Islamic law; interpretation and construction; Hanafites.

Considered an iconic symbol of indigenous legal heritage, Islamic law is adopted nowadays in whole or in part in the legal systems of the Muslim world and is also of significance in Muslim-minority European countries, where it typically finds its niche in civil and financial domains. This article sets out to investigate the norms of translating Islamic family law discourse using a mixed methods approach based on ‘qualitising’ quantitative data, i.e., an approach in which quantitative data are interpreted (...) qualitatively. Drawing on a self-built monolingual English corpus of over three million words covering diverse genres, the analysis will harness the power of corpus processing to enable the study of ten iconic lexical profiles (individual concepts/conceptual systems and their corresponding Arabic and English terms) that are specific to Islamic family law. Profile-based correspondence is also employed to investigate the probability of lexical variation in expressing a conceptual category—a profile refers to a set of synonymous variants or linguistic labels that can be used to designate the same concept. The corpus analysis seeks to identify the key loanwords that represent cultural icons featured in the English-language discourse of Islamic family law and to explore the different mechanisms used to render shariʿa-based concepts. The aim is to investigate concomitant translation norms based on linguistic frequency in the corpus and to interpret ideological implications with reference to the theory of translation norms, which postulates that translation decision making is subject to norms dictated by extralinguistic factors (e.g., socio-political or ideological). The study finds that Islamic family law relies significantly on Arabic loanwords (constructing an ‘Islamgish’ discourse) to maintain shariʿa-based linguistic heritage, which can be seen as a kind of ‘working for one’s own good’. Thus, what is at play here is the ethics of self-interest, which is very typical of postcolonial agendas. (shrink)

Islamic law; interpretation and construction; Shiites.

Islamic law; interpretation and construction.

In the absence of a codified Family Law, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has traditionally applied the Hanbali school of Islamic Law in its family courts. However, the court’s handling of children’s custody cases has been criticised as being too rigid and narrow in interpreting the principles of Islamic Law. To overcome some of the problems faced in children’s custody cases, the Saudi authorities have recently made a number of Directions and Decisions for the family courts to follow. (...) Through looking at these measures and some relevant court judgements, this Article aims to shed some light on the effect of these changes in emphasising the human rights of children in family law cases. (shrink)

The paper explores the role and meaning of maṣlaḥa and its possible appropriation in the field of Islamic legal and economic thought, as laid down by various medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars. Questions that are pertinent to the research are the following: how has maṣlaḥa been incorporated in legal reasoning and what kind of meaning does it convey; what type of economic reading does it presuppose; do ethics, law, and scriptural sources play equally important role as reference in developing (...) the concept in economic terms, are some of the questions that this paper will try to provide answer to. Further, as there is a tendency to believe that Islamic economic thought cannot be equated only with legal and juridical underpinnings, it is pertinent to pose a question if economic ideas have flourished independently from its legal framework. Maṣlaḥa in its capacity has always remained part and parcel of Islamic legal theory, and has been rarely addressed within the frame of economic thought; therefore a new reading is required to deal with the position of economic teachings within Islamic tradition. The paper consists of three sections, whereby the contributions made by Muslim medieval scholars on Islamic economics will be presented. The first chapter provides a historical overview of Islamic law and the concept of maṣlaḥa in relation to the field of Islamic economics, including Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s monumental Iḥya ‘ulūm al dīn, which presents a milestone in converging Sufi ethical teachings of Islam in accordance with the legal methodology of Islamic law. The second part aims to discern and examine the economic jurisprudence and economic theory in Islam as it is understood by some of the mainstream theoreticians of Islamic studies, advocating the view that Islamic economics is inextricably related to the gist of Islamic legal reasoning. In this section the ideas of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr will be presented as he proposes a new reading of Islamic economics as a doctrine and not a science. The third part questions Islamic legal establishment and its normativity, the claim that legal norms have always been part of the Islamic economic reasoning. This claim rests upon the idea that Islamic legal patterns were also socially constructed, including some aspects of Islamic economic reasoning. Concluding remarks will draw upon the idea that despite the fact that Islamic legal and economic literature are based upon the religious scriptures of Islam, the Qur’an and Tradition, it is more appropriate to claim that they rest upon the ethical cosmology that surpasses purely theological concerns. (shrink)

