Teleology has a complicated history in the biological sciences. Some have argued that Darwin’s theory has allowed biology to purge itself of teleological explanations. Others have been content to retain teleology and to treat it as metaphorical, or have sought to replace it with less problematic notions like teleonomy. And still others have tried to naturalize it in a way that distances it from the vitalism of the nineteenth century, focusing on the role that function plays in teleological explanation. No (...) consensus has seemed possible in this debate. This paper takes a different approach. It argues that teleology is a perfectly acceptable scientific notion, but that the debate took an unfortunate misstep some 2300 years ago, one that has confused things ever since. The misstep comes in the beginning of Aristotle’s Physics when a distinction is made between two types of teleological explanation. One type pertains to artifacts while the other pertains to entities in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are guided by something external to themselves, human intentions, while natural entities are guided by an internal nature. We aim to show that there is, in fact, only one type of legitimate teleological explanation, what Aristotle would have considered a variant of an artifact model, where entities are guided by external fields. We begin with an analysis of the differences between the two types of explanation. We then examine some evidence in Aristotle’s biological works suggesting that on account of his natural-artifactual distinction, he encountered difficulties in trying to provide teleological accounts of spontaneous generation. And we show that it is possible to resolve these difficulties with a more robust version of an artifact model of teleology, in other words, with an externalist teleology. This is McShea’s model, in which goal-directed entities are guided by a nested series of upper-level fields. To explain teleological behavior, this account invokes only external physical forces rather than mysterious internal natures. We then consider how field theory differs from other efforts to naturalize teleology in biology. And finally, we show how the account enables us to grapple with certain difficult cases – genes and intentions – where, even in biology today, the temptation to posit internal natures remains strong. (shrink)

Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...) responsible for bringing about bad than for bringing about good side effects that the agent is indifferent about (Knobe 2003). Elsewhere, we have presented an analysis of the everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, and accounts for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility. -Knobe, J. (2003) Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63, pp.190–93. -Nahmias, E.; Coates, J.; Kvaran. T. (2007) Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy XXXI -Nichols, S.; Knobe, J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions, Noûs 41:4, 663-685. (shrink)

Is there a link between how a firm manages its internal and external stakeholders? More specifically, are firms that give employees stock ownership and more say in running the enterprise more likely to engage with external stakeholders? This study seeks to answer these questions by elaborating on mechanisms that link employees to external stakeholders, such as the community, suppliers, and the environment. It tests these relationships using a sample of 347 private, mostly small-to-medium size firms, which completed a stakeholder impact (...) assessment organized by the non-profit B Lab. The results support the hypotheses that both employee ownership and employee involvement are positively associated with external stakeholder engagement. Further, we found that certification plays a role, as employee ownership contributes to external stakeholder engagement only in certified B Corporations, and not in firms that merely completed the B Lab Impact assessment. Our findings have import for stakeholder engagement frameworks, as we show that there is interplay between internal employee stakeholders and external stakeholders that may be important to overall firm–stakeholder management. (shrink)

David Hume wrote that Berkeley's arguments `admit of no answer but produce no conviction'. This book aims at the kind of understanding of Berkeley's philosophy that comes from seeing how we ourselves might be brought to embrace it. Berkeley held that matter does not exist, and that the sensations we take to be caused by an indifferent and independent world are instead caused directly by God. Nature becomes a text, with no existence apart from the spirits who transmit and receive (...) it. Kenneth P. Winkler presents these conclusions as natural consequences of Berkeley's reflections on such topics as representation, abstraction, necessary truth, and cause and effect. In the closing chapters Proefssor Winkler offers new interpretations of Berkeley's view on unperceived objects, corpuscularian science, and our knowledge of God and other minds. (shrink)

Chapter Introduction. Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication The primary goal of this monograph is to examine the interaction of ...

