This paper is a criticism of full-information theories of welfare. Such theories unsuccessfully attempt to accommodate an internalist intuition (that one's good depends in some way on one's desires or hypothetical desire) with a rationalist intuition (that only fully-informed desires are relevant to one's good).

Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that (...) these causal powers aren’t tied to protoplasmic material. Whatever these causal powers are, they don’t consist in mere information-processing or computation. IIT agrees, and also positively characterizes the relevant causal powers as those involved in generating integrated information. Examining the further commitments of each theory reveals that IIT renews a fundamentally ontological challenge to information-processing and computational theories of mind. (shrink)

Intelligent design advocate William Dembski has introduced a measure of information called “complex specified information”, or CSI. He claims that CSI is a reliable marker of design by intelligent agents. He puts forth a “Law of Conservation of Information” which states that chance and natural laws are incapable of generating CSI. In particular, CSI cannot be generated by evolutionary computation. Dembski asserts that CSI is present in intelligent causes and in the flagellum of Escherichia coli, and concludes (...) that neither have natural explanations. In this paper, we examine Dembski’s claims, point out significant errors in his reasoning, and conclude that there is no reason to accept his assertions. (shrink)

Quantum Information Theory and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics is a conceptual analysis of one of the most prominent and exciting new areas of physics, providing the first full-length philosophical treatment of quantum information theory and the questions it raises for our understanding of the quantum world. -/- Beginning from a careful, revisionary, analysis of the concepts of information in the everyday and classical information-theory settings, Christopher G. Timpson argues for an ontologically deflationary (...) account of the nature of quantum information. Against what many have supposed, quantum information can be clearly defined (it is not a primitive or vague notion) but it is not part of the material contents of the world. Timpson's account sheds light on the nature of nonlocality and information flow in the presence of entanglement and, in particular, dissolves puzzles surrounding the remarkable process of quantum teleportation. In addition it permits a clear view of what the ontological and methodological lessons provided by quantum information theory are; lessons which bear on the gripping question of what role a concept like information has to play in fundamental physics. Topics discussed include the slogan 'Information is Physical', the prospects for an informational immaterialism (the view that information rather than matter might fundamentally constitute the world), and the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in light of quantum computation. -/- With a clear grasp of the concept of information in hand, Timpson turns his attention to the pressing question of whether advances in quantum information theory pave the way for the resolution of the traditional conceptual problems of quantum mechanics: the deep problems which loom over measurement, nonlocality and the general nature of quantum ontology. He marks out a number of common pitfalls to be avoided before analysing in detail some concrete proposals, including the radical quantum Bayesian programme of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. One central moral which is drawn is that, for all the interest that the quantum information-inspired approaches hold, no cheap resolutions to the traditional problems of quantum mechanics are to be had. (shrink)

Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of (...) representation. Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches. (shrink)

Can information theory be used to understand neural signaling? Yes, but assumptions have to be made about the nature of that signaling. The traditional view is that the individual neural spike is an all-or-none phenomenon, which allows neural spikes to be viewed as discrete, binary pulses, similar in kind to the signals in digital computers. Under this assumption, the tools of information theory can be used to derive results about the properties of neural signals. However, new (...) results from neuroscience demonstrate that the precise shape of the individual spike can be functionally significant, thus violating the assumption that spikes can always be treated as a binary pulse. Instead, spikes must sometimes be viewed as a continuous signal. Fortunately, information-theoretic tools exist for the study of continuous signals; unfortunately, their use in the continuous domain is very different from their use in the discrete domain, and not always well understood. Researchers interested in making precise claims about the nature of the information used, stored, and processed in neural systems must pay careful attention to these differences. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Integrated Information Theory offers an explanation for the nature and source of consciousness. Initially proposed by Giulio Tononi in 2004, it claims that consciousness is identical to a certain kind of information, the realization of which requires physical, not merely functional, integration, and which can be measured mathematically according … Continue reading Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness →.

