Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there (...) still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories. Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality. (shrink)

Putting individual constants and quantifiers into the same syntactic category within first-order language promises to have far-reaching consequences: a syntax of this kind can reveal the potential of any such language, allowing us to realize that a vast class of noun phrases, including non-denoting terms, can be accommodated in the new syntax as expressions suited to being subjects of sentences. In the light of this, a formal system that is an extension of classical first-order logic is developed here, and is (...) equipped with an appropriate semantics. An ontological interpretation of the new logic is then also provided, with several categories of object and notions of existence being distinguished. Last but not least, a modal version of the logic, with some interesting formal features, is proposed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Leśniewskian Ontology (LO) is a system in which the basic subject-predicate formula takes the form of a b and express one-argument predication, e.g. John is a student. In LO’s language, there is no many-argument form of predication given that would allow for the structural expression of, for example, the sentence John is Anne’s son. In this article, a simple and natural extension of LO is suggested to encompass many-argument predication. The system thus obtained corresponds to polyadic second-order logic.

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties . Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size : too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics . We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.

Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. (...) Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

“The influence of [Kazimierz] Twardowski on modern philosophy in Poland is all-pervasive. Twardowski instilled in his students a passion for clarity [. . .] and seriousness. He taught them to regard philosophy as a collaborative effort, a matter of disciplined discussion and argument, and he encouraged them to train themselves thoroughly in at least one extra-philosophical discipline and to work together with scientists from other fields, both inside Poland and internationally. This led above all [. . .] to collaborations with (...) mathematicians, so that the Lvov school of philosophy would gradually evolve into the Warsaw school of logic [. . .]. Twardowski taught his students, too, to respect and to pursue serious research in the history of philosophy, an aspect of the tradition of philosophy on Polish territory which is illustrated in such disparate works as [Jan] Łukasiewicz’s ground-breaking monograph on the law of non-contradiction in Aristotle and [Władysław] Tatarkiewicz’s highly influential multi-volume histories of philosophy and aesthetics. [. . .] The term ‘Polish philosophy’ is a misnomer [. . .] for Polish philosophy is philosophy per se; it is part and parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy – simply because [. . .] it meets international standards of training, rigour, professionalism and specialization.”– Barry Smith, “Why Polish Philosophy does Not Exist”. (shrink)

There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct (...) the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. We claim that "plain" and "necessitated" counterfactuals differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework. We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of the identification of "would" with "would necessarily".

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

Jacek Filek criticizes the modern “nonethical” ethics. He points out its break with philosophy, lack of self-criticism, inanity, undue and fruitless formalism, and academism. His article makes a general request for the restitution of ethics as the independent and dignified scholarly discipline closely connected with world and life.

In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world and whose concurrence prompted the image of an optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought (...) to existence both what is unworthy and what displays high degrees of excellence. On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility. (shrink)

Author: Migasiński Jacek Title: TRANSCENDENTALISM OF LEVINAS (Transcendentalizm Levinasa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 21-41 Keywords: LEVINAS, KANT, TRANSCENDENTALISME, PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:En s’inspirant de l’approche de Natalie Depraz qui defini la position théorique de Husserl tardif comme «l’empirisme transcendental», je propose retrouver aussi dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas une forme specifique du transcendentalisme, transcendentalisme de genese – différente de l’apriorisme transcendental de (...) Kant. Je demontre que – en dépit de l’apparence – on peut interpreter certaines couches de la réalité ou certains phénoménes ou encore événements que Levinas soumet à l’analyse – telles que «il y a», «la mort», «le feminin», «la fecondité», «la jouissance» et «le travail – la demeure» – comme les conditions empirico-transcendentales de la genese du sujet mur et susceptible de nouer «l’intrigue éthique». Je montre ainsi combine Levinas doit aux méthodes classiques de la phénoménologie. Cependant je demontre aussi que ni la transcendence de l’Infini qui se devoile dans «l’épiphanie du visage», ni cette figure du sujet qui est décrite dans la dernière période de Levinas, notamment «le soi» – le sujet dechiré de l’interieur par la diachronie propre a lui, le sujet an – archique, indicible dans un langage prédicatif – ne peuvent plus remplir les functions transcendentales. En fin j’essai de demontrer que la perspective transcendentale chez Levinas trouve ses limitations et qu’elle est remplacée dans la dernière période par une sorte de dialectique apophatique. (shrink)

