Hegel broke open the deadliest assumptions of Western thought by conceiving being as becoming and consciousness as the social-subjective relation of spirit to itself, yet his white Eurocentric conceits were grotesquely inflated even by the standards of his time. With In a Post-Hegelian Spirit, Gary Dorrien emphasizes both sides of this Hegelian legacy, contending that it takes a great deal of digging and refuting to recover the parts of Hegel that still matter for religious thought. By (...) distilling his signature argument about the role of post-Kantian idealism in modern Christian thought, Dorrien fashions a liberationist form of religious idealism: a post-Hegelian religious philosophy that is simultaneously both Hegelian as it expounds a fluid, holistic, open, intersubjective, ambiguous, tragic, and reconciliatory idea of revelation and post-Hegelian, as it rejects the deep-seated flaws in Hegel's thought. Dorrien mines Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel as the foundation of his argument about intellectual intuition and the creative power of subjectivity. After analyzing critiques of Hegel by SA, ren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, Karl Barth, and Emmanuel Levinas, Dorrien contends that though these monumental figures were penetrating in their assessments, they appear one-sided compared to Hegel. In a Post-Hegelian Spirit further engages with the personal idealist tradition founded by Borden Parker Bowne, the process tradition founded by Alfred North Whitehead, and the daring cultural contributions of Paul Tillich, W.E.B. Du Bois, Martin Luther King, Jr., Rosemary Radford Ruether, David Tracy, Peter Hodgson, Edward Farley, Catherine Keller, and Monica Coleman. (shrink)

Feuerbach is now recognized as a central figure in the history of nineteenth-century thought. He was one of Hegel's most influential pupils: he dominated German radical philosophy in the 1840s and was the leader of the Young Hegelians; his 'anthropological' critique of Hegel's idealism decisively influences the materialism and humanism of Marx and Engels; his critique of religion pointed the way for the philosophers of religion; and his psychological analyses found a place in Freudian thought (...) and the existential and phenomenological traditions. In this 1977 text, Professor Wartofsky wishes to go beyond this conventional view to establish Feuerbach as much more than a transitional figure between Hegel and Marx or an influence on important later developments. He seriously considers Feuerbach's philosophy on its own terms and seeks to demonstrate its continuing importance. He therefore traces Feuerbach's development in detail, emphasizing its dialectical character, and finds fundamental originality in his epistemology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We can best understand Marx’s economic thought by seeing it as implicitly relying upon and reworking a Hegelian philosophy of history, which was deeply salvific and soteriological in its basic structure. Hegel’s philosophy of history reworked the Christian narrative of man’s fall, his redemption through Christ’s atonement, and his return to a state of reconciliation with God in the life of the Christian church. Thus, the loss of the organic form of community found in the Greek (...) polis was a fall that was atoned for in the religious alienation found in both Judaism and Christianity, where man is treated as separated from a transcendent God. The reconciliation between man and God is found, finally, in the reconciliation of the modern, rational state. Early on Marx adopted Hegel’s philosophy of history, but its basic structure remains even in his mature economic work. There he envisions the loss of the organic unity of primitive communism, and the alienation of individuals from the larger social totality of feudalism and capitalism. Under communism, however, individuals are reconciled with the larger social whole through the collective mastery of the products of labor. (shrink)

The philosophic moment of Marx : Marx's transformation of the Hegelian dialectic -- Preface to the Iranian edition of Marx's humanist essays -- The theory of alienation : Marx's debt to Hegel -- The todayness of Marx's humanism -- A 1981 view of Marx's 1841 dialectic -- The inseparability of Marx's economics, humanism, and dialectic -- Capitalist development and Marx's capital, 1863-1883 -- Today's epigones who try to truncate Marx's capital (...) -- Letter to Herbert Marcuse on automation -- Marx's grundrisse and the dialectic in life and in thought -- Capitalist production/alienated labor -- Marx's critique of culture -- Post-Marx marxism and the battle of ideas -- Post-Marx marxism as a category -- Hobsbawm and Rubel on the Marx centenary, but where is Marx? -- Marx's philosophy of revolution vs. non-marxist scholar-careerists in "marxism" -- Paul Mattick : economism vs. Marx's humanism -- Bertell Ollman : pitting "human nature" against Marx's humanism -- The dialectic of labor in Marx and "critical thought" -- Gramsci's "philosophy of praxis" -- Rosdolsky's methodology and Lange's revisionism -- Adorno, Kosik, and the movement from practice -- Marx as philosopher of revolution in permanence-reading Marx for today -- Section A: Marxist-humanism -- Introduction to philosophic notes -- The emergence of a new movement from practice that is itself a form of theory -- New stage of production, new stage of cognition, new kind of organization -- The dialectic of absolute idea as new beginning -- Section B: Black liberation and internationalism -- Abolitionism and the American roots of marxism -- Marx and the two-way road between the U.S. and Africa -- Black intellectuals in dilemma -- Women's liberation and the dialectics of revolution -- Marx's "new humanism" and the dialectics of women's liberation in "primitive" and modern societies -- Marx's and Engels' studies contrasted : relationship of philosophy and revolution to women's liberation -- Letter to adrienne rich on women's liberation, gay liberation, and the dialectic -- Dialectics of organization and philosophy -- Spontaneity, organization, philosophy (dialectics) -- Philosopher of permanent revolution and organization man -- A post-World War II view of Marx's humanism, 1843-1883 : marxist humanism, 1950s-1980s -- Appendices -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorical system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the Science of Logic if he (...) had lived to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Yet until recently very little attention has been devoted to the fact that Marx's first major theoretical work, written in 1843 at the age of twenty-five, is a detailed critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Most of the literature which relates Marx to Hegel draws its evidence either from the two essays in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher or from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts: yet Marx's views in these writings are an outcome of his earlier confrontation with (...) class='Hi'>Hegel in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. This critique of §§ 261-313 of the Rechtsphilosophie had never been published in Marx's lifetime and was printed for the first time by David Riazanov in 1927. While the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 have achieved widespread recognition, this Critique remains relatively unknown, has as yet not been translated into English and remains generally neglected. My argument in this paper will be that a close look at the Critique is indispensible for an understanding of Marx's intellectual development, that most of the elements of Marx's later, "mature" social philosophy are already in existence in 1843 and that consequently some of the traditional views about the stages Marx's thought went through have to be radically revised. (shrink)