The present article proposes an Informational-Theoretic interpretation of logical analysis applied to natural language in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Natural language is characterized by descriptive definitions in order to compress information according to empirical regularities. However, notations fitted to empirical patterns do not explicitly reflect the logical structure of language that enables it to represent those very patterns. I argue that logical analysis is the process of obtaining incompressible and uniformly distributed codes, best fitted to express the possible combinations of facts (...) instead of eventual empirical regularities. That implies mutual translatability between different representations of the same facts, which justifies the possibility to decompose natural language and to rebuild it in mathematized ideographical languages, such as physics. Logical analysis decomposition process, then, results in a reductionism that sets the basis for conceptions of logic and language not only in Tractatus, but also in Some Remarks on Logical Form, which, in turn, is shown to be unattainable in Philosophical Remarks. That posterior book introduces a fragmentation of linguistic systems and analytical methods that can no longer be interpreted under computation theory alone. (shrink)

To better understand what information is and to explain information-related issues has become an essential philosophical task. General concepts from science, ethics and sociology are insufficient. As noted by Floridi, a new philosophy, a Philosophy of Information (PI), is needed. In the 80’s, Wu Kun proposed a “The Basic Theory of the Philosophy of Information”, which became available in English only in 2010. Wu and Joseph Brenner then found that the latter’s non-standard (...) “Logic in Reality” provided critical logical support for Wu’s theory. In Part I of our paper, we outline the two basic theories as a metaphilosophy and metalogic for information. We offer our two theories as a further contribution to an informational paradigm. In Part II [WuB14], we develop the relation between information and social value as a basis for the ethical development of the emerging Information Society. (shrink)

Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people's goal is to reduce uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic uncertainty and (...) the reduction thereof. However, a variety of alternative entropy metrics (Hartley, Quadratic, Tsallis, Rényi, and more) are popular in the social and the natural sciences, computer science, and philosophy of science. Particular entropy measures have been predominant in particular research areas, and it is often an open issue whether these divergences emerge from different theoretical and practical goals or are merely due to historical accident. Cutting across disciplinary boundaries, we show that several entropy and entropy reduction measures arise as special cases in a unified formalism, the Sharma–Mittal framework. Using mathematical results, computer simulations, and analyses of published behavioral data, we discuss four key questions: How do various entropy models relate to each other? What insights can be obtained by considering diverse entropy models within a unified framework? What is the psychological plausibility of different entropy models? What new questions and insights for research on human information acquisition follow? Our work provides several new pathways for theoretical and empirical research, reconciling apparently conflicting approaches and empirical findings within a comprehensive and unified information‐theoretic formalism. (shrink)

Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis. These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases. Hiddleston, 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I (...) propose an informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account. In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs. (shrink)

The notion of information has figured prominently in much modern evolutionary theorizing. But while theorists usually concede the importance of distinguishing between our ordinary use of this notion and its special acceptation in information theory, some biological theorizing requires "information" to serve a double duty. Lorenz's ethological theorizing is a case in point, and this paper challenges its conceptual underpinnings. Special attention is paid to Lorenz's contention that adaptation to an environment is akin to representation, and (...) it is urged that many purportedly (phylogenetically) adapted behaviors might well instead be better interpreted as non-information-laden (ontogenetically) adaptive behaviors. (shrink)

Like all other inventions, advances in the field of digital computational technologies, which we will briefly describe as the information world, have also played an essential role in humanity life. These advances have brought some ethical debates to our individual and social life, as well as the industrial benefit obtained by the digital and analog technological developments that positively or negatively affect and transform all economic and cultural paradigms surrounding human life. The branch of the philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>information, which questions the basic issues and discussions of the information age through philosophical paradigms, deals with the ontological, epistemological, and axiological problems of the information age. The subject deals with the analysis and new results of an Aristotelian information ethics theory, which is a theory first proposed to the world of thought in the field of the philosophy of information. The main reason for dealing with this subject in the thesis is to examine the scientific, technological, and philosophical bases of the information revolution. (shrink)

Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.