Author: Sójka Jacek Title: STUDIES IN CULTURE AND THEIR ORIGINS (Kulturoznawstwo i jego źródła) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 171-181 Keywords: STUDIES IN CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, JÓZEF CHAŁASIŃSKI, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author traced the origins of studies in culture (in Polish: kulturoznawstwo). The first part deals with the philosophical tradition out of which (...) several philosophies of culture had emerged, esp. within German philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The second part is dedicated to the tradition of British cultural studies which has influenced considerably today’s reflection on culture. Finally, the third part points at the Polish sociology of culture of the last century. A special emphasis was put on the work of Józef Chałasiński who tried to work out a “science of culture in its totality”. His “American culture” from 1962 can be seen as a project of cultural studies in today’s sense of the word. In conclusion the author tries to relate all three sources of studies in culture to the theory of Jerzy Kmita, a founder of studies in culture developed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, Patrick Todd (2016, 'Future contingents are all false! On behalf of a Russellian open future') advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as (...) an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal. (shrink)

In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive (...) causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise. (shrink)

It is argued that the assignment of truth values to future contingents is threatened not by a tensed metaphysics but by a temporally “local” notion of truth, i.e., by the assumption that whatever is true at a given time needs to be grounded in what exists at that time. If this assumption is accepted, tensed and tenseless metaphysics are equally vulnerable; if it is rejected, both can accommodate true future contingents. This means that semantic decisions are largely independent of metaphysical (...) considerations. The work of Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) is a clear example of how the tensed metaphysics of the growing block can incorporate true future contingents. Two potential worries are discussed in the context of their work: (a) that their grounding strategy overgeneralizes and admits true counterfactual contingents; and (b) that the growing block theory lacks sufficient resources to distinguish the unique possible future course of events that is relevant for the grounding of future contingents. (shrink)

t. 1. Etyka ogólna -- t. 2, cz. 1-2 Etyka szczegółowa.

In this paper we investigate some basic semantic and syntactic conditions characterizing the equivalence connective. In particular we define three basic classes of algebras: the class of weak equivalential algebras, the class of equivalential algebras and the class of regular equivalential algebras.Weak equivalential algebras can be used to study purely equivalential fragments of relevant logics and strict equivalential fragments of some modal logics. Equivalential algebras are suitable to study purely equivalential fragment of BCI and BCK logic. A subclass of the (...) class of regular equivalential algebras is suitable to study equivalential fragments of ukasiewicz logics. Some subvarieties of the class of regular equivalential algebras provide natural semantics for equivalential fragments of the intuitionistic prepositional logic and various intermediate logics. (shrink)

The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

In this text, in discussion with J. L. Schellenberg, I develop a position that I call Christian ultimism. This position lies between Schellenberg’s simple ultimism and traditional Christian theism. Christian ultimism is more apophatic than personalistic, though it more clearly emphasizes the presence of a supra-personal and communicative element in the Ultimate Reality. The proposed position is resistant to a philosophical version of the hiddenness argument, but it must answer to the challenge of the theological problem of the lack of (...) universal access to Christian revelation. Schellenberg’s idea of deep time both magnifies this problem and provides the tools for solving it: the awareness of deep time does not allow us to judge the future, but it does allow us to hope for a revelation accessible to all at the eschatological end of time. (shrink)

In this text I discuss and debate Adam Jonkisz’s book Questions and Answers: Set-theoretic approach. I consider, among other things, the problem of the minimal component of question, of the division of questions, of the specificity of existential questions. I put forward a thesis that every question is a question to be completed, in the sense that every question expresses a ‘gap’ in our knowledge that should be filled. The natural division of questions corresponds to the numbers and types of (...) these ‘gaps.’. (shrink)