Recently, contextualism about epistemic modals and predicates of taste have come under fire from advocates of assessment relativistic analyses. Contextualism, they have argued, fails to account for what we call "felicitous insensitive assessments". In this paper, we provide one hitherto overlooked way in which contextualists can embrace the phenomenon by slightly modifying an assumption that has remained in the background in most of the debate over contextualism and relativism. Finally, we briefly argue that the resulting contextualist account is at least (...) as plausible as the relativist alternative and should be carefully considered before contextualism is abandoned for relativism. (shrink)

In [2] T. J. Carlson introduces an approach to ordinal notation systems which is based on the notion of Σ₁-elementary substructure. We gave a detailed ordinal arithmetical analysis (see [7]) of the ordinal structure based on Σ₁-elementarity as defined in [2]. This involved the development of an appropriate ordinal arithmetic that is based on a system of classical ordinal notations derived from Skolem hull operators, see [6]. In the present paper we establish an effective order isomorphism between the classical and (...) the new system of ordinal notations using the results from [6] and [7]. Moreover, on the basis of a concept of relativization we develop mutual (relatively) elementary recursive assignments which are uniform with respect to the underlying relativization. (shrink)

Every healthcare organisation enacts a multitude of policies, but there has been no discussion as to what procedural and substantive requirements a policy writing process should meet in order to achieve good outcomes and to possess sufficient authority for those who are asked to follow it.Using, as an example, the controversy about patient’s refusal of blood transfusions, I argue that a hospital wide policy is preferable to individual decision making, because it ensures autonomy, quality, fairness, and efficiency.Policy writing for morally (...) controversial medical practices needs additional justification compared to policies on standard medical practices and secures legitimate authority for HCO members by meeting five requirements: all parties directed by the policy are represented; the deliberative process encompasses all of the HCO’s obligations; the rationales for the policy are made available; there is a mechanism for criticising, and for evaluating the policy. (shrink)

The climb of Gasherbrum IV’s (7,925 m) ‘Shining Wall’ in 1985 by Voytek Kurtyka and Robert Schauer is considered one of the greatest mountaineering achievements in the twentieth century, even though the two climbers did not reach the summit. The article explores three ways of understanding mountaineering without the objective of reaching the summit. I start with a game-playing approach and then a view on mountaineering that takes its inspiration from deep ecology and argue that while both have the potential (...) for explaining important aspects of mountaineering, neither will fully account for the value of climbing mountains without summiting. Finally, I argue that we can supplement either of these two views with a radically different way of understanding mountaineering, which involves creating and appreciating a work of art. (shrink)

This article understands codes of ethics as written documents that represent social actors in specific ways through the use of language. It presents an empirical study that investigated the codes of ethics of the German Dax30 companies. The study adopted a critical discourse analysis-approach in order to reveal how the code-texts produce a particular understanding of the various internal social groups for the readers. Language is regarded as social practice that functions at creating particular understandings of individuals and groups, how (...) they are interrelated, and how they should behave. Findings show that codes of ethics do not represent employees as a group that is empowered or morally enlightened; instead they are positioned as passive receivers of rules and regulations. Furthermore, codes of ethics classify employees as having a need to be monitored and controlled by the higher levels of the corporate hierarchy. Overall, code language enforces compliance through maintaining existing and building new asymmetries between the different groups within a company. As a consequence, the article discusses a somewhat different understanding of code effectiveness. Reproducing and reemphasizing hierarchical relations could also lead to code compliance, perhaps without any need for developing the moral employee that is committed to ethical values. (shrink)

International scientific collaboration has increased both in volume and importance. In this article, the authors study the interpretation of macro-level data on international co authorship collaboration. They address such questions as how one might explain country- to-country differences in the rates of international coauthorship, networks of interna tional scientific collaboration among countries, and patterns of international collaboration in scientific fields. Attention is drawn to cognitive, social, historical, geopolitical, and economic factors as potential determinants of the observed patterns. They present a (...) methodology that gives one a measure, independent of size, of countries'propensities to collaborate internationally. (shrink)

The overall strategy of Lycan’s paper is to distinguish three kinds of conditional assertion theories, and then to show, in order, how they are variously afflicted by a set of problems. The three kinds of theory were the Quine-Rhinelander theory (or the Simple Illocutionary theory), The Semanticized Quine-Rhinelander, and the No Truth Value theory (or NTV). This strategy offers considerable clarity, but it comes at a cost, for what I take to be the best version of a conditional assertion theory (...) contains core parts of all three theories. In what follows, I will suggest that many of the objections offered by Lycan can be dealt when all the pieces are taken into consideration at the same time. But I will also suggest that a refined version of what Lycan called the Immediate Implausibility objection does show us that the conditional assertion theory is false. (shrink)