Chaitin’s incompleteness result related to random reals and the halting probability has been advertised as the ultimate and the strongest possible version of the incompleteness and undecidability theorems. It is argued that such claims are exaggerations.

My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, (...) entanglement-assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics. (shrink)

This paper argues that Information Theoretic Redundancy (ITR) is fundamentally a composite concept that has been continually misinterpreted since the very inception of Information Theory. We view ITR as compounded of true redundancy and partial redundancy. This demarcation of true redundancy illustrates a limiting case phenomenon: the underlying metric (number of alternatives) differs only by degree but the properties of this concept differ in kind from those of partial redundancy. Several other studies are instanced which also imply (...) the composite nature of ITR. We thus provide broadly based but particular support for earlier generalized suggestions that it is the underlying calculus of Information Theory rather than the ill-named concepts themselves that provides something of a unitary language for the description of phenomena. (shrink)

Quantum information theory has given rise to a renewed interest in, and a new perspective on, the old issue of understanding the ways in which quantum mechanics differs from classical mechanics. The task of distinguishing between quantum and classical theory is facilitated by neutral frameworks that embrace both classical and quantum theory. In this paper, I discuss two approaches to this endeavour, the algebraic approach, and the convex set approach, with an eye to the strengths of (...) each, and the relations between the two. I end with a discussion of one particular model, the toy theory devised by Rob Spekkens, which, with minor modifications, fits neatly within the convex sets framework, and which displays in an elegant manner some of the similarities and differences between classical and quantum theories. The conclusion suggested by this investigation is that Schrödinger was right to find the essential difference between classical and quantum theory in their handling of composite systems, though Schrödinger's contention that it is entanglement that is the distinctive feature of quantum mechanics needs to be modified. (shrink)

With the aim of giving a naturalistic foundation to the notion of mental representation, Fred Dretske (1981;1988) has put forward and developed the idea that the relation between a representation and its intentional content is grounded on an informational relation. In this explanatory model, mental representations are conceived of as states of organisms which a learning process has selected to play a functional role: a necessary condition for fulfilling this role is that the organism or some proper part of it (...) (presumably situated in the brain) is a natural indicator of the occurrence of a determinate type of event in the environment of the organism (or in the organism but outside of the proper part serving as the indicator). A state of the organism is a natural indicator of a type of event if and only if it carries information about the occurrence of that type of event. Jerry Fodor (1987) has devised and followed another strategy which consists in considering the relation between a mental representation and its intentional object as a relation of lawful, or nomic, dependence. A representational state of an organism has an objective content in virtue of the existence of a relation of nomic dependence between this state - presumably a property of the brain of the organism - and some objective property in the world. This dependence also creates a regular correlation between the occurrences of representational states of a certain type and the states of affairs whose type is their representational content. Both approaches encounter indeterminacy problems: for each, there exist situations in which the explanatory model chosen - information flow or nomic dependence - does not succeed in selecting, purely on the basis of the constraints characteristic of that model, one out of several potential contents for a given representational state. In such cases, that state is related to more than one type of events in accordance with the informational or nomic constraints imposed by those theories. In what follows, I examine an attempt by Pierre Jacob (1997) to solve two problems of indeterminacy threatening the informational theory of mental representation. According to Jacob, one of these problems can be solved with the help of the distinction between the source which is the target of the information and the channel over which the information is transmitted, whereas the solution to the other problem requires the introduction of the concept of function. I shall begin with a consideration of the distinction, with respect to a situation of information transmission, between the source and the channel. I argue that both the source and the channel, and thus the information transmitted, depend not only on the external situation which characterises the source, the channel and the receiving organism, but also on the previous knowledge and the informational needs of the receiver. I then try to show that this relativity of information undermines the solution Jacob proposes to one of the problems of indeterminacy of representational content. Finally, I examine the possibility considered by Dretske and Jacob to solve this 'problem of the reference class' due to the mentioned relativity of information, by grounding the flow of information on lawful dependence instead of statistical dependence. I shall propose two arguments showing first that these two groundings are not equivalent and second that nomic dependence is inappropriate as a grounding for information flow. I conclude by suggesting that the problem of the reference class can be solved within the framework of the informational approach, on the condition of enriching it with functional considerations. (shrink)