It is not just rhetoric to ask why we should still be reading the Young Hegelians today. In spite of their commitment to action, their influence on the politics of the times was marginal at best; and even as philosophers, the movement of thought which they represented was all but dead by 1848. Now that we read them at a distance of over a century, it is clear that for once at least the fate meted out by circumstances was (...) well deserved. The writings of the Young Hegelians appear painfully thin in insight and force of argument. This global judgment must of course be qualified. Protestant theology has not been the same since David Strauss, and Feuerbach’s conception of man stands as the first statement of modern scientific humanism. Still, the ideal of humanity that inspired either of them has none of the historical richness of Hegel’s “spirit”; in the case of Feuerbach there is also none of the scholarship that redeems at least some of Strauss’ work. The value of both men’s writings lay mostly in their iconoclastic nature. They cleared the air, though at the cost of grave oversimplifications, of the illusion that after Hegel things could quite ever be the same again - as if the speculative comprehension of the Christian faith that Hegel claimed to have achieved could have left that faith undisturbed. But now that the profane has become the commonplace, there is little to recommend them in our eyes; and now that we have also had plenty of opportunity to notice how quickly the spirit of revolution degenerates into faction and anarchy, there is even less to recommend the rest of the Young Hegelians. The later Marx stands out intellectually in comparison to them precisely because he succeeded in breaking free from their ideological hold. I sometimes wonder whether his figure has really been enhanced by the post-war attempt at reinterpreting Capital in the light of his supposed earlier “humanism.” Sidney Hook’s statement that the late Marx was a scientist, and that his theory is to be proven either right or wrong on strictly historical and empirical evidence, might be a bit far-fetched perhaps; it still is in my mind the best compliment that one can pay to Marx. (shrink)

A major and timely re-examination of key areas in the social and political thought of Hegel and Marx. The editors' extensive introduction surveys the development of the connection from the Young Hegelians through the main Marxist thinkers to contemporary debates. Leading scholars including Terrell Carver, Chris Arthur, and Gary Browning debate themes such as: the nature of the connection itself scientific method political economy the Hegelian basis to Marxs' "Doctoral Dissertation" human needs history and international relations.

Hegel conceptualized the capitalist economy as a system of needs, with commodities and money serving as means to human ends. While anticipating Marx’s criticisms of certain tendencies in capitalism, Hegel insisted that higher-order institutions, especially those of the modern state, could put them out of play and establish a reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality warranting rational affirmation. Hegel, however, failed to comprehend the emergence of capital as a dominant subject, subordinating human ends under its end. (...) The structural coercion, domination, and exploitation inherent in the capital/wage labor relationship illustrate that point, as does the depoliticization of inherently political matters in capitalist market societies. The reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality Hegel endorsed requires a form of socialism incorporating deliberative democracy in local workplaces and communities, conjoined with representative bodies on regional, national, and ultimately global levels. (shrink)

Marxism as an intellectual movement has been one of the most important and fertile contributions to twentieth-century thought. No social theory or political philosophy today can be taken seriously unless it enters a dialogue, not just with the legacy of Marx, but also with the innovations and questions that spring from the movement that his work sparked, Marxism. Marx provided a revolutionary set of ideas about freedom, politics and society. As social and political conditions changed and new (...) intellectual challenges to Marx's social philosophy arose, the Marxist theorists sought to update his social theory, rectify the sociological positions of historical materialism and respond to philosophical challenges with a Marxist reply. This book provides an accessible introduction to Marxism by explaining each of the key concepts of Marxist politics and social theory. The book is organized into three parts, which explore the successive waves of change within Marxist theory and places these in historical context, while the whole provides a clear and comprehensive account of Marxism as an intellectual system. (shrink)

Hegel 's classic Phenomenology of Spirit is considered by many to be the most difficult text in all of philosophical literature. In interpreting the work, scholars have often used the Phenomenology to justify the ideology that has tempered their approach to it, whether existential, ontological, or, particularly, Marxist. Werner Marx deftly avoids this trap of misinterpretation by rendering lucid the objectives that Hegel delineates in the Preface and Introduction and using these to examine the whole of the (...) Phenomenology. Marx considers selected materials from Hegel 's text in order both to clarify Hegel 's own view of it and to set the stage for an examination of post-Hegelian philosophy. The primary focus of Marx's book is on the account. Hegel gives of the phenomenological journey from natural consciousness to philosophical wisdom. In showing that Hegel 's many statements concerning consciousness 'finding itself' or 'knowing itself' in its world can be understood as discovering the rationality of the conditioning world, Marx offers a solution to several sets of interrelated problems that have troubled students of Hegel. His book contains valuable analyses of the relation between Hegel 's thought and that of Descartes and Kant as well as that of Karl Marx, and it also sheds considerable light on the question of the internal unity or coherence of the Phenomenology. (shrink)

Introductory essay to the collection "I that is We, We that is I" (ed. by Italo Testa and Luigi Ruggiu, Brill Books, 2016). In this book an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of (...) naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm. (shrink)

Abordaremos a crítica marxiana à noção hegeliana de "ser" , mostrando que a historicidade e a objetividade, em verdade, são determinações desta . Deste modo, intentamos mostrar que analogias entre a lógica hegeliana e a teoria marxiana podem eclipsar aspectos centrais à abordagem materialista proposta pelo autor de "O capital". Apontando a inversão hegeliana entre sujeito e predicado, Marx trata da apreensão do real que, muito embora seja traçada em diálogo com a dialética hegeliana, é também sua antítese direta (...) . We will deal with the Marxian criticism to the Hegelian notion of "being". It will be shown that historicity and objectivity are determinations of this category . So, the analogy between the Hegelian logic and the Marxian theory may, sometimes, hide essential aspects of the materialist comprehension of history. Here, we intend to prove that, by questioning the treatment dispensed to the matter of being by Hegel, Marx criticizes the Hegelian inversion between subject and predicate in a way that, although dialoguing with Hegel, his conception is the exact opposite at the same time. (shrink)

