Edition of the opuscules by D. Báñez on De auxiliis controversy. There is the critical edition of three manuscripts and the first Spanish annotated translation of the opuscules. The Latin text is disposed together with the translation. An introduction situates the opuscules in its systematic and historical context.

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...) even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone confrontar el concepto de opinión pública con la realidad y las expectativas de una sociedad digitalizada para analizar si la actual colonización algorítmica exige un nuevo cambio estructural de la opinión pública o más bien la retirada de este concepto. Los datos y metadatos masivos se han vuelto un arma de doble filo para la sociedad democrática digitalmente hiperconectada. Mientras que, por un lado, el increíble potencial que atesora el _big data_ y sus diferentes técnicas y (...) tecnologías de explotación de los datos y metadatos lo convierten en un producto codiciado por sistema de instituciones que componen tanto el estado como la sociedad civil; por otro, los altos impactos negativos que su uso instrumental e irresponsable está produciendo y puede llegar a producir, hacen del _big data_ una herramienta controvertida y altamente criticada por alejarnos de cualquier intento de construir una ciudadanía digital. Si bien la democracia algorítmica no se apoya solo en la opinión pública, el objetivo es mostrar la incompatibilidad entre opinión pública artificial y democracia. Nuestro hilo conductor es el concepto habermasiano de opinión pública, puesto que será precisamente la fuerza de la sociedad civil, a través del diseño en su seno de espacios de participación, de donde podemos extraer el potencial necesario para enfrentarnos a la actual colonización algorítmica, para recuperar una deliberación autónoma y crítica sin la cual no existe opinión pública alguna y, por tanto, tampoco democracia. (shrink)

The idea of solidarity is in vogue, especially since the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the term “solidarity,” as used in nursing, is imprecise and vague, lacking clear definition and connoting a variety of general meanings. Based on the original meaning of “solidarity” in ancient Roman law, this article captures the archetypical idea of solidarity from a historical and interdisciplinary perspective. This archetypical or primary meaning comes before the development of any other meanings of the word, and it is (...) therefore authentic and genuine because it does not derive from something else. After establishing the archetypical meaning of solidarity, the article translates this meaning into the area of nursing and demonstrates a deep connectivity between healthcare and solidarity. The second part of the article offers and develops a new definition of nursing solidarity as the responsibility for the healthcare of a person (unit) shared as a whole (entirety) by that person and a nurse or a nursing team (plurality). This new definition has some implications for nursing practice and education, since the definition emphasizes the idea that solidarity helps to (a) foster respect and avoid discrimination, (b) promote cohesion in health communities, (c) increase individual responsibility and a spirit of service, (d) stimulate motivation, (e) improve communication, (f) create an engaging workplace, and (g) develop leadership. (shrink)

The quasispecies theory is a helpful concept in the explanation of RNA virus evolution and behaviour, with a relevant impact on methods used to fight viral diseases. It has undergone some adaptations to integrate new empirical data, especially the non-deterministic nature of mutagenesis, and the variety of behavioural motifs in cooperation, competition, communication, innovation, integration, and exaptation. Also, the consortial structure of quasispecies with complementary roles of memory genomes of minority populations better fits the empirical data than did the original (...) concept of a master sequence and its mutant spectra. The high productivity of quasispecies variants generates unique sequences that never existed before and will never exist again. In the present essay, we underline that such sequences represent really new ontological entities, not just error copies of previous ones. Their primary unique property, the incredible variant production, is suggested here as quasispecies productivity, which replaces the error-replication narrative to better fit into a new relationship between mankind and living nature in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