In lieu of the sum-zero scenarios of either wholly individualist or holist depictions of social entities, some social ontologists and philosophers of social science have recently called for gradualist approaches able to account for variances in ontological reducibility between specific instances of social phenomena. The precise formal tools needed for this type of approach are, however, currently lacking. In this paper, I propose a new approach to social ontology that utilizes Integrated Information Theory (IIT) in order to provide (...) a suitable formal language for gradualist descriptions and analyses of social entities. In line with the operational physicalism of IIT, social entities are stipulated as causally irreducible to their parts to the degree that differences are made by and to them over and above the differences made by and to their parts. (shrink)

Information theory offers a measure of "mutual information" which provides an appropriate measure of tracking efficiency for the naturalistic epistemologist. The statistical entropy on which it is based is arguably the best way of characterizing the uncertainty associated with the behavior of a system, and it is ontologically neutral. Though not appropriate for the naturalization of meaning, mutual information can serve as a measure of epistemic success independent of semantic maps and payoff structures. While not containing (...) payoffs as terms, mutual information places both upper and lower bounds on payoffs. This constitutes a non-trivial relationship to utility. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss how information theory has been used in the study of animal communication, as well as how these uses are justified. Biologists justify their use of Shannon’s information measures by the work they do in allowing for comparisons between different organisms and because they measure a quantity that is purported to be important for natural selection. I argue that there are problems with both sorts of justification. To make these difficulties clear, I focus (...) on the use of Shannon’s information measures to quantify the amount of information transmitted by the fire ant’s odor trail and the honeybee’s waggle dance. Both of these systems are relatively simple and well understood, and the application of Shannon’s information measure to these systems initially seemed very promising and relatively straightforward. They are therefore particularly suitable for revealing the benefits and difficulties of applying Shannon’s information measures to biological systems in general, and animal communication systems in particular. (shrink)

In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of consciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a green and square thing. I raise a series of questions about the central (...) explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. I also raise some questions about the explanation of qualitative content. (shrink)

Non-technical introduction to Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness.

The integrated information theory (IIT) is an ambitious theory of consciousness that aims to provide both a neuroscientific and a metaphysical account of consciousness by identifying consciousness with integrated information. In the philosophical literature, IIT is often associated with a panpsychist worldview. In this paper, I show that IIT can be considered, instead, as a form of emergentism that is incompatible with panpsychism. First, I show that the panpsychist interpretation of IIT is based on two properties (...) of integrated information: intrinsicality and fundamentality. I show that the way IIT deals with these two properties, however, aligns better with emergentism than panpsychism. Then, after plugging some anti-panpsychist assumptions into IIT’s structure, I analyse different philosophical options for interpreting the formal result of causal emergence of integrated information in terms of dependence on and autonomy from its physical substrate. The upshot is that integrated information can be seen as dependent upon the fusion of the cause-effect powers of a physical substrate, and as autonomous in virtue of global-to-local determination. According to this interpretation, consciousness is the constraining power of the system as a whole upon itself, when this power emerges from the fusion on the cause-effect powers of the system’s components. (shrink)

In a recent work (Grasso et al., 2021 ), practitioners of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim to have overcome the weaknesses of causal reductionism in producing a coherent account of causation, as causal reductionism would blatantly conflate causation with prediction and could not answer the question of ‘what caused what.’ In this paper, I reject such a dismissal of causal reductionism since IIT anti-reductionists misunderstand the reductionist stance. The reductionists can still invoke a causal account stemming from (...) the causal power of the universe’s basic units and interactions that, eventually, may lead to structures supporting integrated information. Additionally, I claim that the IIT-inspired misunderstanding of causal reductionism originates from the former’s metaphysical deficit, conflating information with causation. However, as a possible way out, if IIT is complemented with a deeper metaphysical ground, such as nested hylomorphism, an improved argument against causal reductionism can be made to work by invoking formal causality as the ultimate cause of integration in natural systems. (shrink)