I suggest that we can read Marx in the light of recent analytic, neo-Hegelian thought. I summarize the Pittsburgh School philosophers’ claims about the myth of the given, the claim that human experience is conceptual all the way out, and that we live in a space of reasons. I show how Hegel has been read in those terms, and then apply that reading of Hegel to Marx’s argument that capital is akin to what Hegel (...) called Geist, or spirit. We can understand capitalism as a space of reasons that is contradictory: while the space of reasons is supposed to make human freedom possible, our space of reasons makes freedom impossible. Reading Marx in this way is helpful, because it avoids the flaws of analytical Marxism, existentialism and structuralism. However, it raises a large problem of its own: Can the theory of the space of reasons be applied to a society that is not free of alienation? I argue that it can, but only in ways that would not satisfy the analytic neo-Hegelians themselves. (shrink)

Simmel never finished his book on Hegel. Simmel rarely mentions Hegel throughout his collected works. But when he does, it is often with praise. However, Simmel explicitly distances himself from Hegel in those places where, as readers, we find Hegelian traits. What should we make of this complex relationship? With the aim of contributing to understanding Simmel’s systematic thought, I assess the extent to which Simmel was and was not influenced by Hegel. I refer to (...) two lesser-known writings, in which Simmel addresses Hegel’s philosophy at length, along with some of the more incidental mentions of Hegel that Simmel makes throughout his oeuvre. I show that Simmel adopts Hegel’s conception of philosophy while rejecting its system building. I then argue that what most scholars consider to be Hegelian in Simmel’s philosophy, namely dialectics, in fact represents his weakest, or most general, form of Hegelianism. Moreover, I show that given Simmel’s aesthetic focus, he may have been more influenced by Schiller than by Hegel in this regard. Finally, among other Hegelian features that are often overlooked, I consider Simmel’s conceptual relationality of individual–society as well as his critique of Kantian ethics. (shrink)

This classic work by one of the most important philosophers and critics of our time charts the genesis and trajectory of the desiring subject from Hegel's formulation in Phenomenology of Spirit to its appropriation by Kojève, Hyppolite, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze, and Foucault. Judith Butler plots the French reception of Hegel and the successive challenges waged against his metaphysics and view of the subject, all while revealing ambiguities within his position. The result is a sophisticated reconsideration of the post-Hegelian (...) tradition that has predominated in modern French thought, and her study remains a provocative and timely intervention in contemporary debates over the unconscious, the powers of subjection, and the subject. (shrink)

The specific nuances of what Gramsci names ‘the new dialectic’ are explored in this paper. The dialectic was Marx's specific ‘mode of thought’ or ‘method of logic’ as it has been variously called, by which he analyzed the world and man's relationship to that world. As well as constituting a theory of knowledge (epistemology), what arises out of the dialectic is also an ontology or portrait of humankind that is based on the complete historicization of humanity; its ‘absolute (...) “historicism”’ or ‘the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought’, as Gramsci worded it (, p. 465). Embracing a fully secular and historical view of humanity, it provides a vantage point that allows the multiple and complex effects of our own conceptual heritage to be interrogated in relation to our developing ‘nature’ or ‘being’. The argument presented in this paper is that the legacy of both Hegel and Marx is manifest in the depth of Gramsci's comprehension of what he termed the ‘educative‐formative’ problem of hegemony. It is precisely the legacy of this Hegelian‐Marxist radical philosophical critique that is signified in his continuing commitment to the ‘philosophy of praxis’ and the historical‐dialectical principles that underpin this worldview. (shrink)

In the decade after the death of Hegel in 1833, a group of young philosophers sought to extend some of Hegel’s ideas to criticize contemporary thought and society. These were the so-called “Young Hegelians,” which included the young Karl Marx. With interest in Marx and Marxism on the wane, interest in the Young Hegelians has also subsided. That is unfortunate, since the Young Hegelians have much to teach us. This paper recounts the Young Hegelians’ critique (...) of religion, beginning with that of Ludwig Feuerbach in his seminal work, The Essence of Christianity. (shrink)

