A caring approach to knowledge production has been portrayed as epistemologically radical, ethically vital and as fostering continuous responsibility between researchers and research-subjects. This article examines these arguments through focusing on the ambivalent role of care within the first large-scale experimental beagle colony, a self-professed ‘beagle utopia’ at the University of California, Davis (1951–86). We argue that care was at the core of the beagle colony; the lived environment was re-shaped in response to animals ‘speaking back’ to researchers, and ‘love’ (...) and ‘kindness’ were important considerations during staff recruitment. Ultimately, however, we show that care relations were used to manufacture compliancy, preventing the predetermined ends of the experiment from being troubled. Rather than suggesting Davis would have been less ethically troubling, or more epistemologically radical, with ‘better’ care, however, we suggest the case troubles existing care theory and argue that greater attention needs to be paid to histories, contexts, and exclusions. (shrink)

Vincent Giraud undertakes to introduce the thought of the author of Broken Hegemonies by taking as guiding thread the phenomenon. Schürmann’s procedure follows the imperative by which Greek science defined its specific task: ‘To save the phenomena.’ If that which manifests itself is always originarily a singular, which the different ‘hegemonic fantasms’ force to become in its appearing a particular case of their own law—then, the retrieval of the phenomena will be brought about by an epic of the singular, (...) which alone is capable of establishing us in the ‘tragic condition’ that forms the basis of our relation to appearing. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine how any domain of Meinongian objects can be structured by a special kind of mereology. The basic definition of this mereology is the following: an object is part of another iff every characteristic property of the former is also a characteristic property of the latter. I will show that this kind of mereology ends up being very powerful for dealing with Meinongian objects. Mereological sums and products are not restricted in any way (...) in a domain of Meinongian objects: there is a sum and a product for any pair of Meinongian objects. With the mereological operations of sum, product and complement, and two special Meinongian objects, we can define a full boolean algebra on Meinongian objects. Moreover, this kind of mereology is atomic and extensional: an atom is a Meinongian object having just one characteristic property and two objects are identical iff the same atoms are parts of both of them. A Meinongian object can finally be defined in mereological terms as the sum of the atoms of its characteristic properties. (shrink)

Ethics review committees have become a common institution in English-speaking research communities, and are now increasingly being adopted in a variety of research environments. In light of existing debates on the aptness of ethics review boards for assessing research work in the social sciences, this article investigates the ways in which researchers navigate issues of research ethics in the absence of a formal review procedure or of an ethics review board. Through the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data, the article (...) questions the overall utility of ethics review boards. Highlighting the importance of space for sharing, the authors argue for the development of a new type of structure that takes into account researchers’ ‘ethos of responsibility’ as an adequate ethical compass for research in the social sciences. (shrink)

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view $O$ and wants to interpret a formal language $L$ , a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for $L$ in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with $O$ . Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an (...) ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. From those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, showing thus that we can perfectly quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and thus why endorsing an ontological view should have an impact on the kind of logic one should use. (shrink)

À partir d’une lecture intégrale de l’oeuvre d’Augustin d’Hippone (354-430), Vincent Giraud met au jour les aspects de ce qu’il appelle, dès l’introduction, une « condition herméneutique ». Il s’agit de démontrer que le « il y a », le « es gibt » propre à toute « donation » phénoménale, se situe, pour Augustin, entièrement sous condition du signe : la compréhension de l’existence humaine peut alors faire l’objet d’une reprise radicale à partir du concept de signe. Être (...) au monde, à soi, à autrui, à Dieu, c’est donc d’abord faire face à des signes. Car c’est le signe (signum) qui prévaut dès lors que la chose même (res ipsa) fait défaut. Cette tension fondamentale entre signification et manifestation peut alors être considérée comme la trame profonde qui régit toute la pensée augustinienne de l’humain. L’étude s’ordonne en deux grandes parties, qui permettent de déployer l’ensemble du spectre couvert par l’existence herméneutique telle que l’a conçue Augustin. (shrink)

In the inaugural issue of this journal, David Tyfield used some recent discussions about "meaning finitism" to conclude that the sociology of scientific knowledge is an intellectually hopeless basis on which to erect an intelligible study of science. In contrast, the authors show that Tyfield's argument rests on some profound misunderstandings of the SSK. They show that his mischaracterization of SSK is in fact systematic and is based on lines of argument that are at best incoherent.

This article addresses tensions within the emerging field of animal studies, which have arisen in the process of trying to craft an ethics that is not grounded in humanist rights-frameworks, by--firstly--mapping how these debates are manifested and--secondly--positing Cary Wolfe’s concept of "affirmative biopolitics" as means of overcoming these conceptual rifts. Building on work that attributes these tensions to the influence of posthumanism, it argues that the embrace of posthumanist thought has marginalised critique by framing perspectives such as ecofeminism and critical (...) animal studies as irredeemably humanist. To counter this marginalisation, Wolfe’s recent work on biopolitics is used to create a much-needed conversation between these perspectives. Debates surrounding veganism provide a route into instigating this dialogue, due to it being a contested practice that crystallises the differences between "mainstream" and critical animal studies. This framing of veganism not as a totalising practice but as a form of "affirmative biopolitics," however, is not solely intended to highlight affinities between apparently antagonistic perspectives, but offered as a contribution to broader debates about how a "posthumanist ethics" could be enacted in practice. (shrink)