Here is a fine semipopular book about the ideas which have motivated the much-talked-about revolution in the theories of information, control and communication. Jagjit Singh is one of those rare science writers who knows how to present intricate technical concepts to the less-than-expert reader without compromising the original sense or significance. The book begins, appropriately enough, with a discussion of the concept of information, culminating in the technical definition which enables us to assign numerical values to its quantity. (...) The following chapters present the conceptual heart of the Shannon-Weaver theory, the theories of automatic computing machines and the intriguing neurological theories of Warren McCulloch and John Von Neumann. The chapter on Turing Machines does not pay enough attention to the purely mathematical applications of these devices for the present reviewer's taste. The closing chapters deal with mathematical theories of intelligence and the brain. The text is accompanied by many good drawings and appropriate mathematical demonstrations. A book of this quality could have been produced only by an author with absolute command of his topic.—H. P. K. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory is one of the leading models of consciousness. It aims to describe both the quality and quantity of the conscious experience of a physical system, such as the brain, in a particular state. In this contribution, we propound the mathematical structure of the theory, separating the essentials from auxiliary formal tools. We provide a definition of a generalized IIT which has IIT 3.0 of Tononi et al., as well as the Quantum IIT introduced by (...) Zanardi et al. as special cases. This provides an axiomatic definition of the theory which may serve as the starting point for future formal investigations and as an introduction suitable for researchers with a formal background. (shrink)

Rosenfield says rhetorical critics agree that the purpose of criticism is to "study the effects of rhetorical discourse". But he claims such a study, like all theoretical analysis, must work through the medium of a set of theoretical concepts. They intervene between us and what we analyze, and contribute to what we are able to say about what exists on the other side of the theoretical grid. In this case, concepts of cause and effect are most important, since rhetorical effects (...) are to be studied. The author then examines two theories of rhetoric, that of Aristotle and that of "information theorists," to see how concepts of cause-effect influence each. He says he need not examine Aristotle’s concept of cause as it works in describing the heavens, nor in theology, nor in "reference to a logical ‘Unmoved Mover'," because such uses do not apply directly to human behavior moreover we cannot interpret Aristotle consistently, "for he contradicts himself" ; moreover we need not depend on Aristotle’s own "explicit statements". The author aims not at providing "an interpretation of Aristotle as revealed in his words," but his attitude of mind, treating his "corpus" in a "flexible" way, allowing "his mind to range away from the printed page". He then proposes to imagine what sort of ideas a sophisticated man like Aristotle, living in a "primitive" society, might have about force, change, etc. This will provide the "foundation" for the author’s interpretation of Aristotle. He goes on to speak about perfective impulses, active and acquiescent powers, dynamic re-alignment, dynamic equilibrium, tendency to order, and referential grids. There are no fewer than 138 references to Aristotle in 36 pages, many long citations, taken from many different works of the Philosopher. Occasionally a remark will point out the difference between Aristotle’s world-view and ours; for instance after quoting Aristotle to the effect that living things need food and perish without it, the author says, "If Aristotle had possessed our vocabulary, he might have said that stable contexts and processes exhibit homeostatic characteristics. However, without the benefit of our experience or terminology, he had to approach such concepts obliquely". (shrink)