The subject “rule”, which is one of the most fundamental issues of the Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), has been in the center of methodological debates. There is one important term in this regard, which should be studied very carefully: Khiṭāb(speech) of the God. It is because that, especially since the first period of Islam, it has been taken with some significant terms in the field of Kalāmsuch as Husn (pretty; good), Qubh (ugly; evil), and the quality of God’s (...) talk. Yet, adopting this term in the description of the “rule” shows that Fiqh is based on divine inspiration, and it also emphasizes that even though there are some differences in details, wisdom of human being is not ignored when adjudicating. Moreover, it suggests that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling case is related to the connection through the term speech or divine inspiration. In this regard, Kalāmdimension of the term and its affect to legal theoretical discussions are very important in terms of historical process of the definition of the “rule” in Islamic law. In this study, I tried to examine whether or not the term “khiṭābof the God” which is used in the definition of the “rule” formed a limitation for consideration of legal evidence in Islamic law and if there is any limitation for the legal evidence regarding being only in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah due to this definition.SummaryThe “hukm (rule, arbritation, judgment, God’s will)”-as the backbone notion in usūl al-fiqhis one of the significant key notions discussed in the legal theory. Specifically, the term “khitabullah” mentioned in the definition of hukmis noteworthy to investigate. Since the early formation period of Islamic law, the term khitabullahhas been embraced along with the theological subjects: “husnand qubuh(the good and evil) and kalām(the attribute of speech to Allah)”. The term “khitabullah” in the definition of hukmemphasizes that indeed the source of fiqhis the revelation (wahy) and also emphasizes that the function of reason (‘aql) is not ignored in the process of adjudication- even if there are some nuances in details.Additionally, it presents that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling a case is connected to the term speech (khitāb), or in other words to revelation (wahy).On the whole, in the legal theory, the rule of Sharī‘ah is defined as God’s khitab(the communication of God), which means the demand of God relating to the acts of those who are subject of law or the effect of the khitābon the acts of those persons. Although, in the early formative period various explanations were made about what the rule is, it can be understood that the present definition of hukmbegan to evolve towards the end of the 5thcentury (A. H.). It is clear that al-Ghazālī had an impact on the formation of this definition. It is because al-Ghazālī defined the rule of Sharī‘ahas “the communication from God relating to an act of the person who is the subject of law”. After al-Ghazālī, al-Rādī and al-Baydāwī added to al-Ghazālī’s definition the words “iqtidā and takhyīr” and Ibn Hājib added “wad‘an”. Whereas in the Mutakallimun(theologians) tradition, Ibn Hacib's definition was preferred, Fuqaha(jurists) tradition chose two definitions-resembling each other: “Those coming to exist with the khitāb” and “the effect of God’s khitāb”.Along with al-Ghazālī’s definition, the concept of khitābcarved out a niche for itself in it and became the main element of the definition. It is understood that some discussions in the field of theology, such as husn-qubhand God’s attribute of speech have been effective on the interpretation of the concept of khitāb. The Ash‘arilegal theorists argue that the good and evil are not attributes of the self / the acts, whereas the Maturidi legal theorists argue that the exploration and determination of these attributes is rational and thus, the verdict reached via this rationale is lawful. The Maturidi legal theorists initiated the concept of being subject of law with the concept Sharī‘ah and in the line with this opinion; they defined hukmon the basis of khitāb. On the other hand, the Mutazilites’ claiming the attribute of good and evil are inherent feature of the act, did not define hukmon the basis of the khitābaccording to their theological understanding. The word of khitābassessed with God’s eternal speech (al-kalām al-azalī) has been approached from various aspects: for instance, whether the presence of the addressee is mandatory. The early Asharites scholars (mutaqaddimun), in particular Imam Asharī, did not entitle the eternal speech as khitāb. They consider that the presence of the interlocutor is necessary in the conversion of Kalāminto khitāb. The mutaakhirunAsharites (successors of the early Asharites scholars) did not consider the presence of the interlocutor necessary, thus they viewed the eternal speech as khitāb. The former identification of the hukmwith khitābby the early Ashari legal theorists caused to the problem of whether hukmis adventitious or not. Therefore, this approach was criticised by the Mutazilites. On the other hand, the Maturidi and Mutezilite legal theorists accept that hukmis adventitious; hence they do not consider as a problem naming the eternal speech of God as khitāb.When the historical course is examined, it can be said that one of the important aspects of the development of hukm’s definition is the use of khitāb. Khitābin some cases is used without possessive construction, in other cases it is used with possessive construction with God, or in possessive construction with shar’ or Shāri’. The most important one within these possessive constructions is the notion “khitaballah”. Therefore, it is necessary for khitaballahto be approached from the angle of the legal theory. In comparison to other terms, this notion narrowed the scope of the rule down. In the meanwhile, it raised the question: how the rule deduced via legal evidences can be incorporated in khitāb? As a consequence of this question, some legal theorists, such as Tūfī, proposed another definition by adducing this question.Although it is commonly accepted that the rules deduced via other evidences are within the context of the khitāb, there are also different descriptions about the concept of khitaballah. The rule is not limited to khitaballahin the conception of traditional interpretation accepting the khitābas eternal speech or literal speech (al-kalām al-lafzī). Because either all evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the eternal speech or other evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the literal speech. Thus, each result coming to exist with the other evidences is part of the Islamic law. But not all of these rules are considered equal to each other. Because each rule which is deduced from indisputable origin (qatii al-thubut) and is deduced from completely explicit sources (qatii al-dalala) are accepted as the word of God or the Prophet. On the other hand, other rules deduced via jurisprudence- in other words by jurist’s own value of judgment is viewed as the virtual rule (al-hukm al-zāhir). Such rules do not express absolute certainty. It is unacceptable for these rules to be described as the word of God or the Prophet. In this way, it is clearly understood that the concept of khitaballahmentioned in the description do not introduce restriction to the evidences ofSharī‘ah.We do not see a contradiction when the indefinite rules of Islamic law included in the context of khitāb. Because ijtihāddoes not aim to produce a new rule, on the contrary it functions in order to find out the already existing rules. The legitimacy of the rule obtained through ijtihādemerges from the way that this rule is deduced from the khitāb,which directly or indirectly represents the divine will. In addition, according to us, this legitimacy is not merely limited to versification and conception of the khitāb, but it also includes the function of the reason in (reasonable of the) khitāb. As a matter of fact, trying to solve unlimited cases with limited texts is difficult- in fact this is impossible. The majority of the legal theorists also share this opinion. Then, there is no obstacle in accepting that each rule obtained by authentic source and methodology can be considered part of Islamic law by implicating the rule in the context of khitāb(which represents the divine will) - although it may contain error and presumption. (shrink)

