Die Beschäftigung mit Platon hat eine lange Geschichte, Rezeptionen seines Denkens sind so prägend für die Philosophiegeschichte geworden, dass diese verständlicherweise zuweilen als eine Sammlung von Fußnoten zu seinem Werk begriffen wurde. Das gilt besonders für einen durchgängigen metaphysischen Zug des abendländischen Denkens, ein grundsätzliches Ordnungsmodell aus der Antike, das, christlich gewendet, die Theoriebildung bis in unsere Tage fundiert. Aber mit einer Reihe anderer Gewissheiten ist auch dieser erfolgreiche Platonismus Gegenstand der Kritik geworden. Kann und soll man den metaphysischen Platon (...) retten oder muss man Platon vielmehr gegen die metaphysische Tradition neu verstehen? Muss man Platon gegen die Platonisten verteidigen, ist er der Anfang einer philosophischen Verirrung? -- Dorothea Frede, Ekkehard Martens, Arbogast Schmitt, Gernot Böhme, Hermann Schmitz, Wolfgang Detel und andere entdecken – auch durch ihre Kritik – Platon als Gesprächspartner der Gegenwart neu. (shrink)

Виходячи з запитаності в сучасній культурі метафізичного осмислення природи людини, укоріненого в філософському спадку Канта, автор зосереджує увагу на експлікації антропологічних інтенцій кантівських «Критик», акцентуючи амбівалентність позиції мислителя на проблемі автентичної форми метафізичної антропології.

According to the Doctrine of Illicit Intentions, it is impermissible both to form and then to act on an illicit intention. An intention is illicit, roughly, if it causes the agent who has it to be, in a certain way, disposed to perform actions that are impermissible. If the range of actions an agent might be directed to perform by an intention includes impermissible actions, then it may be impermissible to form or act on that intention even if, in (...) the end, the agent performs no action that is impermissible (other than forming and acting on an illicit intention itself). (shrink)

The Blochian concept of cipher is discussed in some detail with a view to possible developments in the modern philosophy of nature. Parallels and differences are listed as to the Idealistic tradition in Germany preceding Bloch’s approach. It is found that within the framework of a strict process philosophy of the Blochian type, life forms and human (reflexive) life in particular show up as systemic parts of a nature that is projecting itself towards what has not yet become, hence (...) a strong similarity to Schelling’s approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AFTER VATICAN II INTRODUCTION IT HAS BECOME commonplace to observe that the doctrine of God is in crisis, an acknowledgement that is softened somewhat in discerning that this is less a crisis of faith itself than of the cultural mediation of faith. For some this is theological disaster, marking the loss of the traditional concept of God to the forces of atheism and (...) secularism. To others it is a liberating factor in that it signals the displacement of an alienating idea of God that clears the way for a long overdue theological reconstruction. One undeniable benefit has been a return of the doctrine of God to its rightful place of centrality in theological discourse--a privileged position it occupied in the 13th century thought of Aquinas and Bonaventure, in the 16th century thought of Luther and Calvin, one retained by Schleiermacher in the 19th century and regained by Karl Barth in the 20th century. Once again, God has become the focus of theological questioning. The difference lies in the way the question has shifted: now the burning issue is the absence or silence of God. THE NEW WAY OF RAISING THE QUESTION OF GOD Heretofore the starting point for religion and theology was Credo in unum Deum, the creedal distillate of the Christian Gospel. This was the Archimedian point of belief upon which depended anthropology, christology, ecclesiology, sacramentology, etc. Such is no longer the case due to the success of the atheist critique beginning with Feuerbach. The atheist challenge remains, either in the negative form of a massive indifference (here the very question of God's existence pales into insignificance, Sartre tells us, because it makes no difference 395 396 WILLIAM J, HILL, O.P. whatsoever to the quality of life: believers kill one another just as do unbelievers, and even do so in the name of God), or in the positive form of a religious humanism, even in some quarters of a theology without God. More radical still is what has been called " semantic atheism ", i.e. the contention that the very word "God" is without meaning, any meaning, that is, that can be validated in the public forum. Nietzsche's cry " God is dead " gives way now to the assertion that the very term "God" has no referent other than that arbitrarily given to it by believers; no objectively real referent, that is. What has occurred, in a spontaneous dialectic of history, whether for good or for bad, is the overthrow of classical theism, i.e. of that understanding in which God is the Supreme Being explaining the existence of everything else-a preunderstanding that precedes revelation and makes the latter credible. This Hellenic and Medieval notion of God was called into question when the cultural world that gave it birth ceased to exist. What was rejected was an objectifying of God, cognitively, by way of metaphysics. This could no longer be the point de depart for the doctrine of God; it was no longer possible to begin with an idea that was then subsequently given content from the sources of revelation. This rendered suspect any demonstrating or verification of God's existence-though it must be said that the atheist premise was equally incapable of validation. This precipitated a radical shift in the question about God. No longer was the concern "Does God exist? ", "Is he real? '', but rather now "Is God present and operative in human life?", and" Does that presence make a difference?". This was in fact a return to the biblical question concerning God's role in human history both individual and social, a question especially urgent in the post-exilic period. God now meant, not" He who is" (lpsum Esse Subsistens), nor even "He who is with us" (mit- Sein), but" He who will be who he will towards mankind", "He who will be the God of our future". The new note being sounded is that of futurity; somewhat muted is the note of divine transcendence, at least in the sense that transcendence was being deferred. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AFTER VATICAN II 397 The shift then was to the God of revelation, more concretely to the God encountered... (shrink)

