Definitions of human nature have preoccupied philosophers, politicians, anthropologists and social scientists for centuries. Our conceptions of ourselves - what we perceive to be 'human nature' - have taken many forms from the abstract to the biologically determined. In The Human Nature Debate, Harry Cowen describes the diversity of ideas about human nature and demonstrates the extent to which all such ideas are socially and politically grounded, reflecting the prevailing concerns and priorities (...) of their times, from the classical Greek conceptions of 'rational man' to the behaviourist explanations that did so much to bolster and justify fascism and Stalinism in the twentieth century. Cowen's admirably clear introduction to the history of ideas about human nature goes beyond the theorising to the ways in which concepts of human nature have both informed and reflected policy and practice. Drawing on a wealth of evidence and example, he demonstrates the political significance of the human nature debate, and looks at the vital interactions between theory and practice in the social sciences, social policy and social practice. (shrink)

This paper argues that the substance concept, as discussed by Aristotle in his Categories, aids us to improve our understanding of human nature. Aristotle distinguished the primary from the secondary substance, and substantial from accidental change. We explain these distinctions, their use for understanding phenomena, and discuss how we can integrate them with evolutionary explanations of human nature. For explaining of how the typical human characteristics evolved, we extend our investigations with a discussion of the (...) concept of person. It is argued that psychological attributes, used to characterize persons, are not attributes of a separate mental substance, as Cartesians believe. The concept of a person, though not a substance concept, qualifies a substance concept of a human being possessing rational powers. The latter evolved as the result of language evolution. (shrink)

The question of human nature has not been effectively addressed in our time because of great skepticism in the academic and philosophical discourses about the idea of social progress and the validity of a common humanity. As a result the question has been reduced by neoliberalism, biopsychology, and social psychology to demonstrating the malleability of humans in response to hierarchical, biological, or social-conformist pressures. To recover the concept of human nature it will be necessary to reconceptualize (...) the dynamic of human development as a feature of the modern and late modern achievements of a more evolved vision of individuality and community. (shrink)

The philosophical concept of the self has had a hard time for a long time. The scepticism that lay behind Hume’s ‘bundle’ theory has been made manifest in ‘post-philosophical’ claims that the self or subject is not so much a ‘something’ that ties together a bundle of sense impressions, but is rather to be seen as an effect of a system of power relations, or an illusory presupposition of the relational properties of syntax.

Xunzi is a Confucian scholar well known for his theory that no human nature is innately good. However, because it is in human nature to be greedy, it is possible to train the people through promise of reward and punishment. Xunzi has long been considered to have taught Han Feizi who has a similar notion of human nature and uses it as basis for his Legalist theories. In this paper, I compare the two (...) philosophers based on their system of reward and punishment in order to analyze the difference and the similarities between the two. Although the two philosophers share an understanding of human nature, and a system of reward and punishment based on such theories, whereas Xunzi has a belief in the possibility of edification through good influence, Han Feizi does not. Xunzi asserts that mercy is more efficient than punishment in case of petty thefts among the poor, and also that even the severest punishment cannot push a soldier to risk one’s life in battle. This goes directly against Han Feizi’s strong belief in the absoluteness of the rule of law, where no mercy is possible even for the poor, and a rigid system of punishment and reward is seen as sufficient to push the people toward risking their lives for their king. On the other hand, although Han Feizi is often criticized for his lack of regard for the people’s lives in pursuit of power for the absolute monarch, it may be seen that such unforgiving application of the law results in an orderly society which benefits the people in the long run. Therefore, it may be argued that both Xunzi and Han Feizi’s long term goal for the legal system is to bring order to society. A comparison between the two scholars proves that no one-dimensional analysis is valid, and renders it possible to understand their philosophies in a much more colorful light. (shrink)

John Dupre warns that our understanding of human nature is being distorted by two faulty and harmful forms of pseudo-scientific thinking. Not just in the academic world but in everyday life, we find one set of experts who seek to explain the ends at which humans aim in terms of evolutionary theory, while the other set uses economic models to give rules of how we act to achieve those ends. Dupre demonstrates that these theorists' explanations do not (...) work and that, if taken seriously, their theories tend to have dangerous social and political consequences. For these reasons, it is important to resist scientism: an exaggerated conception of what science can be expected to do for us. Dupre restores sanity to the study of human nature by pointing the way to a proper understanding of humans in the societies that are our natural and necessary environments. Anyone interested in science and human life will enjoy this book--unless they are its targets. (shrink)

