Introduction to Education provides pre-service teachers with an overview of the context, craft and practice of teaching in Australian schools as they commence the journey from learner to classroom teacher. Each chapter poses questions about the nature of teaching students, and guides readers though the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers. Incorporating recent research and theoretical literature, Introduction to Education presents a critical consideration of the professional, policy and curriculum contexts of teaching in Australia. The book covers theoretical topics in chapters (...) addressing assessment, planning, safe learning environments, and working with colleagues, families, carers and communities. More practical chapters discuss professional experience and building a career after graduation. Rigorous in conception and practical in scope, Introduction to Education welcomes new educators to the theory and practical elements of teaching, learning, and professional practice. (shrink)

Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and motivation that plague interdisciplinary fields like educational neuroscience. Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions (...) leads to many conflicts in interdisciplinary work that masquerade as more superficial issues. To illustrate, we investigate how philosophical assumptions about the mind may influence researchers in educational neuroscience. The methods employed by researchers in this field are shaped by their metaphysical beliefs, and arguments around these issues can threaten accepted disciplinary ontologies. Additionally, how a researcher understands reduction in the special sciences and how they place their colleagues in this ontology constrains the scope of interdisciplinary projects. In encouraging researchers to explicitly discuss the philosophical assumptions underlying their research we hope to alleviate some of the conflict and establish realistic expectations for collaborative projects. (shrink)

In the so-called ‘irony debate,’ one of the most infamous polemics of modern intellectual history, G.W.F. Hegel accuses his German romantic contemporaries of being ‘nicht im Ernst’—not in earnest—with respect to irony. Given how this complaint is lodged alongside other, highly charged accusations (e.g. ‘hypocrisy,’ ‘absolute sophistry’ and ‘evil’), the unsurprising consensus among scholars today is that Hegel’s critique does injustice to the philosophically rich account of romantic irony. Acknowledging this vindication of romantic irony, however, I want to revisit and (...) revise this criticism in a way that makes sense of the seemingly paradoxical claim that earnestness, rather than being the opposite of irony, is the very condition of it. Having clarified both the robust normativity of romantic irony as well as the specific shortcomings of Hegel’s critique in the first part of this paper, I then articulate what I call the ‘earnestness condition,’ or EC, according to which irony is in earnest when (a) it has substance, and (b) is grounded in its substance. Developing this account both advances a largely stalled scholarly discussion of the irony debate and develops a conceptual language useful for distinguishing between thick and thin kinds of irony in use today. (shrink)

This paper is a new translation and interpretation of the essay by Leibniz which has come to be known as “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream.” Leibniz used many different literary styles throughout his career, but “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream” is unique insofar as it combines apparent autobiography with a dreamscape. The content is also somewhat surprising. The essay is reminiscent of Plato, insofar as Leibniz describes a transition from existence in a cave to a more enlightened mode of being outside of it. But, (...) in contrast with the usual identification of Leibniz as a “rationalist,” the mode of being that is valorised involves cognition that is intuitive and supra-rational. The paper begins with the translation followed by an interpretation of the essay. I conclude by considering the ramifications of my interpretation for our conception of Leibniz’s philosophy. (shrink)

Plato.--Aristotle.--Plotinus.--Descartes.--Spinoza.--Leibniz.--Locke.--Berkeley.--David Hume.--Immanuel Kant.--Post-Kantian movements.

This paper explores the issue of Leibniz's commitment to the doctrines of eternal punishment and universal salvation. I argue against the dominant view that Leibniz was committed to eternal punishment, but rather than defending the minority position that Leibniz believed in universal salvation, I suggest that the evidence for his adherence to each is indicative of the way in which he regards religious doctrine as instrumentally valuable. My hypothesis is that Leibniz thought that the appropriateness of advocating eternal damnation, universal (...) salvation or any other eschatological position was a function of the role that it would play in engendering the virtue of true piety in a given audience. (shrink)

This volume presents introductory chapters from internationally-renowned experts on eleven of Leibniz's key philosophical writings. Offering accessible accounts of the ideas and arguments of his work, along with information on their composition and context, this book is an invaluable companion to the study of Leibniz.

