this work was initially a modest one, 'to collect information as to the main facts of Hutcheson's life in Dublin prior to his appointment as Professor at Glasgow'. As the materials grew, however, and Scott's interest in Hutcheson deepened, the planned article expanded into a book that has since become the standard biography. The emphasis throughout is on the development of Hurcheson's thought in the context of an ongoing debate with his contemporaries.

Political authority is the moral power to impose moral duties upon a perhaps unwilling citizenry. David Enoch has proposed that authority be understood as a matter of "robust" duty-giving. This paper argues that Enoch's conditions for attempted robust duty- or reason-giving are, along with his non-normative success condition, implausibly strong. Moreover, Enoch's attempt and normative- success conditions ignore two facts. The first is that success requires that citizens be tolerant of modest errors by the authority, which means that, in conditions (...) of modest error, performing as directed must have a non-instrumental, intrinsic value. The second is that an attempt to exercise authority involves an intention to trigger a moral principle endowing conforming performances with intrinsic value. The mystery of political authority is the mystery of how official directives could possibly suffice to endow conforming performances with intrinsic value. (shrink)

Ariel es un ensayo publicado por el uruguayo José Enrique Rodó en 1900 y considerado como una de las obras de mayor influencia en el campo de la cultura y la política latinoamericanas. Es un texto breve compuesto de seis partes. Se caracteriza por su contenido filosófico y su tono pedagógico. Está dirigido principalmente a la juventud hispanoamericana, como señala el autor, para advertirles contra el utilitarismo y contra lo que él llama la nordomanía. Utiliza los personajes de La tempestad (...) de William Shakespeare: Próspero, Ariel y Calibán. (shrink)

This is the first detailed study to explore the little-understood notions of "knowing who someone is," "knowing a person's identity," and related locutions. It locates these notions within the context of a general theory of believing and a semantical theory of belief- and knowledge-ascriptions.The books's main contention is that what one knows, when one knows who someone is, is not normally an identity in the numerical sense of "a = b," but rather a certain sort of predication to know who (...) someone is is just to know that that person is F, where "F" is a predicate that is "important," in a technical sense defined by the authors, for the purposes determined by context. Their book offers a rigorous formal semantics for ascriptions of knowing and of knowing-who in particular, solving such well-known problems and paradoxes as Kripke's Puzzle, and Quines difficulties with de re belief, along the way.The authors apply their analysis to each of several important issues in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and ethical theory in which the previously unexamined notion of "knowing who" has loomed large-the mechanics of linguistic referring, the foundations of epistemic logic, problems of self-knowledge and self-regarding belief, universalizability and "Golden Rule" arguments in ethics, and moral "personalism" versus "impartialism."Stephen Boër is Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University. William Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina and author of Logical Form in Natural Language. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to argue that the emergence of the material conditions for the suppression and denial of the will in the human organism is not something like an “accident on the way” of will's manifestation in the world. It is rather, as it were, an intentional result of the whole process of objectivation of the will, a result that emerges from a teleological order. This teleological order is primary and more fundamental than the teleological order of nature (...) that produces each phenomenon and each organic structure according to its ability to promote the emergence, conservation and expansion of life. This means that we have to understand the problematic principle of nature's purposiveness in Schopenhauer's thought as containing two distinct and largely contradictory orders of purpose. We can call these two orders of purposiveness “order of nature” and “order of salvation”. These two orders of purpose correspond to what I understand to be two forms of teleology that coexist in constant tension in his system: a functional and an ethical-soteriological teleology. (shrink)

El modelo de cultura sirvió para mostrar cómo el hombre podría simultáneamente ser un individuo, único en el orden biológico y psicológico y ser, al mismo tiempo, fundamentalmente social, viviendo y pensando en función de su grupo de acuerdo con concepciones compartidas gracias a su capacidad de comunicación simbólica. Los conceptos de contacto cultural, de resistencia cultural, de choque cultural, de aculturación, de cambio social y cultural, y más tarde de cambio social aparecen en el campo de la Antropología en (...) la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, en el marco de la expansión capitalista mundial. (shrink)

Age is determined by the amount of time that someone or something has existed. For example, a person born in 1980 and a 1980 vintage wine would each be 40 years old in 2020. Recently, Joona Räsänen has challenged this belief, arguing that in some cases one’s age is not determined by how long one has existed, but by some feature or set of features about one’s biology, experiences, and/or beliefs about themselves. In many cases, age is an ad hoc (...) indicator of physical health, psychological development, and the like, but for Räsänen, it seems age isn’t merely an indicator of such things; it’s derived from these things! Here I argue Räsänen’s alternatives to chronological age are ontologically burdensome and inconsistent with our intuitions in both normal and weird cases. (shrink)

This reexamination of documents purporting to show that Henry of Ghent served on a commission of 16 theologians that compiled the 219 articles condemned in 1277 produces a different picture. It shows that Henry did not serve on a special commission appointed by bishop Tempier but was present at a meeting of all masters, who condemned the articles. It also shows that Tempier did not bypass masters in the faculty of theology, but had them vote on the articles.

