This paper expounds the relations between continuous symmetries and conserved quantities, i.e. Noether's ``first theorem'', in both the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian frameworks for classical mechanics. This illustrates one of mechanics' grand themes: exploiting a symmetry so as to reduce the number of variables needed to treat a problem. I emphasise that, for both frameworks, the theorem is underpinned by the idea of cyclic coordinates; and that the Hamiltonian theorem is more powerful. The Lagrangian theorem's main ``ingredient'', apart from cyclic (...) coordinates, is the rectification of vector fields afforded by the local existence and uniqueness of solutions to ordinary differential equations. For the Hamiltonian theorem, the main extra ingredients are the asymmetry of the Poisson bracket, and the fact that a vector field generates canonical transformations iff it is Hamiltonian. (shrink)

In this paper, part of the ideas developed in Lewowicz (2000) will be reconsidered in the light of Pandora's Hope (1999a) - one of the latest publications of Bruno Latour. We will ponder the significance of these ideas and some of the incidental advances or retreats of the views of this author in the last 20 years. Although we still believe that, from the ontological point of view, Latour's philosophy is materialistic - then eliminativist - and not ontological relativist (contrary (...) to the opinion of his colleague philosophers), some of the symmetries developed in that text show outstanding ontological-epistemological and even methodological deficiencies which we try to show here; especially the symmetry between 'human and nonhuman actors' (Latour 1999a) and his very singular (but not without a fair amount of antecedents) concept of history of the things whose neologism is that of pragmatogony. Andrew Pickering (The mangle of practice, 1999a) proposed and developed the concept of temporary emergency. In view of this concept, he succeeds in criticising Latour's exact symmetries making use primarily of the concept of intentionality to account for the asymmetry (by no means radical, according to the latter) between 'the human and nonhuman collective'. In this paper we will try to reinforce (and inevitably to question) the notion of temporal emergency by giving it a less local aspect than the one given by this author. We will not only hold the asymmetry of certain dichotomies - presumably avoided by and avoidable according to Latour - but we will also claim the historical impossibility of such an avoidance: the concept of historialised emergency and not just temporalised, precludes this. It is concluded, firstly, that only an eliminativist materialism (within the range of materialisms) is able to avoid and even 'overcome' such pairs like nature/society and some of its derivatives like subject/object and individual/collective. Secondly, the decisive character of some dichotomies will be defended and lastly it will be attempted to account for the almost only ontological possibility of constructivism: the eliminativist materialism. (shrink)

Dynamical collapse models embody the idea of a physical collapse of the wave function in a mathematically well-defined way. They involve modifications to the standard rules of quantum theory in order to describe collapse as a physical process. This appears to introduce a time reversal asymmetry into the dynamics since the state at any given time depends on collapses in the past but not in the future. Here we challenge this conclusion by demonstrating that, subject to specified model constraints, (...) collapse models can be given a structurally time symmetric formulation in which the collapse events are the primitive objects of the theory. Three different examples of time asymmetries associated with collapse models are then examined and in each case it is shown that the same dynamical rule determining the collapse events works in both the forward and backward in time directions. Any physically observed time asymmetries that arise in such models are due to the asymmetric imposition of initial or final time boundary conditions, rather than from an inherent asymmetry in the dynamical law. This is the standard explanation of time asymmetric behaviour resulting from time symmetric laws. (shrink)

Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.