BackgroundThe H2020 i-CONSENT project has developed a set of guidelines that offer ethical recommendations and practical tools aimed at making the informed consent process in clinical studies more comprehensive, tailored, and inclusive. An analysis of the appropriateness of some of its novel recommendations was carried out by a group of experts representing different stakeholders.MethodsAn adaptation of the RAND/ucla Appropriateness Method was used to assess the level of agreement on the recommendations among 14 representatives of different stakeholders, including patients, regulators, investigators, (...) ethics experts, and the pharmaceutical industry. The process included two rounds of rating and a virtual meeting.ResultsFifty-three recommendations were evaluated. After the first round, 34 recommendations were judged “appropriate”; 19 were judged “uncertain”; and none was judged “inappropriate”. After the second round, 9 “uncertains” changed to “appropriate”. All recommendations rated medians of 6.5–9 on a 1–9 scale (1 = “extremely inappropriate”, 5 = “uncertain”, 9 = “extremely appropriate”). The sections “General recommendations” and “Gender perspective during the consent process for clinical studies” showed the highest “uncertainty” rating. The four keys to improving the understanding of the ICP in clinical studies are to: (1) consider consent a two-way continuous interaction that begins at the first contact with the potential participant and continues until the end of the study; (2) improve investigators’ communication skills; (3) co-create the information; and (4) use a layered approach, including information to compensate for the potential participant’s possible lack of health literacy and a glossary of terms.ConclusionsThe RAND/ucla method has demonstrated validity for assessing the appropriateness of recommendations in ethical guidelines. The recommendations of the i-CONSENT guidelines were mostly judged “appropriate” by all stakeholders involved in the informed consent process. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es situar la ética del cuidado en contexto de las éticas de la responsabilidad. Para ello analizamos la orientación hacia el cuidado en las éticas de la responsabilidad mostrando la transición de una responsabilidad limitada por el cálculo consecuencialista en la actividad política, a una responsabilidad integral exigida por la preservación de la naturaleza ante los desafíos de la ciencia y la técnica. Interpretamos la aportación de Carol Gilligan en términos de «provocación » a la (...) ética contemporánea para que el cuidado no sea únicamente una categoría sentimental o afectiva sino una categoría con la que reconstruir reflexivamente la justicia social. Esta interpretación evita que la orientación al cuidado se reduzca a una introducción del género en la ética de la justicia y minusvalore el papel de la fundamentación en detrimento del activismo. Este fortalecimiento el cuidado de la responsabilidad resulta fecundo si leemos a Gilligan desde Hans Jonas. Se construye así una responsabilidad sustantiva e integral que levanta la «voz» y se convierte en grito para romper con el descuido, la indiferencia y la insensibilidad. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of (...) knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism. (shrink)

Dissertação de Mestrado de: DOMINGOS, Harethon Silveira. A Religião e os Direitos Humanos: Doutrina Social da Igreja e direitos emergentes na visão do Papa Francisco. 2018. Dissertação – Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, MG.

O presente artigo insere-se no quadro da Didática da Matemática, alicerçando na Teoria Antropológica do didático, uma teoria que tem o objeto de saber como seu foco, analisando-o a nível epistemológico e institucional e tem entre os seus elementos primitivos de analise, a abordagem ecologia, praxeológica e a noção de relação ao objeto. É sobre a relação ao objeto que o artigo concentra a sua discussão, a nível teórico, objetivando mostrar como a DM pode contribuir para um debate sobre a (...) decolonização epistemológica de saberes no ensino da Matemática. Em nossa analise, destacamos a abordagem ecológica como o principal elemento de análise na TAD que, ao se situar na análise das condições e restrições de vida do objeto em seu ambiente conceitual, procura compreender como o objeto está posto nos currículos, ao questionar sobre o que existe? o que não existe? o que desapareceu e porquê? o que existe em outros ambientes de vida e não estão aqui? Porque que não estão aqui? Etc. A DM procura por este meio, questionar e denunciar as práticas de ensino que tem as epistemologias do pensamento moderno colonial, eurocêntrico/ocidental como únicas formas de produção do conhecimento matemático, e que por via disso, tendem a subjugar, subalternizar, primitivizar sabedorias outras, não eurocêntricas/ocidentais. Ao mesmo tempo que denuncia, por meio da abordagem praxeológica, propõe ações, mecanismos que possibilitem trazer e discutir as sabedorias não eurocêntricas/ocidentais em espaços escolares, para participarem do processo de produção do conhecimento científico, através do processo de circulação de saberes ou praxeologias entre instituições. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo, que se insere no âmbito da filosofia da religião, é tratar o problema lógico do mal e mais concretamente a teoria da defesa do livre-arbítrio de Alvin Plantinga. Quero examinar se esta é uma teoria plausível e se resiste a algumas objeções. Pretendo defender que esta teoria parece resistir a certas objeções.