Kant makes it clear in the Inaugural Dissertation that all the sense‐representations which form the material content of human knowledge are simply ‘modifications of inner sense’. Immortality would be, Kant suggests, the continuation of the unity of one's experience in a differently intuited world; ‘those transcendental objects, which in our present state appear as bodies, could be intuited in an entirely different manner’. Just as the early rationalist doctrine of the self is denied speculative validity, but admitted as a (...) practical postulate of morality; so the early rationalist doctrine of God is retained, but solely for practical use, without any cognitive function. Kant's contention that the ideal of God is a postulate for the employment of understanding in the investigation of nature is not usually granted much force in contemporary thought. Positively, the absolute demands of categorical morality require the postulates of freedom, immortality and God as a condition of their intelligibility. (shrink)

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main (...) focus of the paper. It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal “ought” in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal “ought” were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts. (shrink)

A strategy for dealing systematically with such complex relationships as those between science and theology is presented after a brief overview of the historical record and illustrated in terms of the concept of divinity. The application of that strategy to the title relationships yields a multilogical/multilevel solution which presents certain analogies to or isomorphisms with the doctrine of the Trinity. These concern mainly the multilogical/multilevel character of both conceptualizations and the relational and contextual reasoning required to conceive them. Furthermore, (...) certain characteristics of the doctrine facilitate the dialogue between theologians and scientists on account of their similarity with such scientific concepts as diversity in unity, multiplicity of relationships, nonseparability, and nonclassical logic. (shrink)

It is well known that in India, over the last two thousand five hundred years or more, there has been a pervasive belief in the doctrine of Karma. Various forms and variants in which this doctrine has found expression in the multifarious texts and metaphysical systems have drawn a good deal of attention. The present paper, however, is an attempt at analysing the function of this doctrine, in the sustenance of the traditional social system, and particularly (...) the scheme of social stratification. As we shall see, an unshakable faith in this doctrine by people belonging to all strata of society provided tremendous strength to the caste hierarchy based on birth, and ensured a secure place for the Brāhmanas and their progeny on the top of the social pyramid. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Signatures (DoS) figures prominently in both contemporary and historic herbal traditions across a diversity of cultures. DoS—conceptualized beyond its conventional interpretation as “like cures like”, which relies solely on plant morphology—can be viewed as a type of ecosemiotic communication system. This nuanced form of interspecies communication relies on the presence of “signatures”, or signs, corresponding to the therapeutic quality of different plants based on their morphology but also their aroma, taste, texture, and even their context in (...) the landscape. Despite its widespread contemporary dismissal by mainstream science as overly simplistic, childlike, primitive, and generally of limited value, we suggest that the recognition of “signatures” in plants may be considered as a form of communication between humans and plants. Drawing upon Indigenous thought, ecosemiotic theory, and lyric philosophy, we posit that understanding “signatures” metaphorically, as a reflection of the “shape of the world”, offers insights into the interconnectedness of all life forms—a profound affirmation of relational coherence between humans and the more-than-human. We advocate for another perspective on DoS: one which holds potential towards reorienting and restoring our relationships in the vibrant world of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes one of the main lines of philosophy, which is designated as the philosophy of forms and concepts. The main stages in the formation of a philosophy of this type are identified, which culminates in two fundamental principles: in the Kantian idea of the formation of objects through internal forms from the primary material of sen­sations and in the Hegelian idea of the identity of being and thinking. The question of the natural and unnatural origin (...) of concepts and the concept of form is discussed. “Concept” and “form” are terms that claim to be a direct expression of formative and comprehending thinking, denote two interrelated procedures: firstly, the removal of forms from objectivity, the transfer of forms into the “cognitive ability” and endowing them with the status of internal principles that form objects; secondly, the identification of an object and its meaning, and their mutual transformation in dynamics. Form is both a function of the concept that synthesizes the object and its meaning in identification, and its condition. Bergson’s criticism of the philosophy of “Forms and Ideas” is analyzed in connection with his doctrine of duration. Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis (in the book “What is Philosophy?”) that philosophy is the invention of concepts and its justification is also the subject of analysis. In this regard, the issue of translating the term “concept” into Russian is being considered. The article raises the question of a terminological turn in historical and philosophical research as a necessary element in the analysis of philo­sophical doctrines and problems. The question is also raised about non-conceptual think­ing as differentiation and distinction of differences. (shrink)