Beauvoir and Merleau‐Ponty both recognize human freedom as fully situated and never total. Yet the concept of freedom receives radically different treatments and emphases in their work. Beauvoir never ceases to tout the importance of freedom to human existence, and to use it as the basis for an ethics of authenticity. Merleau‐Ponty offers only one extended treatment of the concept of freedom and appears skeptical of authenticity. After arguing that their views on both freedom and authenticity are aligned, this chapter (...) argues that the different weight placed on freedom and authenticity emerges from differences in their social ontology. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) is unique among the arsenal of medical therapeutics though it does return us to a dilemma Hippocrates addressed 2400 years ago. It provides welcome relief for suffering patients and their families, but MAiD is not suicide – it is invited homicide. It is more like a death ritual than a therapeutic procedure. Unlike medical interventions, MAiD cures no diseases and true informed consent cannot be obtained. It separates the body from the soul and perceived doctors’ (...) errors are punishable through criminal prosecution. If badly administered, it could undermine trust in the medical profession. The providers are also at risk for delayed remorse. As the inclusion criteria for MAiD become more relaxed, doctors who currently decide on candidates for MAiD should have access to established panels for guidance. The panels should include legal and ethical specialists. (shrink)

While we know the year in which many bachelors of theology read the Sentences at Paris, we do not have equivalent information on bachelors of theology at Oxford. This note discusses the limitations of the principal source for Oxford, the Biographical Register of the University of Oxford, and illustrates the importance of consulting the manuscript sources, especially both series of registers of common letters in the Vatican Archives.

In a 1985 article entitled “The Art of Glaukos,” Diskin Clay suggested that the enigmatic passage at the beginning of the geological myth in Phaedoreferred toRepublic10, where the soul is likened to the sea-creature Glaucus whose true nature, like the soul’s, is obscured by the distortions imposed by underwater life. Starting with a defense of Clay’s ingenious suggestion, my purpose is to compare Phaedoto Glaucus, with its true nature obscured by traditional assumptions about the order in which Plato composed his (...) dialogues, and thus how they should be read. At least part of the reason that Clay’s thesis has not been embraced is because it clashes with the dogma that Phaedocannot refer back to Republic; I want to challenge that dogma. Borrowing from Catherine Zuckert the notion that, since Phaedocomes at the end of Socrates’ story, it can usefully be read as the culmination of the Platonic dialogues, I will show how a “late” Phaedo—i.e., a reading of the dialogue that is open to the possibility that it refers to more than one dialogue generally considered to be later than it with respect to composition—recovers its true nature, presently encrusted with the oysters and seaweed of an outdated developmentalism that has obscured this culminating masterpiece of Plato’s dramatic and philosophical art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ovid: Dichter und WerkWilliam S. AndersonNiklas Holzberg. Ovid: Dichter und Werk. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997. 218 pp. Cloth, DM 48, SFr 44.50, ÖS 350.Looking at the dust cover of this volume, which features a Pompeiian wall painting with an impetuous satyr tightly grasping a nude, buxom, and resistant female, a reader might be led to expect a conventionally shallow literary biography of Ovid, the poet of erotic (...) enjoyment. Probably Holzberg had nothing to do with the choice of the cover, which was designed only to attract buyers. If he did, he would have been ironically aware of the surprises he had in store for unsuspecting readers: there is little in this book to excite the average modern satyr. Instead of titillating his audience with erotic images, Holzberg focuses our attention on the elegiac system, from which, as he shows, the poet Ovid ingeniously worked.The reader receives warning in the foreword, where Holzberg says little about the historical personage Ovid but directs us instead to the variety of roles the poet Ovid developed in his different works. It is these roles that have familiarized us with Ovid, not the historical facts that have accumulated around him [End Page 651] outside his poems. Holzberg declares, then, that he wishes to read Ovid’s poetry as “novels,” that is, as fictional accounts by a fictional speaker who uses the first person.Before proceeding to the poetic works in chronological order, Holzberg devotes two important introductory chapters to discussing his approach first to the work, then to the poet. That of course reverses the order of his subtitle, but by way of correction: this writer and this book are primarily interested in the poetry that Ovid created and that we can still critically read: the poet is far more problematical. So we start with a paradox: our present time is an Ovidian Age (aetas Ovidiana), as was the era in cultivated Western Europe about a thousand years ago. We probably read Ovid today as well as, if not better than, the people who rushed to multiply Ovidian manuscripts in that previous era. However, the question is: do we read and hear Ovid with the awareness of those original Roman audiences, nearly a millennium earlier, who enjoyed what we may consider the first aetas Ovidiana, when Ovid himself was present to register his amazing effects in Rome (and to recall them fondly in exile)? The answer that Holzberg produces is: no, we don’t read Ovid as a Latin audience; instead, we pick out what makes him like us, modern. To read his works as Holzberg wants, then, we must first grasp the features which belong to the doctus poeta. Ovid was what Holzberg calls “a poet between texts” (a clever variation on Fraenkel’s famous phrase for Ovid, “a poet between two worlds”). That stresses the literary practice of intertextuality rather than the cultural interrelationships that occupied Fraenkel and his contemporaries. It also justifies the role of Holzberg, who steps in to help the helpless “modern reader” and to explain some of the key intertexts that functioned directly for Ovid’s first audiences. Similarly, a modern reader needs to step back from the trap of the plausibly witty story that Ovid’s first-person speaker narrates, to appreciate the conventions with which the poet ably plays for the amusement of his well-read audiences; and this means understanding what Holzberg calls the “elegiac system,” which serves as the basis of all Ovid’s work. Recognizing the fundamental elements of the system, we can see better how he modifies and innovates with familiar material, whether it is a form like that of the exclusus amator or the interesting variations he creates on the “slavery of love.”Holzberg’s approach to Ovid the poet is deliberately skeptical. Our only contemporary “evidence” about him is the dubious and fictional series of details and events which emerge from the mouth of the “speaker” in the poems. Holzberg distrusts even the prodigious memory of Seneca the Elder. And it is notable that Tacitus, who had the opportunity of giving Ovid an obituary around A.D. 17, in what survives of the... (shrink)

