The policy of genocide carried out by Armenian nationalists against Azerbaijanis has a history of more than 200 years. The goal of this insidious policy was the expulsion of Azerbaijani people from their historical lands and the creation of a mythical state of “Great Armenia” in these territories. On March 31, 1918, under the leadership of the Dashnaktsutyun party with the help of the Red Army of Soviet Russia, the Azerbaijani population of Baku was subjected to genocide. The corpses of (...) 57 Muslim women, whose ears and noses were cut off, and their bellies were torn open, were found in one of the neighborhoods in Baku. Armenians threw people alive into water wells, burning ovens, and oil wells, ripped apart pregnant women's bellies with bayonets, killed children with bayonets, nailed babies to walls, raped women, young girls, and old women. They hung men upside down by their legs, cut them in half with swords, crucified some of them on wooden beds, wrapped them in carpets and rugs and burned them alive, cut off people's hands and feet, and forced them to eat their own flesh under bayonets. Wild Armenian gangs burned Muslim clerics in the fire of bonfires lit from the Koran, the holy book of Islam. This was the true face of the Armenian nationalists who loudly shouted about “self-determination”, “autonomy” and “genocide”. The cruelty of Andranik, who made “necklaces” from children’s eyes, and other Armenians, knew no bounds. In March 1918, up to 20 thousand Azerbaijanians in Baku, and in 1917-1920 on the territory of Azerbaijan, more than 400 thousand Azerbaijani people were subjected to “genocide” by the Armenians. As the world ignores these atrocities, they are increasing. (shrink)

The international community's indifferent and double standard approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for 30 years forced Azerbaijan to restore its territorial integrity through military means and political negotiations on the battlefield during the Second Karabakh War, from September 27 to November 10, 2020. Although the 44-day Patriotic War ended with the victory of the Azerbaijani army under the leadership of the President of the Republic and Victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, armed clashes occasionally occurred along the borders of Azerbaijan (...) and Armenia. On September 19-20, 2023, as a result of successful localized anti-terrorism measures carried out by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan was fully restored. On October 15, President Ilham Aliyev raised the Flag of Azerbaijan in Agdara, Askeran, Khojavend, Khojaly, and Khankendi. On December 21, 2023, as part of the 1/8 finals of the Azerbaijan Cup, the football teams “Garabagh” from Agdam and “MOIK” from Baku met for the first time at the stadium in the Khankendi region, which had been liberated from occupation. The unity of the Karabakh-Army-People is the main source of our Victory. (shrink)

The main goal of the research is to explain the function of teacher seminaries and pedagogical courses, to reveal the relationship between these educational institutions and religious education. At the same time, at the level of statistical data, we can observe the participation rate of the local Muslim population in Russian public schools, and thus the rate of Muslim teachers in the education system. In the study, the formation process of the educational system of Tsarist Russia was given a general (...) overview, and it was seen that the Russian education system did not differ from the Azerbaijani education in terms of its close relationship with religion until the 18th century. This trend is an indication that the process of replacing religious education with secular education which corresponds to that period. The article provides information about the stages of the Russian education system, the purpose of creating teachers' seminaries and pedagogical courses in the secondary education category, statistics, curriculum, the place of religious education in these institutions, and the problems that manifest themselves here are described in a descriptive manner. When we look at the information related to religious education, it is seen that in the seminaries opened in accordance with the 1902 law, mother tongue and religious education was not given, but the objections of the local people were heard by the tsar officials and the teaching of these courses was started on the account of the charitable societies. Based on the report obtained on Islamic teaching, it is possible to say that Islamic history, Aqaid (creeds) and various prayers were taught in the seminary according to both sects. By the way, it is known that the mother tongue classes are also taught by religious teachers. (shrink)

In the realm of human creation and characteristics, human beings possess various emotions and thoughts. The concept of the self (nafs) is one of these. Examining the levels of the self does not mean that the self carries multiple meanings. The levels of the self reflect the stages of a person's approach to God. This article explores the second level of the self, known as the self-reproaching self (nafs al-lawwama), and its place in human psychology. In the world of Sufism, (...) the concept of the self has a single meaning. However, considering the stages, it has been analyzed in seven levels (the commanding self, the self- reproaching self, the inspired self, the contented self, the pleasing self, the contented and pleased self, and the perfected self). These perspectives on the self in Sufism have also become a current research topic in the field of religious psychology. The concept of the self differs in meaning between Western and Islamic worlds. While Western scholars address the self in conjunction with some psychological concepts, in Islamic thought, the self is examined both in conjunction with psychological concepts and independently. The focus of this research is the self-reproaching self (nafs al-lawwama) and its approach in human psychology, based on scholars' opinions. Research Method: This study utilizes works, opinions, and theories related to this topic. The significance of the study lies in examining approaches to human psychology in the self-reproaching self (nafs al-lawwama), reviewing relevant research, and providing a source for future studies. The aim of the research is to understand how the psychological state of a person changes in the stage of the self- reproaching self and to review opinions and studies on this subject. (shrink)