This classic work by one of the most important philosophers and critics of our time charts the genesis and trajectory of the desiring subject from Hegel's formulation in _Phenomenology of Spirit_ to its appropriation by Kojève, Hyppolite, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze, and Foucault. Judith Butler plots the French reception of Hegel and the successive challenges waged against his metaphysics and view of the subject, all while revealing ambiguities within his position. The result is a sophisticated reconsideration of the post-Hegelian (...) tradition that has predominated in modern French thought, and her study remains a provocative and timely intervention in contemporary debates over the unconscious, the powers of subjection, and the subject. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian ReformationGiving a Hearing to The Parallax ViewAdrian Johnston (bio)Slavoj Žižek. THE PARALLAX VIEW. Cambridge: MIT P, 2006. [PV]Near the end of a two-hour presentation at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on November 10, 2006, Slavoj Žižek confesses that, in terms of the intellectual ambitions nearest to his heart, “my secret dream is to be Hegel’s Luther” [“Why Only an Atheist Can Believe”]. This confession (...) comes just months after the publication of his latest major work, The Parallax View, a book described as a new magnum opus. There are ample justifications within this text to license retroactively rereading it through the lens of Žižek’s subsequent public admission that he is now preoccupied with rescuing Hegel from the numerous misinterpretations to which this giant of German idealism (who casts such a long shadow over the Continental European philosophical tradition) has been repeatedly subjected over the past two hundred years. The Parallax View, at certain points explicitly and in other places implicitly, can be seen as centered on an effort to confront aggressively the various received versions of Hegel widely accepted as official and orthodox exegetical renditions. The motif of the “parallax gap,” elaborated in a plethora of guises throughout this 2006 tome, condenses and reflects the axiomatic theses of what could be called Žižek’s Hegelian reformation.The critical assessment of The Parallax View offered here seeks to go straight to its theoretical heart by highlighting a single line of argumentation running through the full span of this text’s different moments and phases. Žižek’s own Hegelian-style conceptions of truth (as fiercely partisan rather than calmly neutral) and universality (as immanently concrete rather than transcendently abstract) validate such an interpretive approach—“universal Truth is accessible only from a partial engaged subjective position” [PV 35]. Deliberately extracting particular conceptual constellations and forcing them to link up with each other according to the plan of a certain directed philosophical agenda promises to be much more revealing of the essential features of Žižekian thought than a comprehensive survey of this latest of his major works.The specific argumentative thread to be isolated here is the new extended engagement with the terrain covered by cognitive science and the neurosciences. Apart from the task of denouncing falsifying popular pictures of Hegel, one of Žižek’s other driving ambitions in this book is the desire to formulate a fundamental ontology appropriate to the theory of subjectivity mapped out over the course of his entire intellectual itinerary (a theory informed by Kant and post-Kantian German idealism combined with Lacanian psychoanalytic metapsychology). And, herein, the articulation of such an ontology appropriately gets entangled, via reflections on the nature of the brain, with the latest instantiations of the perennial philosophical problem of the relationship between mind and [End Page 3] body. Žižek grants that the central nervous system is, in at least several undeniable and important senses, the material, corporeal ground of the subject, the bodily being without which there cannot be the parlêtre (speaking being). But, in the spirit of Schelling and Hegel (especially their philosophies of “productive” nature), the fashions in which Žižek attempts to tie together systematically a materialist ontology with an account of more-than-material, transontological subjectivity illuminate a normally obscured and ignored set of implied consequences flowing from the gesture of dissolving hard-and-fast dualist distinctions between body and mind, nature and spirit.The past few decades of philosophical engagement with the neurosciences, an engagement almost completely monopolized by the Anglo-American Analytic philosophical tradition and neglected by the Continental European philosophical tradition to an equal degree, has emphasized (to put this in the vernacular of German idealism) the naturalization of spirit resulting from the collapse of any strict nature-spirit dichotomy. The materialisms promoted by those Analytic philosophers amenable to grounding the mental on the neuronal simply assume that the outcome of folding mind and matter into each other is a becoming-material of the mind, namely, a naturalization of the spirit (that is, the mind comes to resemble the brain conceived of as just another part... (shrink)

Philosophy finds itself "between tradition and another beginning." 1 For this reason it seems necessary to reconsider the foundations of traditional philosophy in the hope that out of these considerations new questions may arise which may lead to a new philosophical foundation. To this end neither the large manual nor the monograph is well suited. What is required, instead, is to take a few steps which lead our thoughts directly into the problems of a given, traditional, philosophical foun dation. In (...) this sense the present work wishes to provide an "introduction" into that philosophical foundation which, until Hegel, had a decisive influence upon traditional philosophy_ Consequently, it does not see its task in providing a survey of this whole complex of problems. Nor does it offer solutions to questions about difficult passages which have been the subject of two thousand years of Aristotelian scholarship_ Instead, it follows a definite path which might bring this Aristotelian science, the theory which seeks to determine being as being, on hei on, closer to the student of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the conception of the individual in Hegelian thought. The discussion will focus on some of the textual uses that Hegel and some Hegelians make of the term individual. The ultimate aim of the paper, however, is to focus on the concrete individual and to argue that there are two fundamentally important yet distinct uses to which Hegel and some Hegelians put the term. These two uses are not compatible, dialectically or otherwise. The (...) plan of this paper is to state the nature of the problem of the individual and then to examine it in more detail through the writings of representative British Hegelians. (shrink)

A present-day continuation of the philosophical narrative presented in G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit that confronts every major post-Hegelian philosophical position and arrives at an original reconception of the purpose of dialectical phenomenology.

This article contrasts Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel in his mature works with Georg Lukács’s brilliant interpretation of the relation of Marx and Hegel. Hegel and the Hegelian turn in Marxism, as powerfully represented by Lukács, however, have been strongly criticized in recent decades by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers for whom concepts central to Lukács’s project, such as totality and the historical Subject, are anti-emancipatory, expressions of domination. Nevertheless, the global historical transformations of recent decades (...) – including the crisis of the Fordist/Keynesian welfare state, the collapse of Soviet Communism, and the emergence of a neo-liberal capitalist global order – have called into question the post-Marxist turn. These historical changes, then, suggest the need for a renewed theoretical concern with capitalism. Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel provides the basis for a critique both of Lukács as well as of post-structuralism in ways that can avoid the weaknesses of each while incorporating their strengths. (shrink)

In a step-by-step progression through Marx's three volume work, discovers a systematic theory of socio-economic categories ordered according to the dialectical logic derived from Hegel.