In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of consciousness they arrive at, but also with respect to how they understand their starting point. Some approaches begin with experimentally gathered data, whereas others begin with phenomenologically gathered data. In this paper, I analyse how the most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, fits its phenomenologically gathered data with explanatory hypotheses. First, I show that experimentally driven approaches hit an explanatory roadblock, (...) since we cannot tell, at the present stage, which model of consciousness is best. Then, I show that IIT’s phenomenology-first approach implies a self-evidencing explanation according to which consciousness can be explained by starting from consciousness itself. I claim that IIT can take advantage of the virtuous circularity of this reasoning, but it also faces a data-fitting issue that is somehow similar to that faced by experiment-driven approaches: we are not given enough information to decide whether the explanatory hypotheses IIT employs to explain its phenomenological data are in fact best. I call this problem “the self-evidencing problem” for IIT, and after introducing it, I propose a possible way for IIT to solve it. (shrink)

In conclusion, then, we have tried to show that Drug actions can be predicted and described best on a probabilistic basis and information theory offers a suitable framework for such predictions. Drug actions are fundamentally of the all-or-none type involving the choice between two alternatives and these choises are therefore measurable by binary digits. Drug actions are not absolutely but only relatively specific and such specificity can be measured on the basis of information theory by an (...) array of suitable correlation data. Synergisms and antagonisms can best be explained and measured by considering them as intersymbol influences in communications. A theory of drug action based on information theory is more comprehensive and simpler than any theory based on the principles of classical physics and chemistry.However, these conclusions provide only the general basis for future detailed studies of various drug groups which will probably require the collaboration of chemists and pharmacologists as well as biological mathematicians to produce practical results.Der Verfasser bespricht die verschiedenen Probleme der Drogenwirkung und der Reizwirkung im allgemeinen und kommt zu den folgenden Schlussfolgerungen: Die Wirkung der Drogen kann am besten auf Grundlage der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie vorhergesagt und beschrieben werden und die mathematische Informationstheorie bietet einen befriedigenden Rahmen für solche Voraussagungen. Drogenwirkungen beruhen im Grunde genommen auf dem „Alles oder Nichts Prinzip”, d.h. sie beruhen auf einer Wahl zwischen zwei Alternativen und diese Wahlen sind als Logarithmen mit der Basis 2 messbar. Drogenwirkungen sind nicht absolut sondern nur relativ spezifisch und diese SpezifizitÄt kann auf Grundlage der Informationstheorie durch eine Matrize gernessen werden die eine Anordnung passender Korrelationsdaten enthÄlt. Synergismen und Antagonismen zwischen verschiedenen Substanzen können am besten dadurch erklÄrt und gemessen werden, dass man sie als gegenseitige Beeinflussung zwischen den eine Mitteilung bildenden Symbolen auffasst. Eine Theorie der Drogenwirkung auf der Informationstheorie basiert, ist umfassender und einfacher als irgend eine andere der die Prinzipien der klassischen Physik und Chemie zugrunde liegen.Jedoch bieten diese Schlussfolgerungen nur die allgemeine Grundlage für zukünftige detaillierte Studien der verschiedenen Drogenklassen und diese Studien werden die Mitarbeit der Chemiker, der Pharmakologen und der mathematisch eingestellten Biologen erfordern.L'auteur discute les divers aspects de l'action des drogues et des stimulus en général et arrive aux conclusions suivantes: La meilleure manière de prédire et de décrire l'action des drogues est celle qui se base sur la théorie des probabilités, et la théorie mathématique des informations et communications offre un cadre satisfaisant pour de telles prédictions. L'action des drogues est essentiellement du type „tout ou rien”, c'es-à-dire qu'un choix entre deux alternatives prend place et ces choix peuvent Être mesurés par des digits binaires. L'action des drogues est charactérisée non pas par une specificité absolue mais seulement relative et cette specificité peut Être mesurée sur base de la théorie des informations par une matrice contenant des données corrélatives convenables. Les synergismes et les antagonismes des substances agissant simultanément peuvent Être expliqués et mesurés en les considérant comme des influences, existantes entre les symboles constituant une communication. Une théorie pharmacodynamique basée sur la théorie des informations est plus compréhensive et plus simple qu'une théorie basée sur les principes de la physique et de la chimie classiques.Toutefois, ces conclusions ne fournissent que la base générale pour des études futures détaillées des diverses classes de substances pharmacologiques, et ces études demanderont la collaboration des chimistes, des pharmacologistes ainsi que des biologistes mathématiciens. (shrink)