While the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macroscopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the asymmetry manifest elsewhere? In statistical mechanics, progress can be made with this question. What I dub the ‘Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace framework’ can be used to construct the irreversible equations of SM from the underlying microdynamics. Yet this framework uses coarse-graining, a procedure that has faced much (...) criticism. I focus on two objections in the literature: claims that coarse-graining makes time-asymmetry ‘illusory’ and ‘anthropocentric’. I argue that these objections arise from an unsatisfactory justification of coarse-graining prevalent in the literature, rather than from coarse-graining itself. This justification relies on the idea of measurement imprecision. By considering the role that abstraction and autonomy play, I provide an alternative justification and offer replies to the illusory and anthropocentric objections. Finally, I consider the broader consequences of this alternative justification: the connection to debates about inter-theoretic reduction and the implication that the time-asymmetry in SM is weakly emergent. 1Introduction 1.1Prospectus2The Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace Framework3Why Does This Method Work? 3.1The special conditions account3.2When is a density forwards-compatible?4Anthropocentrism and Illusion: Two Objections 4.1The two objections in more detail4.2Against the justification by measurement imprecision5An Alternative Justification 5.1Abstraction and autonomy5.2An illustration: the Game of Life6Reply to Illusory7Reply to Anthropocentric8The Wider Landscape: Concluding Remarks 8.1Inter-theoretic relations8.2The nature of irreversibility. (shrink)

Two of the greatest interpreters of Parmenides, Giovanni Casertano and Franco Ferrari, have given opposite interpretations of the role of the character of Parmenides. For Ferrari, Parmenides would only be a critic of ideas, as he equates them with their sensitive participants (thus, he could not be considered one of the prosopa of Plato). For Casertano, on the other hand, Parmenides expresses the ‘metaphysical’ aspects of ideas in accordance with the young Socrates’ discourse on the “prodigy” in the initial part (...) of the dialogue. Neither of the two interpretations presents a Parmenides that represents the figure of Plato adequate for the “dramatic” development of the dialogue. If, on the other hand, we regard them both as integral parts, the image and role of Parmenides could be more appropriate to the bipolar structure of the dialogue and of Plato himself. To this end, I have assumed that Plato unifies in Parmenides his dialectical-deductive method with that of Zeno: the aporetic-paradoxical one that is more open than his to finding ways of escape from any paradoxical arguments. It would be for this reason that Parmenides encourages the young and inexperienced Socrates to follow Zeno’s tropos when defining virtue, also because it was Socrates himself, in the final part of his discourse on the “prodigy,” who praised Zeno for the double courage shown first in criticizing the common sense and the principles of current physics and then in overcoming the contrast between these principles and the more specific mathematizing logic. I identify in this praise of Socrates an assumption, on the part of Parmenides, that the burden of bringing back into ideas the courageous behaviour that Zeno showed in the world of the sensible. I agree with Vlastos in considering Parmenides to be “the manifesto of Plato’s self-criticism,” and in viewing this Parmenides as the prosopon of a Plato that is willing both to level self-criticism at his own stance and to give voice to those who do not think like him and even to those who reject his position. (shrink)

The paper presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the notion of “spontaneous symmetry breaking”, which I believe today provides a template for conceiving the relationship between symmetry and asymmetry in physics as well as in other areas of the natural sciences. The central thesis of the paper is that spontaneous symmetry breaking represents an instance of “narrative knowing” in the sense developed by recent research in history and philosophy of science (Morgan and Wise (eds) SI narrative in (...) science, Studies in history and philosophy of science, 2017a). Spontaneous symmetry breaking is best understood as a hybrid narrative comprising formulas, verbal statements, images, and at times also other media. This flexible notion can be deployed in different variations, allowing to explain a broad range of non-symmetric phenomena or models as resulting from (not necessarily observable) processes of loss of symmetry. I will support this thesis by first analysing in detail the way in which spontaneous symmetry breaking, and in particular electroweak symmetry breakdown, are presented in today’s physics textbooks and reference works, and then by reconstructing the emergence of the hybrid construct from the late 1950s until the 1970s, when spontaneous symmetry breaking definitively established itself as a key physical notion. (shrink)

By a comparison between Maxwell's electrodynamics classically interpreted (MT) and relativistic electrodynamics (RED), this paper discusses whether the “asymmetries” in MT mentioned by A. Einstein in his 1905 relativity paper are only of a conceptual nature or rather involve specific empirical claims. It is shown that in fact MT predicts strongly asymmetric behaviour for very simple interactions, and an analysis is made of the extent of the “symmetry” achieved by means of relativistic postulates. A “low” velocity experiment is suggested (...) which could provide another test of the accuracy of RED with respect to MT. (shrink)