Basic characteristic of Islamic heritage law, principally it has accepted the two-to-one ratio between the male and the female children/siblings in division of heritage. In Islamic inheritance law, the main/basic reason why the share of the male is twice the share of the female is no “value” judgments given to female/women in creation and gender in Islam, on the contrary, are real realities related with the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, in other words, (...) related with “socio-economic structure/fact” in the family and society structure foreseen by Islam. As a matter of fact, “need principle” is based on in division and succession of heritageand a fair arrangement has been made in accordance with the rights and responsibilities of the husband and wife in Islamic Law. In some classical tafsīr books, the concept of “degree” in the verse “... Men have a degree (right) over women” (Al-Baqara 2/228) mentioning the mutual rights and responsibilities of women and men; and the expression of “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the verse –the inheritance of man is the share of two women– (Al-Nisā 4/11) mentioning the inheritance shares of boys and girls is interpreted against the woman by disregarding the intended purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of this interpretation, the share of men in inheritance is twice the share of women in Islamic law is ontologically (existential/creation) based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”. In this article/study, an analyticallook atthe interpretations in some classical tafsīr books on the axis of “daraja/degree” and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” that today sheds light on the sociological-historical background of depriving the daughter from the heritage will be made. Summary: Just as there is no way to determine a person’s sex, it is not either possible by reason to have such an opportunity. - With the possibility of medical intervention nowadays - sex is determined by the discretion of the Supreme Creator rather than will. Indeed, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth; He creates what he wills. He gives to whom He wills female [children], and He gives to whom He wills males (Al-Shūrā 42/49.)In addition to human biological sex, there is also social gender. Indeed, the term “sex” refers to being biologically female or male, while the term "gender" refers to the social and cultural identity of a woman or man, or the social roles that occur in the historical process.Accordingly, while it is not possible to determine biological sex (in normal circumstances in advance), determining gender is shaped by the cultural will of individuals and societies. As a matter of fact, gender is shaped according to the religions, customs and cultures of the societies and it shows differences according to time, culture and family structure. In this context, in the pre-Islamic Arab society, the gender of the girl or the woman was shaped by the custom of the ritual and customs. Indeed, it is a known fact that during the period of Jahiliyyah, in terms of social gender, the girl/woman has been deprived of many social and economic rights, especially heritage. The Qur’ān has brought the girls who, in the period of Jahiliyyah, were oppressed in terms of gender, deprived of many social and economical rights, treated as second class human, embarrassed of themselves and buried alive, to the same position as man. In this context, as it is in every field in the direction of social structure and social conditions of that day, also in the field of inheritance law, a number of regulations were made in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah being the main sources of Islam. The divisions of the inheritance were connected with religious and legal rules and the shares of the inheritance of the sons and daughters were determined by naṣṣ (verses and hadiths).However, in Islamic inheritance law, as a requirement of the structure of family and society accepted by Islam, in principle, “two-to-one” measures have been adopted between male and female children. As a matter of fact, in this aspect, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11.)On one hand, the principle that Islamic law brings between boys and girls; Seems to be an inequality in terms of the arrangement in which "the inheritance share of the male child is twice the share of the female child", while on the other hand, within the border of in the family foreseen by Islam, this regulation has not been seen as an injustice and inequity by Muslim societies, because in Islamic family law, a man is obliged to ensure the livelihood of the family after marriage. He is also obliged to give his wife her mahr when marrying.In Islamic inheritance law, “necessity principle” is taken as the basis of responsibility that women and man have undertaken in family and society. Therefore, even though giving nothing at all to those who are not in need and giving less to those who are in less need, giving too much to those who are in much need might seem contrary to the principle of equality, it is a necessity of the principle of justice and fairness. As a matter of fact, while "law equality, necessity in sharing" principle, law is arranged according to people's qualifications, goods and wealth sharing is divided according to the needs of people. In this context, there has been a fair division in Islamic heritage law based on the necessity, (distributive) justice and fairness principle. Indeed, the French philosopher Roger Garaudy (1913-2012), who chose /converted to Islam, evaluates the following about the proportion of male child in the Qur'an to that of female child: “When we consider that in the Arab society all the obligations of the family and of the care of the parents and of all the things that we call ‘social security’ today are put on the shoulders of the husband, the hereditary male child's share must be twice as high as the female child’s is”.As Garaudy argues, the difference in the inheritance of women and men in Islamic inheritance law is not a legal discrimination/inequality, but a form of divisiveness stemming from a need based on the role and responsibility that women and men have undertaken in the family and society. Therefore, giving nothing to those who need nothing, giving little to those who need little, and giving a lot to those who need a lot,even though may seem contradictious to the principle of equality, it becomes a necessity of equity and (distributive) justice principle. In this case, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child, is social and economic reasons and it is possible to rank them as follows:1) According to Islamic law, women are not obliged to make their own economic livelihoods. The woman’s economic responsibility belongs to her father or brothers before marriage, and then to her husband after marriage. 2) When a woman is married she is not responsible for herself or other family members’ livelihood. The male is obliged to make a living for himself, his wife and his children.3) While married, the male is obliged to give the wife mahr. The woman has no such responsibility.As it is understood from the above explanations, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child is not about the ontologically “value” based on creation and sex given to the woman (girl child) in Islam. On the contrary, it is the real facts concerning the family and society structure that Islam predicts, the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, namely “socio-economic structure/fact”.In some commentaries in classical commentary books, the rights and responsibilities of women and men are referred to, like: the word “degree” mentioned in: …but the men have a degree over them [in responsibility and authority (Al-Baqara 2/228), and the talk about the inheritance shares of boys and girls in: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11). Eventually, the concepts “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” have been associated with the gender of the woman/girl child ontologically (based on social fact) by ignoring the referent purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of these interpretations, it was desired that the Islamic law principle of inheritance share of male child being twice the share of female child, ontologically, should be based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”.In this study, some of the era’s dominant culture classical interpretations grounding women's inheritances share on her gender and based on the axis of the concepts of "degree" and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the related verses of the Qur'ān will be elaborated. (shrink)

