The claim that the having of aesthetic properties supervenes on the having of non-aesthetic properties has been widely discussed and, in various ways, defended. In this paper, I will show that even if it is sometimes true that a supervenience relation holds between aesthetic properties and the 'subvenient' non-aesthetic ones, it is not the interesting relation in the neighbourhood. As we shall see, a richer, asymmetric and irreflexive relation is required, and I shall defend the claim that the more-and-more-popular relation (...) of grounding does a much better job than supervenience. (shrink)

Pavel Materna proposed valuable explications of concept and conceptual system. After their introduction, we contrast conceptual systems with (a novel notion of) derivation systems. Derivation systems differ from conceptual systems especially in including derivation rules. This enables us to show close connections among the realms of objects, their concepts, and reasoning with concepts.

In this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that he doesn't exist. In this book, he also defends the view that this book itself doesn't exist. But this did not prevent him to write the book, and although in Benovsky's view you don't exist either, this does not prevent you to read it. Benovsky defends a brand of non-exceptionalist eliminativism. Some eliminativists, typically focusing on ordinary material objects such as chairs and hammers, make exceptions, for instance for blue whales (...) (that is, living beings) or for persons (that is, conscious organisms). Benovsky takes one by one all types of allegedly existing objects like chairs, whales, and persons and shows that from the metaphysical point of view they are more trouble than they are worth – we are much better off without them. He thus defends an eliminativist view about ordinary objects as well as the 'no-Self' view, where he explores connections between metaphysics, phenomenology, and Buddhist thought. He then also considers the case of aesthetic objects, focusing on musical works and photographs, and shows that the claim of their non-existence solves the many problems that arise when one tries to find an appropriate ontological category for them, and that such an eliminativist view is more natural than what we might have thought. The arguments provided here are always topic-specific: each type of entity is given its own type of treatment, thus proving a varied and solid foundation for a generalized, non-exceptionalist, full-blown eliminativist worldview. (shrink)

Model-theoretic concepts of saturation and categoricity are studied in the context of accessible categories. Accessible categories which are categorical in a strong sense are related to categories of $M$-sets ($M$ is a monoid). Typical examples of such categories are categories of $\lambda$-saturated objects.

Metaphysical theories are beautiful. At the end of this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties and that these play a crucial role when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice.Before we get there, the philosophical path the author proposes to follow starts with three discussions of metaphysical equivalence. Benovsky argues that there are cases of metaphysical equivalence, cases of partial metaphysical equivalence, as well as interesting cases of theories that are not equivalent. (...) Thus, claims of metaphysical equivalence can only be raised locally. The slogan is: the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics.To do this work, Benovsky focuses on the nature of primitives and on the role they play in each of the theories involved. He emphasizes the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them.He then raises the simple but complicated question: how to make a choice between competing metaphysical theories? If two theories are equivalent, then perhaps we do not need to make a choice. But what about all the other cases of non-equivalent "equally good" theories? Benovsky uses some of the theories discussed in the first part of the book as examples and examines some traditional meta-theoretical criteria for theory choice (various kinds of simplicity, compatibility with physics, compatibility with intuitions, explanatory power, internal consistency,...) only to show that they do not allow us to make a choice.But if the standard meta-theoretical criteria cannot help us in deciding between competing non-equivalent metaphysical theories, how then shall we make that choice? This is where Benovsky argues that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties – grounded in non-aesthetic properties – and that these play a crucial role in theory choice and evaluation. This view, as well as all the meta-metaphysical considerations discussed throughout the book, then naturally lead the author to a form of anti-realism, and at the end of the journey he offers reasons to think better of the kind of anti-realist view he proposes to embrace. www.jiribenovsky.org. (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of (...) reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with a reductionist/eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...) controversial) reason to believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than universals. (shrink)

This open access book is about exploring interesting borderline cases of art. It discusses the cases of gustatory and olfactory artworks, proprioceptive artworks, intellectual artworks, as well as the vague limits between painting and photography. The book focuses on the author’s research about what counts as art and what does not, as well as on the nature of these limits. Overall, the author defends a very inclusive view, 'extending' the limits of art, and he argues for its virtues. Some of (...) the limits discussed concern our senses, some concern vagueness and fuzzy boundaries between different types of works of art, some concern the amount of human intention and intervention in the process of creation of an artwork, and some concern the border between art and science. In these various ways, by understanding better such borderline cases, Benovsky suggests that we get a better grip on an understanding of the nature of art. (shrink)

