That the senselessness of violence – violence no longer a mere political means to a justified end outside it – is omnipresent in today’s world: the realization of this truth appears to have made obsolete today the conventional understanding of violence as mere political means. That the Greeks thought “bia,” which means violence, in its close proximity with “bio,” which means “life,” speaks not surprisingly a truth whose manifestation we perceive today more clearly than ever before, (...) albeit the mode or manner of this manifestation today was perhaps not known to the Greeks. Taking F.W.J. von Schelling’s reflection on evil and violence as the point of departure, this paper seeks to understand the relation between life and violence anew and attempts to show that at the heart of the phenomenon of evil lies the enigmatic and fascinating question of the image. (shrink)

SummaryGod is always experienced in the mode of representations. The fundamental representation of God is Jesus Christ, the true image of God. In order to specify this designation further, with reference to all of humanity, it is suggested that the basic features of such representation can be identified in the features of desire and vulnerability, as manifestations of interconnectedness and dependence. These features are not only expressing themselves as that with which humans need to come to terms, but they also (...) manifest the deeply relational character of humanity and its internal connection to goodness. They also make it possible to specify further how God and the human being are intrinsically connected, and make it possible to see why love is so important in the realization ofimago Dei: It is love that secures that both desire and vulnerability can contribute to human flourishing, and thus precludes sin from manifesting itself. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection of Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of intentional human consciousness and the evolving discourse on artificial intelligence (AI). By understanding the distinctions between human cognition and AI capabilities, we can develop a Nouvelle théologie that addresses the ethical and theological dimensions of AI’s integration into society. This approach not only highlights the unique human capacities for self-reflection and moral reasoning but also guides the deliberate and responsible design of AI to promote human flourishing and the common good. (...) It seeks to enrich contemporary technological engagement with insights drawn from the rich reservoir of Catholic intellectual tradition, particularly through the lens of Lonergan’s cognitive theory, which emphasizes the dynamic interplay of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Highlighting the profound gap between AI’s computational abilities and the depth of human cognition, the paper argues for the uniqueness of human spiritual and moral capacities—features that AI cannot emulate. The exploration reaffirms the human person’s imago Dei and the irreplaceable capacity for transcendence, ethical discernment, and relationality, informing a responsible approach to AI development that upholds human dignity and serves the common good. The paper challenges the narrative of technological determinism, advocating for active human agency in shaping AI’s societal role. It promotes a Lonerganian ethical framework for AI that adheres to the transcendental precepts of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility—principles that guide technology development toward enhancing human well-being and fostering communal flourishing. (shrink)

Quel est le type de rationalité que peut revendiquer la théologie dans le champ des savoirs ? Pas seulement d’épistémologie, la question prend aujourd’hui une tournure nettement plus utilitaire : qu’est-ce qui justifie le fait que des institutions prestigieuses comme les universités entretiennent encore à grand frais des Facultés dont l’objet même est devenu culturellement marginal ? Craintes illusoires ? Les gestionnaires des universités d’inspiration chrétienne, comme il en existe dans mon pays, vous diront qu’elles ne sont pas dépourvues de (...) fondement. Les urgences en termes humains : là est l’enjeu. Nos sociétés se trouvent face à des défis inédits. La prise de conscience la plus récente est la catastrophe écologique qui nous menace. Et l’écologie n’est pas le seul défi. Nous vivons dans un monde d’inégalités terrifiantes, où sévissent de nombreux espaces de famine, où la violence semble incontrôlable, où les idéologies religieuses qu’on croyait mortes exercent encore des ravages. L’enjeu, ce n’est donc pas la survie d’institutions vénérables, ni même la qualification culturelle de notre digne corporation, mais l’avenir de la planète et de cette espèce de vivants très particulière, les humains. A moins d’être inconscient, le théologien qui essaie de faire son métier dans ce contexte ne peut que s’interroger sur la pertinence de son travail et sur la responsabilité qui est la sienne.What kind of rationality can theology claim in the field of knowledge? No longer solely epistemological, this question today takes on a decidedly more utilitarian turn: what might justify the fact that prestigious institutions such as universities still maintain at great cost departments the only object of which has become culturally marginal? Illusory fears? The administrators of universities of Christian inspiration, as we have in my country, will tell you that these questions are well founded. What is paramount is the urgency of the issues human being must face. Our societies have to cope with previously unheard of challenges, the most recent of which is the realization that we are facing the threat of an ecological catastrophe, and this is not the only one. We live in a world of terrifying inequalities, where many areas are plagued by famine, violence appears uncontrollable, and religious ideologies we thought long past still wreak havoc. What is at stake is thus not the survival of venerable institutions, nor even the cultural qualification of our worthy community of scholars, but the future of the planet and of this very particular species – human beings. Unless they insist on being oblivious to the situation, theologians trying to do their job in this context cannot help but question what the pertinence of their work might be and what their responsibility is. (shrink)

