Benedict de Spinoza is one of the most controversial and enigmatic thinkers in the history of philosophy. His greatest work, Ethics (1677), developed a comprehensive philosophical system and argued that God and Nature are identical. His scandalous Theological-Political Treatise (1670) provoked outrage during his lifetime due to its biblical criticism, anticlericalism, and defense of the freedom to philosophize. Together, these works earned Spinoza a reputation as a singularly radical thinker. -/- In this book, Steinberg and Viljanen offer a concise (...) and up-to-date account of Spinoza’s thought and its philosophical legacy. They explore the full range of Spinoza’s ideas, from politics and theology to ontology and epistemology. Drawing broadly on Spinoza’s impressive oeuvre, they have crafted a lucid introduction for readers unfamiliar with this important philosopher, as well as a nuanced and enlightening study for more experienced readers. (shrink)

Spinoza's Political Psychology advances a novel, comprehensive interpretation of Spinoza's political writings, exploring how his analysis of psychology informs his arguments for democracy and toleration. Justin Steinberg shows how Spinoza's political method resembles the Renaissance civic humanism in its view of governance as an adaptive craft that requires psychological attunement. He examines the ways that Spinoza deploys this realist method in the service of empowerment, suggesting that the state can affectively reorient and thereby liberate its citizens, but only if (...) it attends to their actual motivational and epistemic capacities. His book will interest a range of readers in Spinoza studies and the history of political thought, as well as readers working in contemporary political theory. (shrink)

In modern discourse about the history of science, it seems to be widely accepted that at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany was one of the leading countries in the production of science. In the past, historians of science tried to trace back a specific ‘German style’ of science that—in combination with other factors—determined this German dominance around 1900, especially in the life sciences. Considering the theoretical concept of ‘national styles’, it has to be kept in mind that around (...) 1900, contemporaries already proclaimed ‘national styles’ of science as representations of national identity. Thus, the question arises as to how far existing historiographical conceptions of national styles may include earlier claims and prejudices. Careful reconstructions of contemporary discourses on national styles and inquiries into the ‘stylisation’ of a dominant, successful ‘German style’ are necessary. One of the contemporary critics of a ‘German style’ of science was the physiologist Jacques Loeb (1859–1924), who emigrated to the USA in 1891. Loeb corresponded regularly with the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838–1916). Ernst Mach can be considered Loeb's intellectual father with whom he corresponded about strategic, philosophical, and epistemological questions. Using the Loeb–Mach correspondence, the aim of the paper is to reconstruct Loeb's conception of a ‘German style’ of science and its differences to an ‘American style’. Changes in his views are discussed as well as the roots of his views and some of their consequences. Finally, Loeb's ideas on national styles and his working profiles before and after his emigration are compared to historiographical analyses of ‘American’ or ‘German’ styles of science around 1900. (shrink)

Epistemic utility theory is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk (...) of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk. (shrink)