Population-level asymmetry may be maintained, not by an “evolutionarily stable strategy” pitting a dominant bias against its nondominant opposite, but rather by a genetically based system pitting a directional bias against the absence of any such bias. Stability is then achieved through a heterozygotic advantage, maintaining balanced polymorphism. This model may better capture the fundamental trade-off between lateralization and bilateral symmetry.

In this paper I contend that the 'superfluity' of triangles is only apparent; all those specified are indeed required for the smallest sub-units, so long as the symmetry of the final body to be constructed is taken into account at earlier stages.

Upshot: Gibsonian and enactivist thinkers appear to diverge primarily with respect to the emphasis placed on the contributions of the organism to perception-action. Enactivists claim that a fundamental asymmetry in the organism-environment relationship should be credited for the existence of meaning in the world. Gibsonians counter that theory must reckon with both the asymmetry and symmetry between organism and environment as well as with the role of specificational information in underwriting their coordination.

Kant formulated a secular argument against suicide’s permissibility based on what he regarded as the intrinsic value of humanity. In this paper, I first show that Kant’s moral framework entails that some types of suicide are morally permissible. Just as some homicides are morally permissible, according to Kant, so are suicides that are performed according to equivalent maxims. Intention, foreseeability, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, and mental capacity determine the moral characterization of the killing. I argue that a suicide taxonomy that differentiates (...) types of suicide according to morally relevant criteria is compatible with Kantian ethics; it establishes that even where we hold a robust deontological sanctity of life position, we are not obligated to preserve the lives of people whose future life only offers profound suffering, and helping them to die may be justifiable if doing so honors their dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, homicide and suicide are only weakly morally symmetrical in that even if a given suicide is morally impermissible, we do not normally have the right to prevent it forcibly, though this may be altered by juridical laws under some circumstances. (shrink)

In contrast to temporal asymmetry stressed in process philosophy, symmetry prevails in Mahayana Buddhism and East Asian philosophy formed under its influence. The paper clarifies the meaning of symmetry from the perspectives of Kitaro Nishida and Dogen, it explores similar or overlapping ideas in Whitehead’s philosophy oforganism, and it suggests that the differences among them are much smaller than commonly believed.

The problem of explanatory asymmetry remains a serious challenge for non-causal accounts of explanation. This paper proposes a novel solution, and it does so by appealing to the theoretical context in which an explanation is offered. The paper develops the problem of explanatory asymmetry for non-causal dependency accounts of explanation, focusing specifically on Alexander Reutlinger’s Counterfactual Theory of Explanation and recent work by Marc Lange and Lina Jansson. It defends the idea that nomological possibility with respect to a (...) global theory is the right constraint on explanation, and it shows how this breaks the apparent symmetry in counterfactual dependence that is the source of the problem. This solution appeals to theoretical context, and the paper develops and defends the version of contextualism in explanation that is required. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to articulate a comparative study of Zeno of Citium and Immanuel Kant. The main reason for the comparative form of the study is that the full extent of the selective affiliations, continuities and discontinuities in the philosophers’ thought with regard to democracy under a cosmopolitan condition, as they define it, has not yet been explored. Studying their political arguments does not entail, in the present study, a historical examination of their ideas. Historical research (...) has, to date, been the norm in the examination of the thought of these thinkers. However, although both thinkers focus both on citizenship as an indispensable condition for democratic governance, a systematic comparison of what citizenship and democracy are as major political concerns in Zeno and Kant remains unquestioned by researchers. The originality of the present research derives, first, from the comparison of both thinkers that has not been critically presented so far. Second, it derives from the critique of the political views of Zeno according to the research conducted in the Gregory Vlastos Archive (that has never been conducted and presented so far) and is followed by tracing symmetries and asymmetries in the works of Kant that extend their arguments on cosmopolitanism to the solidification of democracy and the avoidance of war. As for the focus of the study on Kant, the novelty that is being argued for is the priority attributed to the cosmopolitan agenda as a precondition of a sovereign democratic state instead of the opposite being presented and claimed so far. (shrink)