The doctrine of idols is one of the most famous aspects of Bacon's thought. Yet his claim that the idols lead to madness has gone almost entirely unnoticed. This paper argues that Bacon's theory of idols underlies his diagnosis of the contemporary condition as one of ‘universal madness’. In contrast to interpretations that locate his doctrine of error and recovery within the biblical narrative of the Fall, the present analysis focuses on the material and cultural sources of the (...) mind's tendency towards error. It explains the idols in terms of Bacon's materialist psychology and his exposé of the debilitating effects of language and traditional learning. In so doing, it highlights the truly radical nature of the idols. For Bacon, the first step towards sanity was to alert people to the prevailing madness. The doctrine of idols was intended as a wake-up call, preparing the way for a remedy in the form of his new method of inquiry. The paper concludes by indicating how Bacon's method aimed to treat ‘universal madness’, and it suggests that his diagnosis influenced John Locke. (shrink)

He served as editor of The Theosophical Society's Theosophical Review, and later formed The Quest Society and edited its journal, The Quest Review.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses of (...) Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 23-47 [Access article in PDF] Suárez' Doctrine of Eternal Truths Amy D. Karofsky 1. Introduction The primary aim of this paper is to offer an interpretation of Suárez' doctrine of eternal truths as found in Metaphysical Disputation XXXI, chapter XII, sections 38-47. There, following the typical scholastic style, Suárez considers and rejects several theories before developing his own. Because (...) it is somewhat difficult to determine what view Suárez ultimately adopts, interpretations of this passage tend to vary. For example, Norman Wells suggests that the necessity and eternality of essential propositions is grounded in the intellect of the divine being. 1 Armand Maurer and John P. Doyle maintain that eternal truths are not grounded in the being of God, but rather in the real being of the essences themselves. 2 I will argue that none of these interpretations adequately expresses Suárez' project, for Suárez wants a solution to the problem of eternal truths that does not depend upon the will of the divine being and one that avoids any ontological commitment to unactualized, possible essences. 3 2. Explanation of the Problem of Eternal Truths Suárez begins the thirty-first disputation with a proof of the identity of essence and existence in finite creatures. The key premise in his argument is the claim that, lacking existence, an unactualized essence is not a being, but absolutely [End Page 23] nothing. 4 By 'being' Suárez means existing being, or a being that is created by God. 5 Unlike the essence of God, the essence of a creature is dependent for its being on the efficient causality of God. Prior to the creative act of God, then, the essence of a creature is not an existing being, hence not a being at all; the unactualized, possible essence is a non-being or nothing.From the claim that a nonexistent essence is absolutely nothing, the following problem arises:... si, ablata existentia, perit essentia, ergo propositiones illae in quibus praedicata essentialia de re praedicantur, non sunt necessariae, neque perpetuae veritatis... 6An essential proposition of the form "X is f" is a proposition in which an essential property f is attributed to an object X. If there are no X's in existence, then there is nothing of which f can be predicated. It would seem, then, that the proposition, "X is f" must be false. One might maintain, however, that even though there are no X's in existence, there is an essence (of) X that has the property f. And in this way, "X is f" remains true, even if there are no X's in existence.However, if one holds, as Suárez does, that the unactualized essence is absolutely nothing, then this solution will not work. For if there are no X's in existence, and if a nonexistent essence is absolutely nothing, then there is nothing of which the essential attribute can be predicated. Thus it appears that any proposition that purports to attribute a property to a nonexistent object must be false and so clearly it can be neither necessarily nor eternally true. Therefore, because Suárez believes that an unactualized essence is absolutely nothing, he seems to be committed to the claim that essential propositions are neither necessarily, nor eternally, true. I will refer to this problem as the Problem of Eternal Truths.Another way to illustrate the Problem of Eternal Truths is to see that there are two seemingly inconsistent propositions: AN: An unactualized, possible essence is absolutely nothing, and NE: True essential propositions are necessarily and eternally true. [End Page 24]Given that a proposition in which a property is attributed to an unactualized essence is false, if Suárez wants to assert the truth of AN, it would appear that he must deny the truth of NE, and, in so doing, reject the possibility of any science of creatures that deals only with necessary truths.Suárez considers three different solutions to this problem: (What I will call) the Aristotelian Solution, the Divine... (shrink)

