This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, (...) the metaphysico-scientific link, was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy. (shrink)

With over 150 alphabetically arranged entries about key scientists, concepts, discoveries, technological innovations, and learned institutions, the Oxford Guide to Physics and Astronomy traces the history of physics and astronomy from the Renaissance to the present. For students, teachers, historians, scientists, and readers of popular science books such as Galileo's Daughter, this guide deciphers the methods and philosophies of physics and astronomy as well as the historical periods from which they emerged. Meant to serve the lay (...) reader and the professional alike, this book can be turned to for the answer to how scientists learned to measure the speed of light, or consulted for neat, careful summaries of topics as complicated as quantum field theory and as vast as the universe. The entries, each written by a noted scholar and edited by J. L. Heilbron, Professor of History and Vice Chancellor, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, reflect the most up-to-date research and discuss the applications of the scientific disciplines to the wider world of religion, law, war, art and literature. No other source on these two branches of science is as informative or as inviting. Thoroughly cross-referenced and accented by dozens of black and white illustrations, the Oxford Guide to Physics and Astronomy is the source to turn to for anyone looking for a quick explanation of alchemy, x-rays and any type of matter or energy in between. (shrink)

We discuss the extent to which the visibility of the heavens was a necessary condition for the development of science, with particular reference to the measurement of time. Our conclusion is that while astronomy had significant importance, the growth of most areas of science was more heavily influenced by the accuracy of scientific instruments, and hence by current technology.

This is the second in a series of three papers that charts the history of the Lenz–Ising model (commonly called just the Ising model in the physics literature) in considerable detail, from its invention in the early 1920s to its recognition as an important tool in the study of phase transitions by the late 1960s. By focusing on the development in physicists’ perception of the model’s ability to yield physical insight—in contrast to the more technical perspective in previous historical (...) accounts, for example, Brush (Rev Modern Phys 39: 883–893, 1967) and Hoddeson et al. (Out of the Crystal Maze. Chapters from the History of Solid-State Physics. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 489–616, 1992)—the series aims to cover and explain in depth why this model went from relative obscurity to a prominent position in modern physics, and to examine the consequences of this change. In the present paper, which is self-contained, I deal with the development from the early 1950s to the 1960s and document that this period witnessed a major change in the perception of the model: In the 1950s it was not in the cards that the model was to become a pivotal tool of theoretical physics in the following decade. In fact, I show, based upon recollections and research papers, that many of the physicists in the 1950s interested in understanding phase transitions saw the model as irrelevant for this endeavor because it oversimplifies the nature of the microscopic constituents of the physical systems exhibiting phase transitions. However, one group, Cyril Domb’s in London, held a more positive view during this decade. To bring out the basis for their view, I analyze in detail their motivation and work. In the last part of the paper I document that the model was seen as much more physically relevant in the early 1960s and examine the development that led to this change in perception. I argue that the main factor behind the change was the realization of the surprising and striking agreement between aspects of the model, notably its critical behavior, and empirical features of the physical phenomena. (shrink)

As part of an ongoing study of causal models in the history of science, a counterfactual scenario in the history of modern astronomy is explored with the aid of computer simulations. After the definition of “linking advance”, a possible world involving technological antecedence is described, branching out in 1510, in which the telescope is invented 70 years before its actual construction, at the time in which Fracastoro actually built the first prototelescope. By using the principle of the (...) closest possible world, we estimate that in this scenario the discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars would by anticipated by only 28 years. The second part of the paper involves an estimate of the probability of the previous scenario, guided by the principle that the actual world is the mean and using computer simulations to create possible worlds in which the time spans between advances is varied according to a gamma distribution function. Taking into account the importance of the use of the diaphragm for the invention of the telescope, the probability that the telescope were built by 1538 for a branching time at 1510 is found to be smaller than 1%. The work shows that one of the important features of computational simulations in philosophy of science is to serve as a consistency check for the intuitions and speculations of the philosopher. (shrink)