In celebration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of G.W.F. Hegel, Slavoj Žižek gives us a reading of a philosophical giant that changes our way of thinking about the post-human era we are entering. No ordinary study of Hegel, Hegel in a Wired Brain reveals our time as it appears through Hegel's eyes. Focusing in on the idea of the wired brain, this is a philosophical analysis of what happens when a direct link between our (...) mental processes and a digital machine emerges. Here Žižek explores the phenomenon of a wired brain affect, and the notion of singularity subsequently arising when we can share our thoughts and experiences with others. He hones in on the key question of how it affects our experience and status as free human individuals, dealing with what happens with the human spirit, our subjectivity and the very essence of being-human when a machine can read, action and disperse our thoughts. With characteristic verve and energy, Žižek connects Hegel to the world we live in and shows why he is much more fun than anyone gives him credit for, and why the 21st century might just be Hegelian. (shrink)

FROM THE CRITIQUE OF THE HEAVENS TO THE CRITIQUE OF THE EARTH - A CONTRIBUTIONTO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KARL MARX'S UNFINISHED CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL THEOLOGYThis article presents a reconstruction of Marx’s unfinished 1843 critique of political theology. In the preparatory notebooks for Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx identified Hegel’s political philosophy as an expression of “political theology,” which was to be the subject of his projected critique. However, he never completed nor published the (...) manuscript. This article presents a detailed analysis of the manuscript and its intellectual context in order to reconstruct this incomplete critique of political theology, conceived as the conception of the state as a sovereign subject that transcends and determines society from without that remains predominant in contemporary political thought. The distinctly Hegelian conceptual resources of Marx’s critique allowed him to overcome the contradiction between state and society issuing from this political theological conception of the state without resorting to abstract negation as most prior critiques have done. Marx instead proceeds to show that it is the social significance of this political theology and the associated practices that constitute the earthly existence of the modern state within civil society as a whole. (shrink)

The first publication of seminal early writing by Louis Althusser. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Louis Althusser enjoyed virtually unrivalled status as the foremost living Marxist philosopher. Today, he is remembered as the scourge and severest critic of "humanist" or Hegelian Marxism, as the proponent of rigorously scientific socialism, and as the theorist who posited a sharp rupture—an epistemological break—between the early and the late Marx. This collection of texts from the period 1945-1953 turns these interpretations of Althusser on (...) their head: we discover that there was a "young Althusser" as well as the "mature Althusser" we are already familiar with. In his fascinating Master's thesis, "On Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel" (1947), Althusser developed a position which he was later to attack ferociously: namely, that the revolutionary potential of the Hegelian dialectic could be defended against Hegel's own political conservatism. We see Althusser still wrestling with the spectres of Hegel and of Catholicism in another long text, his letter to Jean Lacroix, and, finally, we see his own "epistemological break" in the piece "On Marxism" from 1953. Other texts included are his critique of Alexander KojÅve (whose interpretation Francis Fukoyama has recently revived) and his attack on the French Church's teachings on women, sex and the family. Widely recognized as an intellectual giant of the late twentieth century, Althusser has left a towering legacy. This collection not only gives a unique insight into the formation of such a personality, but will also restore the "unknown Althusser" to the centre of the history of Marxism and of philosophy since the Second World War. (shrink)

The Kant-Hegel relation has a continuing fascination for commentators on Hegel, and understandably so: for, taking this route into the Hegelian jungle can promise many advantages. First, it can set Hegel’s thought against a background with which we are fairly familiar, and in a way that makes its relevance clearly apparent; second, it can help us locate Hegel in the broader philosophical tradition, making us see that the traditional ‘analytic’ jump from Kant to Frege leaves (...) out a crucial period in post-Kantian thought; third, it can show Hegel in a progressive light, as attempting to take that tradition further forward; fourth, it can help us locate familiar philosophical issues in Hegelian thought that otherwise can appear wholly sui generis; and finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, focusing on this relation can help raise and crystalise some of the fascinating ambiguities concerning Hegel’s outlook, regarding whether Hegel’s response to Kant shows him to have been a reactionary, Romantic, pre-critical thinker, who sought to turn the philosophical clock back to a time before Kant had written, or a modernist, Enlightened and essentially critical one, who remained true to the spirit if not the letter of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

Reading Hegel retrieves Hegelian speculative experience for literary theory. The relationship between Hegel and literary theory has for a long time been both contested and paradoxical. On the one hand, "theory" is often skeptical of all that Hegel ostensibly stood for: idealism, systematicity, and identity at the expense of difference. Yet, in spite of itself, literary theory is taken to owe a profound debt to Hegel's philosophy. Robert Lucas Scott's book complicates this account and argues that (...) literary theory has made the mistake of abstracting Hegel's thought from its more dynamic presentation in Hegel's writings, reducing "Hegel" to a series of propositions or positions. Literary theory, Scott argues, misses what is perhaps the greatest innovation of Hegel's philosophy: a presentation of experience that begins precisely by setting aside all preconceptions or prior assumptions. It is on this point that Hegel's philosophy itself approaches literature: its content cannot be simply abstracted from the singular experience of reading it. Only through a mode of reading alive to speculative experience can literary theory become truly Hegelian. Scott's exposition of Hegel offers a model of reading with relevance beyond philosophy: one that is critical without pretensions of mastery and detachment and that honors the singularity of the reading experience without succumbing to the subjectivism of the "postcritical." The book also includes engagements with the work of Luther, Kant, Marx, Gillian Rose, Fredric Jameson, Robert Brandom, Catherine Malabou, and more in its recovery of Hegel's thought for a critical understanding of our time. (shrink)

This work brings together, for the first time in English translation, Hegel's journal publications from his years in Heidelberg (1816-18), writings which have been previously either untranslated or only partially translated into English. The Heidelberg years marked Hegel's return to university teaching and represented an important transition in his life and thought. The translated texts include his important reassessment of the works of the philosopher F. H. Jacobi, whose engagement with Spinozism, especially, was of decisive significance for (...) the philosophical development of German Idealism. They also include his most influential writing about contemporary political events, his essay on the constitutional assembly in his native Württemberg, which was written against the background of the dramatic political and social changes occurring in post-Napoleonic Germany. The translators have provided an introduction and notes that offer a scholarly commentary on the philosophical and political background of Hegel's Heidelberg writings. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the shared elements and the main differences of the conceptions of Hegel and Marx regarding the method. First we establish the theoretical frame of the relation between both thinkers and show the problems that this relation presents. Later we carry out a critique of the interpretation of Hegelian Marxism. Finally we give a general characterization of which we consider that make up the place of confluence of the conceptions of Hegel and Marx.

Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel is now recognized as one of the great philosophers; his concept of the dialectic profoundly influenced the course of Western thought, and — particularly through the lens of Marxist philosophy — continues to exert great influence even today. Yet Hegel himself has often been accused of being a philosopher of reaction: on the political sphere the polar opposite of Marx. It was not until the publication of Jacques D'Hondt's Hegel en son (...) temps that the vision of Hegel as a supporter of the oppressive post-Napoleonic regime in Prussia gave way to the realization that Hegel was appointed by the liberal wing of the Prussian bureaucracy, that he frequently was at odds with the reactionary forces, and that he supported many of the leading student activists of his day. Hegel en son temps has previously been translated into German and Italian, but has never before been available in English. Its publication now will be welcomed throughout the English-speaking world by scholars and students alike. (shrink)

While much has been written in recent years about the significance of Hegel’s Logic for Marx’s method in Capital, less attention has been given to the relevance of Hegel’s method for understanding Marx’s outlook on rights. The dominant view among political theorists across the Anglo-American, Marxist and critical theory traditions is that the revolutionary transformation of capitalism would pave the way for the disappearance of rights in communist society. The aim of this article is to question (...) the orthodoxy concerning the fate of rights in communist society by bringing into relief the relevance of Aufhebung. When applied to Marx’s social theory, this Hegelian concept sheds valuable light on the transformation of rights in communist society and points to an alternative conclusion than the one proposed by leading commentators. A re-Hegelianized reading of Marx’s cumulative reflections on rights shows the possibility of a reconstituted notion of rights in communist society. (shrink)

Published in 1821, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right is considered the definitive articulation of the legal, moral, social, and political philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. However, shortly before its publication, Hegel delivered a series of lectures on the subject matter of the work at the University of Berlin. These lectures are unlike any others Hegel gave on the philosophy of Right in that they do not supplement a published text but rather give a full and independent presentation (...) of his mature political thought. Yet, they are also unlike Hegel's formal treatise in that they form a smooth and flowing discourse, much like Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy. Substantively, these lectures contain more extensive discussions of poverty and the proletariat than are found in Hegel's published text--discussions that carry out the retreat from optimism about the present age intimated in the preface to Outlines but nowhere evident in the text itself. Translated with an introduction and notes by Alan Brudner, Hegel's 1819/20 lectures on the philosophy of Right present his complete thoughts on law and the state in a manner that is more accessible and engaging than any other Hegelian text on these subjects. (shrink)

This paper challenges the commonly made claim that the work of Pierre Bourdieu is fundamentally anti-Hegelian in orientation. In contrast, it argues that the development of Bourdieu's work from its earliest structuralist through its later 'post-structuralist' phase is better described in terms of a shift from a late nineteenth century neo-Kantian to a distinctly Hegelian post-Kantian outlook. In his break with structuralism, Bourdieu appealed to a bodily based 'logic of practice' to explain the binaristic logic of Lévi-Strauss' structuralist analyses of (...) myth. Effectively working within the tradition of the Durkheimian approach to symbolic classification, Lévi-Strauss had inherited Durkheim's distinctly neo-Kantian understanding of the role of categories in experience and action—an account that conflated two forms of representation—'intuitions' and 'concepts—that Kant himself had held distinct. Bourdieu's appeal to the role of the body's dispositional habitus can be considered as a retrieval of Hegel's earlier quite different reworking of Kant's intuition-concept distinction in terms of distinct 'logics' with different forms of 'negation'. Bourdieu commonly acknowledged the parallels of his analyses of social life to those of Hegel, but opposed Hegelianism because he believed that Hegel had remained entrapped within the dynamics of mythopoeic thought. In contrast, Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss, he claimed, by instituting a science of myth, had broken with it. This criticism of Hegel, however, relies on an understanding of his philosophy that has been rejected by many contemporary Hegel scholars, and without it, the gap separating Hegel and Bourdieu narrows dramatically. (shrink)

Reading Charles Taylor's Hegel, one is quite struck by his view that Hegel's Logic offers us an ontology. To some degree this is an obvious observation in that the Logic certainly pretends to speak regarding “all that is”. Within the optic of Taylor's suggestion, it is possible to explore the primacy of the ontological claim for Hegel's work, the possibility of nihilism consequent upon its collapse, and an access to a post-Hegelian and post-nihilistic future for human (...) class='Hi'>thought and activity. (shrink)

Since Hegel, philosophy cannot stop thinking its end. The violent transformations which Hegel's philosophy has uncovered and caused in the structure of philosophical terms and in the terms under which philosophy is possible is Hamacher's topic. Starting from Hegel's commentaries on biblical scripture, Hamacher traces the genealogy and unfolding of Hegel's thought into his mature works--the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of History--focusing throughout on the limits and borders, the limitations and extremities of (...) its conceptual and textual movements. Because the concept for Hegel is the end of the thing--the point where it peaks--because it occurs by severance from its representational content, the trace of this splitting appears imprinted into its discursive articulation. The Hegelian text is punctuated by a series of terms and topics that operate according to the logic of the turning point: one function activating its opposite, they serve as pores between mutually exclusive experiences and establish their unity. This dialectical procedure falters, its unity dissolves, the pores turn into aporias, wherever conceptual exigencies surpass the reality they have instilled. Hamacher shows that dialectics, proceeding by way of aporias, remains unable to account for its own movement. Hegel's system must be read from the point where its rupture fails to converge with its end. Analyzing both the historical and the systematic aspects of Hegel's philosophy, addressing Kant and religious fetishism, Nietzsche and the impossible repetition of the same, Marx and the aroma of religion, Freud and the hysterical body, Hamacher's argument is directed toward what in Hegel's philosophy of spirit resists spiritualization and defeats philosophy. Aspiring to be the last philosophy, speculative idealism has to incorporate all previous systems and spiritualize its incorporation. Its logic of ingestion must, however, reject with repulsion and nausea everything that resists appropriation. Emphasizing Hegel's claim to present the political theology of modern society, Hamacher shows that the mechanism of nausea meant to keep the system intact is in fact itself a mechanism foreign to its body; it averts the promised incorporation, defeats idealization, leaves the body politic disintegrated, and voids the claim of the most powerful ontology of modern society to mark the end, the completion and plenitude--the pleroma--of philosophy and history. What remains--the indigestible, the unreadable, the nondiscursive--demands yet another kind of discourse and another practical gesture: toward a pleroma other than Hegel's. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of nature’s having a “purposiveness without a purpose” was quickly picked by the Romantics and made into a theory of art as revealing the otherwise hidden unity of nature and freedom. Other responses (such as Hegel’s) turned instead to Kant’s concept of judgment and used this to develop a theory that, instead of the Romantics’ conception of the non-discursive manifestation of the absolute, argued for the discursively articulable realization of conceptual truths. Although Hegel did not argue (...) for the “end of art” (although it is widely held that he did just that), he did, curiously enough, claim that it is art and not philosophy which tells us about the “life” of agents. To see how he reconciles that claim with his otherwise entirely discursively oriented philosophy, it is necessary to look at his thesis of the end of art’s “absolute” importance. Hegel’s worries have to do with the impossibility of fully exhibiting the “inner” in the “outer” in modern art and with the newly emerging problem of “fraudulence” in the poet’s voice. This is illustrated by examples drawn from the history of music and the problems besetting the lyric poet in modern life. Because of these problems, we are, Hegel says, now “amphibious animals” having to live in different and seemingly incompatible worlds. Hegel’s student, Heinrich Heine, found that the only satisfactory way of responding to this was for the modern artist to adopt a distinctive type of irony in response to the Hegel’s worries about modern art. This form of irony, it is argued, is itself Hegelian in spirit. (shrink)