Crazily, Christopher Norris seems to think sociology is at war with philosophy; it is not. I respond to his hostile comments on the sociology of scientific knowledge, which was inspired by Wittgenstein, by explaining the need for symmetry in the explanation of scientific knowledge, methodological relativism, elective modernism and a number of other issues.

The visual arts offer refreshing and novel resources through which to understand the representation, power, ideology and critique of law. This vibrantly interdisciplinary book brings the burgeoning field to a new maturity through extended close readings of major works by artists from Pieter Bruegel and Gustav Klimt to Gordon Bennett and Rafael Cauduro. At each point, the author puts these works of art into a complex dance with legal and social history, and with recent developments in legal and art theory. (...) Manderson uses the idea of time and temporality as a focal point through which to explore how the work of art engages with and constitutes law and human lives. In the symmetries and asymmetries caused by the vibrating harmonic resonances of these triple forces - time, law, art - lies a way of not only understanding the world, but also transforming it. (shrink)

Chicks reared in the absence of light and rat pups reared without extra stimulation fail to exhibit behavioral laterality, implying that a threshold amount of environmental stimulation is necessary for the brain to follow an asymmetry pathway. Reverse asymmetry has been reported in the chick, but not the rat, though a sex difference resembling reverse asymmetry has been found in the rat.

As interest in Huayan thought among Western scholars has grown over the last few decades, a number of individuals have noted similarities between A. N. Whitehead's ideas of reality as a process of arising actual occasions and Huayan doctrines concerning the interdependent arising of dharmas. Comparisons of the two systems do show striking similarities, but as Steve Odin has pointed out, one area of noteworthy difference may be their views of temporal passage.1 There seems to be clear agreement among Whitehead (...) scholars that his view requires temporal asymmetry such that the present arises as a creative advance toward an open future. In contrast, Huayan is well known for advocating a symmetrical view of reality, and the Huayan view of time, it has been argued, is no exception. On this basis some have suggested that in accounting for and even requiring an open future, Whitehead's views effectively allow for a free advance of becoming that may not be possible within the context of Huayan views. But is this the case? -/- By examining sections of Fazang's works that specifically deal with tense and temporal passage, we will see that the typical view of Huayan as advocating a temporally symmetrical notion of passage is only partially accurate. Even further, it is apparent in light of that material that the Whiteheadian critique of Huayan is partly inaccurate as well. It is this latter point that may mean Huayan views allow for a type of becoming that Whitehead's cannot. To see how this is the case, it will be helpful to briefly summarize the Whiteheadian critique before focusing on key elements of Fazang's view. (shrink)

This paper outlines a defense of hybrid contingentism: that it is contingent which individuals there are, but not contingent what properties there are. Critics pursue two main lines of complaint. First, that the hybrid contingentist’s treatment of haecceitistic properties is metaphysically mysterious, and second, that hybrid contingentism involves an unjustified asymmetry in the associated modal logic. I suggest that these complaints may be too quick, at least in the setting of higher-order metaphysics. It is not at all obvious whether (...) and to what extent we should expect particular "symmetries" across the orders, and so whether (as Williamson (2013) argues) “the default preference is for a uniform metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none.”. (shrink)

The paper considers the absorber theory of radiation by (Wheeler and Feynman 1945) and (Wheeler and Feynman 1949) and advances the idea that the theory is grounded on the philosophical intuition of overall processes. Such intuition consists of having to consider advanced and retarded radiation as well as the interaction between absorbers and emitter. I discuss the discrepancy between microdynamic time-symmetry and the asymmetry of the experimental evidences. In doing so, I consider (Price, 1991)'s reformulation of the theory (...) and argue that it overlooks the philosophical intuition. I then compare the overall process idea with some accounts of holism and ultimately suggest that it also played an important role in Feynman's later works. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly (...) with the “Harm principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not coherent. (shrink)