Analysis of the doctrine of the notion may begin by differentiating the notion in Berkeley from the idea. For Berkeley "human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads, that of ideas, and that of spirits." These two objects of knowledge are so radically different from one another that they have nothing in common but the name "being." Concerning the first kind of knowledge, knowledge by ideas, Berkeley recognizes two kinds: "ideas actually imprinted on the senses" and "ideas formed (...) by the help of memory and imagination." Ideas of imagination and ideas of sense "equally exist in the mind," i.e., they are both mind-dependent and distinct from the mind. Ideas of imagination are copies of ideas of sense. (shrink)

They also describe how one rids oneself of the karmic particles already accumulated, thus attaining liberation. The Karma-granthas form the basis of the present book, the only book in English on this subject of fundamental importance.

Author demonstrates that Russell’s conception of space and time diverges from Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and leans towards logical and mathematical topology. Russell’s approach is grounded in analytical rather than synthetic judgments, contrasting with Kant’s perspective. The British philosopher develops a subjective-psychological model of space and time that complements the logical-mathematical model, serving as the foundation for human experience and cognition. This Russellian model considers the psychological aspects of perceptual and tactile space and time, highlighting their intersection in human perception, which (...) facilitates the experience. It represents a form of «return» to Kant’s subjective theory, albeit on psychological rather than transcendental principles. It is argued that Russell incorporates physical topology into subjective-psychological space and time because he views things as physical objects rather than a complex of sensory associations. This incorporation is indicative of Russell's commitment to neorealism. (shrink)

This essay by the Dutch modernist writer Menno ter Braak, ‘National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancour’, was written in 1937 just before the German annexation of the Netherlands. It is a rare examination of how the concept ressentiment can be used to analyse 1930s National Socialism, outlining the ways in which the fascist variant of ressentiment is both distinctive and also, nonetheless, connected to its democratic and socialist versions. The essay develops Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s understandings of ressentiment by (...) applying them to fascism, insisting on the centrality of the moral sentiment of ressentiment not just to populism but to all forms of democracy, and to any philosophical or political orientation committed to an ideal of equality, indeed to all of modern society, culture and politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self-Moving Motion RAPHAEL DEMOS I WILLXSXTHEREADERto ignore for the time being what he has gleaned about the soul from the reading of the Phaedo and the Republic. In these dialogues Plato speaks of the soul sometimes as wholly rational, as having three parts, and so forth. But in these dialogues he is t~lklng of the human soul, which is a special (...) case, whereas in this essay I am de~Hng with the wider role and the concept of the soul as the efficient cause of motion, change, and all becoming everywhere in the cosmos. My cardinal texts in this exposition are the Sophist (246a-249d), the Phaedrus (245c, d), and a considerable portion of Laws, X. Consider the Phaedo, a dialogue with at least four motifs: it is a dramatic evocation of the last day in the life of Socrates, it is an argument for the immortality of the soul and for the reality of the world of ideas, it is a myth of the nether world, and finally, it is a theory of the cosmos as ruled by purpose--all in all, one of the great pieces of literature of the Western world. For the reader, it is an evocation of an attitude to life, based on Plato's conception of the soul--an attitude expressed in the famous phrase that the wise man spends his life meditating on death. As contrasted with what may be called his existential concern with the soul, in the other dialogues on which I will comment, Plato approaches the topic of the soul as part of his explanation of the cosmos. In these his attitude is objective and quasi-scientific. It is to this side of Plato's thought that I wish to call attention in this essay, where the establishment of the immortality of the soul is incidental to the more basic doctrine that the soul is an arche, a primary factor and an ontological principle. In the,Sophist, we find Plato playing the music of his philosophy in a new key. He refers to the "friends of the forms" as though he, himself, were an outsider looking in; then, too, he asserts that motion is really real in contrast to his derogatory references to motion in the Cratylus, the Phaedo, and the Republic.I In these (and other) dialogues, Plato contrasts change and changing things with the timeless forms in respect of reality: the former are said, at best, to be semi-real; only the latter are really real. But in the Sophist he changes his tune, arguing that total reality (~o ~v, to' ~a~rE~ By) includes both motion and rest (248e 8; 249d 3-4). What does he mean by these two words? That by 'rest' he means the realm of ideas is indicated (if not proved) by his references to the forms in the same context (247b 1But in the Theaeteius,he classifiesmotions in a semi-scientific fashion, leaving the impression on the reader that he regards motion as a reality. [133] 134 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1-2; 249b, 10, c 1).2 As for motion, Plato makes it clear that the term covers not only (a) physical motion but also (b) life, (c) psyche, and (d) phronesis or naus (249b 5). All these are said to be forms of kinesis; how this is so--how life, soul, mason may be described as motions or changes--is a matter for later comment. What is more to the point is Plato's insistence that motion and what is moved are onta (beings, 249b 2, d 3). Plato uses change (metabol$) interchangeably with kinesis; anticipating the Phaedrus, I will include activity under change. And anticipating the Laws, I will characterize some of this activity as mental; indeed the Sophist, includes within change nous, phronesis, and episteme; that is to say, understanding (in the sense of an activity, 249a, b, c).s Plato offers various reasons in support of his contention that change is real. He may also be offering a special demonstration as follows. The philosopher who denies that change is real is engaged in a mental activity, in short... (shrink)