Bei transzendenten Erfahrungen treten Aspekte und Dimensionen der vertrauten Wirklichkeit hervor, die normalerweise verborgen sind. Gewohnte Deutungsmuster und Erklarungskategorien versagen. Kognitive Spannungen sind die Folge. Das Bedurfnis nach ihrer Losung fuhrt oft zu vorschnellen Interpretationen und Erklarungen oder gar zur apriorischen Abwertung und Ignorierung transzendenter Erfahrungen. Sorgfaltige und umsichtige wissenschaftliche Studien sind daher immer noch ein Desiderat. Die Beitrage basieren auf einer Ringvorlesung an der Universitat Basel. Sie thematisieren an einschlagigen Beispielen die Phanomenologie transzendenter Erfahrungen, ihre biographischen Wirkungen, ihr Zusammenspiel (...) mit kunstlerischem Schaffen und Erleben, die Schwierigkeit ihrer Deutung und Beurteilung und ihre Abwertung und Pathologisierung durch Aufklarung und Wissenschaft. Inhalt: Heiner Schwenke: Einleitung: Was sind und zu welchem Ende erforscht man transzendente Erfahrungen? Heiner Schwenke: Begegnungen mit Personen aus anderen Welten Jorg-Andreas Botticher: Wo das Unsagbare horbar wird - Musik und Transzendenz David-Marc Hoffmann: Rudolf Steiner als Lehrer der Transzendenz Heiner Schwenke: Swedenborg und Kant - Zur Schwierigkeit, transzendente Erfahrung zu verstehen Saskia Wendel: Unterscheidung der Geister - Zur Kriteriologie religioser Erfahrung Andreas Sommer: Geisterglaube, Aufklarung und Wissenschaft - Historiographische Skizzen zu einem westlichen Fundamentaltabu. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Technological advances introduce the possibility that, in the future, firms will be able to use big-data analysis to discover and offer consumers their individual reservation price. This can generate some interesting benefits, such as a better state of affairs in terms of equality of both welfare and resources, as well as increased social welfare. However, these benefits are countered by considerations of relational equality. This article takes up the market-failures approach as its basis to demonstrate what is wrong with using (...) big data to personalize prices. The article offers an improvement to the market-failures approach and argues that what is wrong with using big data to personalize prices is that it unfairly undermines consumers’ ability to benefit from the market, which is the very point of having a market. (shrink)

More and more, we face AI-based products and services. Using these services often requires our explicit consent, e.g., by agreeing to the services’ Terms and Conditions clause. Current advances introduce the ability of AI to evolve and change its own modus operandi over time in such a way that we cannot know, at the moment of consent, what it is in the future to which we are now agreeing. Therefore, informed consent is impossible regarding certain kinds of AI. Call this (...) the problem of radical ignorance. Interestingly, radical ignorance exists in consent contexts other than AI, where it seems that individuals can provide informed consent. The article argues that radical ignorance can undermine informed consent in some contexts but not others because, under certain institutional, autonomy-protecting conditions, consent can be valid without being (perfectly) informed. By understanding these institutional conditions, we can formulate practical solutions to foster valid, albeit imperfectly informed consent across various decision contexts and within different institutions. (shrink)

Die Frage, ob und wie der universale Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte sich mit dem Pluralismus der Religionen und Kulturen vermitteln läßt, ist ein zentrales Thema innerhalb der gegenwärtigen Menschenrechtsdebatte. Die Kantische Philosophie kann einen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte leisten, indem sie dazu verhilft, einige vielfach beschworene Dichotomien kritisch auszuräumen, durch die die interkulturelle Verständigung über Menschenrechte nicht selten schon im Ansatz blockiert wird. Nach Kant zielt eine kosmopolitische rechtliche Rahmenordnung nicht auf globale Uniformierung, sondern auf die politisch-rechtliche Gestaltung der faktisch erreichten (...) und vermutlich irreversiblen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung. Wenn menschenrechtliche Freiheit jedem einzelnen Menschen zukommt, so steht der darin implizierte Individualismus als ein genuin ethischer Individualismus keineswegs, wie oft behauptet, in Gegensatz zu kommunitären Ansprüchen auf Solidarität, sind doch Menschenrechte an der der Würde des Menschen als der inneren Quelle jeder moralischen Solidarität orientiert. Schließlich widerspricht die in der sittlichen Autonomie begründete Menschenwürde zwar einem politisch-rechtlich durchsetzbaren materialen Gottesrecht; sie ist gleichwohl aber offen für theologische Ausdeutungen der Menschenwürde über die anthropozentrische Perspektive hinaus. (shrink)