This article considers the imago Dei from the perspective of paleoanthropology. We identify structural, functional, and relational elements of the imago Dei that emerged mosaically during human evolution. Humans are unique in their ability to relate to each other and to God, and in their membership of cultural communities where shared attention, the transmission of moral norms, and symbolic behavior are important elements. We discuss similarities between our approach and the concept of theosis adopted in the Eastern Orthodox (...) Church. (shrink)

There is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between (...) contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out. (shrink)

Le concept de modernité et des notions qui lui sont apparentées - sécularisation, laïcité, libéralisme, séparation de l'Église et de l'État, discours sur les droits et libertés - souffrent d'une imprécision définitionnelle à la source de nombreuses incompréhensions. La distinction entre deux paradigmes historiques de référence, soit une modernité américaine attachée à son héritage judéo-chrétien et une modernité française fermée à la transcendance et historiquement hostile à l'Église, offre une grille d'analyse susceptible de clarifier les débats transatlantiques et la posture (...) philosophique des uns et des autres. Ces deux modèles rivaux résultent de lectures fondatrices antagoniques des droits de l'homme et de la laïcité. Partisans des deux modernités s'opposent, souvent avec âpreté, dans l'ensemble des diverses cultures nationales de la Civilisation occidentale. Discréditée par les grands totalitarismes athées et les hécatombes du XXe siècle, la modernité comprise comme auto-nomie ne saura se relever qu'en se réconciliant avec ses sources originelles chrétiennes. Garant de la dignité de la personne humaine, l'imago Dei - l'anthropologie biblique - constitue le fondement ultime et le cadre interprétatif nécessaire aux droits fondamentaux de la personne. (shrink)

This short article provides an introduction to a special section, consisting of six papers on human evolution and the imago Dei. These papers are the result of dialogue between theologians and philosophers of religion at the University of Oxford and the Catholic University of Leuven. All contributors focus on the imago Dei, and consider how this theological notion can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, looking at a variety of disciplines, including the psychology of reasoning, cognitive science of (...) religion, paleoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary ethics. (shrink)

Obraz jako pojęcie filozoficzne ma długą i złożoną historię, która ma swój początek już w starożytności. Uczeni chrześcijańscy włączyli je do swoich badań filozoficznych w postaci imago Dei. W niniejszej pracy autor dokonał analizy dzieł św. Tomasza z Akwinu w celu ustalenia, jakie konsekwencje antropologiczne wynikają z idei stworzenia człowieka na obraz Boży. W pierwszej kolejności ustalono, że człowiek jako istota stworzona na obraz Boga uczestniczy poprzez swój intelekt w naturze Bożej. Dodatkowo przedstawione zostały trzy etapy uczestnictwa człowieka w (...) Bogu. Następnie autor bronił klasycznej teorii Akwinaty przeciwko współczesnym reinterpretacjom jego myśli. Argumentowano, iż Akwinata słusznie utrzymuje, że jedynie intelektualna część duszy ludzkiej jest, ściśle rzecz biorąc, stworzona na Obraz Boży, natomiast ciało ludzkie (i inne stworzenia irracjonalne) upodabnia się do Boga na podobieństwo śladu. (shrink)

El concepto de la forma divina del ser humano es mencionado en varias descripciones en las tres religiones abrahámicas mayores. El enfoque tradicional judeocristiano de Imago Dei (La imagen de Dios) tiene tres perspectivas principales: sustantiva, funcional y relacional. Ibn ‘Arabī, como pensador y místico musulmán, explicó esta idea a través del concepto de espejo y otros dos conceptos, a saber, el ‘Hombre Perfecto’ y la vicegerencia de Dios. Consideró la forma divina del ser humano como un espejo a (...) través del cual Dios se manifiesta. Este artículo ofrece una visión general comprensiva de la interpretación de Ibn ‘Arabī a la luz de los enfoques judeocristianos. La explicación de Ibn ‘Arabī incluye tres enfoques. A través del concepto del hombre perfecto, la explicación de Ibn ‘Arabī se acerca a la interpretación sustantiva, y a través del concepto de vicegerencia, revela la interpretación funcional. El artículo reconoce una interpretación relacional de la forma divina a través de algunas explicaciones contradictorias que pueden hallarse en sus libros. Este análisis de su explicación también arroja bastante luz sobre aspectos de su perspectiva antropológica. (shrink)