The application of the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah by fuqaha is a problematic violation of human rights. This is because there is no good reason to show that the punishment for riddah is the death penalty. The existence of the hadith which is considered to be the legitimacy of riddah punishment turns out to be very different from the reality of its application in the history of Islamic criminal law. This article aims to answer academic anxiety about (...) the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah as a result of the ijtihad of fuqaha as well as to confirm the construction of its historical reality in state life. This article finds that some verses of the Qur’an and the hadith which are used as legal basis by fuqaha are only understood textually and treated as absolute theological verses and hadiths, but not based on historical evidence. The history of the application of criminal punishment during the time of the Prophet shows that there is no application of the death penalty to the perpetrators of riddah, except riddah which is followed by criminal acts. So it is not solely because of the act of riddah itself, but because of a greater crime against Islam. The implementation of the death penalty for the perpetrators of riddah which is based on textual interpretation of the hadith, thus has the potential to conflict with the principles of human rights and religious freedom which have been regulated in the Qur’an. Contribution: This study enriches perspectives on the meaning of riddah as one of the strategic issues in Islam and shows that a new interpretation of riddah has become an important idea to promote a peaceful and inclusive society and provide access to justice for all. (shrink)

Islamic banking is based on moral foundations that make it distinct from conventional banking. Some argue that because of its foundation in Islam, Islamic banking may represent a more morally appealing alternative. Yet, evidence shows that this is not the case. Indeed, the current practice of Islamic banking has not been able to achieve its goals which are based on Islam's moral values: to enhance justice, equitability, and social well-being. This essay examines the extent to which (...) class='Hi'>Islamic banking is ethical and concludes that the practice of the industry does not seem to be de facto ethical from the Islamic perspective of ethical values. It only consists in trading the same instruments of conventional banks without genuinely enforcing Islam's ethical vision. The practice of Islamic banking misrepresents Islam and does not contribute to solving social problems. The interaction between maqasid al-shari᾽a and qiyās provides a supplementary tool for interpreting the failure of the prior in terms of the practical misuse of the latter by Islamic banks. This essay provides an interpretive approach to the current debate about why Islamic banking has failed and suggests ways to move cautiously in the future. (shrink)

This study investigates some cases related to the interpretation of law in Right of Abode cases heard by the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong, and discusses the sharp contrast between the different versions of interpretation of the same legislative expressions as the same signs in similar cases heard by the same court. This study does not aim to find out the legislative intent of legislation, but to investigate the process of meaning-making in general and the intent (...) seeking in these cases in particular from a socio-semiotic perspective. The study concludes that meaning-making in legal settings is neither purely a jurisprudential operation nor the choice among different canons of legal interpretation. It is rather the dialogue demonstrated in various forms, such as power negotiation and interest weighing. The study, therefore, argues that legal interpretation is a social practice and meaning-making in legal settings is an enterprise of social dialogue and power negotiation; in other words, legal interpretation is in a sense an inter-semiotic operation between law and its interfaces with society and politics. (shrink)