The thought of G. W. F. Hegel has had a deep and lasting influence on a wide range of philosophical, political, religious, aesthetic, cultural and scientific movements. But, despite the far-reaching importance of Hegel's thought, there is often a great deal of confusion about what he actually said or believed. G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts provides an accessible introduction to both Hegel's thought and Hegel-inspired philosophy in general, demonstrating how his concepts (...) were understood, adopted and critically transformed by later thinkers. The first section of the book covers the principal philosophical themes in Hegel's system: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethical theory, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and theory of the history of philosophy. The second section covers the main post-Hegelian movements in philosophy: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and French poststructuralism. The breadth and depth of G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts makes it an invaluable introduction for philosophical beginners and a useful reference source for more advanced scholars and researchers. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the comparison of the master-slave dialectic with the Marxist concept of class struggle. The master-slave dialectic is presented not only in its source – Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – but also in its reception by later authors: Alexander Kojève and Jacques Lacan. Alexandre Kojève focuses on the resolution of the antago­nism between slave and master in Empire, the society of the Citizen, by which history ends. Lacan proposes considering this theoretical construct from the (...) position of the “death of the master” and in the situation of the “sophisticated domination” (which the slave possesses and through which an immanent break is made in the structure of the master’s absolute knowledge). One of the sources of the concept of class struggle in classical Marxism is the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, which is reconceptualized in a more rev­olutionary, practice-oriented way. Concept of class struggle opposes to the speculative Hegelian construction, which is trying to describe self-consciousness in a more abstract way. Marx also borrows Hegelian terminology from The Science of Logic, because he wants to describe the structure of class as a research object (consciousness that has not come to self-consciousness, the class-in-itself) and as an active, revolutionary subject (consciousness that has entered the struggle for recognition – and thereby has gained self-consciousness, the class-in-itself). A comparative analysis of these concepts allows us to see the sources of the Marxist doctrine of class and class struggle and to open the way of a synthesis between the Marxist and “post-Hegelian” reading of the master-slave dialectic. (shrink)

This book is an admirable sequel to the author’s Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. In that earlier study, Professor Avineri stressed the “inseparable link between Marx and the Hegelian heritage,” insisting that Marx had managed to remain a “true” Hegelian even in the process of turning his early master’s social and political doctrine on its head. Undeniably, Marx “did this in a way that would have startled and disturbed Hegel considerably”; yet, according (...) to Avineri, it was all consistently Hegelian: “For the unique and specific achievement of Hegel’s philosophy makes its own subversion possible.” In this sequel the same “inseparable link” is stressed, though here, of course, we have a looking forward to Marx from Hegel rather than a looking back to Hegel from Marx. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of the death of God in Hegel's philosophy and its implications for his political thought. It argues that Hegel's notion of the death of God involves a Christological kenotic sense of self-emptying, which extends beyond his philosophy of religion to impact his entire philosophical system, including politics, given that Hegel considers that the state consists in the march of God. The paper aims to interpret Hegel’s stance on the death of (...) God as kenotic and its integration into his system, with the purpose of addressing how this kenotic structure manifests in concrete conceptions of the state. Specifically, it examines the enigmatic figure of the Hegelian monarch as a kenotic-political figure. Finally, it concludes that Hegel's political thought consists of a political theology of kenosis, which is more concerned with the divestment of power rather than a plenipotentiary paradigm. (shrink)

The three-volume set gives new insights into Hegel's dialectics and thereby his overall philosophical thought via a retracing of the origins of dialectics and an analysis of its logic structure, with the concept of the Nous highlighted as fundamental to this. The first volume explores two origins of Hegelian dialectics from ancient Greek philosophy, namely the linguistic spirit of Logos and the existentialist spirit of Nous, before illuminating how their binary opposition, division and unification constitutes the inner tension (...) of Hegel's dialectics and developing into the forms of thought that fashion the history of western philosophy. Focusing on self-negation and reflective form of dialectics, and representing spirits of Nous and Logos respectively, the second volume further explores their core functions in terms of subjectivity, free spirit and practicality. In the final volume, the author defines Hegel's dialectics as "a unity of three": logic, epistemology and ontology. This unification and the interrelation of three components demonstrates the internal feature of Hegel's dialectics as well as the connection and divergence between Hegel and Marx's philosophical thought. The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Hegel and Marx's philosophy, German classical philosophy and Western philosophy. (shrink)