The subject of human acts has been one of the controversial topics of kalām since the first centuries of Islam. A lot of concerning human acts –from divine attributes to divine decree and destiny, from the issue of good and evil (ḥusn and Qubḥ) to the boundaries of the reasoning, from the accountability with impossible things to the rational accountability, from the topics of substance and accident to causality- has been said and written in the history of Islamic tought. In (...) this study, the subject was discussed especially within the scope of man’s on his own action in connection with the divine knowledge, will, and power. On this issue, the Muʻtazila argues that human beings are independent in doing their good and evil acts with the power that God has given to them because of His will and wisdom, and that the evil actions that they have done cannot be associated with the divine attributes in any way. Sunnī theologians assert that God creates human actions through man’s orginated power. They also arguethat evil acts are not independent of the Divine Creation although human beings are the reason of evil in terms of thier acquisition (kasb) and will (irāda). Nevertheless, the representetives of the Sunnī kalām (Asharites and Māturīdis) differ on their account of acquisition, which expresses man’s agency in his acts. In contrary to the Mātūrīdiya, the Ashʻariya holds that acquisition is a created act of God. On the other hand, the Mashshai (peripatetic) philosophers, who are opposed by teologians on some issues such as divine attributes and the working of activity/acts in nature, consider human’s actions part of the eternal chain of cause-effect that emanate (al fayḍ) from the First Principle. However, according to them, every link of this chain is formed by the divine providence (al-ināyah). They also attribute morally evil acts not to the First Principle which is complete (tām) and full good (hayr), but to agents in the cause-effect chain. In summary, according to both teologians and philosophers, the ultimate source of human acts is the divine will and power. The acts that are morally or religiously evil, are not independent of man’s will. Thus, human beings are accountable for their actions. Philosophers and teologians, who agree on these issues, have explained their views and build their opinions on different concepts and principles. They have shown a very different attitude in their discourse and secondary principles, while all of them basically try to express the same idea. This difference has revealed within the frame of the following questions: Is man’s accountability for his actions because of his created power or will? Can evil actions, which are willed by human beings and therefore created by God, attributed to Him? Does the fact that the world emanates from God, the First Principle, due to His knowledge and essence, necessitate Him to be a willless and ineffective agent, and therefore to be a cause cause that has no effect on man's actions?Although teologians and philosophers have put forward different views in the context of the answers to these questions, they agree on the issues we have mentioned above. As this study shows, there is actually a common purpose in this subject, man’s actions, which causes deep divisions between theologians and philosophers in Islamic history. Primary sources of the study are the basic texts of the schools mentioned above. Additionally, the study were limited to the subject the effect of human on acts. It consists of two parts: the main part and the conclusion part. In the main section, the approaches of schools were examined from two aspects, in in terms of divine attribute and human effectiveness, and in the conclusion section, the common purposes behind the discussions were determined. (shrink)

This study aims to analyze the concept of faith focusing on the Karrāmiya in Khurasan, which was pioneered by Muhammad b. Karrām (190/805-255/868). The Karrāmiya claimed that one’s (public) testimony of faith is enough to be considered a Muslim as opposed to those who held that there is a relationship between faith and actions and argued for the assent (taṣdīq) of faith at the heart. The Karrāmīs were criticized because, according to their opponents, they seem to accept hypocrites as Muslims (...) and separate faith from deeds. The sources of the Karrāmiya are scarce and therefore we have to build their views based on heresiographical works. When the concept of faith is taken into account in the context of the Qur'an, it has different aspects. The Qur’an mentions the concept of faith within the contexts of will (irāda), knowledge (‘ilm), assent (taṣdīq), the unseen (al-ghayb), and deeds (‘amal). Although the Karrāmīs did not seem to make emphases on those aspects of faith, we do not have reliable sources suggesting that they denied those Qur’anic aspects. We will shed some light on the Karrāmīs’ view of faith in this study. (shrink)