The article underlines the significance of social rights as important constitutional rights of a human being and emphasises the peculiarities of their nature from the point of view of not only national, but also international law. The article presents an analysis of the constitutional doctrine of the protection of guarantees of social rights, which has been formulated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in the course of considering the issues of reduction of social guarantees—pensions and remuneration, (...) which were determined by the economic crisis. In the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence the personal right to social security has been construed in the most broad and comprehensive terms. The human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution have been treated as constituting an integrated and harmonious system, and social rights have been interpreted not only as certain obligations of the state to the public, which inter alia are determined by the social purpose of the state, but also as a person’s individual rights, for which judicial defence is guaranteed. Such concept of the said rights has also been influenced by international law, inter alia the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Social rights, while being an object of regulation of international law, have been forming the European doctrine of guarantees of these rights and have influenced the concept of these rights in national law. The main attention in the article is devoted to the analysis of the doctrine formulated in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in relation to the correction (limitation) of social rights (payment of pensions and remuneration) under the conditions of economic crisis. In the article the period of formation of this doctrine is divided into two stages: the period of 2002–2006, when the Constitutional Court had to decide regarding the compliance of the legal acts whereby social guarantees had been constricted with the Constitution, and which was caused by the consequences of the so-called Russian economic crisis for the economic development of the state of Lithuania; and the period from 2009 to date, during which the Constitutional Court has been forming the constitutional doctrine of limitation of social rights, which was conditioned by the outcomes of the global economic crisis for the economy of the state of Lithuania. The article raises a question as to whether the constitutional doctrine being formed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis may be assessed as an independent one or whether it still remains to be a separate case of limitation of rights within the general doctrine of limitation of human rights. On the basis of the analysis of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, a conclusion is drawn that the criteria established in the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis are even stricter than the universally recognised criteria for the limitation of human rights in the law of human rights, therefore, it is possible to assess the doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis, as formulated by the Constitutional Court during 2009–2012, which is the continuation of the previous doctrine, as an independent doctrine, the basis of which, undoubtedly, remains to be formed by the general principles of limitation of human rights recognised in the law of human rights. The article is not only confined to the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, it also provides examples of construction of the doctrine of social rights (inter alia those influenced by the economic crisis) by certain other constitutional courts. (shrink)