The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model is a financing model used especially in the financing of infrastructure projects in developing countries. It is one of the most common methods used by the countries to provide non-budgetary financing. The fact that becoming popular in the world as of the 20th Century, this model started to be implemented in the Islamic countries created the need for examining the model in terms of Islamic law. No substantive studies have been conducted on this matter (...) in Turkey. In the Arab world, the first significant development in this regard was the 23rd Term meeting of Al Baraka Group organized in Mecca in November 2002. Next, the Islamic Fiqh Community, which operates under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, organized a meeting about the BOT model in 2009. At this meeting, ten experts from different countries presented papers on the BOT model, and a final declaration was announced at the end of the meeting. After this meeting, some independent studies were carried out on the BOT model. However, it was observed that these efforts did not reach a sufficient level, and generally remained within the framework of the papers presented at the meeting. The BOT model is a model that takes place in the form of the transfer of the facility to the relevant public institution or organization free of charge at the end of the period after the depreciation and profit of the invested capital are realized. All expenses are covered by the private enterprise. The public service or activity is operated for a certain period of time by the private enterprise. It was observed that the studies on the BOT model in Turkey mainly dated back to the last quarter of the Twentieth Century. In this context, the Law No. 3996 about the BOT model was enacted on 08 June 1994 in Turkey. Today, the BOT model is actively used in many areas, and the delivery of the service begins after the projects are completed. The BOT model has three main successive stages. In the first stage, the project is completed with the financing of OGS. In the second stage, the operating right of this project would be awarded to the investor in accordance with the contract. In the third stage, the ownership of the facility would be transferred to the relevant public institution. The BOT model was discussed in terms of Islamic law, firstly in general and then in terms of the interests and convictions. The BOT model contains many interests in terms of both the state and the society. In addition, it has certain disadvantages. There are many reasons and aims in selecting the BOT model. The most important of these reasons is the continuation of the projects and the required work without imposing a burden on the public budget. Islamic law has a structure that prioritizes public interest. In this context, the state must observe the public interest in its operations. In the BOT model, the existence of public interest is particularly notable with the projects implemented in the fields of hospitals, roads, bridges, airports and etc. Islamic jurists have different opinions regarding the contracts administered in the BOT model. Some of them consider this model as a new contract that does not exist in the tradition, while others compare it to a traditional contract. The analogies of the traditional contract have been compared to leasing, payment, foundation, fief, corporate (with partnership) and exception contracts. Others, on the other hand, considered the BOT model as an atramentous contract combining several different contracts. It seems difficult to argue that the BOT model is completely similar to any of the classical fiqh contracts. However, as a result of the BOT model, it is considered an agreement with a company to conclude a contract; therefore there is a more prominent similarity to an exception contract. Nonetheless, it is not possible to say that the BOT model fully complies with the traditional exception contract. As a matter of fact, while there is no time determination in the exception contract, the time is determined in the BOT model. In the exception contract, while the material must be completely covered by the private sector, in the BOT model, issues such as the right to land and building construction are covered by the employer. In addition, the classical exception contract does not contain many contracts as in the BOT model; and it is an agreement in which the fee is presented and terminated after the order is placed. Nonetheless, the BOT contract includes three basic contracts (construction-operation-transfer) as well as many contracts related to these contracts. Finally, considering that the BOT model was a contract, the issues in the context of the basic elements that should be included in a contract were discussed in this study. In addition, situations such as ignorance, gharar and interest in terms of affecting the validity of the contract were discussed and dealt with in terms of the BOT contract. (shrink)

Pourquoi Averroès? Pourquoi Averroès juriste? Parce que dans le cadre du débat avec ceux qui soutiennent le caractère indubitable du texte sacré, Averroès affirme la primauté de la raison. Il a ainsi mis en avant le questionnement, le doute dans la recherche de la vérité. Ce doute toléré dans le cercle restreint des philosophes était inacceptable en droit (la charia) qui s'applique à tous les membres de la communauté des musulmans. D'où sa condamnation et son exil. La redécouverte de la (...) pensée d'Averroès pourrait permettre au monde arabo-musulman de s'extraire du chaos. (shrink)

As a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) term, the concept of “ignorance” ex-presses uncertainties in legal transactions and, in Islamic law, is accepted as a situation that negatively impacts the legitimacy of contracts. If the sale is deferred, clarification of the delivery time of the price to be paid for the goods sold, the number of installments, etc. during the contract is considered essential for the validity of the transactions in order not to damage the principle of mutual consent in (...) purchase and sale transactions and to avoid conflicts between the parties. However, not every uncertainty is considered an obstacle to the validity of the contract, and minor uncertainties that do not lead to disputes are tolerated. The fiqh sources of four Islamic sects contain many examples of these uncertainties. This study firstly examines the effect of ignorance on the validity of purchasing contracts in Islamic law using the issues in classical fiqh sources and then analyses the housing sales contract of TOKI’s (housing development administration of Turkey) “my first house social housing project” in this context from a fiqh perspective. In addition, the study addresses the related housing sales contract in terms of the juristic preference method by considering the aspect of meeting an important need of society and realizing the purpose of this project. Then, while evaluating the issue from a juris-prudential point of view, the study discusses that the absolute and strict interpretation of the rule of “ignorance renders the contract void,” which is adopted by ignoring the public interest, does not produce favorable results. (shrink)