Cognition in living entities—and their social groupings or institutional artifacts—is necessarily as complicated as their embedding environments, which, for humans, includes a particularly rich cultural milieu. The asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories permit construction of a new class of empirical ‘regression-like’ statistical models for cognitive developmental processes, their dynamics, and modes of dysfunction. Such models may, as have their simpler analogs, prove useful in the study and re-mediation of cognitive failure at and across the scales and (...) levels of organization that constitute and drive the phenomena of life. These new models particularly focus on the roles of sociocultural environment and stress, in a large sense, as both trigger for the failure of the regulation of bio-cognition and as ‘riverbanks’ determining the channels of pathology, with implications across life-course developmental trajectories. We examine the effects of an embedding cultural milieu and its socioeconomic implementations using the ‘lenses’ of metabolic optimization, control system theory, and an extension of symmetry-breaking appropriate to information systems. A central implication is that most, if not all, human developmental disorders are fundamentally culture-bound syndromes. This has deep implications for both individual treatment and public health policy. (shrink)

One of the tasks with which communication engineers are presented is that of devising a mechanism by which a significant sequence of words, a message, produced by somebody, the sender of the message, is reproduced at some other place, with the shortest practical time lag. The reproduction must be such that the receiver of the message will be able to understand what the sender meant by his message, at least, if he knows the sender's language. The following illustration is typical: (...) A writes on a sheet of paper “I love you” and wishes that B, 3000 miles away, should become aware of the full content of this message, with little delay and at a low cost. There will be institutions, in a capitalistic society, which will compete with each other in providing A, for a price, with the required service. Those companies which perform these services most satisfactorily, i.e., with an overall better combination of faithfulness, time lag, and cost, will get the job. The executives of these companies will hire engineers and put them to work on improving this overall combination. (shrink)

Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated Information Theory, e1003588, 2014; Tononi et al. Nat Rev Neurosci, 17, 450-61, 2016) and a recently proposed criticism of that theory: the ‘unfolding argument’. I show that the phenomenology-first approach in consciousness research can lead to valid scientific theories of consciousness. I do this by highlighting the two reasons why the unfolding argument fails: first, (...) phenomenology-first theories are grounded, not circular. Second, falsificationism does not provide an adequate demarcation criterion in philosophy of science. I conclude that this specific debate has significance for how, in general, consciousness researchers test and criticize theories of consciousness, and how dismissing the phenomenology-first methodology in favour of a third person-based methodology means endorsing a position in philosophy of mind that has already been challenged. (shrink)

Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or "subobjects"). Partitions are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a "distinction" [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u,u′) from the universe U ] is dual to an "element". An element being in a subset is analogous to a partition π on U making a distinction, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite (...) probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered pairs |U|² from the finite universe. That yields a notion of "logical entropy" for partitions and a "logical information theory." The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon's theory gives the average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a conceptual underpinning for Shannon's theory based on the logical notion of "distinctions.". (shrink)

This book develops an empirically informed normative theory of need-based justice, summarizing core findings of the DFG research group FOR2104 “Need-based Justice and Distributive Procedures”. In eleven chapters scholars from the fields of economics, political science, philosophy, psychology, and sociology cover the identification and rationale of needs, the recognition and legitimacy of needs, the dynamics and stability of procedures of distributions according to needs, and the consequences and sustainability of need-based distributions. These four areas are studied from the (...) perspective of two mechanisms of need objectification, the social objectification by the discursive generation of mutual understanding (transparency) and the factual objectification by the transfer of decisions to uninvolved experts (expertise). The volume addresses academics in the fields of justice research, ethics, political theory, social choice and welfare, framing, individual and group decision making, inequality and redistribution, as well as advanced students in the contributing disciplines. (shrink)