This paper defends a modest conception of human nature and argues that any adequate moral theory must incorporate this conception. Against the extreme historicist view it is argued that there are morally important necessary characteristics all human beings possess, and that many moral theories can be justified and criticized on the basis of these characteristics. Against the extreme naturalist view it is argued that the morally important and necessary characteristics give only a minimum content to moral (...) theories and an adequate theory must both include and go beyond this minimum. In conclusion, it is claimed that it follows that purely formal, some relativistic, some élitist, and some natural law moral theories are mistaken. (shrink)

This paper examines the relation between the problem of human nature and political theory; it is claimed that every such theory is founded on some anthropological preconditions. The paper studies the political conceptions of four modern philosophers: Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Pyotr Kropotkin. It reveals that two opposing tendencies form the imaginary of the modern era: the authoritative one that identifies an egoistic/ unsociable human nature that needs control, and the libertarian (...) one that recognizes a human being capable of more advanced types of social fabric. The problem that is also investigated is how anthropological dualism can be transcended to permit the conception of a new anthropological type as well as the type of society that will help human potentiality of consciousness and coexistence to unfold. (shrink)

Over six previous editions, Twelve Theories of Human Nature has been a remarkably popular introduction to some of the most influential developments in Western and Eastern thought. Now titled Thirteen Theories of Human Nature, this text continues to be an ideal introduction to human nature andintellectual history. This unique volume will engage and motivate students to consider how we can understand and improve both ourselves and human society.

While realists acknowledge that their theories of world politics are rooted in specific assumptions about human nature, neorealists tend to discount human nature in favor of an emphasis on systemic forces. Nevertheless neorealism has assumptions about human nature that shape neorealist theorizing. Specifically, in Man, the State, and War and Theory of International Politics, Waltz make essentially the same assumptions about human nature as the realists — that our human natures (...) are fixed, that we cannot trust others, and that decision-makers are rational calculators who seek to promote their narrowly defined self-interests. Moreover, for Waltz, human nature determines world politics as much or more than its anarchic structure. A review of biology, specifically human neuroscience, suggests that these assumptions about human nature, and its relation to world politics, ought to be challenged. Our ”natures’ are much more complex and flexible than realism and neorealism assumes. (shrink)

Is human nature something that the natural and social sciences aim to describe, or is it a pernicious fiction? What role, if any, does ”human nature’ play in directing and informing scientific work? Can we talk about human nature without invoking---either implicitly or explicitly---a contrast with human culture? It might be tempting to think that the respectability of ”human nature’ is an issue that divides natural and social scientists along disciplinary boundaries, (...) but the truth is more complex. The contributors to this collection take very different stances with regard to the idea of human nature. They come from the fields of psychology, the philosophy of science, social and biological anthropology, evolutionary theory, and the study of animal cognition. Some of them are ”human nature’ enthusiasts, some are sceptics, and some say that human nature is a concept with many faces, each of which plays a role in its own investigative niche. Some want to eliminate the notion altogether, some think it unproblematic, others want to retain it with reforming modifications. Some say that human nature is a target for investigation that the human sciences cannot do without, others argue that the term does far more harm than good. The diverse perspectives articulated in this book help to explain why we disagree about human nature, and what, if anything, might resolve that disagreement. Introduction Tim Lewens 1 Doubling Down on the Nomological Notion of Human Nature Edouard Machery 2 Trait Bin and Trait Cluster Accounts of Human Nature Grant Ramsey 3 A Developmental Systems Account of Human Nature Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths 4 Human Nature, Natural Pedagogy, and Evolutionary Causal Essentialism Cecilia Heyes 5 Human Nature John Dupré 6 Sceptical Reflections on Human Nature Kim Sterelny 7 The Social Construction of Human Nature Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown 8 The Use and Non-Use of the Human Nature Concept by Evolutionary Biologists Peter J. Richerson 9 Human Ontogenies as Historical Processes Christina Toren 10 Divide and Conquer Maria Kronfeldner. (shrink)

Human nature is a puzzling matter that must be analysed through a holistic lens. In this commentary, I foray into anthropology's biosocial dimensions to underscore that human relations span from microorganisms to global commodities. I argue that the future of social-cultural anthropology depends on the integration of evolutionary theory for its advancement. Ultimately, since the likelihood of novel zoonoses' emergence, digital ethnography could offer remarkable opportunities for ethical and responsible inquiries.