Özİrâde, Kelâm’da, ilimden sonra üzerinde en çok tartışılan konulardan biridir. İrâdenin mâhiyeti hakkında, Mu‘tezilî bilgin Ebû’l-Kāsım el-Kâ‘bî el-Belhî’nin görüşleri dikkate şayandır. Kâ‘bî, oluşturduğu epistemolojik sistemde, irâdeye alışılagelenden farklı bir anlam alanı açmaya çalışmaktadır. Kâ‘bî’ye göre irâde, fiilî bir sıfattır. Ona göre Allah’ın irâdesi hâdistir. İrâde, Tanrı hakkında kullanıldığında, Tevhîd ve tenzih kaygısına; insan hakkında kullanıldığında ise özgürlük, imtihan ve sorumluluk kaygısına dayalı bir şekilde ele alınmaktadır. Kâ‘bî, bu iki kullanım arasında dikkatli ve kesin bir ayrım yaratmaya özen göstermektedir. O, irâde (...) hakkındaki görüşleriyle, Mu‘tezilî düşünce içinde de farklılaşmıştır. Kâ‘bî’nin Nazzâm’ın görüşleriyle uyum gösteren irâde anlayışı, insana otonomi sağlaması açısından önemlidir. Kâ‘bî’ye göre, Allah li-zâtihî mürîd olmadığı gibi O’nun irâdesi, hakîkî anlamda da kullanılmamaktadır. Ona göre irâde, Allah ve insan arasında ortak bir lafız olmasına rağmen, Allah mecazî anlamda mürîddir. Kâ’bî, Allah açısından İlâhî irâdeyi yaratma (tekvîn) insan açısından ise Allah’ın emretmesi olarak ele alır. Bu bağlamda onun epistemolojisinde irâde, Allah-âlem ilişkisine güçlü bir zemin oluşturmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Kelâm, Mu‘tezile, İlâhî İrâde, Ebû’l-Kāsım el-Belhî, el-Kâ‘bî, Nazzâm, Sıfatlar, Bağdat Mu‘tezilesiTHE WİLL ACCORDİNG TO ABŪ L-QĀSİM AL-KAʿBĪ AL-BALKHĪ AbstractAfter the problem of divine knowledge (‘ılm), divine will/volition (irāda) is one of the most debated issues in Kalām. In regard of divine will and volition Mu’tazilī scholar Abū al-Qāsim al-Ka’bī al-Balkhī’s opinions are of distinctive value. In his epistemology, al-Ka’bī tries to comprehend it in quite an unusual manner. For al-Ka’bī divine will (irāda) is one of the attributes of act. This means that divine will is an accident (hâdis). The term volition when used in relation to God it shall carry the apprehension of divine unity (tawhīd) and transcendence (tenzīh). Whereas in relation to man will implies freedom of action and responsibility of consequences thereby. al-Ka’bī put serious emphasis in differentiating meaning of volition in realm of man and of transcendence. Showing profound similarities with his prior Mu’tazilī al-Nazzam, al-Ka’bī undertakes the problem of divine volition in such a way that does not supersede both, realm of man and of transcendence. Showing similarities with the opinions of his prior Mu’tazilī al-Nazzām, his understanding on will is significant for attributing full authority to man. According to al-Ka’bī, transcendental being (Allah) does not have volition per se (لا هو مريد لذاته). His volition is not used in literal meaning of the word either. He believes that although volition is a common term between God and man, God wills (مرید) in truly metaphorical and figurative sense. al-Ka’bī states that the volition form God’s position is His creation (takwīn) whereas in regard of man, divine volition shall be understood as Allah’s orders. Within this context, term of volition in al-Ka’bī’s epistemology carries the ground for relational foundations of Allah and His creation.Keywords: Divine Will, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, al-Kaʿbī, God's Attributes, Mu‘tazila, Baghdādī School. (shrink)

In a seminal modern work of uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī argues that the two terms ṭalab and irāda are coined to refer to a single concept. Within the argument he implies that the Ashʿarīs, and some modern Twelver Shīʿa who lean towards their position, fall foul of a linguistic fallacy when they assert that ṭalab and irāda are distinct. For al-Khurāsānī, both ṭalab and irāda may be used in two distinct modes, a real mode or an initiating mode. The former (...) denotes a real seeking or willing within the essence of an actor, whereas the latter simply seeks to initiate the meaning of seeking or willing. Accordingly, an initiating ṭalab may be distinct from a real irāda, and a real ṭalab may be distinct from an initiating irāda, without undermining the position that ṭalab and irāda are conceptually identical. Analysis of al-Khurāsānī’s arguments, and some criticisms of it by later modern and contemporary scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, will aim to broaden our understanding of the category of inshāʾ in Arabic, hitherto analysed through the lens of J. L. Austin’s notion of performatives. More generally, the paper takes the treatment of this linguistic issue as an example affirming the continued importance of modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh for engaging with Arabic philosophy of language and argument. (shrink)

In a seminal modern work of uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī (d. 1911) argues that the two terms ṭalab (seeking) and irāda (willing) are coined to refer to a single concept. Within the argument he implies that the Ashʿarīs, and some modern Twelver Shīʿa who lean towards their position, fall foul of a linguistic fallacy when they assert that ṭalab and irāda are distinct. For al-Khurāsānī, both ṭalab and irāda may be used in two distinct modes, a real (ḥaqīqī) mode or (...) an initiating mode (inshāʾī). The former denotes a real seeking or willing within the essence of an actor, whereas the latter simply seeks to initiate the meaning of seeking or willing. Accordingly, an initiating ṭalab may be distinct from a real irāda, and a real ṭalab may be distinct from an initiating irāda, without undermining the position that ṭalab and irāda are conceptually identical. Analysis of al-Khurāsānī’s arguments, and some criticisms of it by later modern and contemporary scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, will aim to broaden our understanding of the category of inshāʾ in Arabic, hitherto analysed through the lens of J. L. Austin’s notion of performatives. More generally, the paper takes the treatment of this linguistic issue as an example affirming the continued importance of modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh for engaging with Arabic philosophy of language and argument. (shrink)