The Oprah Winfrey Show provides an interesting set of contradictions. On the one hand, it appears to challenge common-sense assumptions about relationships, specifically heterosexual relationships (for example, by consistently raising issues of sexual violence within a heterosexual context). Yet, at the same time, Oprah's presentation often works to reinforce precisely the norms she seeks to challenge. Through a close analysis of a selection of programme clips from one particular programme among many about relationships, sexuality and families, this article will consider (...) the ways in which the Oprah Winfrey Show both problematizes and yet normalizes the boundaries of heterosexuality. Here we shall discuss both the resolute exposure and exploration of what could be termed the casualities of normative (and compulsory) heterosexuality and, paradoxically, its recuperation as a ‘rational’ ideal. In exploring the ways in which this recuperation takes place, we shall begin with a brief consideration of two of the key discourses which shape the show: the discourse of therapy and that of kinship. Our analysis of the sexual politics of the Oprah Winfrey Show in these terms will focus on the programme, ‘How to Make Love Last’ (18 January 1993). Like so many other programmes, ‘How to Make Love Last’ intends to highlight and deal with problems within heterosexual relationships as distressing but solvable (through the medium of therapeutic self-help). At another level, however, the programme also (unwittingly) reveals a different order of problems which, ironically, can only be reinforced by the mode of rescue proposed and staged. (shrink)

Transgenic mice constitute an entirely new dimension of mammalian molecular genetics. They allow us to observe genes at work in the intact organism. Virtually every sector of biomedical research is likely to be affected.

A landmark of Enlightenment thought, Hume's _An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding_ is accompanied here by two shorter works that shed light on it: _A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh_, Hume's response to those accusing him of atheism, of advocating extreme skepticism, and of undermining the foundations of morality; and hisof _A Treatise of Human Nature_, which anticipates discussions developed in the _Enquiry_. In his concise Introduction, Eric Steinberg explores the conditions that led Hume to write (...) the Enquiry and the work's important relationship to Book I of Hume's _A Treatise of Human Nature_. (shrink)

This book is the first to explore in detail the role that symbolic representation plays in the architecture of Kant's philosophy. Symbolic representation fulfills a crucial function in Kant's practical philosophy because it serves to mediate between the unconditionality of the categorical imperative and the inescapable finiteness of the human being. By showing how the nature of symbolic representation plays out across all areas of the practical philosophy - moral philosophy, legal philosophy, philosophy of history and philosophy of religion - (...) Heiner Bielefeldt offers a unique perspective on how these various facets of Kant's philosophy cohere. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Christian Nimtz argues for the view that the semantic notion of paradigm termhood lies at the heart of Kripkean philosophy of language and metaphysics. According to Nimtz, th...

In 1871, the German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller moved from his Basel chair to the much better paid chair in Tartu, and taught there until his untimely death. Besides philosophy, he had studied various disciplines, including the natural sciences. In the preparation of his own philosophy, he explored the history of philosophy for more than twenty years and made pioneering contributions to the history of concepts. Only by the early-1880s did he begin to elaborate his "new philosophy", an original version of (...) personalism, both anti-idealist and anti-materialist. He did this in three major works which built upon each other. Unwritten remained the keystone of his philosophy, the Philosophie des Christentums, in which Teichmüller wanted to show that the philosophical contents of Christianity were encapsulated by his own personalism. One major objective of his philosophy, as I see it, was regaining reality---in particular the reality of the person---after it had been lost in the wake of the failure of modern representationalism. Notwithstanding its coherentist elements, I see Teichmüller's philosophy as a precursor of direct realism. Although he fell into oblivion soon after, his thoughts were received throughout Europe, notably by Friedrich Nietzsche, Aleksey Kozlov and Nicholas Lossky. His extensive literary remains, which are kept in Basel, remain to be explored. (shrink)