In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; (...) therefore, there is room for justified beliefs (in a prudential or moral sense) without evidence. (shrink)

In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.

This book provides an overview of the institutional and intellectual development of sociology in Brazil from the early 1900s to the present day; through military coups, dictatorships and democracies. It charts the profound impact of sociology on Brazilian public life and how, in turn, upheavals in the history of the country and its universities affected its scientific agenda. This engaging account highlights the extent of the discipline’s colonial inheritance, its early institutionalization in São Paulo, and its congruent rise and fall (...) during repeated regime changes. The authors’ analysis draws on original research that maps the concentration of research interests, new developments, publications and centers of production in Brazilian sociology, using qualitative and quantitative data. It concludes with a reflection on the potential impact of the recent far-right turn in Brazilian politics on the future of the discipline. This book contributes a valuable country study to the history of sociology and will appeal to a range of social scientists in addition to scholars of disciplinary historiography, intellectual and Brazilian history. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...) belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...) conclui, por modus tollens, que não há identidade entre dor e estimulação das fibras C. Por isso, a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo não é uma solução bemsucedida para o problema da mente-corpo. Este artigo tem duas partes. Na primeira parte, que é expositiva, apresento o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Subsequentemente, ponho em causa o argumento de Kripke, argumentando que não é procedente, pois a nossa situação epistémica atual não nos permite determinar se é metafisicamente possível a dor não ser idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. Assim, Kripke não refuta a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Palavras-chave : designação rígida, filosofia da mente, identidade tipo-tipo, Kripke, necessidade da identidadeMy aim in this paper is to critically assess Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. Assuming the thesis of the necessity of identity, as well as the thesis of rigid designation, Kripke holds that if pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then pain is necessarily identical with C-fibre firing. However, precisely because the proposition expressed by the sentence “pain is not identical with C-fibre firing” is a metaphysical possibility, Kripke concludes, by modus tollens, that pain and C-fibre firing are not identical. Therefore, the type-type identity theory is not a successful solution to the mind-body problem. So this paper has two parts. In the first part, which is expositive, I present Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. After that, I will dispute Kripke’s argument, arguing that it is not sound, for our current epistemic situation does not allow us to determine whether it is a metaphysical possibility that pain is not identical with C-fibre firing. Thus, Kripke does not refute the type-type identity theory. Keywords : Kripke, necessity of identity, philosophy of mind, rigid designation, type-type identity. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...) of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony. (shrink)

I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that (...) the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC). (shrink)

Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is (...) with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement. (shrink)

This paper explores the writings of Jose Rizal as a source of insight into the predominant role of Mary, as the Mother of God, in Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish Colonial period in the Philippines. It demonstrates the implication of the contradiction of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary—as the mediatrix of salvation, on the one hand, and the symbol of religious oppression, on the other hand—to the construction of the Filipina identity in Philippine Colonial Catholicism. It proposes (...) a feminist reimagining of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary that is empowering for Filipino women. (shrink)

Dos sentidos del término conciencia han convivido desde que tenemos constancia del uso del mismo: el psíquico y el moral. Un rasgo distintivo del pensamiento moderno consiste en considerar que el primero ha de prevalecer sobre el segundo. Sin embargo, la propia evolución del concepto parece exigir en nuestros días una apelación a lo social para completar su determinación.