In Kant's Human Being, Robert B. Louden continues and deepens avenues of research first initiated in his highly acclaimed book, Kant's Impure Ethics.

Now available together as a set for a discounted price: _Theories of Human Nature_, with, _Human Nature: A Reader_, by Joel J. Kupperman. _On _Theories of Human Nature_:_A very fine book on human nature, both what it is and what philosophers have thought about it--philosophers in an inclusive sense, from Plato and Aristotle to Mengzi and Xunzi, from Hume and Kant to Ibn al-Arabi to Marx and Rousseau and including many others. The writing is lively (...) and accessible, the philosophy insightful, and the sense of human possibilities conveyed admirable. It will fit nicely into many different sorts of classes. --John Perry, Stanford University _On _Nature: A Reader_:_ This anthology provides a set of distinctive, influential views that explore the mysteries of human nature from a variety of perspectives. (shrink)

When speaking of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature, past scholars divided Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi into three categories, and they tended to divide the theories into moral categories of good and evil. The discovery of bamboo and silk sheets from this period, however, has offered some valuable literature, providing a historical opportunity for the thorough research of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature. Based on the information on the recently excavated bamboo and silk sheets, especially (...) the essay titled “Xing Zi Ming Chu” on bamboo sheets unearthed in Guodian, this essay examines pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature from a new perspective. In doing so, it looks forward to a breakthrough in academic patterns of thought which typically defined pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature as good or evil, and thus a closer look at the original appearance of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature as a whole. (shrink)

Human Nature offers a wide-ranging and holistic view of human nature from all perspectives: scientific, historical, and sociological. Mary Clark takes the most recent data from a dozen or more fields, and works it together with clarifying anecdotes and thought-provoking images to challenge conventional Western beliefs with hopeful new insights. Balancing the theories of cutting-edge neuroscience with the insights of primitive mythologies, Mary Clark provides down-to-earth suggestions for peacefully resolving global problems. Human Nature builds (...) up a coherent, and above all positive, picture of who we really are. (shrink)

In Human Nature and Politics in Utopian and Anti-Utopian Fiction, Nivedita Bagchi's purpose is primarily to examine "human nature" as a historical concept that can help us to make sense of the political theory of her chosen works of fiction within their authorial context. Bagchi does not use the term "Human nature" first and foremost as a category for analysing the present but rather to address historic texts on terms their authors would have (...) understood.Following an introduction, the book's four main chapters cover Thomas More's Utopia, Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. The conclusion also contains an analysis of... (shrink)

An anthology of substantive selections on human nature from fifteen authors: Plato, Aristotle, Mencius, Seneca, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, Beauvoir, B. F. Skinner, and E. O. Wilson. Reprinted in 2015 by Biblio Publishing, ISBN 978-1-62249-267-1.

본 연구는 『대승기신론』의 일심(一心) 개념을 중심으로 불교 인성론을 탐구하여 윤리교육적 함의를 찾아본 것이다. 현재 인성교육담론은 서구 인본주의 인성과 전통 유교 인성 두 축으로 이루어지고 있는데, 불교문화의 한국적 위상, 불교윤리의 구조와 논리, 미래사회의 복잡성에 대한 대비 등을 고려할 때, 이제 불교 인성론에 주목할 필요가 있다. 그러나 붓다가 천명한 무아(無我)를 전제하면 윤리적 행위와 책임 주체 문제로 인성 논의가 쉽지는 않다. 찰나로 변하여 동일성 확보가 어려운 무아로는 업보와 깨달음의 인격 주체를 담보하기 어렵기 때문이다. 하지만 붓다가 무아를 주장한 이유가 나를 부정하기 위한 것이 아니고 (...) 괴로움과 번뇌의 원인이 나[我]와 내 것[我所]에 대한 집착에 있음을 비판하기 위한 것임을 알면, 연기론과 공의 논리에 의거한 무아로서 인성 논의는 타당함을 알 수 있다. 무아에서 법유(法有)로, 중관의 공(空)과 유식을 거치며 대승불교에서는 불신(佛身)이 신성시되고, 사물의 내재적 본질로 법성(法性) 진여(眞如)를 강조하며 여래장‧불성 개념이 등장한다. 인도의 여래장사상은 중국에서는 유교 인성론의 영향으로 불성사상으로 정립되고 이후 동아시아 불교사상의 핵심이 되었으며, 『대승기신론』에서는 일심으로 구조화된다. 『대승기신론』은 중생심으로서 일심을 중심으로 마음의 구조와 작동원리를 파악하여, 어떻게 정법(淨法)에서 염법(染法)으로 변화하는지 논의하면서 궁극적으로 인성은 진여불성임을 강조한다. 『대승기신론』의 일심, 즉 인성론에서 찾을 수 있는 윤리교육에의 시사점은 다섯 가지로 요약할 수 있다. 첫째, 진여불성에 대한 강조에서 찾을 수 있는 성선에 대한 믿음, 둘째, 일심의 구조와 작동논리와 수행으로 연계되는 인성교육의 구조화, 셋째, 훈습(薰習)에 의한 도덕적 영향과 환경의 중요성, 넷째 근기(根機)의 차이를 고려한 수준별 윤리교육의 가능성, 다섯째, 도덕교과서로의 기신론의 의미 등이다. 무아와 불성 등 불교의 인성론은 연기법과 공의 논리에 의하여 지지되며, 불성의 가능성을 믿고 나에 대한 집착과 번뇌를 수행으로 극복하여 동체대비(同體大悲)의 윤리적 실천을 추구하는 데서 그 대승적 의미를 찾을 수 있다. (shrink)