This short article provides an introduction to a special section, consisting of six papers on human evolution and the imago Dei. These papers are the result of dialogue between theologians and philosophers of religion at the University of Oxford and the Catholic University of Leuven. All contributors focus on the imago Dei, and consider how this theological notion can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, looking at a variety of disciplines, including the psychology of reasoning, cognitive science of (...) religion, paleoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary ethics. (shrink)

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I (...) make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Redeeming the Enlightenment: Christianity and the Liberal VirtuesJudith W. KayRedeeming the Enlightenment: Christianity and the Liberal Virtues Bruce K. Ward Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 230 pp. $26.00.Bruce Ward has written a remarkably rich intellectual history whose theological diagnosis yields refreshing interpretations of ethical norms. Each chapter treats one of liberalism’s cherished virtues (equality, authenticity, tolerance, and compassion) and argues for the Christian roots of each in order (...) to show how Christianity is “the fulfillment of what the Enlightenment, at its best, sought” (196).Ward uses the Christian humanism of Dostoevsky to redeem the equality espoused by Rousseau and Kant in light of Nietzsche’s attacks. Equality is grounded neither in a human capacity nor in obedience to a principle, but in the imago Dei. While hardly original, this foundation with attention to immanence can create an enlivened perception of others in their richness while being transformed by love from “the other world.” Ward redeems authenticity with agapic self-dispossession rather than self-assertion, which liberates it from individualism and opens it to the “call of God.” Liberal compassion finds its fulfillment in the love of particular, suffering humans, which requires discernment, respect, and effective action. Such compassion is rooted in and revelatory of divine love.Ward’s most compelling chapter, on tolerance, begins by noting how this ideal often inhibits moral judgment or promotes indifference. Ward is a student of neither Mill’s nor Nussbaum’s libertarian versions of tolerance. Instead, Ward draws upon René Girard to argue that tolerance must account for the perpetrator’s demonization of social outcasts that leads to the victim’s resentment. Victims must lead the way in exposing and then exiting this cycle. Dostoevsky recommends a practice of taking responsibility for all persecution (“all are guilty for all”) as an expression of active love. Such a practice forges points of human contact between groups in conflict, even if prejudices are slow to change. In response to intolerant religions, Christians should assume such universal responsibility rather than rely on the “restrained” violence of the liberal state. Although Ward derides multicultural versions of tolerance that “celebrate difference,” he observes that the universal human of Enlightenment ontology cannot exist except through the particularity of a lived story—precisely multiculturalism’s insight. [End Page 213]The deep lament motivating this book is that an inadequate Christian theology lost its power to explain the world. The resulting defense of humanism by Enlightenment philosophes was deeply shaped by Christian ideals, but they were unable to articulate a foundation for moral norms, which made Nietzschean nihilists appear sane. Both groups are ill equipped to respond to current religious terrorism. As Charles Taylor explores in The Secular Age, the third contenders are those who affirm a good beyond this world. Ward differs from Taylor by arguing that the problem is not a lack of transcendent grounding for norms but an inadequate conceptualization of immanence and transcendence. Ward uses the Trinitarian approach of Dostoevsky to reorder transcendence and immanence, which avoids translating “Christianity into liberalism” or injecting transcendence into secularism.Ward’s project succeeds if one accepts Nietzsche as the major critic of the Enlightenment. Readers who have accepted as legitimate other criticisms of the philosophes may be disappointed. His discussion of compassion lacks Catholic interlocutors such as Edward Vacek who argue that agape avoids the polarity between self-love and compassion; feminists who critique Enlightenment dichotomies between savage and civilized or reason and emotion; and Marxists who argue that capitalism denies human equality, thus making Ward’s “capitalist liberal humanism” sound naive. It is not clear how Ward would redeem the Enlightenment from such criticisms.Nevertheless, Ward’s rereading of the Enlightenment is majestic in its sweep, compelling in its close textual analysis, and brimming with fresh insights. The text assumes much familiarity with the philosophes; its pedagogical use is recommended for graduate students and scholars. [End Page 214]Judith W. KayUniversity of Puget SoundCopyright © 2012 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Domestic abuse is a common occurrence for women in the Christian Church. Underlying this dark reality is a long history of patriarchal theological interpretations that have depicted God as a dominant male figure that subjects women to male hierarchy as a subordinate. Often based on an understanding of Jesus as subordinate to God the Father in the Trinity, the correlated praxis of the Church has commonly been to subject women to suffering at the hands of men – even at the (...) cost of their lives – thus mimicking the death of Christ. This deeply flawed androcentric theology and subsequent praxis of women’s subordination has been severely challenged by liberal feminists, and rightly so for the sake of women’s survival and flourishing. This article utilizes the Social Trinity to provide a Christian feminist critique of patriarchal atonement models and theology towards the feminist goal of liberating women from male-perpetrated violence. Ultimately a reframing of God will be presented that includes women as full persons and calls them to resist the suffering of domestic abuse and to reclaim their full personhood as the imago Dei. (shrink)