This article is intended to present a proposal for dialogic digital ethics on a critical reading of the European Commission's independent high-level expert group’s document Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019). These would be digital ethics with a normative horizon for action and criteria for justice based on dialogue and possible agreement between all agents involved and affected by the digital reality. The aim is to show that the participation of all parties involved is not merely advisable but morally required (...) as part of the Commission’s effort to generate common European willingness and governance to deal with the fourth industrial revolution now going on. The acknowledgement of equal dignity implied by people-centric artificial intelligence (AI) is utterly unthinkable without this possibility of equal participation. Without it, trust cannot be generated or guaranteed. As we intend to show, the new principle of explicability plays a decisive role in this objective as a principle with a moral as well as an instrumental. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo presentar los rasgos básicos de una ética digital dialógica a partir de una lectura crítica del documento elaborado por grupo independiente de expertos de alto nivel para la Comisión Europea Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (High-level expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). Una ética digital que tiene en el diálogo y acuerdo posible de todos los agentes implicados y afectados por la realidad digital su horizonte normativo de actuación, su criterio de justicia. La finalidad es mostrar que, en su esfuerzo por generar una voluntad común y una gobernanza europeas ante la actual revolución industrial, la participación de todas las partes implicadas no solo es recomendable sino moralmente exigible. El reconocimiento de la igual dignidad que implica una Inteligencia Artificial centrada en las personas no es ni siquiera pensable sin el horizonte de una participación igual. Sin ella, la confianza no puede generarse ni garantizarse. Como pretendemos mostrar, en este objetivo juega un papel decisivo el nuevo principio de explicabilidad, principio que posee un valor moral y no solo instrumental. (shrink)

A variety of theories of management and organizational studies have failed to consider the human being in his or her integrity and, thus, fall short of being humanistic. This article seeks to contribute to the recovery of a more complete view of the human being in management, learning from classical humanism developed throughout Western Civilization, from the Greek and Roman Philosophers and the Judeo-Christian legacy to the Renaissance. More specifically, it discusses several relevant aspects of this Classical humanism, which can (...) aid in re-thinking management. These include a realistic epistemology and metaphysics, and the human being as a whole. Classical humanism also entails the consideration of the human action as a unity with both internal and external dimensions, ethics understood as a guide for good life, society viewed as a community of people, and being open to beauty and transcendence. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to highlight the confluence of pastoral power and biopolitical power, as foundations for today’s unholy alliance that undermines the sense of democratic political subjectivity. From that perspective, it explores the connections between the Heideggerian conception of subjectivity and alternative pastoral power and biopolitics that Foucault calls through its ethics focused on self-care.

Humanizar la muerte requiere, ante todo, el reconocimiento del valor que en sí misma tiene la experiencia de la muerte y la importancia trascendental que, para todo individuo, posee afrontar con el respaldo sanitario y emocional necesario ese momento decisivo. En este sentido, el enfoque que toma como base la idea de la imposibilidad de vivir la muerte, y no sólo la con frecuencia cuestionada preparación del personal sanitario para ayudar al paciente terminal a afrontarla, tiene mucho que ver en (...) el escamoteo y ocultamiento de tal experiencia. Frente a esto hay que considerar que la muerte es algo que se vive, aunque obviamente no se sobrevive a ella. No sobrevivir a la muerte no resta valor a la experiencia de la muerte. (shrink)

En la evolución de la nanotecnología encontramos una excelente ilustración de la forma en que se producen, en nuestra época, las interacciones entre lo económico y lo tecnocientífico. Nos ofrece, además, una ejemplificación elocuente de cómo, en esa interacción, tienden a ser escamoteadas cuestiones que poseen una trascendencia ética de primer orden y que deberían situarse en el debate ético y político en un lugar de preponderancia.

The aim of this paper is to raise some issues that relate to disciplinary status of bioethics. I am particularly interested in entering to consider here its relation to philosophy and the role it should play in different areas of research and medical practice. The question is whether bioethics can be understood and practiced as part of an action protocol or requires a philosophical foundation that will provide strength and consistency.