al-Juzʼ al-awwal. al-Taʼsīs al-Qurʼānī al-muʻāṣir li-ʻilm uṣūl al-fiqh al-muqāran, dirāsah istiqrāʼīyah fī al-manjhaj wa-al-athar al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-thānī. Handasat al-insān al-qānūnī, dirāsah iṭārīyah fī mutatāliyat al-muthul wa-taṭwīʻ al-insān al-muntaẓim -- al-Juzʼ al-thālith. Tiknūlūjyā al-taʻāẓum al-insānī, ruʼyah fikrīyah iṭārīyah fī al-handasah wa-ṣināʻat al-insān al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-rābiʻ. al-Lā yaqīn al-ẓarfī, dirāsah fī al-masārāt al-falsafīyah al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-qānūnīyah lil-zamakān -- al-Juzʼ al-khāmis. Lughat ṣināʻat al-naṣṣ al-qānūnī, dirāsah fī al-naẓarīyah wa-al-taṭbīq -- al-Juzʼ al-sādis. Ibtikār al-manhaj al-qānūnī bayna al-usus al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-taṣawwurāt al-naẓarīyah wa-al-ʻilmīyah -- al-Juzʼ (...) al-sābiʻ. al-istidlāl al-istiqrāʼī li-qānūn al-mustaqbal fī al-nānū tiknūlūjī -- al-Juzʼ al-thāmin. Naẓarīyāt muʻāṣirah fī ḍawʼ al-manhaj al-Sanhūrī lil-ʻalāqah al-baynīyah lil-qānūn wa-al-sharīʻah -- al-Juzʼ al-tāsiʻ. al-Ḥayāh al-shakhṣīyah wa-al-mawt, naẓarāt qānūnīyah falsafīyah fī al-mafhūm, al-tamyīz, al-miʻyār -- al-Juzʼ al-ʻāshir. Falsafat al-qānūn fī ʻālam al-ḥadāthah wa-mā baʻda al-ḥadāthah. (shrink)

ABSTRACTModern medical practice is becoming increasingly pluralistic and diverse. Hence, cultural competency and awareness are given more focus in physician training seminars and within medical school curricula. A renewed interest in describing the varied ethical constructs of specific populations has taken place within medical literature. This paper aims to provide an overview of Islamic Medical Ethics. Beginning with a definition of Islamic Medical Ethics, the reader will be introduced to the scope of Islamic Medical Ethics literature, from (...) that aimed at developing moral character to writings grounded in Islamic law. In the latter form, there is an attempt to derive an Islamic perspective on bioethical issues such as abortion, gender relations within the patient‐doctor relationship, end‐of‐life care and euthanasia. It is hoped that the insights gained will aid both clinicians and ethicists to better understand the Islamic paradigm of medical ethics and thereby positively affect patient care. (shrink)

This study explores how Islamic business ethics and values impact the way in which Muslim women entrepreneurs conduct their business in the Arab world. Guided by institutional theory as a theoretical framework and social constructionism as a philosophical stance, this study uses a qualitative, interview-based methodology. Capitalizing on in-depth, face-to-face interviews with Muslim Arab women entrepreneurs across four countries in the Arab Middle East region, the results portray how Islamic work values and ethics are embedded in the entrepreneurial (...) activities of these Arab women. The results also illustrate how Muslim women entrepreneurs seek well-being in their life and excellence in their work while running their businesses. The Muslim women entrepreneurs adhered to the Islamic work-related values of good and hard work, honesty and truthfulness, fairness and justice, and benevolence and perceived them as instrumental to the survival and success of their enterprises. The agency of the Muslim Arab women allowed them to construct and navigate their entrepreneurial careers away from the traditional, doctrinaire interpretations of Islam. This study, therefore, contributes to theory development on the interrelationship between gender and business ethics within entrepreneurial contexts and in relation to Muslim values. It also contributes to studies on entrepreneurship and business ethics by showing how Arab women practice entrepreneurship and project their faith in their enterprises. The implications of the study for academics, multinational corporations, and globalization are numerous and important for understanding how business is conducted in Islamic countries. (shrink)

Early modern Protestant scholars closely engaged with Islamic thought in more ways than is usually recognized. Among Protestants, Lutheran scholars distinguished themselves as the most invested in the study of Islam and Muslim culture. Mehmet Karabela brings the neglected voices of post-Reformation theologians, primarily German Lutherans, into focus and reveals their rigorous engagement with Islamic thought. Inspired by a global history approach to religious thought, Islamic Thought Through Protestant Eyes offers new sources to broaden the conventional (...) class='Hi'>interpretation of the Reformation beyond a solely European Christian phenomenon. -/- Based on previously unstudied dissertations, disputations, and academic works written in Latin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Karabela analyzes three themes: Islam as theology and religion; Islamic philosophy and liberal arts; and Muslim sects (Sunni and Shi‘a). This book provides analyses and translations of the Latin texts as well as brief biographies of the authors. -/- These texts offer insight into the Protestant perception of Islamic thought for scholars of religious studies and Islamic studies as well as for general readers. Examining the influence of Islamic thought on the construction of the Protestant identity after the Reformation helps us to understand the role of Islam in the evolution of Christianity. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to conceptualise Islamic workplace rectitude. Based on a comprehensive literature review, the study proposes that Islamic workplace rectitude is composed of a harmonious blend of Islamic workplace spirituality, Islamic workplace ethics, and submission to Allah. The study involved an inductive interpretive analysis, where critical aspects of workplace rectitude were extracted based on the agreed-upon Qur’anic verses and Hadith. The study augments the literature on workplace behaviour through divine command theory by (...) offering new theoretical evidence from an Islamic perspective. As presented in the current study, Islamic workplace rectitude is a higher-order, stable psychological construct that can be distinguished from other constructs. It comprises Islamic workplace spirituality, Islamic workplace ethics, and submission to Allah. However, further research is needed to accomplish conceptual and empirical distinctiveness for the proposed construct of Islamic workplace rectitude. This study presents an alternative approach to Islamic workplace behaviour, facilitating fresh insights and further development and research in this exciting area. The study adopts a holistic approach, contributing to identifying commonalities between workplace attitudes and Islam. It introduces Islamic workplace rectitude, a novel concept not present in the existing literature. The present work is, therefore, expected to trigger further interest and research in Islamic workplace rectitude. (shrink)