In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's (...) class='Hi'>theory, morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 146. (shrink)

This book investigates the problematisation in Adam Smith's moral philosophy of a classical question: what makes us human beings from a moral standpoint? To do this, Riccardo Bonfiglioli explores the relationship between the concepts of ‘human nature’, ‘mind’ and ‘the self’ in order to reconstruct Smith’s theory of subjectivity. After providing a systematic reconstruction of Adam Smith’s conceptions of ‘human nature’, ‘mind’ and ‘the self’ – exploring some aspects of Smith’s philosophy (nature, philosophy (...) of history, sympathy and imagination) and their empirical expressions (education, conduct and character) – Bonfiglioli argues that, in Adam Smith’s work, the meaning of ‘moral human beings’ would depend on the human being’s effort to live in harmony with oneself and the others. According to Bonfiglioli, in Smith’s moral theory, this ‘harmony with oneself and the others’ would be achieved in relation to a certain kind of awareness that can be possible when human beings try to judge the conduct and try to act according to the impartial spectator. Specifically, this impartial spectator is reinterpreted by the author in the light of the concept of immediacy. (shrink)

This article considers aspects of Philippa Foot’s theory of naturalist realist metaethics. It addresses the question of whether human nature can function as a direct source of normativity or whether it is more of a metanormative framework that is open to norm-creation based on the agent’s rational volitional activity. This gives rise to the question of whether the source of moral normativity is not in fact the agent’s practical rationality since natural facts may conflict and therefore cannot (...) constitute a direct guide for the articulation of moral norms. Our interpretation is based primarily on Foot’s Natural Goodness, and identifies the tensions between the broader and narrower meanings of the conception of human nature. In the first step we discuss the broader meaning of human nature. In the second we consider the narrower meaning of human nature, practical rationality. In conclusion we show that in its broader sense human nature cannot function as a proper source of moral normativity; rather, it is a metanormative framework for making moral judgements. Within this framework practical rationality operates as human nature in the narrower sense and only it can be considered the source of moral normativity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBy showing its organic linkage between theories of human nature and governance, this article illustrates that the Huainanzi is a scripture that holds a systematic and unique theory. The ideal governance of the Huainanzi is mystical transformation, i.e. the Daoist concept of non-action. Rule by simple Confucian rituals is not at odds with mystical transformation. However, mystical transformation does not include the rule by rituals. Moreover, excessively complicated rituals are incompatible with mystical transformation. Human nature (...) in the Huainanzi does not contradict humanity and righteousness. Human nature’s growth into humanity and righteousness is as natural as the approach of a butterfly to flowers. However, the humanity and righteousness of the Huainanzi are not innate to human nature. Likewise, unlike a flower, a butterfly is not part of a plant. Moreover, artificial flowers, which correspond to excessively complicated rituals, are incompatible wi... (shrink)

In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature , Steven Pinker maintains that at present there are three competing views of human nature—a Christian theory, a "blank slate" theory (what I call a social constructivist theory), and a Darwinian theory—and that the last of these will triumph in the end. I argue that neither the outcome of such competition nor the particular content of these theories is as clear as Pinker (...) believes. In this essay I take a critical as well as a constructive look at the challenge presented by a Darwinian theory of human nature—a challenge to the social sciences and the humanities and also to theology and more specifically to a Christian understanding of human nature. (shrink)

We welcome the critical appraisal of the database used by the behavioral sciences, but we suggest that the authors' differentiation between variable and universal features is ill conceived and that their categorization of non-WEIRD populations is misleading. We propose a different approach to comparative research, which takes population variability seriously and recognizes the methodological difficulties it engenders.