According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most (...) of the effect of manipulation on attributions of moral responsibility is unmediated by worries about inadequate information or deep self discordance. Instead, it depends largely on worries that the action is ultimately explained by factors outside the agent’s control, just as proponents of manipulation arguments have proposed. More generally, data suggest that judgments of... (shrink)

According to a view defended by Hubert Dreyfus and others, elite athletes are totally absorbed while they are performing, and they act non-deliberately without any representational or conceptual thinking. By using both conceptual clarification and phenomenological description the article criticizes this view and maintains that various forms of conscious thinking and acting plays an important role before, during and after competitive events. The article describes in phenomenological detail how elite athletes use consciousness in their actions in sport; as planning, attention, (...) thinking, decision, and monitoring of performance. Elite athletes do not act as zombies. It is concluded that qualia and phenomenal consciousness are important phenomena in elite sport. (shrink)

Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i den norske idrettsmodellen der topp og bredde hører sammen, og der toppidrettsutøvere uvegerlig blir rollemodeller for barn og unge. Den moderne toppidretten er i økende grad preget av egoistiske holdninger der det dreier seg hele tiden om å skaffe seg fordeler. I denne artikkelen tar jeg opp egoisme, rettferdighet og sjenerøsitet som tre grunnleggende holdninger i idrettskonkurranser og drøfter hvorvidt man med inspirasjon fra sjenerøsitetsidealer og praktiske eksempler kan tenke seg en toppidrett som i større grad (...) bygger på sjenerøsitet. Artikkelen starter med en kort presentasjon av den norske idrettsmodellen og jeg skisserer deretter tre kriterier som alle idrettskonkurranser må oppfylle: 1) spille for å vinne, 2) klare regler som følges, og 3) respekt for konkurrenter. Deretter presenterer jeg egoisme, fairness og sjenerøsitet som tre mulige grunnholdninger, og de implikasjonene de har i en idrettslig sammenheng. Etter en gjennomgang av den grunnleggende egoismen i dagens toppidrett, som infiserer ikke bare utøveren, men også hele systemet rundt utøveren, diskuteres muligheten for å utvikle holdninger basert på sjenerøsitet. Det nevnes tre kilder til inspirasjon; engelsk overklassesport, Nietzsches tanker om den overlegne mester, og Arne Næss' sportspraksis og hans saklighetslære for gode diskusjoner. Deretter presenteres empiriske eksempler på sjenerøsitet og hva en spillteoretisk analyse av ulike holdninger gir som resultat. Jeg konkluderer med at en endring i retning av sjenerøsitet vil gi en rikere toppidrett og et bedre grunnlag for en helhetlig idrettsmodell.Nøkkelord: etikk, idrett, egoisme, rettferdighet, sjenerøsitetEnglish summary: From egoism to generosity – can elite sport be reformed?The Norwegian sport model can be visualized as a pyramid with mass sport at the base and elite sport at the top. This means that elite athletes become role models for children and young athletes. However, modern elite sport is increasingly characterized by egoistic attitudes where the goal is to acquire advantages that the other athletes do not have. The article discusses egoism, fairness and generosity as three fundamental attitudes in sporting competitions and discusses whether it is possible to develop an elite sport that is based on generosity to a greater extent than now. The article starts with a presentation of the Norwegian sport model and then sketches three criteria that every sporting competition must fulfill, 1) play to win, 2) clear rules that must be complied with, 3) respect for fellow competitors and opponents. Then there is a delineation of egoism, fairness and generosity as three possible attitudes and the implications they have in the context of sport. Egoism seems to be the basic attitude in elite sport today and it infuses not only the athletes but the whole system around them. The article then looks into the possibilities for generosity in elite sport and draws inspiration from three quite different sources; 1) British upper-class sport in the 19th century, 2) Nietzsche's views of the superior and brilliant masters, and 3) the philosopher Arne Næss' sport philosophy and his rules for good academic debates. This is followed by empirical examples of generosity and a game theoretical illustration of the consequences of egoism and generosity. The conclusion is that a change in the direction of generosity will lead to a richer and more meaningful elite sport and provide a better basis for an organic sport model. (shrink)