This article explores the intersection between Karl Barth’s doctrine of creation and African Christology seeking to elicit similarities as well as differences. It argues that this intersection is contested and open to different understanding and interpretation. The common goal amongst the two doctrines is that they derive from biblical teachings about creation and the creator. However, there is also divergence between the doctrines. Barth’s point of departure in his doctrine of creation maintains the Covenant of God to humanity (...) which is not extended to all creation. African Christology’s point of departure, on the other hand, maintains that the relations between God, humanity and all life-forms are sacred because of its intrinsic value and sacramental nature. From an African perspective, creation is mutually related and interconnected to the web of life. All life forms hold intrinsic value. It is argued that African Christology implicates Barth’s Christological focus as something that reveals Barth’s doctrine of creation as anthropocentric.Contribution: The article promotes a multi-disciplinary approach to eco-theology by exploring the intersection between Karl Barth’s doctrine of creation and an African Christological perspective on ecology. It implicates Christian anthropocentrism as a contributory factor to ecological degradation and suggests that African Christology is an important resource for developing a remedial eco-theology. (shrink)

"It is the purpose of this article to attempt to re-examine the account of Thrasymachus' doctrine in Plato's Republic, and to show how it can form a self-consistent whole. [...] In this paper it is maintained that Thrasymachus is holding a form of [natural right]".

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies has been and continues to be enormously influential in the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. In simple terms, the Doctrine states that we directly perceive in the first instance the activity of our nerves, rather than properties in the external world. The canonical early statement of the Doctrine by the physiologist Johannes Peter Müller had profound influence on both the phi- losophy and psychology of the 19th and early 20th centuries, (...) especially as reformulated and transmitted by Müller’s student Helmholtz. A common assumption of historical and ongoing debate about the Doctrine has been its supposedly idealist or skeptical implications. What is not commonly recognized is that Müller himself ad- vanced a realist interpretation along lines that would be recognized today as a form of epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller’s structuralist epistemology in detail and reconstructs his articulation and defense of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies in its canonical form. Part II argues for the continued im- portance of the Doctrine and its structuralist interpretation for contemporary psychology, philosophy of per- ception, and history of philosophy of science. (shrink)

IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED, Maimonides does not treat the doctrine of divine omniscience and divine providence in a strictly theological context. He arrives at this subject for the first time in the third section of the Guide, after he has concluded the thematic treatment of at least the following themes: the names and attributes of God ; the proof of the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God ; the separate intelligences and the order of the world ; (...) the creation of the world ; and prophecy. Directly following the discussion of prophecy is the thematic interpretation of ma‘aseh merkabah —Ezekiel 1 and 10—. This interpretation concludes with the remark that while all of the preceding “up to this chapter,” that is, I 1–III 7, is indispensable for the understanding of ma‘aseh merkabah, the discussion “after this chapter,” that is, from III 8 to the end, will in no way—neither in a detailed manner nor in the form of hints—involve “this subject,” namely ma‘aseh merkabah. Accordingly, Maimonides immediately turns to “other subjects.” Now, for Maimonides ma‘aseh merkabah is identical with metaphysics. The closing remark at the end of Guide III 7 means, then, that while all preceding discussions are of a metaphysical character, the following discussions will not belong to metaphysics. The subjects of the nonmetaphysical section of the Guide are: divine providence ; and the purpose of the Torah in general and of its arrangements in particular. Whatever else may be the case with regard to the plan of the Guide, it is certain that Maimonides, through precisely this plan, excludes the question of divine omniscience and of divine providence from the subject matter of metaphysics. (shrink)

The doctrine of the twelve Kālīs is one of the earliest developments of the Śākta tradition of the Kālīkula/Kālīkrama/Mahānaya and it is well known in the later exegetical works of Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja, and Maheśvarānanda. Although the twelve Kālīs have been treated to some extent in secondary literature, a systematic study of the development and reception of this doctrine has not been undertaken yet. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the Kālīkula scriptures are available in (...) manuscript form, and methodical analysis of their contents remains a desideratum. In this article, I intend to examine selected tantric scriptures teaching the doctrine of the twelve Kālīs, focusing on the development of the constituent elements of this doctrine, as they appear in different tantric sources. This article traces the origins of the twelve Kālīs to the esoteric teaching of the Sun-Goddess, linked to the tradition of the Skeleton of Kālī. It will argue that in the subsequent phase of the doctrine’s development the solar context gradually diminished and an emphasis on the twelve goddesses’ function as the destroyers of time became more and more pronounced. This tendency, in turn, influenced the codification of the twelve Kālīs as the fully-fledged doctrine of time-consumption, popular in the Trika and the Trika-inspired Krama sources. (shrink)

I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases (...) as illustrations, but my position does not depend on intuitive judgements about them. Instead, it follows from the view that the moral permissibility of an action depends at least partly on how it forms the agent's character. I also respond to some objections presented by Harris, Bennett, McIntyre, Thomson and Scanlon to the doctrine of double effect. (shrink)