Plato asked, "How shall a man live?" In this volume, Robert J. McShea offers an important, serious, and controversial answer to that perennial question.

The key issue of traditional theories of human nature in China is De or virtue, Yu or desire and their correlation. It leads to two developing currents: one is the old tradition since Xia, Shang and Zhou, the Three Dynasties which take desire as nature, another is the new tradition later Confucius initiated which take virtue as nature. So the understanding of human nature in early China experienced a process from desire to virtue, or (...) from the instinct of human to the essence of human. Prior to Confucius, nature is desire and instinct. In that time, the theories of human nature has two themes, namely to manage nature by virtue and to explain nature by Qi. Since Lao Zi, virtue was taken as the inner essence of human. Later Confucius further to take virtue as nature directly, so completes the fundamental transformation of traditional theory of human nature. This is the source of the idea nature of reason and the origin of the theory nature is good. Zisi advocated “what Heaven has conferred is called the nature” to promote the new tradition, and named desire as “the inner”. The new excavated bamboo book Xing Zi Ming Chu not only developed the idea of “the inner” of Zisi, but also further to restore desire as nature, and constructed a unique system of outer moral apriorism for it. Shortly afterward, Mencius turns this trend and advocates none but the four beginnings is nature, desire only is impartment, therefore he develops the new tradition to extremes. Even though, before the period between Tang and Song dynasties, the mainstream of the theory of human nature in China was the oldtradition, and that the new tradition merely like a flash in the pan. In fact, the dualism of human nature in Song and Ming dynasties carried on the old tradition, and at the same time, succeeded the new tradition, and put them into a unified thought system. (shrink)

Leo Tolstoy's theory of human nature is sketched with Descartes's and Hume's theories of human nature in the background for context. Tolstoy's view is limited to "What Is Art"?, although it could be substantially augmented by references to his other well-known works. "By words a man transmits his thoughts," to which Tolstoy adds, "by means of art he transmits his feelings." Language and art work together to give us an aesthetic education that is built around (...) the forms of communication found in the arts: story-telling, singing, acting, dancing, making, and so on. These activities reflect the fundamentals of human nature; hence, the connection Tolstoy found between human nature and art that previous thinkers had not made. (shrink)

Reification is a concept of critical theory that denotes certain problematic, habitualised forms of objectification. In this article, I examine whether the concept can be applied in environmental philosophy and what value it has for environmental critical theory. I begin by introducing the concept and the two senses in which reification of the non-human world has been discussed in the literature: first, denoting the misrecognition of others’ attitudes towards the natural world; and second, denoting a misconceived relationship (...) between humans and their environment. After this, I introduce two potentially new subjects of reification: non-human animals and non-human nature. I also discuss two phenomena that could count as reification: industrial meat production and the commodification of ecological systems. (shrink)

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as a radical (...) departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche. (shrink)

Seeing human nature through the prism of grammar may seem rather unusual. I will argue that this is a symptom for a problem – in both discussions of human nature and grammar: Neither the theory of grammar has properly placed its subject matter within the context of an inquiry into human nature and speciation, nor have discussions of human nature properly assessed the significance of grammar.

Questions for Further Consideration and Recommended Further Reading, which follow each relevant chapter, encourage readers to think further and to craft their own perspectives.