At present classical physics contains two contradictory groups of derivations of the equilibrium spectrum of random classical electromagnetic radiation. One group of derivations finds Planck's spectrum based upon the use of classical electromagnetic zero-point radiation and fundamental ideas of thermodynamics. The other group of derivations finds the Rayleigh-Jeans spectrum from scattering equilibrium for non-linear mechanical systems in the limit of small charge coupling to radiation. Here we examine the scaling symmetries of classical thermal radiation. We find that, in general, classical (...) mechanical systems do not share the scaling symmetries of thermal radiation. In particular, this is true for the mechanical scattering systems used in the derivations of the Rayleigh-Jeans law. Indeed, relativistic hydrogenlike systems with Coulomb potentials of fixed charge are the only mechanical potential systems which do share the scaling symmetries of thermal radiation. We propose that only these last mechanical systems are allowed in a classical electromagnetic description of nature. (shrink)

John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I (...) will argue that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris. He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the role of exact symmetries in theories of physics, working throughout with the example of gravitation set in Newtonian spacetime. First, I spend some time setting up a means of thinking about symmetries in this context; second, I consider arguments from the seeming undetectability of absolute velocities to an anti-realism about velocities; and finally, I claim that the structure of the theory licences us to interpret models which differ only with regards to the absolute velocities (...) of objects as depicting the same physical state of affairs. In defending this last claim, I consider how ideas and resources from the philosophy of language may usefully be brought to bear on this topic. (shrink)

We advocate an account of dualities between physical theories: the basic idea is that dual theories are isomorphic representations of a common core. We defend and illustrate this account, which we call a Schema, in relation to symmetries. Overall, the account meshes well with standard treatments of symmetries. But the distinction between the common core and the dual theories prompts a distinction between three kinds of symmetry: which we call ‘stipulated’, ‘accidental’ and ‘proper’.

This article develops an analogy proposed by Stachel between general relativity (GR) and quantum mechanics (QM) as regards permutation invariance. Our main idea is to overcome Pooley's criticism of the analogy by appeal to paraparticles. In GR, the equations are (the solution space is) invariant under diffeomorphisms permuting spacetime points. Similarly, in QM the equations are invariant under particle permutations. Stachel argued that this feature—a theory's ‘not caring which point, or particle, is which’—supported a structuralist ontology. Pooley criticizes this analogy: (...) in QM the (anti-)symmetrization of fermions and bosons implies that each individual state (solution) is fixed by each permutation, while in GR a diffeomorphism yields in general a distinct, albeit isomorphic, solution. We define various versions of structuralism, and go on to formulate Stachel's and Pooley's positions, admittedly in our own terms. We then reply to Pooley. Though he is right about fermions and bosons, QM equally allows more general types of particle symmetry, in which states (vectors, rays, or density operators) are not fixed by all permutations (called ‘paraparticle states’). Thus Stachel's analogy is revived. (shrink)

Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showing how the explanandum would have been different, had (...) the facts about an explanatory symmetry been different. Furthermore, the authors argue that such explanatory dependencies need not be causal. (shrink)

This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by Heylighen (Found Sci 15 4(3):345–356, 2010a ). It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this author’s web page. The “geometrization” of time and causality is the common ground of the analysis hinted here and in Heylighen’s paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this organization of natural (...) phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the issues raised by Heylighen. (shrink)