This article tries to contextualise the formulation of Islamic laws with regards to contemporary dynamics of non-Muslim leadership in the government. It particularly addresses the religious deliberation of the traditionalist Muslim organisation, the Nadhlatul Ulama/NU, and its youth organisation, the Gerakan Pemuda Ansor. The construction of Islamic laws in contemporary Indonesia tells an insightful viewpoint in Islamic-laws making and delivers multiplicity in Islamic interpretation. Despite the fact that these two organisations are of the same organisation, (...) the NU, their formulation of Islamic laws with regards to non-Muslim leadership demonstrates a different and contrasting opinion. While the national board of the NU through its national congress in 1999 argues against non-Muslim leadership, the national religious deliberation board of the Ansor in 2017 issues a legal opinion that approves non-Muslim leadership. As this article argues, the different opinions between these two institutions develops particularly because of different construct in defining Islam and democracy in the largest Muslim country Indonesia. They differ in reconciling istinbat of two principles of Islamic laws ; al-sabit and al-mutahawwil. It further argues that the national board of the NU particularly sees the prohibition of non-Muslim leadership as al-sabit, an unchanged dictum, whereas the Ansor considers it al-mutahawwil as looking at the Indonesian state constitution that does not discriminate its citizens based on religion. Thus, making Islamic laws accords to the state constitution. (shrink)

The puzzle arises because propositions of law seem to be descriptive—they are about how things are in the law, not about how they should be—and yet it has proved extremely difficult to say exactly what it is that they describe. Legal positivists believe that propositions of law are indeed wholly descriptive: they are in fact pieces of history. A proposition of law in their view, is true just in case some event of a designated law-making kind has taken place, and (...) other wise not. This seems to work reasonably well in very simple cases. If the Illinois legislature enacts the words "No will shall be valid without three witnesses, "then the proposition of law, that in Illinois will needs three witnesses, seems to be true only in virtue of that historical event.But in more difficult cases the analysis fails. Consider the proposition that a particular affirmative action scheme is constitutionally valid. If that is true, it cannot be so just in virtue of the text of the Constitution and the fact of prior court decisions, because reasonable lawyers who know exactly what the constitution says and what the courts have done may yet disagree whether it is true. What are the other possibilities? One is to suppose that controversial propositions f law, like the affirmative action statement, are not descriptive at all but are rather expressions of what the speaker wants the law to be.Another is more ambitious: controversial statements are attempts to describe some pure objective or natural law, which exits in virtue of objective moral truth rather than historical decision. Both these projects take some legal statements, at least, to be purely evaluative as distinct from descriptive: they express either what the speaker prefers—his personal politics—or what he believes is objectively required b the principles of an ideal political morality. Neither of these projects is plausible because someone who says that a particular untested affirmative action plan is constitution does mean to describe the law as it is rather than as he wants it to be or thinks that, by the best moral theory, it should be. He might, indeed, say that the regrets that the plan is constitutional and thinks that, according to the best moral theory, it ought not to be.There is a better alternative: propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation but is different from both. This suggestion will be congenial, at least at first blush, to many lawyers and legal philosophers. They are used to saying that law is a matter of interpretation; but only, perhaps because they understand interpretation in a certain way. When a statute is unclear on some point, because some crucial term is vague or because a sentence is ambiguous, lawyers say that the statute must be interpreted, and they apply what they call "techniques of statutory construction." Most of the literature assumes that interpretation of a particular document is a matter of discovering what its authors meant to say in using the words they did. But lawyers recognize that on many issues the author had no intention either way and that on others his intention cannot be discovered. Some lawyers take a more skeptical position. They say that whenever judges pretend they are discovering the intention behind some piece of legislation, this is simply a smoke screen behind which the judges impose their own view of what the statute should have been.Ronald Dworkin, professor of jurisprudence at Oxford University, is the author of Taking Rights Seriously and editor of The Philosophy of Law. (shrink)

This paper examines the contribution of sociology to the Islamic proselytization. In the context of epistemology, it has the opportunity to develop based on five aspects: factors, systems, interpretative, developmentalism and participatory. The five principles can be developed based on sociological theories. Among these theories, for example are the phenomenology of Islamic proselytization, the social construction of Islamic proselytization, dramaturgy of Islamic proselytization, hermeneutics of Islamic proselytization, communicative acts of Islamic proselytization, and ethnomethodology of (...) Islamic proselytization. Through a sociological approach, the Islamic proselytization will be able to develop more quickly. In further, it can be said that the inclusion of social science is a form of pattern of science development based on the integration of science, namely the phenomenon of Islamic proselytization as an object of study and utilizing other sciences as an approach. (shrink)