Theologians and Old Testament scholars have been at odds with respect to the best interpretation of the imago Dei. Theologians have preferred substantialistic (e.g., image as soul or mind) or relational interpretations (e.g., image as relational personhood) and Old Testament scholars have preferred functional interpretations (e.g., image as kingly dominion). The disagreements revolve around a number of exegetical questions. How do we best read Genesis 1 in its literary, historical, and cultural contexts? How should it be read theologically? How (...) should we read Genesis 1 as a canonical text? This book charts a path through these disagreements by offering a dogmatically coherent and exegetically sound canonical interpretation of the image of God. Peterson argues that the fundamental claim of Genesis 1:26-28 is that humanity is created to image God actively in the world. "Made in the image of God" is an identity claim. As such, it tells us about humanity's relationship with God and the rest of creation, what humanity does in the world, and what humanity is to become. Understanding the imago Dei as human identity has the further advantage of illuminating humanity's ontology. Canonically, knowledge of the contours and purpose of human existence develops alongside God's self-revelation. Tracing this development, Peterson demonstrates the coherence of the OT and NT texts that refer to the image of God. In the NT, Jesus Christ is understood as the realization of God's image in the world and therefore the fulfillment of the description of humanity's identity in Genesis 1. In addition to its specific focus on resolving interdisciplinary tensions for Christian interpretation of the imago Dei, the argument of the book has important implications for ethics, the doctrine of sin, and the doctrine of revelation. (shrink)

This study aims at showing how at the basis of Nikolai Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism and Marxism lays the concept of Imago Dei. The Russian religious philosopher puts forward the Imago Dei as fundamental to the Christian understanding of human dignity. Berdyaev believes that in both capitalism and Marxism an objectification of the person takes place, and therefore a denial of basic human dignity. Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism refers to its internal principles, partly building on Marx’s early criticism (...) of capitalism. Although he shared some of the same concerns with Marx and other Marxist theorists, ultimately his was a critique from a Christian perspective that was deeply humanistic, whereas Marxism in its Hegelian orientation had failed in achieving what Berdyaev understands as true humanism. Having confronted and engaged both systems of thought during his own life, Berdyaev’s insights are most interesting, and I argue in this paper that they are also relevant for our own reflections on these subjects today. (shrink)

Reconnaissant que la foi en Dieu Créateur est un mystère qui transcende notre pouvoir de compréhension humaine et de mise en concepts, l'auteur met en oeuvre divers modèles théologiques pour jeter quelque lumière sur la richesse de cette croyance. En ce qui concerne le modèle ontologique, il a recours à la théologie de Karl Rahner pour explorer le sens de l'être-créature. De par sa constitution ontologique l'être humain est à la fois différent et dépendant de Dieu en tout acte. Le (...) modèle «fiduciaire» favorisé par les Réformateurs, insiste sur le fait que la foi en Dieu Créateur est réellement un acte de confiance en l'attention que Dieu nous porte. Le modèle eschatologique, proposé par des penseurs tels Moltmann et Pannenberg, met l'accent sur Dieu comme notre futur absolu et l'objet de nos plus profonds désirs. L'article examine également certains modèles écologiques courants ainsi que l'«ecoféminisme» qui soulignent le besoin d'une intendance de la création plutôt que d'une domination. Un modèle de domination conduit à la violation de la terre comme à l'exploitation de la femme. L'article se préoccupe principalement de montrer que la foi en Dieu Créateur dans le Nouveau Testament est toujours liée au Christ comme Nouvelle Création. L'intention divine en créant était de conduire les créatures à partager la filiation du Christ. Les créatures deviennent imago Dei en vivant la relation filiale du Christ vis-à-vis du Père. Ignace de. (shrink)