In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. After sketching a natural reading of this argument, Plaisted observes that the argument appears to imply something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz’s other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and defend a more plausible alternative. In the process, (...) we call attention to the neglected topic of Leibniz’s views on the nature of conceiving, and reveal his commitment to the somewhat surprising thesis that one can conceive something through a concept even if one has no conscious grasp of that concept. (shrink)

Section 17 of Leibniz’s Monadology contains a famous argument in which considerations of what it would be like to enter a machine that was as large as a mill are offered as reasons to reject materialism about the mental. In this paper, I provide a critical discussion of Leibniz’s mill argument, but, unlike most treatments, my discussion will focus on texts other than the Monadology in which considerations of the mill also appear. I provide a survey of three previous interpretations (...) of the argument and a partial defence of one of them, namely the one that Marc Bobro and I offered in Stepping Back Insider Leibniz's Mill (The Monist, 1998). However, I also argue that a fourth interpretation is necessary to account for the appearances of Leibniz’s mill in at least some of his writings. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of the treatment of Leibniz's conception of substance in Heidegger's The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. I explain Heidegger's account, consider its relation to recent interpretations of Leibniz in the Anglophone secondary literature, and reflect on the ways in which Heidegger's methodology may illuminate what it is to read Leibniz and other figures in the history of philosophy.

The aim of this paper is to shed light on Leibniz’s justification of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It approaches this issue through a close textual analysis of the correspondence with Samuel Clarke and a more abstruse and lesser-known writing, ‘Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream’.

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

Originally published in 1930, Sir Oliver Lodge proposes a connection between physics and philosophy, or as he describes it, a key to unlock the intricate connection between mind and matter. A response to early twentieth century mathematically-led philosophy, Lodge looks at physics from a physical direction rather than from a theoretical model. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy as well physics.

Originally delivered as a series of lectures for the Halley Stewart trust in 1926, Lodge’s work was collected and first published in 1927. Lodge uses his scientific training to inquire into such general issues as religion, human progress, and societal advances with an aim to better understand the physical order of the universe. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy, particularly those interested in the development of early twentieth century thought.

Hobbits and hooligans -- Ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists -- Political participation corrupts -- Politics doesn't empower you or me -- Politics is not a poem -- The right to competent government -- Is democracy competent? -- The rule of the knowers -- Civic enemies.

The main concern of this essay is to make a case for the thesis that Leibniz conceived of his philosophy as a way of life in something like the sense articulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. On this view, philosophy was a type of conduct, or a mode of existing‐in‐the‐world, which had to be practised at each instant, with the goal of transforming the whole of the individual’s life. The essay also serves as an introduction to some of the (...) main themes in Hadot’s work. While it includes a brief discussion of a number of the central components of Leibniz’s philosophy conceived as a way of life, the essay does not aim to do so in great detail. Rather, it offers a manifesto and initial road map. (shrink)

Between 1698 and 1706 Leibniz was engaged in one of his most interesting correspondences, with the Dutch philosopher and physicist Burcher de Volder. The two men were concerned primarily with the question of how the motion of bodies can be explained without appeal to the direct intervention of God. Leibniz presented a naturalistic account of motion to De Volder, but failed to convince him of its adequacy. I shall examine one reason for this failure - the disagreement that arose over (...) the issue of whether there is a substance whose nature is constituted by extension. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.