The hermeneutic path involved in the interpretation of law as well as in the interpretation of sacred texts, though peculiar, seems - as Emilio Betti pointed out - to share several things, most importantly the "normative" nature of interpretation. The 1999 issue of the Yearbook "Ars Interpretandi" accounts for the several and disparate relationships between these two important "regional hermeneutics".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin MillerKhaled El-RouayhebLarry Benjamin Miller. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning 21. Cham: Springer 2020. Pp. xviii + 143. Hardback, €77.99.Very few unpublished PhD dissertations have had a formative influence on a field. One of the precious few is Larry Miller's Princeton (...) dissertation from 1984 on Islamic disputation theory. It proposed an original and compelling account of the development of the discipline, from the earliest extant Arabic works in the tenth century to the composition of classic madrasa handbooks in the late thirteenth century. It has been cited regularly in the past decades and has served as the starting point for all later studies of Arabic/Islamic dialectics in European languages. The fact that it has finally been published is a fitting tribute to a study that is even more admirable for having been written when many of the primary sources were still only available as manuscripts.Part of the explanation for why the dissertation was not published sooner may be that its author did not pursue an academic career. And as he states in a short preface, he has not kept abreast of all relevant studies and editions that have appeared since his dissertation. A thorough revision and update has therefore not been possible. Though some minor corrections and revisions have been made, the book is still by and large the influential 1984 dissertation, now made available with a short introduction by Walter Young, one of the leading younger scholars in the field, along with helpful indices of proper names and subjects.Miller's narrative begins with Arabic works on disputation (jadal) by a number of theologians from the late ninth and tenth centuries, such as Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. 911), [End Page 518] al-Ash'arī (d. 935), and the Karaite Jewish scholar al-Qirqisānī (d. ca. 960). The basic assumption was that a questioner (sā'il) would ask a claimant (mu'allil) (i) what his view is; (ii) what the ground or reason ('illa) for that view is; (iii) the appropriateness of the ground/reason for the view; and (iv) to verify the ground/reason by showing it to be commensurate with the view. The ground/reason for the theological dialecticians was standardly an entity or property, not a premise. The reasoning tended to be informal and analogical, as opposed to explicitly making syllogistic deductions from quantified premises.Parallel to this theological tradition of jadal, there was an Arabic Aristotelian tradition that took its point of departure from Aristotle's Topics, translated into Arabic more than once in the period from the late eighth to the early tenth centuries. Though also often referred to as jadal, this tradition, represented by the writings of al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (d. 1037), and Averroes (d. 1198), retained distinct features. It tended to deny any epistemic value to dialectics, instead seeing it as useful only insofar as it provided logical training. For the Aristotelian/Neoplatonic philosophers, the pursuit of truth was the preserve of demonstrative syllogism (burhān). Whereas the theological dialecticians envisaged a claimant (mu'allil) and a questioner (sā'il), with the burden of proof on the former, the philosophical tradition had a questioner (sā'il) seek, in the manner of Socratic elenchus, to elicit from a respondent (mujῑb) a series of answers that would allow the construction of a syllogism whose conclusion contradicted the respondent's initial position.From the time of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Islamic theologians tended to take over the syllogistic ideal of reasoning from the philosophers, perhaps explaining why theological writings on jadal trail off after the eleventh century. The informal, analogical jadal tradition continued, however, in the writings of Islamic jurists. From the eleventh century, scholars such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) and al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) wrote works on jadal in which the examples are disputes about questions of Islamic law and the disputants are partisans of the various legal schools. This tradition of what Miller calls "juristic dialectics" (74, 95) later adopted some... (shrink)

In Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: A Fresh Interpretation, Mohammad Kamali considers problems associated with and proposals for reform of the hudud punishments prescribed by Islamic criminal law, and other topics related to crime and punishment in Shariah.

In this article, I aim to contribute to the remedy of the current under-theorization of discourse on food ethics and politics from the perspective of the Islamic food tradition by proposing a formulation of an Islamic conception of food justice that extends the religious discourse on food beyond that of dietary laws. The conception of Islamic food justice that I propose makes explicit the connections between the religious, ethical, and political discourses on food. First, I argue that (...) the similarity between the central question of the secular approach to food ethics and that of the modern interpretation of the religious approach to food is best understood as a consequence of the shared assumption of the modern concept of subjectivity. Second, I argue that problematizing the concept of subjectivity that underlies both the secular and the religious approaches to food ethics is key to challenging the boundaries of the current disciplinary-bound discourses as it would allow for a reformulation of the central question beyond that of individual identity and extend the religious discourse on food to the realm on politics. (shrink)

A complete history of Islamic political thought from early Islam to the present Now in its 2nd edition, this textbook describes and interprets all schools of Islamic political thought, their origins, inter-connections and meaning. It examines the Qur'an, the early Caliphate, classical Islamic philosophy and the political culture of the Ottoman and other empires. It covers major thinkers such as Averroes and Ibn Taymiyya as well as a number of lesser authors, and Ibn Khaldun is presented as (...) one of the most original political theorists ever. It draws on a wide range of sources including writings on religion, law, philosophy and statecraft expressed in treatises, handbooks and political rhetoric. The new edition analyses the connections between religion and politics, covering the most recent developments in Islamic political thought and the most recent historical scholarship. It ends with a critical survey of reformism and Islamism from the late-19th century up to the present day. (shrink)

Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law. By David M. Freidenreich. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011. Pp. xvii + 325. $60.