All the medical and bioethical questions, ranging from stem cell research to converging technologies and synthetic biology, touch on the question regarding the image of human beings and their position in the cosmos, by which we are able to orient ourselves. This article argues that the biblical belief in creation and the discourse about humans as created beings by and in the image of God can still be proclaimed as a viable form of human self-interpretation in the present. The distinction (...) between practical knowledge and knowledge of orientation may be of help here. Guidance for how to live and act is not best found in abstract principles, but rather in meaningful stories, in metaphors and symbols. On this level, too, is also where faith in creation and the certainty of our own creatureliness is located. Contribution: This article interprets the doctrine of creation by a hermeneutical theology. It analyses the interdependence between hermeneutics and criticism in the process of reinterpreting the classical propositions about the human being and the world as God’s creation and the relation of anthropology and ethics. The aim is to show what might be the contribution of Christian faith in creation to the approach of an ethics of responsibility in the field of bioethics and ecology. The specific contribution of this article to current debates on an ethics of creation is the thesis that the key to a well-balanced theological approach to all this is the Pauline doctrine of justification as interpreted by the protestant reformers. (shrink)

The jus ad bellum doctrine of legitimate authority, conceived by St. Augustine and evolved by St. Thomas Aquinas, that a sovereign might identify a just cause and declare war without reference to the nation’s soldiers or citizens, continues to inform thinking about just war. Contesting this claim, the present paper reasons that without the moral confidence of the soldiers who serve, no conflict can be justified. The paper claims that soldiers have relevant and important ideas about the justice of (...) the cause. Soldiers, who enlist in order to advance justice by just means, deserve the chance to fight and perhaps to die with the fully formed moral assurance that their cause is right. (shrink)

What is the nature of truth? This question has been answered by philosophers in quite different ways, while F. H. Bradley asserts that truths have degrees and that no proposition can be stated to be simply true or false. In this paper, I briefly illustrate what he calls the doctrine of degrees of truth and try to address the problems it entails. I first explain what he means by truth and error/falsehood (he does not make a clear distinction between (...) the two terms); then, I concentrate on his criticisms of three theories of truth, followed by a discussion of his own identity theory of truth. I will be focusing on his doctrine of the degrees of truth and highlight its difficulties. I show that his theory faces some insurmountable difficulties, and it should be motivated by a particular form of monism that he insisted on, saying existence monism. (shrink)

I shall argue that the central doctrines of Locke's politics have a theological basis, a doctrine of Creation similar to the Thomist one. Locke does not elaborate this doctrine; he presupposes it. It is not a hidden, esoteric element in his thought; it is there on the surface, but in a scattered and fragmentary form.I shall proceed in this fashion: First, I shall set out this doctrine of Creation and show its connexion with Locke's moral theory by (...) way of an examination of his doctrines of property and power. I shall then show that Locke extends this doctrine of Creation to human productive activity with crippling results for his political theory. (shrink)

The social doctrine of Catholicism was formed during the twentieth century - first as an addition to moral theology, and then acquired a certain autonomy, enriched with continuous, organic and systematic reflection on new and complex social problems. The most important point in the development of social doctrine is that it, being a doctrinal corps, with a stable theological basis, is not confined to a closed theological system, but proves its adaptability to the evolution of society, depending on (...) the situation in the world and the human ability to respond to new problems and time calls It stems from the impartial consideration of the social documents of all the Pontiffs - from Leo XII to John Paul II - and becomes even more evident from the Second Vatican Council. So, in order to understand the historical development of social doctrine, it is necessary to understand the socio-cultural context of each document, to consider the economic, social, political and cultural conditions in which they were formed and applied. (shrink)

The author examines Kant’s transcendental doctrine of space and time in order to find out possible anthropological connotations of the German philosopher’s topology. The analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions: 1) the anthropological features of space and time significantly correct the transcendental understanding of space and time as forms of sensual intuition; 2) the anthropological connotations of the forms of space and time make it impossible to have both noumenal, intellectual intuition of things and intuition (...) based on a different topology, on configurations of the world that are different from those familiar to humans; 3) Kant’s achievement is his work «Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science» (1786), which demonstrates the effectiveness of the transcendental method, in particular transcendental aesthetics, in substantiating the natural sciences (physics) of the time, which made it possible to prove the close connection of the natural sciences with the transcendental conditions of experience. (shrink)