One of the more famous criticisms of ontological arguments is that provided by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, and two of the more frequent comments on it are essentially these: Kant points out that existence is no predicate; his criticism contains several puzzling elements which can just as well be neglected, since the first point is enough. It is the intent of this paper to substantiate a protest against such analyses of Kant’s anti–ontological–arguments argument and to develop certain (...) consequences from this for current attempts to rehabilitate ontological arguments. The protest is not that such analyses are simply wrong, but that they are dangerously misleading and represent Kant’s argument as weaker than it in fact is. The substantiation is provided by the examination of the three main elements of Kant’s criticism of ontological arguments: the distinction of real and logical predicates, the analysis of uses of ‘to be’, and the discussion of concepts of possible and of actual things. The consequences for current attempted rehabilitations of ontological arguments center upon the alleged distinction of ‘existence’ and ‘necessary existence’. On the basis of the foregoing substantiation it is shown that this distinction, despite its proponents’ claims, does not make Kant’s criticism inapplicable, that the sense of ‘necessity’ remains a problem, that Kant knew quite well what he was doing in criticizing ontological arguments, and that the necessary existence allegedly proved by ontological arguments is not that which is also alleged to be religiously required. (shrink)

Zu seinen Lebzeiten war Kurt Gödel außerhalb der Fachwelt der Mathematiker, Philosophen und theoretischen Physiker kaum bekannt. Zu Beginn seiner Karriere schuf er beeindruckende Arbeiten zur Vollständigkeit und Beweisbarkeit formaler logischer Systeme, die zu seiner Dissertation und seiner Habilitations-schrift wurden und ihn unter Fachleuten weltberühmt machten. Seine Unvoll-ständigkeitssätze läuteten das Ende der formal-logischen Programme der Logizisten (Russell et al.) und der Formalisten (Hilbert et al.) ein. Später erzielte er auch signifikante Ergebnisse in der Mengenlehre. Nach seiner Emigration in die USA (...) (Princeton), widmete er sich mehr der Philosophie, dem Leitmotiv seines Lebens, und er fand auch eine einzigartige Lösung zu Einsteins Feld-gleichungen der Gravitation, sein "Gödel-Universum". Dieses Buch beschreibt sowohl den Gödel, der ein genialer Wissenschaftler war, und der gewagte und neuartige Hypothesen zu den Fundamenten der Mathe-matik und Physik hervorbrachte, ‒ als auch den Gödel, der ein perfekter Rationalist war, aber sein Alltagsleben nur mit Mühe meistern konnte und zeitlebens unter Depressionen, Angstneurosen und Hypochondrie litt. Ein Leben voller Paradoxen, in dem er trotz all seiner psychischen Probleme Beachtliches leistete und zu einem Vorbild für viele jüngere Wissenschaftler wurde. Das Buch liefert den Kontext zu seinen Errungenschaften, die ein verblüffend breites Spektrum intellektueller Unternehmungen darstellen, und zu seiner zunehmenden Geisteskrankheit; und es zeigt, wie er eine lange und erfolgreiche Karriere mit Hilfe seiner loyalen Ehefrau Adele und einigen seiner Freunde durchlaufen konnte. Dies ist eine faszinierende Geschichte der wissen-schaftlichen Genialität und der menschlichen Natur. (shrink)

Walter Chatton’s Reportatio has been dated to 1322-23, possibly at London, and his Lectura either as a revision of bachelor lectures given earlier at Oxford, or given after 1323. Stephen Brown has shown that material in Chatton’s Lectura dates to 1323-1324 when Chatton and Ockham were disputing in the same place, presumably London, before Ockham left England forever. The present article shows how arguments dating to one place and time can be used in a later work, and should not be (...) used to date that work. (shrink)