The articles in this issue cover a wide range of topics, including the moral status of human embryos and human-animal chimeras and hybrids, the determination of death, theories of human cognition, and policies on the identity of mitochondrial donors. Despite this variety, there are two underlying questions that tie the articles together: what is a human being? And, what is the basis of moral status? First, I discuss these two questions and why they are important for (...) bioethics. Then I provide summaries of the six articles in this issue and explain how each of them is connected to the questions of human nature and moral status. (shrink)

One of the constants in Noam Chomsky’s philosophical, linguistic and ethical positions is the existence of what he calls “human nature”. Following Marx, Darwin and last century’s revolutions in the social sciences, human nature has been one of the most contested conceptual holdovers from modern European philosophy. Chomsky’s discoveries and models on syntax and language make up one of the frameworks to most critically offset the traditional moral dimension of human nature. Contrary to most (...) traditions prior to his work, language can no longer be restricted to either mind, soul or spirit. Language, as Chomsky has continually upheld and sharply refined, is a physical and biological process. But how his notion of human nature derives from this process is complex, as he seems to disregard philosophy’s classic analytic delineation between the descriptive causal realm of human nature and the normative axiological extensions of the same concept. In this paper, we seek to examine the philosophical and ontological implications of Chomsky’s claim that human nature derives from the innate dimension of the language faculty. Not only does Chomsky maintain the category of human nature, he also indexes it to the question of freedom. We thereby argue for the coherence of his proposal and show how it operates to weld the perspective of a modal theory of biologically-rooted creativity to innate conditions specific to his theory of language generation. However, we question whether its restriction to humans alone is sustainable from a scientific perspective by putting forth the claim that Chomsky’s science is in fact a radical ontology of social subjectivation. (shrink)

In the face of the current climate and environmental crisis, not only pragmatic solutions but also a theoretical shift is needed. A philosophical and ethical reflection is most necessary to guide our actions by promoting a renewed relationship between human and non-human nature, providing the theoretical and ethical foundations to initiate a new path of coexistence on this Planet. In this paper, I will make the case for the relevance of evolutionary biology knowledge to current challenges in (...) environmental ethics. I argue that by acknowledging biological evidence, philosophy can fruitfully reconsider the complex issue of the human-nature relationship from a non-anthropocentric perspective. Evolutionary biology approaches the human-nature relation problem from an ecological dimension and a deep-time perspective. Contra anthropocentric theories, scientific evidence shows (i) that there has never been any ontological separation between humans and the rest of the natural world, and (ii) that considering the profound evolutionary interdependence between these two spheres is essential to understand the ongoing climatic and environmental crises. In considering some specific cases – namely, the relational approach to ecosystems, the holobiont theory, and the niche construction theory – , I put into focus the fallacy of the anthropocentric vision that marks the current development model pursued by globalized Western societies, and contrast this with an approach of ‘humanistic ecocentrism’. I argue that this approach is consistent with scientific evidence, and that overcoming the present crisis will require a profound transformation in societal and individual values, which can only be achieved through a scientifically and ethically based ‘ecological education’. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism claims ethical goodness is a kind of human natural goodness, where natural goodness is a function of human nature. Call this the core thesis. The normativity objection claims the core thesis fails because ethical goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. In this study I aim to cast new light on this objection and propose a new strategy of response. My argument divides into two main moves. In the first, I side with critics (...) in arguing that Aristotelian naturalism has a serious problem that concerns the normativity of human nature, although standard formulations of the normativity objection do not quite capture it. The problem is that there is an explanatory gap in Aristotelian naturalism’s account of ethical goodness. I argue that although facts about human nature and natural goodness are irreducibly normative in the evaluative sense, they are not necessarily normative in the practical sense. Hence, Aristotelians need to explain what makes such facts practically normative. They have not successfully done this. This explanatory gap threatens the viability of Aristotelian naturalism, for it leaves a central feature of ethical experience—viz. the practical normativity of ethical facts—unexplained. I call this the normativity problem. In the second main move of my argument I propose a two-part solution to the normativity problem. The first part consists in a new metanormative account of the source of normativity I call Aristotelian constructivism. It yields an objectivist, species-relative and naturalistic account of practical normativity. The second part of the solution is an account of practical reason that connects human final ends with human nature. Aristotelian constructivism explains the practical normativity of those final ends, and thus of facts about human nature, without reference to the evaluative status of those facts. Aristotelian constructivism thereby enables Aristotelian naturalists to retain their core thesis. (shrink)

There is not much disagreement that the recent spectacular establishment of parliamentary democracies and market economies in Eastern Europe and the even more breathtaking events in most Soviet republics – which should culminate in the reemergence of the Baltic nations as independent states – may be convincingly conceived of as the triumph of civil society over the Marxist-Leninist system. Both the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist system and the reemergence of civil society may be discussed in terms of theories which deal (...) with the relationship between human nature and sociopolitical systems. (shrink)