Integrated information theory of consciousness proposes an identity between its causal structure and phenomenology. Through this assertion, IIT aims to explain consciousness by prioritizing first-person experience. However, despite its phenomenology-first stance, developments in IIT have overlooked temporality. As such, we argue that at present IIT’s phenomenological analysis is incomplete. In this critique, we show how IIT takes a non-identical illusionist stance towards the experiences of continuity, flow, and extent of our experiences. Moreover, in isolating temporal grains of experience (...) to a single timescale, IIT misses out on capturing the multi-scale nested nature of temporal phenomena. Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. Here, we propose an axiom to address these concerns. We conclude by discussing how IIT may need to be revised if our concerns hold true. (shrink)

In Part I of our joint paper [WuB13], we outlined our respective theories, The Basic Theory of the Philosophy of Information and Logic in Reality and showed their synergy for the understanding of complex informational processes. In this part, we develop Wu’s fundamental philosophical insight of the origin of the values of information in the interactions of complex information processing. A key concept in our work is that of a logical isomorphism between human individual and (...) social value and the natural laws of the physical world. On the basis of Wu’s concept of Informational Thinking, we propose an Informational Stance, a philosophical stance that is most appropriate for, and not separated nor isolated from, the emerging unified theory of information. We propose our metaphilosophy and metalogic of information as further support for the ethical development of the Information Society. (shrink)

What does it feel like to be a bat? Is conscious experience of echolocation closer to that of vision or audition? Or do bats process echolocation nonconsciously, such that they do not feel anything about echolocation? This famous question of bats' experience, posed by a philosopher Thomas Nagel in 1974, clarifies the difficult nature of the mind–body problem. Why a particular sense, such as vision, has to feel like vision, but not like audition, is totally puzzling. This is especially so (...) given that any conscious experience is supported by neuronal activity. Activity of a single neuron appears fairly uniform across modalities and even similar to those for non-conscious processing. Without any explanation on why a particular sense has to feel the way it does, researchers cannot approach the question of the bats' experience. Is there any theory that gives us a hope for such explanation? Currently, probably none, except for one. Integrated information theory has potential to offer a plausible explanation. IIT essentially claims that any system that is composed of causally interacting mechanisms can have conscious experience. And precisely how the system feels is determined by the way the mechanisms influence each other in a holistic way. In this article, I will give a brief explanation of the essence of IIT. Further, I will briefly provide a potential scientific pathway to approach bats' conscious experience and its philosophical implications. If IIT, or its improved or related versions, is validated enough, the theory will gain credibility. When it matures enough, predictions from the theory, including nature of bats' experience, will have to be accepted. I argue that a seemingly impossible question about bats' consciousness will drive empirical and theoretical consciousness research to make big breakthroughs, in a similar way as an impossible question about the age of the universe has driven modern cosmology. (shrink)

The improvement of man, of his ideological and political, occupational, and moral qualities, is a most important condition for success in the building of communism. The socialization of the new man as a creatively active, spiritually rich, and harmoniously developed personality is a goal in our Party's program. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the process of socialization means much more than familiarizing a person with the ideological principles and norms of behavior of a citizen of developed socialist society. Socrates (...) long ago was astounded by the illogic of the man who knew what was good but did what was bad. (shrink)

There are two basic approaches to the problem of induction:the empirical one, which deems that the possibility of induction depends on how theworld was made (and how it works) and the logical one, which considers the formation(and function) of language. The first is closer to being useful for induction, whilethe second is more rigorous and clearer. The purpose of this paper is to create an empiricalapproach to induction that contains the same formal exactitude as the logical approach.This requires: (a) that (...) the empirical conditions for the induction are enunciatedand (b) that the most important results already obtained from inductive logic are againdemonstrated to be valid. Here we will be dealing only with induction by elimination,namely the analysis of the experimental confutation of a theory. The result will bea rule of refutation that takes into consideration all of the empirical aspect of theexperiment and has each of the asymptotic properties which inductive logic has shown tobe characteristic of induction. (shrink)