The article surveys and analyzes the roles in Judaism of the value of imago Dei/human dignity, especially in bioethical contexts. Two main topics are discussed. The first is a comparative analysis of imago Dei as an anthropological and ethical concept in Jewish and Western thought (Christianity and secular European values). The Jewish tradition highlights the human body and especially its procreative function and external appearance as central to imago Dei. The second is the role of imago (...) Dei as a moral value relative to others. In rabbinic Judaism, respect for human dignity is not the primary moral maxim; it is secondary to the value of neighborly love and sometimes to other moral laws and values. (shrink)

Most contemporary theologians have distanced themselves from views that identify the image of God with a capacity or a set of capacities that humans have. This article examines three arguments against the structural view and finds them wanting. The first argument is that the structural view entails mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary philosophy. Against this, I argue that contemporary forms of dualism are able to circumvent such worries and are at least prima facie (...) plausible. The second claim is that structural views end up disvaluing the human body and our relatedness. Here, I argue that neither the structural view nor dualism has such consequences. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries that have to do with the lack of a clear-cut boundary between human capacities and the capacities of nonhuman animals. As a response, the article argues that although there might not be a clear-cut set of capacities that all humans share, we could still have a notion of human distinctiveness that is sufficient for the structural image of God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IS EVERY HUMAN BEING A PERSON?* ROBERT SPAEMANN Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich, Germany I. DEFINING THE QUESTION THE PAPAL encyclical, Evangelium vitae (EV), declares solemnly that "... the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral" (EV 57). This unconditional ethical obligation to respect every human life is justified by reference to "the incomparable dignity of the human person." Such an unconditioned claim is made upon (...) us by the face of every human being we meet. The encyclical supports this claim of intuitive perception with two arguments. First and foremost, the claim to unconditional respect is based biblically and theologically on the recognition of the human being as the imago Dei. The human is the "image" of God. Humans, however, are not unconditioned simply taken in themselves ; merely as such, theirs is a most conditioned, finite being, which can be transformed from living to dead with hardly the lifting of a finger. And yet, such violence, while always possible for us physically, is absolutely impossible on another level. In the human being something "reveals" itself to us that is more than any finite and conditioned mode of being; thus, the term "image." In contrast to mere pictures, which are images only in an accidental sense, the human is created as image. Human being is being an image. Thus human being participates in the 'Translated by Richard Schenk, O.P. 463 464 ROBERT SPAEMAN incorruptibility of the One of whom the human is an image. Human beings are called to eternal life. The second and secondary argument is based on the consequences of not respecting the unconditioned dignity of the human being. The encyclical points out that an order of law in which the freedom from being at another's free disposition is lacking does not deserve the name of law; it is merely an organization of the power of the stronger over the weaker. In section nineteen the pope mentions a theory held by some who would acknowledge only those humans as subjects of legal rights who already manifest certain signs of personal autonomy. He also speaks of the theory of those who would "identify the dignity of the person with the capacity for explicitly verbal communication." Not included in this category are therefore the unborn, the dying, and severely impaired or senile humans; although not mentioned by the encyclical, it must be added that by this theory infants are excluded as well. In his book, Practical Ethics,1 the most influential proponent of this theory, Peter Singer, has declared outright that the life of a human infant is of less value than that of an adult pig.2 Because the encyclical argues for the most part theologically, it does not deal closely with the arguments proposed by Singer and his followers in their attempt to eliminate human rights and to claim that not all human beings are persons.3 The Holy Scriptures do not speak of "persons" as such, but simply of human beings. For revelation, humanity is one single family: all that are begotten of humans belong to this family. The conviction that even newlyborn children possess human dignity is reflected in the infancy 1 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). An expanded second edition appeared in 1993 (Cambridge University Press). 2 "A week-old baby is not a rational and self-conscious being, and there are many nonhuman animals whose rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or even a year old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee" (Singer, Practical Ethics, 122-23; in the second edition this statement appears with slight modifications on p. 169). 3 Cf. also Norbert Hoerster, Abtreibung im saekularen Staat: Argumente gegen den Paragraphen 218 (Frankfurt, 1991). IS EVERY HUMAN BEING A PERSON? 465 narratives of the Gospel, where shepherds and kings worship the child at Bethlehem. The conviction that human being begins... (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Individualität der menschlichen Person gehört zu den Schlüsselfragen jeder Anthropologie. Edith Stein kennt nicht nur eine einmalige Konstellation von äußeren Entwicklungsfaktoren der Person, sondern denkt eine wesentliche Individualität, die für jegliche Entwicklung Voraussetzung ist und sich in einem authentischen Leben als „persönliche Note“ manifestiert. In theologischer Perspektive darf jeder Mensch sich rühmen, „unmittelbar ein Gotteskind zu sein und ein eigenes unwiederholbares Gottessiegel in seiner Seele zu tragen“. Diese Aussage in ihrem Hauptwerk Endliches und ewiges Sein führt (...) Edith Stein zu Überlegungen im Bereich der imago Dei-Lehre, der Leib-Christi-Theologie und der christlichen Mystik. Der Autor verfolgt die Frage in philosophischer und theologischer Perspektive erstmals im ganzen Werk Edith Steins und zeigt dabei die Entwicklung ihres Verständnisses der wesentlichen Individualität jeder Person auf. (shrink)