Despite Spinoza’s reputation as a thoroughgoing critic of teleology, in recent years a number of scholars have argued convincingly that Spinoza does not wish to eliminate teleological explanations altogether. Recent interpretative debates have focused on a more recalcitrant problem: whether Spinoza has the resources to allow for the causal efficacy of representational content. In this paper I present the problem of mental causation for Spinoza and consider two recent attempts to respond to the problem on Spinoza’s behalf. While these interpretations (...) certainly shed some light on Spinoza’s account of cognitive economy, I argue that both fail to point the way out of the problem because they fail to differentiate between two forms of representation, one of which is causally efficacious, one of which is not. I close by suggesting that there is some reason to believe that Spinoza’s account of mind avoids some of the problems typically associated with mental causation. Spinoza gilt zwar als kompromissloser Kritiker der Teleologie, aber in den letzten Jahren haben mehrere Philosophiehistoriker überzeugend dafür argumentiert, dass er keineswegs alle teleologischen Erklärungen verabschieden möchte. Neuere Interpretationsdebatten haben sich auf ein hartnäckigeres Problem konzentriert: Verfügt Spinoza über die Ressourcen, um die kausale Wirksamkeit des repräsentationalen Inhalts zuzulassen? In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich das Problem der geistigen Verursachung bei Spinoza dar und betrachte zwei neuere Versuche, im Sinne Spinozas auf dieses Problem einzugehen. Diese Interpretationen werfen sicherlich Licht auf Spinozas Auffassung von kognitiver Sparsamkeit, aber ich argumentiere, dass beide darin scheitern, einen Ausweg aus diesem Problem aufzuzeigen, da es beide versäumen, zwischen zwei Formen von Repräsentationen zu unterscheiden: einer kausal wirksamen und einer, die nicht wirksam ist. Es gibt Grund zur Überzeugung, so lege ich abschließend nahe, dass Spinozas Auffassung des Geistes einige der Probleme vermeidet, die typischerweise mit geistiger Verursachung verbunden sind. (shrink)

According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...) first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question. (shrink)

Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the (...) ‘normative argument against explosion’. Arguments of this type play — implicitly or explicitly — a central role in motivating paraconsistent logics. Branden Fitelson, in a throwaway remark, has conjectured that there is no plausible ‘bridge principle’ articulating the normative link between logic and reasoning capable of supporting such arguments. This paper offers a critical evaluation of Fitelson’s conjecture, and hence of normative arguments for paraconsistency and the conceptions of logic’s normative status on which they repose. It is argued that Fitelson’s conjecture turns out to be correct: normative arguments for paraconsistency probably fail. (shrink)

In my Steinberger 2009 I argued that Neil Tennant’s Harmony requirement is untenable because of its failure to account for the standard quantifier rules.1 Instead of justifying the customary rules for the existential and universal quantifiers, Tennant’s account appears to sanction only wholly unrestricted – and so patently disharmonious – quantifier rules. In his characteristically thoughtful response Tennant 2010, Tennant offers a sequent calculus version of his Harmony requirement that rules out such pathological would-be quantifiers. While I agree with Tennant (...) that recasting his Harmony requirement in the sequent format as he proposes blocks the said disharmonious quantifier rules, I submit that Tennant’s revamped Harmony requirement nevertheless misses the mark. I present two objections to substantiate my claim. First, I show that the crucial additional assumption underlying Tennant’s sequent calculus-based account – what I call the admissibility assumption – is excessively strong: so strong, in fact, that it renders otiose the core of Tennant’s original account. Second, I argue that the admissibility assumption, as a global requirement on deductive systems, is ill-suited for the purposes of codifying the intuitive notion of harmony. Fortunately, though, as I will demonstrate, we can dispense with the admissibility assumption altogether. (shrink)

This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...) argue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of rival logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible logic. (shrink)

Die Menschenrechte bezeichnen eine Kategorie von Rechten, die dem Menschen schlichtweg aufgrund seines Menschseins zukommen und deshalb in jedem Menschen gleichermaßen respektiert werden müssen. Dies macht den normativen Universalismus aus, der die Menschenrechte im Unterschied zu partikularen Rechten auszeichnet. Sie gelten unabhängig von individuellen Vorleistungen, Funktionen, Dokumenten, Mitgliedschaften usw. und haben ihren Grund in der Würde des Menschen.

