W artykule przedstawiam zastosowanie Jungowskiej koncepcji cienia do problematyki Innego.Wskazuję na możliwości teoretyczne, jakie otwiera przed refleksją etyczną Jungowskakoncepcja cienia, oferująca możliwość intrapersonalego rozważenia tego problemu. Koncepcjata daje możliwość odmiennego i pełniejszego spojrzenia na kwestie wolności, równości iodpowiedzialności.

t. 1.Novoe mirovozzrenie i novai͡a teorii͡a nauki -- t. 2. [without special title].

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)

We do not usually draw conclusions and summarize the results of our round table meetings. The speakers share their ideas, divergent viewpoints are discussed, and a certain level of approach to the problems under discussion is formulated. Therefore, today I will also not attempt to draw a conclusion.

Urielʹ Dakosta.--Filosofskai︠a︡ sistema Spinozy.--Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ ėtika Mabli i Morelli.--Zhak Nėzhon i ego ateizm.--K voprosu o politicheskikh vzgli︠a︡dakh Zh.-B. Robinė.--"Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ sistema" Golʹbakha i ee russkiĭ perevodchik XVIII v.--Tragedii︠a︡ russkogo materializma XVIII v. (filosofskie vzgli︠a︡dy A. N. Radishcheva).--I. P. Pnin i ego mesto v istorii russkoĭ obshchestvennoĭ mysli.--Filosofskie vzgli︠a︡dy dekabrista I︠A︡kushkina.

Study on conduct of life of Muslim women and women in Islamic perspective.

Ėtika i metodologii︠a︡ nauki -- Filosofii︠a︡ tekhnonauki -- Gumanitarnai︠a︡ ėkspertiza -- Bioėtika kak prakticheskiĭ filosofskiĭ proekt -- Problemy "uluchshenii︠a︡" cheloveka.

Open peer commentary on the article “Homeostats for the 21st Century? Simulating Ashby Simulating the Brain” by Stefano Franchi. Upshot: It is a mistake to characterise Ashby’s view of life (from the 1950s) as passive, abstractly modelled in part by the homeostat; one should distinguish the stasis of homeostasis from the activity of the (model) organism. Likewise mistaken is the accusation of contingency; one should distinguish the purposeless mechanism from the purposeful (model) organism. There is no basic conflict between Ashby’s (...) view and later developments in a similar tradition; technical advances are not the same as foundational gaps. (shrink)