"Man does not live by bread alone ... " Human life embraces more than just 'living' (material survival); the human soul thrives on many ambiguous metaphysical elements. One of these elements is beauty. The question motivating this article is the ubiquitous 'why'; why do people find beauty in various elements of their environment? Put another way, what is it that enables one to appreciate beauty? The thesis of this article is that a person's ability to appreciate beauty is a result (...) of being created in the image of God. (shrink)

This article explores imagination as a means of ethical re-orientation in the aftermath of atrocity. The discussion of the problem of evil is based on Hannah Arendt’s critique of Kant and her notion of ‘rootless’ rather than ‘radical’ evil. On this basis, the orienting potential of visual images is investi­gated with regard to images of violence in the media on the one hand, and, on the other, with regard to Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam. Then the role of verbal and (...) mental images of humanity or inhumanity is discussed with reference to the Holocaust survivor Jorge Semprun’s testimony in his book Literature or Life. Finally, the biblical motif of the human being created in the image of an invisible God, the imago Dei, comes into view as an exemplary image of humanity that appears in a framework of interpretation where the invisible is mediated with the help of verbal, visual and/or mental images. (shrink)

This article is about the imago Dei, proceeding from an ecotheological perspective. Both the ‘image of God’ and the ‘likeness of God’ are examined based on the understanding that God is a relational God. It approaches the question of the imago Dei in terms of God’s incorporeal nature, and what it is that human beings have in common with God apart from the human being’s capacity for personal and interpersonal relationships. It addresses the question of the imago (...) Dei in terms of God’s spiritual nature and the human being’s ‘earthly’ nature by utilising the metaphor of ‘shadow’. This metaphor was investigated in terms of its meaning in Hebrew (tselem), and Genesis 2:7–8 where the creation of the human being is described in terms of God breathing the breath of life into the human being. A distinction has been drawn between the ‘image of God’ and the ‘likeness of God’, with the ‘likeness of God’ (demuth) that was investigated in the context of Exodus 31:1–5, and the various spiritual gifts conferred to Bezalel by the Spirit of God. Based on this investigation the article posits that the imago Dei as the Shadow of God (life) has been bestowed on all living creatures and not only human beings.Contribution: The suggestion that the imago Dei as the Shadow of God is present in all of the creation urges us to seek further and look deeper into the issue of imago Dei in the sense that such an understanding pointedly has far-reaching implications for the current understanding of the place of human beings in creation. In consideration of this, it bears on our understanding of the meaning of life within the bigger picture of creation and how we respond to the living environment with which we share life. (shrink)

This article presents an exploratory analysis of the metaphoric structure of five artistic paintings within “Think aloud” protocols, in which a group of 14 English speakers with a low self-rated level of expertise in art and history of art expertise were asked to verbalize all their thoughts, ideas and impressions of the artworks. The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows: (1) multiple interpretations for the same artwork are possible, (2) the interpretations of the metaphorical structures described (...) by the participants often diverge from those advanced by the researchers. These findings challenge the methods by which metaphor identification and analysis in pictorials is currently approached. As a matter of fact, most of the research in pictorial metaphors tends to reduce stimuli such as artistic paintings to unique metaphoric interpretations generally produced by a single researcher by means of introspection. By addressing this methodological problem in metaphor research, this article contributes to the development of a theoretical and operational participant-based framework that takes into account the role of metaphoric conceptualization within the domain of art and art cognition. (shrink)

In Augustinian reflection, the main problem of the imago Dei is the renewal of its image through being healed from lust, so as to regain the ordo amoris destroyed by sin. Current research investigates what the gratia Christi and charity contribute to the renewal of the image of God, at the level of a marriage bond that human race was given as part of the act of creation. This emerges as a primary element, both in the original state of (...) man and in his recovery through the gratia Christi. (shrink)