The three-volume set gives new insights into Hegel's dialectics and thereby his overall philosophical thought via a retracing of the origins of dialectics and an analysis of its logic structure, with the concept of the Nous highlighted as fundamental to this. The first volume explores two origins of Hegelian dialectics from ancient Greek philosophy, namely the linguistic spirit of Logos and the existentialist spirit of Nous, before illuminating how their binary opposition, division and unification constitutes the inner tension (...) of Hegel's dialectics and developing into the forms of thought that fashion the history of western philosophy. Focusing on self-negation and reflective form of dialectics, and representing spirits of Nous and Logos respectively, the second volume further explores their core functions in terms of subjectivity, free spirit and practicality. In the final volume, the author defines Hegel's dialectics as "a unity of three": logic, epistemology and ontology. This unification and the interrelation of three components demonstrates the internal feature of Hegel's dialectics as well as the connection and divergence between Hegel and Marx's philosophical thought. The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Hegel and Marx's philosophy, German classical philosophy and Western philosophy. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel is now recognized as one of the great philosophers; his concept of the dialectic profoundly influenced the course of Western thought, and—particularly through the lens of Marxist philosophy—continues to exert great influence even today. Yet Hegel himself has often been accused of being a philosopher of reaction: on the political sphere the polar opposite of Marx. It was not until the publication of Jacques D’Hondt’s _Hegel en son temps_ that the vision of (...) Hegel as a supporter of the oppressive post-Napoleonic regime in Prussia gave way to the realization that Hegel was appointed by the liberal wing of the Prussian bureaucracy, that he frequently was at odds with the reactionary forces, and that he supported many of the leading student activists of his day. _Hegel en son temps_ has previously been translated into German and Italian, but has never before been available in English. Its publication now will be welcomed throughout the English-speaking world by scholars and students alike. (shrink)

A revival of interest in Hegel is long overdue. Both the Analytic movement and the post-World War II access of interest in Existentialism resulted from a reaction against Hegelian idealism, but disagreement with a philosopher’s theories is no good reason for neglecting to study them - in fact, to disagree without knowledge is to risk serious error, and to criticize without understanding is merely to reveal lack of scholarship. It is therefore all to the good that attention should be (...) drawn to Hegel’s writings, and Prof. Weiss has chosen an interesting way of doing this by writing a brief commentary on Hegel’s treatment, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, of Aristotle’s De Anima. This portion of Hegel’s writing is especially crucial for the understanding of his philosophy, for not only is he strongly influenced by Aristotle’s thought and, in a sense, himself the Aristotle of post-renaissance philosophy, but the conception of Mind or Spirit is the key notion of Hegel’s system, as ‘Ousia’ is that of Aristotle’s. Aristotle identifies this ultimately with pure activity, the realization of all potentiality, which is pure form without matter, the activity of God and of active reason in man; and this may be likened to Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. (shrink)

The principal aim of this work, which is a combination of revised versions of essays that have appeared elsewhere together with some new material, is considerably broader than the title might suggest. Rather than specifically focusing upon Hegel’s relation to romanticism or the vicissitudes of his Grecophilia, the real thrust is nothing less than an attempt to place Hegel’s theory of the state within its historical and systematic context, to rescue it from the many misappropriations and misinterpretations which (...) it has suffered, and to sound out its implications for contemporary political theory and practice. If one were to single out a limited number of the most important themes that serve to unify this collection of essays, at least the following would have to be mentioned. First, Kelly insists at the outset that Hegel’s political philosophy can only be adequately understood within the context of his broader systematic project. Specifically, Hegel’s theory of the state must be approached from out of the more general problematic of his views on the systematic interrelationships between philosophy, politics, history, and religion. Though the author’s discussion of the complex issues lurking in the interstices here will seem to many Hegel scholars much too brief and superficial, particularly given Kelly’s own insistence upon their crucial importance, his discussion at least suffices to allow him to make the point that Hegel’s theory of the state cannot be easily assimilated into either the liberal, conservative, or radical traditions, as understood either in the pre- or post-Hegelian context. Rather, Hegel’s thought contributed to an important shift in the fundamental conceptual constellations which governed political discourse in his own time and which formed the bridge to our epoch. On this basis, Kelly proposes to examine Hegel’s theory of the state, both on its own terms and with an eye to the implications which it might yet have for understanding political phenomena. In both respects, the key notion is that of ‘the neutral state’ which knows "how to compose man’s spiritual strivings and intellectual curiosity... in a stable social whole", a dialectical ‘unity-in-diversity’ "checked by the monarchy from above and the people organized in corporations from below", and ballasted by an impartial legal system and a dedicated phalanx of educated civil servants. For Kelly, Hegel’s idea of the ‘neutral state’ was too soon "buried" in the post-Hegelian reaction, with the result that an original source of insight into the modern political problematic, if not of answers to contemporary political conundrums, was unfortunately and unfairly discredited. Kelly carries through with this idea by showing how Hegel’s theory of the state can serve to shed light on the history and current state of American politics and how it can lead to a renewed reflection upon the meaning and significance of history for contemporary thought. Kelly is at his best at those points where he contrasts Hegel’s political thought to other positions in the context of the modern intellectual and political milieu but is a bit weaker when issues arise which seem to require a shift from political theory to philosophical presuppositions. Nonetheless, especially when read together with the contributions of Avineri and Shklar, this work is helpful in the current re-evaluation of the importance and contemporary relevance of Hegel’s political thought.—J.P.S. (shrink)

This paper considers the relation between the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the German idealist G. W. F. Hegel . While Peirce engaged with Hegel’s thought quite extensively, his often critical comments on the latter have made it hard to see any genuine common ground between the two; recent ways of reading Hegel, however, suggest how this might be possible, where the connections between their respective metaphysical positions and views of the categories are explored here. (...) Issues relating to their epistemology and philosophies of languages are considered in a companion article. (shrink)