Modal Meinongianism is a form of Meinongianism whose main supporters are Graham Priest and Francesco Berto. The main idea of modal Meinongianism is to restrict the logical deviance of Meinongian non-existent objects to impossible worlds and thus prevent it from “contaminating” the actual world: the round square is round and not round, but not in the actual world, only in an impossible world. In the actual world, supposedly, no contradiction is true. I will show that Priest’s semantics, as originally formulated (...) in Towards Non-being, tell us something different. According to certain models, there are true contradictions in the actual world. Berto and Priest have noticed this unexpected consequence and have suggested a solution, but I will show that their solution is highly questionable. In the last section of this paper, I will introduce a new and simpler version of modal Meinongianism that avoids the problem. (shrink)

The books of Pascal Quignard present themselves as a hunt for the invisible. The ambition that lies at their heart seems particularly compatible with a phenomenological approach. Indeed, this literary intuition – this “suspicion” in the words of Quignard – hinges on the nature and value of representation. This article tries to read the entire work of Quignard through the phenomenological lens. The elucidation of phenomenality is accomplished here through the steps of a process that leads to the very condition (...) of vision. Once the essence of representation is established as a “predation”, the literary writing of the author reveals it as related to an absent, invisible prey. Through the successive and ascending figures of idolatry, love, art and contemplation, can then start a route to invisibility, which is a true pedagogy of seeing. This quest, conceivable as a learning process through which literature finds its ultimate aim, finally leads to a renewed understanding of the concept of representation. (shrink)

Je montrerai en premier lieu comment et pourquoi la sémantique formelle peut être employée comme un outil pour déterminer l’engagement ontologique d’une théorie : je soutiendrai d’une part que la sémantique doit être prise au sérieux comme apte à décrire la vérifaction des formules du langage; d’autre part, que les engagements ontologiques d’une théorie sont déterminés par ses vérifacteurs. De là, j’exposerai une méthode générale permettant, étant donné un certain type d’ontologie, de construire une sémantique dont les engagements ontologiques sont (...) en accord avec celle-ci. Pour cela, je définirai la notion de cadre ontologique : il s’agit d’une structure telle que toute sémantique cons-truite à partir de cette structure aura un certain engagement ontologique déterminé à l’avance. J’exposerai quatre cadres représentant deux types de nominalisme et deux types de réalisme, et j’esquisserai à partir de ces cadres quatre sémantiques pour les langages du premier ordre. (shrink)

We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray's work, that explicitly incorporating the information, however imprecise, available to the decision maker is relevant, feasible, and fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and whether it matters or not, that it makes it possible to better model and analyze how the decision maker takes into account new information, even when this information is not an event and finally (...) that it is crucial when attempting to identify and measure the decision maker's attitude toward imprecise information. (shrink)

In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have investigated folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, and their compatibility with determinism. To determine whether laypeople are “natural compatibilists” or “natural incompatibilists”, they have used vignettes describing agents living in deterministic universes. However, later research has suggested that participants’ answers to these studies are plagued with comprehension errors: either people fail to really accept that these universes are deterministic, or they confuse determinism with something else. This had led certain experimenters (...) to conclude that maybe folk intuitions about the compatibility of free will with determinism could not be empirically investigated. Here, we propose that we should refrain from embracing this pessimistic conclusion, as scenarios involving time loops might allow experiments to bypass most of these methodological issues. Indeed, scenarios involving time loops belong both to the philosophical literature on free will and to popular culture. As such, they might constitute a bridge between the two worlds. We present the results of five studies using time loops to investigate people’s intuitions about determinism, free will and moral responsibility. The results of these studies allow us to reach two conclusions. The first is that, when people are introduced to determinism through time loops, they do seem to understand what determinism entails. The second is that, at least in the context of time loops, people do not seem to consider determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

This article analyses the policies and the use of social rights in France and Germany in relation to the philosophical conception of subjective rights theorised by Catherine Colliot-Thélène. The first part is devoted to the relationship between the innate right and the solidarist conception of social citizenship, which is institutionalised and evolves within the framework of the “labour society” in both countries. The second part deals with the differences and developments in the French and German regimes of social citizenship and (...) policies of access to rights. In recent times, social rights have been redefined as fundamental rights and form part of a renewed conception of citizenship. In the third part, we study the implementation of schemes of access to social rights and their agents in Berlin, Paris and the Paris region, focusing on the case of “poor migrants”. (shrink)

Le temps suspendu comme moment heureux est à juste titre considéré comme extrêmement précieux. Mais on peut se demander : par quoi donc peut-il bien être suspendu? L'hypothèse que l'auteur examine consiste dans l'idée que le temps est suspendu par le désir s'assouvissant. Ou que le temps suspendu n'est rien d'autre que du désir-temps : ni désir de temps, ni temps du désir ; il relève de leur unité profonde. Il s'agira d'élucider cette hypothèse notamment avec Rousseau, les épicuriens et (...) les stoïciens. (shrink)