Obszar etyki jest najczęściej ograniczany do człowieka i świata ludzkiego: tylko ludzie mogą działać moralnie lub niemoralnie, tylko ludzie mogą być z moralnego punktu widzenia godni pochwały lub nagany; tylko ludziom przypisuje się status podmiotów moralnego działania i podmiotów moralnych praw. W jakim stopniu ten antropocentryzm etyczny daje się utrzymać? Czy współczesna wiedza biologiczna, uwydatniająca ciągłość i stopniowalność cech właściwych dla istot żywych, nie podważa takiego mocnego rozgraniczenia i założenia o uprzywilejowanej pozycji człowieka? Czy nie powinniśmy wyjść poza gatunkowy egoizm, (...) a przynajmniej go ograniczyć? W niniejszym artykule rozważę argumenty na rzecz stanowiącej osobny paradygmat, wyjątkowej pozycji etycznej człowieka oraz zbadam argumenty na rzecz etycznego gradualizmu [czyli stopniowalnych różnic] między istotami ludzkimi a pozostałymi ssakami oraz między człowiekiem a przyrodą. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper provides an introduction to three translations of articles by Soviet philosopher Boris Hessen: “Mechanical Materialism and Modern Physics,” “On Comrade Timiryazev’s Attitude towards Contemporary Science” and “Marian Smoluchowski (On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death)”. It begins by presenting a central tension in Hessen’s work; namely, how even though he is better known for the externalism of his 1931 Newton paper, much of his work has been considered exemplary of an internalist approach. I then show that for Hessen, (...) the history of modern science was defined by the discovery of the dialectical unity in opposition between dynamic and statistical regularity. This not only sheds important light on Hessen’s understanding of causation, but also reconciles the aforementioned tension by showing his approach to the relationship between individuals and collectives in the study of physical phenomena, along with the relationship between individual scientists and socioeconomic conditions. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungBei den meisten Patienten, die heute erwartet an einer unheilbaren Krankheit versterben, wird vor ihrem Tod eine bewusste Entscheidung zum Therapieverzicht getroffen. Während dem Therapieverzicht auf Wunsch des Patienten ein wichtiger Stellenwert in der medizinethischen Diskussion zukommt, hat der Umgang mit Forderung nach „unangemessener“ Maximaltherapie bislang weniger Beachtung gefunden. In einer empirischen Studie zur Einbeziehung von Patienten in Entscheidungen zum Therapieverzicht konnten wir zeigen, dass etwa ein Drittel der Patienten auch bei infauster Prognose Lebenszeit durch Maximaltherapie gewinnen möchte. Diese Patienten (...) wurden im Gegensatz zu Patienten mit palliativem Therapieziel häufig nicht in Entscheidungen zur Therapiebegrenzung einbezogen. Hier werden die ethischen Implikationen dieser Praxis untersucht und gefragt, ob ein Therapieverzicht am Lebensende auch gegen den Wunsch des Patienten ethisch zu rechtfertigen ist oder ob Ärzte dem Wunsch des Patienten nach Lebenszeitgewinn auch bei infauster Prognose durch Maximaltherapie nachkommen sollen. Vor dem Hintergrund der gängigen Konzepte zur Rechtfertigung eines einseitigen Therapieverzichts, die für sich genommen zu kurz greifen, wird ein alternatives Entscheidungsmodell vorgestellt, das vier bewertungsrelevante Kriterien vorsieht: die Wirksamkeit einer Maßnahme, die Autonomiefähigkeit des Patienten, die patientenseitige Nutzenbewertung und die Kosten für die Solidargemeinschaft. Je nachdem, welche Kriterien erfüllt sind, rechtfertigen sie eine Entscheidung zum Therapieverzicht oder eine Fortsetzung der Therapie entsprechend dem Patientenwillen. (shrink)

