The theory of relativity is often regarded as inhospitable to the idea that there is an objective passage of time in the world. In light of this, many philosophers and physicists embrace a “block universe” view, according to which change and temporal passage are merely a subjective appearance or illusion. My aim in this paper is to argue against such a view, and show that we can make sense of an objective passage of time in the setting of relativity theory (...) by abandoning the assumption that the now must be global, and re-conceiving temporal passage as a purely local phenomenon. Various versions of local becoming have been proposed in the literature. Here I focus on the causal diamond theory proposed by Steven F. Savitt and Richard Arthur, which models the now in terms of a local structure called a causal diamond. After defending the reality of temporal passage and exploring its compatibility with relativity theory, I show how the causal diamond approach can be used to counter the argument for the ideality of time due to Kurt Gödel, based on his “rotating universe” solution to the Einstein field equations. I defend the second component of his argument, the modal step, against the consensus view that finds it wanting, and reject the first step, showing that the Gödel universe is compatible with an objective passage of time as long as the latter is construed locally, along the lines of the causal diamond approach. (shrink)

A distinction often drawn in the literature on emergence is that between epistemological emergence and ontological emergence. I argue that the position that there are instances of ontological emergence in the world (radical emergentism) and the position that all instances of emergence are epistemological (ontological reductionism) are both problematic. My aim in this paper is to outline a third form of emergence, inspired by the philosophical ideas of Charles S. Peirce and Daniel Dennett, which will allow us to avoid both (...) radical emergentism and ontological reductionism. Since what emerges in this kind of emergence is a real pattern, I call it real pattern emergence (RP emergence). A defining characteristic of a pattern is that it is more general than the elements or processes instantiating it. That is, the same pattern can be instantiated by different individual elements or processes. This generality of patterns makes them perfect candidates for applying Peirce’s rich theory of generals, including his pragmatism and Scholastic realism. I will argue that a real pattern is what Peirce calls a real general (or real Third), and like a real general, it is autonomous from the elements or processes instantiating it, because it supports predictions about not only what will happen in a given situation, but also what would happen in an indefinite variety of possible micro situations that are not actualized. This autonomy of real patterns will be the key feature that sets RP emergence apart from mere epistemological emergence, without, on the other hand, collapsing it into ontological emergence. The difference between RP emergence and Mark Bedau’s related notion of weak emergence will also be clarified. (shrink)

There seem to be two distinct aspects to the role played by the Interpretant in Peirce’s account of the sign relation. On the one hand, the Interpretant is said to establish the relation between the Sign and Object. That is, the Sign can “stand for” its Object, and thereby actually function as a Sign, only by virtue of its being interpreted as such by an Interpretant. On the other hand, the Interpretant is said to be “determined” by the Sign in (...) such a way that it is thereby mediately determined by the Sign’s Object. How can we understand the relation between these two aspects of the Interpretant? This is the question with which this paper is concerned. I begin by drawing a distinction between what I call the first-order function and second-order function of the Interpretant, and illustrating this distinction using Peirce’s example of comparing the letters p and b in § 9 of the 1867 “On a New List of Categories.” I then show that this same distinction can be discerned in a significant passage in the second section of Peirce’s 1903 “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,” as well as in his early definition of the Interpretant in the “New List.” This double function of the Interpretant has been noted in the Peircean literature, specifically by Joseph Ransdell in his 1966 dissertation, and more recently by André De Tienne. However, an important aspect of what I call the second-order function of the Interpretant remains unclarified in Ransdell and De Tienne’s approaches, namely, its relation to the logical operation of hypostatic abstraction. I will show that the Interpretant, in its second-order function, plays a role formally identical in the sign process to the role played by hypostatic abstraction in Peirce’s demonstrations of the Reduction Thesis. This formal identity will afford us with a way of understanding the relation between the two aspects of the Interpretant in terms of hypostatic abstraction. (shrink)