In this paper, I reinterpret Michael Oakeshott’s idea of a liberal self through the conceptual framework of Foucault’s theory of the aesthetics of the self. Oakeshott believes that agents can create themselves as a “style” or a distinctive shape. This style is a “virtuosity,” an artistic achievement that is also an “excellence” in itself. Oakeshott’s liberal version of the aesthetics of the self is a new way to think about what Foucault’s argument might mean. Oakeshott’s theory is an internal challenge (...) to liberalism insofar as liberalism is purportedly a theory of individuality and the unalienable worth of each person; but for Oakeshott, this individuality pertains to the agent gaining a distinctive style, sustaining “distinctness,” not achieving “distinction.” Oakeshott draws our attention to how distinctness is undermined by the forces of conformity and “normality” in existing liberal society. I also argue that the purportedly “radical” social policy of the basic income, which, while in tension with parts of Oakeshott’s theory, provides all citizens the opportunity to enjoy his particular idea of the self. (shrink)

This article examines a tension within liberal theory by comparing the ideas of liberal virtue in the political theories of Michael Oakeshott and William Galston. On the one hand, liberal society is pluralistic, that is, individuals are free to pursue a variety of ends and purposes. Liberals also argue that liberalism requires a bond of shared characteristics to sustain social unity. Working through the conceptual paradigm of poststructuralism, I argue that Galston fails to resolve this problem as he constructs a (...) liberal individuality that is ‘normalized’ or defined by conformist standards. Oakeshott, conversely, describes a non-normalizing liberalism in which individuals are linked by a common bond of virtue. I argue that these different outcomes spring from the fact that Galston justifies liberal freedom on the basis of ‘instrumentality’ or outcome-orientated considerations, whereas Oakeshott links liberalism with the value of non-instrumentality, or the intrinsic value of acting. (shrink)

The tendency of classical politics to embed the individual in universal and transcendental patterns of action followed in part from the recognition of the futility of unpredictable action oriented to the individual's transient personal future. By contrast, F. A. Hayek argues for liberalism and the rule of law because it is instrumental to the achievement of human ends. Michael Oakeshott, however, claims that freedom is a value in itself, and that liberalism should emphasize moral autonomy because the moral life is (...) public and not oriented to external ends. The moral life intimates a form of self‐sufficiency in action, and self‐sufficient action is timeless in the sense of being indifferent to either the past or the future. Oakeshott returns liberalism to the problems of classical politics without recourse to the dictatorial imposition of a single substantive good. (shrink)