I would have preferred that the Special Section on Children as Organ Donors had focused on the donation of a specific organ because morally relevant differences are obscured when the subject is discussed in general terms. The donation of a lobe of liver and peripheral blood or bone marrow stem cells does not result in the permanent loss of vital tissue because these organs regenerate; however, a kidney does not regenerate and its donor loses a vital organ permanently. Liver tissue (...) and peripheral blood or bone marrow stem cells are typically required to save a life, but, because most patients with end-stage renal disease can be kept alive on dialysis, the donation of a kidney is rarely life saving. Also, donor risk is organ specific; for example, it is more dangerous to donate a lobe of liver than it is to donate peripheral blood or bone marrow stem cells. (shrink)

The present study examines the prevalence, localization, frequency, and intensity of playing-related pain in a sample of high-performing young musicians. We also address coping behavior and communication about PRP between young musicians, teachers, parents, and other people, such as friends. The aim is to provide information on PRP among high-performing musicians in childhood and adolescence, which can serve as a basis for music education, practice, and prevention in the context of instrumental teaching and musicians’ health. The study is part of (...) a large-scale study with highly musically gifted participants at the national level of the “Jugend musiziert” contest. For data analyses, we used descriptive statistics, correlations, Chi2-tests, principal component analysis, Kruskal–WallisHtests, and multivariate regression. About three-quarters of the surveyed participants stated that they had experienced pain during or after playing their instrument. Female musicians were significantly more frequently affected than male musicians. With increasing age, the prevalence of PRP rises from 71 percent to 85 percent. Regarding localization of pain, results are in line with many other studies with musculoskeletal problems the most common. Furthermore, data show a clear relationship between the duration of practice and the prevalence of PRP. Our study found averages of 7:18 h/week, whereas mean values of the duration of practice vary considerably between different instruments. The variance in practice duration is very large within the different instruments. Thus, when researching PRP, it is necessary to consider both the differences between different groups of instruments in the average duration of practice as well as the very large inter-individual variation in the duration of practice within a given instrument group. While just over half of the young musicians felt they had been taken seriously, 32 percent felt that their complaints were not completely taken seriously, and 12 percent did not feel taken seriously at all. Therefore, it is necessary to improve communication and information about PRP to prevent PRP and counteract existing complaints. (shrink)

It is argued that organ donation from a patient to the patient's physician is ethically dubious because donation decisions will be inappropriately influenced and the negative public perceptions will result in more harm than good. It is suggested that to protect the perception of the physician–patient relationship, avoid cynicism about medicine’s attitude to patient welfare and maintain trust in the medical profession, a new professional boundary should be established to prevent physicians from receiving organs for transplantation donated by their patients.

In their recent article "Ideology in Action" in this journal, Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom (1993) offer a theoretical account of ideology informed by pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. The authors provide compelling reasons for understanding ideology not simply as beliefs but as situated social action. Their effort to retrieve the analysis of ideology from the realm of the noosphere is a welcome departure from more traditional conceptions. Moreover, they provide a convincing case for bringing ideological analysis back into many of (...) our analyses of social life. In the following pages I wish to engage the authors on the terrain they have laid out. Drawing on the linguistic turn in recent social theory, I offer a few friendly critiques of their interactionist conception of ideology. After reviewing these problems I discuss how a dialogic analysis of ideology can build on Fine and Sandstrom's important account of ideology, as well as offering additional insights into its nature and dynamics. I begin, however, with a capsule review of the authors' conception of ideology in action. (shrink)

The thirteen essays that constitute this volume clearly show that for over four decades Terence Penelhum has been among the most perceptive writers on Hume. Although he carefully spells out the historical context of Hume’s discussions in a number of these essays, Penelhum’s metier is not identifying antecedents or targets, but instead analyzing with clarity Hume’s views and revealing their interconnections and defects. In doing this, Penelhum succeeds not only in drawing out the implications of Hume’s philosophy but also in (...) displaying its richness. As its title indicates, the work focuses on three areas in Hume’s writings: his discussion of the self and personal identity, his views on moral psychology and freedom of the will, and his treatment of religious belief. Because Penelhum’s views on these matters have not been static, one virtue of this collection is that the reader can follow the evolution of his thoughts about Hume. In particular, each of the new essays, “Hume, Identity and Selfhood”, “Hume and the Freedom of the Will”, and “Religion in the Enquiry and After”, serves both as a summary of Penelhum’s current thinking on the topic and a commentary on his previous work. (shrink)