This paper explores the role that Mary Shepherd's (1777–1847) acceptance of the so-called imago-dei thesis plays for her account of the human mind. That is, it analyses Shepherd's commitment to the doctrine that humans are created in the image of God, (see Gen. 1, 26–7) parts of which Shepherd quotes in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (EPEU), 157, and the ways it informs her understanding of the human mind. In particular, it demonstrates how this thesis informs (...) her understanding of the cognitive and moral capacities of the human mind. In other words, I argue that her commitment to this thesis explains why she believes that human beings are capable of reaching the “higher acquirement of intelligence” and the “completion of virtuous habits” (EPEU 381). Thus, this paper highlights the relevance of Shepherd's theological assumptions to (the ever-growing number of) scholars interested in her understanding of the mind. (shrink)

Según L. Polo la libertad es un trascendental de carácter donal; esa índole donal significa que se ejerce entendiendo y aceptando el don recibido. Se reconoce entonces que ser libre implica saberse uno mismo enteramente dependiente de Dios. Desde estas tesis mantenidas al final de La libertad trascendental, se expondrá la concepción poliana de la criatura en consonancia con esa condición de la libertad. Se mostrará que la teoría poliana acerca de la libertad así entendida encuentra algunos antecedentes en la (...) noción de libertad que fue desarrollada por Nicolás de Cusa en su doctrina acerca de la imagen; doctrina que entiende la libertad como posesión de sí en el autoconocimiento y profunda unión con la trascendencia. (shrink)

This article aims at a constructive and argumentative engagement between the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and philosophical and theological reflection on the imago Dei. The Swiss theologian Emil Brunner argued that the theological notion that humans were created in the image of God entails that there is a “point of contact” for revelation to occur. This article argues that Brunner's notion resonates quite strongly with the findings of the CSR. The first part will give a short overview of (...) the CSR. The second part deals with Brunner's idea of the imago Dei and the “point of contact.” The third and final part of the article outlines a model of revelation that is in line with Brunner's thought and the CSR. The aim of this article is to show how the naturalistic methodology of the CSR provides a fertile new perspective on several theological issues and thereby enriches theological reflection. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Hans Jonas has reflected on the notion of the human soul and on the concept of man being created in God’s image. A careful analysis of his writings reveals that (approximately) from 1968 he changed his perspective on these topics. Before this year, Jonas used some Gnostic myths to speak about the image of man in relation to God and was concerned that referring to the immortality of the human soul or to the notion of imago (...) Dei could lead to dualistic or pseudo-Gnostic interpretations of the natural world. From 1968 (when Jonas published an article for an American Jewish journal) he started to underline the importance of the Judeo-Christian notion of imago Dei (from the book of Genesis) for his ethical project. Subsequently, he used this concept (derived from the Bible rather than from Gnostic texts) in support of his ethical approach to show the special role that God assigned to humanity to act as a steward of His creation. This article presents the development of Jonas’s contributions on these issues over time, their importance in relation to his ethical project and how he was influenced in the development of his perspective on this subject. (shrink)

Transhumanism is an ideology that embraces the use of various forms of biotechnology to enhance human beings toward the emergence of a “posthuman” kind. In this article, I contrast some of the foundational tenets of Transhumanism with those of Christianity, primarily focusing on their respective anthropologies—that is, their diverse understandings of whether there is an essential nature shared by all human persons and, if so, whether certain features of human nature may be intentionally altered in ways that contribute toward how (...) each views human flourishing. A central point of difference concerns Transhumanists’ aim of attaining “substrate independence” for the human mind, such that one’s consciousness could be uploaded into a cybernetic environment. Christian anthropology, on the other hand, considers embodiment, with its characteristics of vulnerability and finitude, to be an essential feature of human nature—hence, Christians’ belief in bodily resurrection. Despite Christianity and Transhumanism having fundamental differences, I contend that Christians may support moderate forms of enhancement oriented toward supporting our flourishing as living, sentient, social, and rational animals. (shrink)

This paper, as a response to Mark K. Spencer’s, “Perceiving the Image of God in the Whole Human Person” in the present volume, argues in defence of Aquinas’s position that the Imago Dei is limited in the human being to the rational, intellective soul alone. While the author agrees with Spencer that the hierarchical relation between body and soul in the human composite must be maintained while avoiding the various permeations of dualism, nevertheless, the Imago Dei cannot be (...) located in the human body or the principle of the body considered within the body/soul composite without betraying a number of fundamental Thomistic metaphysical principles. Essential to these includes Aquinas’s position that an image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons. Further, the paper also argues that a phenomenology of sense experience could not, on principle, attain to an image of God in the whole human person within a Thomistic framework generally. (shrink)