In this interview with Isabelle Moeller questions surrounding the responsible use and development of biometric apps are explored. The use of biometrics - originally to digitally represent and authenticate an identifiable characteristic of a product or a person - have become so wide spread that they are capable of facilitating ever greater continuous surveillance of the what, how, when and where of life. The more biometrical data of a user is collected, the more the integrity of the underlying e-identity is (...) open to fraud and being invisibly compromised. Ethical reflection is long overdue but a prerequisite of minimizing risk to the autonomy of the human person as well as to the integrity of his digital persona. (shrink)

It is often said that there can be no conflict between the two great departments of human interest, called Religion and Science, because they deal with different themes in totally different ways, and therefore never overlap, so that there is no possibility of a fight—the kind of thing that used to be said about Nations before 1914. But this is an exaggeration; no human being can always be satisfied with any one department of knowledge; there are times when he must (...) seek a more comprehensive view. The alternative is to keep your thoughts from straying out of the region to which you are attending, and concentrate on one side only at a time. This has been the practice of many good people, and it is certainly one way of avoiding conflict.But it is not a philosophic or permanently satisfying way. Between the two great regions there is a frontier, and there squabbles and conflicts may occur, unless there be some way of reconciling the frontier inhabitants of the two regions. Our senses tell us that there is a material world full of things which we can investigate; our instincts and intuitions tell us that there is a mental and spiritual world where also we can feel at home. But the object of this article is to show that there is also an etheric or metetheral world, which spreads over both the other regions, and may be the means of reconciling them or of enabling us to attend to either or both without dislocation or shock. (shrink)

Chapter 1: Ryle on Knowing How Chapter 2: Knowledge-wh Chapter 3: PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought Chapter 4: Ways of Thinking Chapter 5: Knowledge How Chapter 6: Ascribing Knowledge How Chapter 7: The Cognitive Science of Practical Knowledge Chapter 8: Knowledge Justified Preface A fact, as I shall use the term, is a true proposition. A proposition is the sort of thing that is capable of being believed or asserted. A proposition is also something that is characteristically the (...) kind of thing that is true or false; that snow is white is a true proposition, that Barack Obama is President of the United States as I am writing these words is another. Facts in this sense are not only among the things we believe and assert; they are also the kinds of things we know. The thesis of this book is that knowing how to do something is the same as knowing a fact. It follows that learning how to do something is learning a fact. For example, when you learned how to swim, what happened is that you learned some facts about swimming. Knowledge of these facts is what gave you knowledge of how to swim. Something similar occurred with every other activity that you now know how to do, such as riding a bicycle or cooking a meal. You know how to perform activities solely in virtue of your knowledge of facts about those activities. (shrink)

Originally published in 1930, Sir Oliver Lodge proposes a connection between physics and philosophy, or as he describes it, a key to unlock the intricate connection between mind and matter. A response to early twentieth century mathematically-led philosophy, Lodge looks at physics from a physical direction rather than from a theoretical model. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy as well physics.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In the January number of the quarterly journal published by The British Institute of Philosophy, called Philosophy, Sir James Jeans with extraordinary ability has represented the view of the universe which may be held now in the twentieth century by a mathematician, and concludes that this representation contributes to and upholds an idealistic philosophy. Now with the contention that an idealistic philosophy is superior to any other, that is to say nearer the truth, we may be allowed to sympathize. Several (...) physicists, even in the nineteenth century, were inclined to sustain the essence of Berkeley's view, or to consider that metaphysical truth must lie somewhere in that direction. G. F. FitzGerald, for instance, was notably of that opinion. But he was not prepared on that account to abandon the physical view of existence, and to take refuge in mere mathematical abstractions. (shrink)

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which (...) put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach. (shrink)

According to Robert Sleigh Jr., “The opening remarks of DM.18 make it clear that Leibniz took the results of DM.17 as either establishing, or at least going a long way toward establishing, that force is not identifiable with any mode characterizable terms of size, shape, and motion.” Sleigh finds this puzzling and suggests that other commentators have generally been insufficiently perplexed by the bearing that the DM.17 has on the metaphysical issue. In this brief paper, I examine the solution that (...) Sleigh offers to his puzzle, and present an alternative way of understanding the relationship between these two sections of the Discourse. (shrink)