This volume is a comprehensive roadmap to the burgeoning area of affective sciences, which now spans several disciplines. The Handbook brings together, for the first time, the various strands of inquiry and latest research in the scientific study of the relationship between the mechanisms of the brain and the psychology of mind. In recent years, scientists have made considerable advances in understanding how brain processes shape emotions and are changed by human emotion. Drawing on a wide range of neuroimaging techniques, (...) neuropsychological assessment, and clinical research, scientists are beginning to understand the biological mechanisms for emotions. As a result, researchers are gaining insight into such compelling questions as: How do people experience life emotionally? Why do people respond so differently to the same experiences? What can the face tell us about internal states? How does emotion in significant social relationships influence health? Are there basic emotions common to all humans? This volume brings together the most eminent scholars in the field to present, in sixty original chapters, the latest research and theories in the field. The book is divided into ten sections: Neuroscience; Autonomic Psychophysiology; Genetics and Development; Expression; Components of Emotion; Personality; Emotion and Social Processes; Adaptation, Culture, and Evolution; Emotion and Psychopathology; and Emotion and Health. This major new volume will be an invaluable resource for researchers that will define affective sciences for the next decade. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for three theses. First, most philosophical analyses of the problem of normative conflict, being based on the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test for conflict, are inadequate. Second, expanding on suggestions made by H. L. A. Hart and Stephen Munzer, I develop an understanding of normative conflict which is not tied to the concept of obedience. Such an understanding of normative conflict is expressly functional: normative conflicts arise when one norm interferes with the intended functioning of another. Third, working (...) from a functional concept of normative conflict, I develop a taxonomical classification scheme for the phenomenon of normative conflict. Normative conflict is the genus within which there are three species: normative contradiction, normative collision, and normative competition. Department of Philosophy, Southeast Missouri State University, Cape Girardeau, MO 63701, U.S.A. (shrink)

"Aristotelian Dialectic" is a dialogue between two persons, T and Q, concerning Aristotle's views on the nature of dialectic and rhetoric and also on the role of dialectic and rhetoric in modern education. T advances two theses: that Aristotle views dialectic and rhetoric as intellectual martial arts. to be used to combat the sophists; and that these arts form the basis of Homeric education. T defends this view by examining what Aristotle has to say in the Topics, The Sophistical Refutations, (...) The Posterior Analytics, and The Rhetoric. T also indicates a strong belief that these arts are as important for education today as they were in Aristotle's time. To drive home this point, T uses many of the techniques he ascribes to Aristotle on Q in the course of their discussion. (shrink)

One of Sulla's first acts on assuming the dictatorship in 81 B.C. was to fill up the numbers of the Senate by the addition of some 300 new members. Tradition is divided on the question of the rank of these men before their promotion, and no unanimity has yet been reached in the matter. There are two distinct versions in the ancient authorities, both equally well attested. Appian and the Epitomator of Livy state that the new members were equites, while (...) Sallust and Dionysius of Halicarnassus assert that they included men of the lowest rank . When we turn to modern historians we find opinion similarly divided. Writers such as Lange, Zumpt and Herzog accept the first version, whereas Niebuhr, Botsford, Willems and Gelzer incline to the view of Sallust. It is tempting to do as some writers have done and to combine the two versions, saying that some of the new Senators were equites and some common soldiers. But this is a very arbitrary cutting of the knot. Herzog seems to play with the idea that Sulla promoted ordinary soldiers via the equites when he says ‘wobei noch dazu mancher war, der seine Ritterstellung erst eben errungen hatte.’ This, however, is mere guesswork. (shrink)

There has always, apparently, been a strangely persistent belief among scholars in the existence of Knights of Senatorial rank, and though the definition of these has varied from time to time, their existence seems to be universally accepted.The first form of this idea is to be found in the view that the phrase ‘equitesillustres’ used by Tacitus refers to Knights possessing Senatorial rank. In a recent article the writer has dealt with this question, and tried to show how Mommsen definitely (...) disposed of this theory. But in spite of his masterly refutation of it, it has found acceptance among more recent scholars, such as Furneaux, Pelham, Cagnat, and others. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce, who contributed the term pragmatism to the language of philosophy, insisted always that the term was intended to designate a method. Pragmatism, he warned, is not a Weltanschauung, nor a doctrine of metaphysics, nor even an “attempt to determine any truth of things.” It is simply a method of ascertaining meanings, of making them clear, and of pointing a way for the successful determination of the truth of things. Peirce's practice consistently belied his preaching in this regard, (...) for his exposition of the method involved a metaphysical system of considerable scope; and this, it seems to me, was unavoidable. Yet it was as a method that Peirce first presented his distinctive point of view, and it is primarily as a method that I wish to consider it here. Into metaphysics, or Weltanschauung, we shall surely be led; despite Peirce's pronouncement, I make no apology for that. (shrink)

This paper chronicles the author’s experience, as an instructor and as an administrator, taking up the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and implementing changes in the curriculum to accommodate a logic student with dyslexia. The author discusses his misconceptions about dyslexia and his attempts to determine more precisely how it affected his student’s reading abilities. While his student struggled with abstract symbol systems (e.g. standard logical notation), the student had no difficulty with sequences of letters. The author elected to teach (...) the introductory logic course with a logical notation composed entirely of letters, namely Lukasiewicz’ notation. The author details the work that went into learning this notation and teaching an introductory logic course in it, including overviews of lessons on semantics, syntax, and introduction/elimination rules for proofs. The student learned the material very quickly and with great success, progressing to moderately sophisticated proofs. The author reflects on how this reformulated version of an introductory logic course squares with the ADA’s language of “reasonable accommodations” and implores professional philosophers to take seriously what the ADA means for their pedagogy. (shrink)

Dewey's most direct treatment of law and legal theory, "Logical Method and Law," presents a sketch of a pragmatic theory of law. Dewey claims the law needs "a logic relevant to consequences, not antecedents." This paper unpacks Dewey's pragmatic theory of law and outlines some criticisms of Dewey's legal views set forth by the American Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn in an unpublished manuscript titled "John Dewey and Our Law." This paper aims to identify where Dewey and Llewellyn agree and where (...) they, as representatives of major schools of thought, part company. (shrink)