This article is a queer reading of the doctrine of miraculous conception and an exploration into how applying an intersex lens to these conception texts can liberate an intersex Jesus. In it, I explain the basics of intersex and otherwise queer theologies, before looking at sex difference in the New Testament through the figures of eunuchs, and conducting an intersex reading of Jesus’ conception and biology. I argue that, if we believe Mary to be a virgin at the moment (...) of Jesus’ conception, with no external male influence, then Jesus is necessarily a chromosomal ‘female’ (and therefore intersex, due to his ‘male’ physical appearance). I then discuss the ways in which his biology can transcend prescriptive roles of sex, mirroring how his social behaviour transcends prescriptive roles of gender. What this queer reading of Jesus can tell us relates to a gender-expansive view of deity – troubling rigid Church institutions by celebrating the breaking of binaries that constrain us. (shrink)

Against the charge that Kant's doctrine of radical evil is inconsistent and alien to his practical philosophy, my aim is to show its necessity within the critical system. First, I undermine the alleged vacuity of Kant's notion of evil by showing that, already in the Groundwork, an evil will is the necessary conceptual correlate of a good will. "Good" and "evil" characterize the agent's form of willing and represent the source of value of right and wrong actions. Then, I (...) show how the doctrine of radical evil derives from Kant's notion of evil. That evil lies at the level of an individual Gesinnung is the result of Kant's radicalizing the use of transcendental freedom. That there is a propensity to evil in the whole species is the result of Kant's naturalizing the principles of his moral psychology. Although Kant is not clear about this distinction, the consistency of his doctrine depends on indicating that an "evil Gesinnung" and the "propensity to evil" are not equivalent concepts. Rather, they refer to different units of moral analysis, the individual and the whole species, and represent a failure to comply with different types of moral obligation: the duty to realize the good and the duty to realize the highest good. The correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation explains the isomorphism that Kant detects between them, as well as their logical independence, without which the individual's choice of Gesinnung would be analytically contained in the species' choice of moral nature . Finally, to account for the problem of moral self-constitution I argue for the necessity of assuming a transcendental volitional structure, the unity of acknowledgement or "I will". At the different levels of analysis, this structure organizes the will's manifold intentions according to unifying principles that allow it to recognize them as its own. Although Kant does not mention it, the "I will" is a necessary assumption to account for the continuity of choice and for its possible imputation to an agent. (shrink)

This article examines Boris N. Chicherin’s ideas about property. It shows that the thinker interprets property as a material form of the objectification of human freedom, the most important and nec...

On 21 June 2011 the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania adopted extensive and important amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Most of them came into force on 1 October 2011.One of the important tasks that have been mentioned for the preparation of amendments was to ensure the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of matters of civil procedure. This article analyses one of the changed aspect - the system of defence of public (...) interest. The doctrine of concept of public interest was formed by the resolutions of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court adopted on 16 January and 21 September 2006. That concept was quite confusing and could be interpreted widely as well as narrowly (such as protection of special key values in the Constitution). This paper analyses the manner in which the doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been implemented in the law of civil procedure. In addition, the article analyzes the history of the amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the protection of public interest. The author presents a situation proposed to the Working Group that prepared the draft amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, and compares the proposals with the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same article analyses the way that the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure forces to the protection of the public interest doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The author concludes that the current system is conducive to abuses when the state can envisage the existence of public interest in every dispute and intervene in its investigation. In addition, the court is transformed into an entity liable to defend public interest, while it should be an independent and impartial entity to administer justice. Let us hope that in judicial practice the concept of public interest will be interpreted very narrowly and the Code of Civil Procedure provides the right to collect evidence or apply interim protection measures and etc. will be seen as a political mistake and generally will not be applied (except when it comes to non dispositive cases). (shrink)

My target in this paper is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘ Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth ’ and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’. It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of those meanings or conventions. In its simplest form the view states that a truth, if it is necessary, (...) is necessary because it is analytic. It is widely recognized that this simple version of the view faces a prima facie problem with the existence of the necessary a posteriori. Assuming that all analytic truths are a priori, if there are necessary a posteriori truths then there are necessary synthetic truths—contradicting the view’s claim that all necessary truths are analytic. Contemporary L-DONTers have things to say about the problem, but in this paper I want to suggest that there is a different, more serious, problem which arises from the phenomenon of indexicality, which L-DONTers have not taken account of. Though there are many versions of the problem, a simple one is this. Consider Kaplan’s celebrated sentence. (shrink)