There’s a general assumption that teleology and function do not exist in inanimate nature. Throughout biology, it is generally taken as granted that teleology (or teleonomy) and functions are not only unique to life, but perhaps even a defining quality of life. For many, it’s obvious that rocks, water, and the like, are not teleological, nor could they possibly have stand-alone functions. This idea - that teleology and function are unique to life - is the target of this paper. I (...) begin with an overview of McShea’s field theoretic account of teleology. I start with the field theoretic account because it presents a promising analysis of teleological systems. It is promising because, in not making any assumptions about life’s special status in teleological systems, it avoids counterexamples that have problematized other accounts. I then consider some of the prominent efforts that have been made to attempt to avoid ascribing functions or teleology to some form of inanimate nature. In my assessment, none of the efforts are successful. I conclude by offering mineral evolution as a case study to show how inanimate nature can be both teleological and functional. The evolution of mineral species reveals that teleology and function extend to inanimate nature, and that teleology and function come in degrees. (shrink)

What kind of a science is psychoanalysis? What constitutes its domain? What truth claims does it maintain? In this unique and scholarly work concerning the nature of psychoanalysis, Gunnar Karlsson guides his arguments through phenomenological thinking which, he claims, can be seen as an alternative to the recent attempts to cite neuropsychoanalysis as the answer to the crisis of psychoanalysis. Karlsson criticizes this effort to ground psychoanalysis in biology and neurology and emphasizes instead the importance of defining the psychoanalytic (...) domain from the vantage point of the character of consciousness. His understanding of the unconscious, the libido and the death drive offer new insights into the nature of psychoanalysis, and he also illuminates and develops neglected dimensions such as consciousness and self-consciousness. Karlsson's approach to psychoanalysis is rigorous yet original, and this book fills an intellectual gap with implications for both the theoretical understanding and clinical issues of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In the Concept of Mind from 1949 Gilbert Ryle distinguished between knowing how and knowing that. What was Ryle’s basic idea and how is the discussion going on in philosophy today? How can sport philosophy use the idea of knowing how? My goal in this paper is first to bring Ryle and the post-Rylean discussion to light and then show how phenomenology can give some input to the discussion. The article focuses especially on the two main interpretations of knowing how, (...) intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. In the second part of the article I discuss how views from phenomenology and philosophy of mind can enrich and widen our understanding of what knowing how means in relation to sport practices. It is argued that knowing how is not limited to athletic abilities but includes knowledge of how the environing world operates in relation to athletic action. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSince the 1960s environmental problems have increasingly been on the agenda in Western countries. Global warming and climate change have increased concerns among scientists, politicians and the general population. While both elite sport and mass sport are part of the consumer culture that leads to ecological problems, sport philosophers, with few exceptions, have not discussed what an ecologically acceptable sport would look like. My goal in this article is to present a radical model of ecological sport based on Arne Naess’s (...) version of deep ecology called ecosophyT. After outlining the Naessian ecocentric view of biospheric egalitarianism I present the consequences for sport and physical activities. I also give examples from Arne Naess’s own practice of sport which was guided by the principle ‘Richness in ends, simplicity in means!’ I discuss whether Naessian deep ecological sport is what we will all end up with after the ecocatastrophe or whether it can be an inspiring ideal for many of us right now. (shrink)

Anne Conway’s Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, first published in 1690, is probably the most ambitious contribution to early modern metaphysics by a woman writing in the English language. This beautifully prepared edition makes Conway’s treatise available to twentieth-century readers in an accessible English translation of the 1690 Latin text—itself a translation of an original English manuscript that has long been lost.

In this article, I will examine the role of risk in the risky nature sports. Risky nature sports are identified as nature sports where participants may reckon with the possibility of severe injury or death if things go wrong. The first part of the article identifies some evolutionary, historical, and conceptual characteristics of nature sports and risk. In the second part of the article, I discuss the concept of risk and its meaning in risky nature sports. Additionally, I address questions (...) concerning the moral tone and context of risk-taking. In most academic disciplines, risk is typically understood as something negative that should always be avoided. But risk also includes positive possibilities, which may, such as in risk sports, outweigh the negative or can even be inherently positive and a value in itself. In the third part, I discuss how important risk is in nature sports. Is it a defining core or more peripheral? This leads to the question of the value. Does the risk element add to the value of the sport? I finally discuss how risk sports can be meaningful parts of the participants’ lives. (shrink)

Substantial metaphysical theory has long struggled with the question of negative facts, facts capable of making it true that Valerie isn’t vigorous. This paper argues that there is an elegant solution to these problems available to anyone who thinks that there are positive facts. Bradley’s regress and considerations of ontological parsimony show that an object’s having a property is an affair internal to the object and the property, just as numerical identity and distinctness are internal to the entities that are (...) numerically identical or distinct. For the same reasons, an object’s lacking a property must be an affair internal to the object and the property. Negative facts will thus be part of any ontology of positive facts. (shrink)