This paper investigates Descartes’s understanding of the imago Dei, that it is above all in virtue of the will that we bear the image and likeness of God. I challenge the key assumption of arguments that hold that Descartes’s comparison between the human will and the divine will is problematic—that in his conception of the imago Dei Descartes is alluding to Scholastic conceptions of analogy available to him at the time, which would place particular constraints on the legitimacy (...) of the comparison. I argue instead that Descartes is evoking a different tradition regarding the nature of image and imitation, stemming from Augustine and Aquinas, and thus, that those constraints do not apply. I then argue that Descartes thinks the likeness between the human will and God’s will is that both are infinite in “extent.” This means that human will can “extend itself” not only to things that can be the object of some other will, but to things that can be the object of God’s will. This is notable because Descartes famously thinks that absolutely anything can be the object of God’s will. I explain why this interpretation is not implausible, contrary to first appearances. (shrink)

The creation of humanity (Gn 1:26–2:25) marks the climatic point of the creation process because after it, God is said to have rested. A clear marker that humans are the epitome of creation is the fact that they were created in God’s image (Gn 1:26). Unlike animals, humans have the capacity to think, act with free will, exert self-control and also have a conscience. These distinctive characteristics earn humanity not only dominion over creation (Gn 1:28), but also the care towards (...) the created order. The fact of having been created in God’s image, imago Dei, or to be godlike, is therefore associated with certain rights and responsibilities over creation. Further, being created in God’s image implies that human life itself is sacred and thus should not be terminated in any way, either by the individual themself or by any other person(s) (Gn 9:6). Given that human life is so sacred, such a rationale is invoked in the absolute prohibition on murder. Above all, being created in God’s image connotes gender equality – ‘male and female he created them’ (Gn 1:27b). In view of the land reform exercise in Zimbabwe, so much has happened, but the big question which remains is whether women have received a fair share in the land redistribution exercise. Making a womanist contextual reading of Genesis 1:26, this article seeks to reflect on the Zimbabwean land reform exercise, challenging the lack of gender inclusion in the redistribution exercise. Contribution: Given that women theology is that of liberation, empowerment and affirmation, this research makes a unique contribution to women theologies as it pushes for women’s empowerment through fair land redistribution. By tapping into the implications of having been created in God’s image, the research has successfully argued that the current situation, whereby gender gaps in land ownership are still quite large, needs to be addressed as stewardship over creation was given to both men and women. (shrink)

This chapter reflects on transhumanism from a Christian perspective, specifically with reference to the Biblical teaching that human beings are made in the “image” and “likeness” of God. It considers a version of that teaching that is seemingly as permissive as could be about “transhumanist technologies,” and concludes that even that version places significant limits on the pursuit and adoption of such technologies. Those limits are far more restrictive than the limits acknowledged by prominent transhumanists, particularly those with a specific (...) focus on proposals aimed at substantially lengthening the average human lifespan. (shrink)

A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostatically united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two (...) things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of identity, every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other person than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature. (shrink)

Pour mettre en honneur la dimension relationnelle et dialogique de la personne humaine, beaucoup d’exégètes et de théologiens, surtout depuis Karl Barth, refusent une interprétation structurelle de l’imago Dei. Ma contribution propose plutôt de montrer qu’une interprétation relationnelle de l’image doit être articulée avec une interprétation structurelle et que toutes les deux sont marquées par une tension téléologique. Edith Stein concrétise cette thèse dans sa réflexion sur l’individualité de la personne humaine qui, dans sa perspective, est condition d’un enrichissement (...) mutuel qui ne concerne pas seulement la diversité des vécus, mais l’enrichissement par les personnes elles-mêmes. La thèse de Stein pourrait être énoncée de la manière suivante : pour valoriser une approche relationnelle et communionnelle, il faut en même temps valoriser une approche ontologique et structurelle de la personne humaine, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne son individualité qualitative. English Title: Structural and Relational Interpretation of the imago Dei: A proposal of Articulation from Edith Stein and Her Conception of the Human Person’s Individuality English Abstract: To appreciate the relational and dialogical dimensions of the human person, many exegetes and theologians, especially after Karl Barth, have refused a structural interpretation of the imago Dei. My contribution proposes rather to show that a relational interpretation of the image must be articulated with a structural one and that both are marked by a teleological tension. Edith Stein concretises this thesis in her reflections on the individuality of the human person which, in her perspective, is a condition for the possibility of mutual enrichment, concerning not only the diversity of lived experiences, but also enrichment by other persons themselves. Stein’s thesis could be enunciated as follows: to valorise a relational and communal approach, one mustvalorise at the same time an ontological and structural approach to the human person, particularly with respect to qualitative individuality. (shrink)