Recent work on the history of General Relativity by Renn, Sauer, Janssen et al. shows that Einstein found his field equations partly by a physical strategy including the Newtonian limit, the electromagnetic analogy, and energy conservation. Such themes are similar to those later used by particle physicists. How do Einstein's physical strategy and the particle physics derivations compare? What energy-momentum complex did he use and why? Did Einstein tie conservation to symmetries, and if so, to which? How did his work (...) relate to emerging knowledge of the canonical energy-momentum tensor and its translation-induced conservation? After initially using energy-momentum tensors hand-crafted from the gravitational field equations, Einstein used an identity from his assumed linear coordinate covariance x'=Mx to relate it to the canonical tensor. Usually he avoided using matter Euler-Lagrange equations and so was not well positioned to use or reinvent the Herglotz-Mie-Born understanding that the canonical tensor was conserved due to translation symmetries, a result with roots in Lagrange, Hamilton and Jacobi. Whereas Mie and Born were concerned about the canonical tensor's asymmetry, Einstein did not need to worry because his Entwurf Lagrangian is modeled not so much on Maxwell's theory as on a scalar theory. Einstein's theory thus has a symmetric canonical energy-momentum tensor. But as a result, it also has 3 negative-energy field degrees of freedom. Thus the Entwurf theory fails a 1920s-30s a priori particle physics stability test with antecedents in Lagrange's and Dirichlet's stability work; one might anticipate possible gravitational instability. This critique of the Entwurf theory can be compared with Einstein's 1915 critique of his Entwurf theory for not admitting rotating coordinates and not getting Mercury's perihelion right. One can live with absolute rotation but cannot live with instability. Particle physics also can be useful in the historiography of gravity and space-time, both in assessing the growth of objective knowledge and in suggesting novel lines of inquiry to see whether and how Einstein faced the substantially mathematical issues later encountered in particle physics. This topic can be a useful case study in the history of science on recently reconsidered questions of presentism, whiggism and the like. Future work will show how the history of General Relativity, especially Noether's work, sheds light on particle physics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so (...) fundamentally a part of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry. (shrink)

In this paper it will be argued that any realist interpretation of quantum mechanics intending to preserve the objectivity of the set of the definite-valued observables should require such a set to be invariant under the symmetry group of the theory. In particular, it will be shown that the natural way to reach this goal is to appeal to the Casimir operators of the Galilean group. Additionally, this idea will be generalized in two ways: by selecting the definite-valued observables (...) of a system in quantum field theory as those represented by the Casimir operators of the Poincaré group, and by extending the strategy to gauge symmetries. (shrink)

If the tiles of a mosaic are arranged symmetrically, then the image those tiles constitute must be symmetric as well. This paper formulates and defends the general principle at work in this case: roughly, that a symmetry cannot ground an asymmetry. It is argued that the principle supports strong objections to four metaphysical views: qualitativism, relationalism, the tenseless or ‘B’ theory of time, and comparativism. A response to these objections is developed which appeals to fragmentalism, the view that (...) reality contains facts which are incompatible with one another. But fragmentalism might be thought too bizarre to tolerate, and if it is, then the objections developed in this paper may well be fatal. (shrink)

The paper discusses Iris Marion Young's idea of asymmetric reciprocity that rethinks typical understandings of gift giving. Iris Marion Young's proposals for asymmetric ethical relationships have important implications for democratic contexts that seek to take differences seriously. Imagining oneself in the place of the other or expecting from the other what one expects from oneself levels out differences between people and hinders possibilities of interaction. The conditions of asymmetry and reciprocity of Iris Marion Young's communicative ethics, as well as (...) that of the unexpected as understood within situations of gift giving, bring about new readings of learning and teaching situations. The paper discusses issues of power and knowledge that have important ethical implications for how the relationships between the teacher and student could be imagined and how the teacher and student imagine themselves. Following Derridean underpinnings to Young's notion of asymmetric reciprocity the paper questions pedagogic attempts that seek to minimize the asymmetric positions of the teacher and the student and challenges educational practices based on the reproduction of knowledge and reproduction of persons. The paper follows Young's arguments against Derrida's reading of asymmetry as being one sided. It argues that such a reading does away with the idea of teaching and learning altogether as teaching necessarily involves acts of responding. It continues to argue that Young's conceptualizations of gift giving as reciprocal and asymmetrical open up alternative understandings of the pedagogic relationships between teachers and students. (shrink)

Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, (...) which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements. (shrink)

Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the (...) desires, means-end beliefs, and intentions that are the immediate causal source of an agent’s actions, and a Deep Self, which contains an agent’s stable and central psychological attitudes, including the agent’s values, principles, life goals, and other more fundamental attitudes. The Deep Self Model proposes that when people are asked to make judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally, in addition to standard criteria proposed in traditional models, people also assess an additional ‘Concordance Criterion’: Does the outcome concord with the psychological attitudes of the agent’s Deep Self? I show that the Deep Self Model can explain a very complex pattern of judgment asymmetries documented in the experimental philosophy literature, and does so in a way that has significant advantages over competing models. (shrink)

In his critique of my book Heidegger and Marcuse, Jeff Kochan (2006) asserts that I am committed to the possibility of private knowledge, transcendent truths, and individualism. In this reply I argue that he has misinterpreted my analysis of the Challenger disaster and Marcuse’s work. Because I do not dismiss Roger Boisjoly’s doubts about the Challenger launch, Kochan believes that I have abandoned a social concept of knowledge for a reliance on the private knowledge of a single individual. In fact, (...) I consider Boisjoly’s observations just as social, if not as scientific, as the results of rigorous scientific study. Kochan’s reliance on a principle of symmetry derived from science studies to explain such politically charged technological controversies tends to mask the role of power and ideology in social life. Kochan interprets Marcuse as a failed Heideggerian who regresses from Heidegger’s social conception of human being to traditional individualism. I am accused of sharing this view. This interpretation overlooks the importance of the Hegelian–Marxist category of ‘real possibility’ in Marcuse’s work and so mistakes his critique of conformist politics for individualist romanticism. Marcuse always attempted to ground radical opposition in a community of struggle without abandoning the heritage of a long critical tradition. This view I willingly share. Keywords: Philosophy of technology; Principle of symmetry; Challenger disaster; Herbert Marcuse; Martin Heidegger; Knowledge . (shrink)

Novelty, the creation of new information, has been the hallmark of Juri M. Lotman’s thought. This issue resurfaces in the discussion of his now famous article “On the semiosphere,” in which Lotman, drawing on Vernadsky, identifies the principles of symmetry, asymmetry, and enantiomorphism as pivotal aspects of the semiotic mechanism of the semiosphere. Specular phenomena and mirror reflections have not only found a prominent place in contemporary semiotic theories of different scholarly traditions – from general semiotics (Eco, Volli) (...) to cognitive semiotics (Sonesson) and to the semiotics of culture (Lotman, Levin) – but they also nail down a key element of the inner mechanism of Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere. By using the analogy of thefacereflecting in amirror, Lotman remarks: “It is also like a face, which, wholly reflected in a mirror, is also reflected in any of its fragments, which, in this form, represents the part and yet remains similar to the whole mirror.” By capitalizing on this excerpt, this study unpacks the significance of Lotman’s idea of specular mechanisms as generators of meaning within the semiosphere. (shrink)

A musical work is an organized system of notes and of higher musical units such as motives, themes, harmonies, etc. We shall here confine ourselves to notes. A note is not just a physical event (an acoustic disturbance, a passage of wave energy), but a musical entity with functional properties sensitive to context. Roughly, it can be described as an acoustic event under a particular description (“tonic”, “dominant”, “leading tone”, “appoggiatura”, “upper voice of a septachord”, etc.). Are pauses genuine notes (...) in this sense? Surely they are indicated by written signs in the score; but, is that sufficient for regarding them as notes? And are they audible notes? Although this may seem a strange, and, some would say plainly false, idea, we shall see in the sequel that there is much to be said in its favor. (shrink)