We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it (...) unclear how they can be subjects of obligations. On the other, the attributions can rarely be understood distributively, as concerned with members’ obligations, because obligations to do something require a capacity to do it, and individual members often lack the relevant capacities. Moreover, even if groups can have obligations, it is unclear why that would be relevant for members, exactly because members often lack control over whether group obligations are fulfilled. In previous work, I have argued that a general understanding of individual obligations extends non-mysteriously to irreducibly shared obligations, rendering attributions of obligations to groups legitimate. In this paper, I spell out how the proposed account also helps us understand the relation between individual and shared obligations. Even though few individual human agents have any significant control over whether we will be successful in preventing climate catastrophe, our collective capacity to prevent catastrophe and shared preventative obligation to do so can give rise to significant individual obligations to contribute to its fulfillment. (shrink)

Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings, of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more familiar themes in (...) empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world. (shrink)

Skill is obviously a central part of sports and should therefore be central in sport philosophic studies. My aim in this paper is to try to place skill in a wider context and thus give skill the place it deserves. I will do this by taking up four points. I first try to place the concept of skill in relation to concepts like ability and know how. I argue that ability is something one has as part of a natural endowment, (...) but skill is something one must acquire. ‘Knowing how’ seems to a greater extent to demand a cognitive grasp and is thus more than a skill. My second point is about development of skills toward expertise and the role of thinking and consciousness. When one is exercising a skill does one need to be conscious of what one is doing or can one act like a zombie and perform non-consciously? I argue that expertise demands know how and conscious thinking. My third point is about the role of skills in sport competitions. What we measure in sports are different sporting skills as they are disp... (shrink)

IN LATE SPRING 2007, professor Allan Gibbard gave the Hägerström Lectures at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the title of “Meaning as a Normative Concept”. He met up with Gunnar Björnsson and Arvid Båve to talk about the views he develops and defends in the lectures.

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it (...) avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too. (shrink)

Since the publication and reception of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger, it has become standard practice among some authors to argue that Heidegger’s thinking of being, both early and late, is an insistent meditation on the alterity of the self in the call of conscience and the alterity of being in relation to beings, and that this thought is consequently already ‘ethical’. This line of argument has been recently pursued by Dastur, Raffoul, and Ricoeur. None of them contests that there is (...) a difference between the alterity of the self and the alterity of the other. But they argue that the experience of the first is the condition of possibility of gaining access to the second. There are several reasons why I have failed to be convinced by this argument. In this paper, I spell out those reasons and argue that Ricoeur’s attempt to carve out a path between Heidegger and Levinas remains unsuccessful. (shrink)

My perspective in this paper is to look at sport and other physical activities as a way of exploring and experimenting with the environing world. The human being is basically the homo movens – born...

This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological (...) entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr’s modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as ‘compatibilism’. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism. (shrink)

The article looks at sport as a form of human action where the participants display various forms of Intentionality. Intentionality may be defined as ‘that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.’ Sporting actions are about human intentions, beliefs, desires, perceptions and not to forget, movements. This means that sports typically display what we call ‘Intentionality.’ The study of Intentionality and intentional actions (...) has previously received relatively little attention among sport philosophers, but deserves more attention. Even though there is a tension and several differences between continental and analytical approaches to philosophical problems, there is a common understanding of the phenomenon we call ‘Intentionality.’ The debate between John Searle, representing the analytical camp, and Hubert Dreyfus, representing the phenomenological camp, is instructive to see the differences, and also the commonalities between the two approaches. The article starts with a clarification of the concept of Intentionality and sketches some of the history and background of the concept. It then presents the main conceptual framework that Searle uses to distinguish the different types and forms of Intentionality and his views on sporting actions. This is followed by a presentation of the phenomenological approach of Dreyfus and the response by Searle. The article ends by discussing the possibility of a combined and enriched view where a clarification of the logic as well as the phenomenology of sporting actions is needed. It may thus be possible to bridge the gap between the two approaches. (shrink)