We study search problems and reducibilities between them with known or potential relevance to bounded arithmetic theories. Our primary objective is to understand the sets of low complexity consequences of theories Si2 and Ti2 for a small i, ideally in a rather strong sense of characterization; or, at least, in the standard sense of axiomatization. We also strive for maximum combinatorial simplicity of the characterizations and axiomatizations, eventually sufficient to prove conjectured separation results. To this end two techniques based on (...) the Herbrand's theorem are developed. They characterize/axiomatize Σb1-consequences of Σb2-definable search problems, while the method based on the more involved concept of characterization is easier and gives more transparent results. This method yields new proofs of Buss' witnessing theorem and of the relation between PLS and Σb1, and also an axiomatization of Σb1. (shrink)

How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...) examined in turn, in order to see which combinations are appealing and which are not. It is argued that the 'worm view' variant of eternalist perdurantism is superior to the other alternatives. In the second part of the book, the same strategy is applied to the combinations of views about persistence across possible worlds (trans-world identity, counterpart theory, modal perdurants) and views about the nature of worlds, mainly modal realism and abstractionism. Not only all the traditional and well-known views, but also some more original ones, are examined and their pros and cons are carefully weighted. Here again, it is argued that perdurance seems to be the best strategy available. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problematic of concept and image as independent forms of mediating the thought. A specific role in incorporating the media of concept and image into the system of thought is played by the mediality itself, which operates as an entity mediating between heterogeneous worlds. The symbolized messages of the concept and image thus represent using the dispositive of representation between the visual and intellectual worlds. The author takes the concept as the initial form of thought, which (...) describes the object from the perspective of its being without making any propositions about it; the image, on the other hand, is taken as a sensory representation of the object. However, each of them is only a particular form of mediation. Representing a concept thus means taking the thought as a conceptual representation. (shrink)

1. Směry, osobnosti, problémy -- 2. Biograficko-bibliografický slovník.

In its jurisprudence relating to Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union seems to oscillate between two different approaches. According to the jurisprudential mainstream, the preliminary ruling is an instrument of dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice. This constant dialogue can fulfill the role assigned to the Court to ensure consistency of interpretation and application of Union law. Another line of cases, however, seems to make preliminary rulings means for individuals to ensure their (...) rights which derive from EU law. These two visions of the preliminary references recently have been opposed in discussions about a particular aspect of the preliminary procedure, which is the late withdrawal of the question referred by the national court. In fact, when the national court considered that the response of the Court of Justice was not “necessary to render judgment,” it could, at any time, including both before and after the deliberate publication, date the judgment to the parties and remove this issue. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice became dependent on matters of procedure (dealings between the parties, amicable agreements, etc.) that occurred in extremis before the national court, which sometimes cast doubt on a possible manipulation of the Court by the parties to the main proceedings. It became necessary to find a solution to solve this problem. The two different visions were then compared. If the preliminary ruling is conceived as an additional instrument for the rights that individuals derive from EU law, there is no need for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make a decision when the dispute is resolved before the national court and the defendant has obtained satisfaction. Conversely, if the preliminary ruling is conceived as an instrument to ensure the uniform application and interpretation of EU law, this judgment may be necessary. In fact, without deciding in abstracto, the Court in its judgement will anchor an interpretation that should be applied in all similar cases in the courts of the 27 Member States. In this case, a judgment may still be necessary, even if the dispute before the national court ended off. In order to preserve this approach, the new Rules of Procedure now contain a provision in Article 100 (1) which reads as follows: “The Court shall remain seised of a request for a preliminary ruling for as long as it is not withdrawn by the court or tribunal which made that request to the Court. The withdrawal of a request may be taken into account until notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interest persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute”. Thus, the late withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling is clearly limited in time and, even if such removal would occur in extremis, the judgment of the Court will be delivered in the interest of interpretation and uniform application of Union law. (shrink)

Consistent application of dialectical materialism leads Marxism-Leninism to the assertion that matter is infinite in its properties. However, the history of physics shows that the various levels of matter possess geometric dimensions that originate at the lowest level and continue through the others. The search for absolute natural constants — which Planck called the most pleasant task of physics — shows the conviction of the physicists that there is a limit to the parameters, a limit beyond which matter is no (...) longer divisible. (shrink)

Zatímco v případě otázek rigidity singulárních termínů panuje obecná shoda, v případě rigidity predikátů tomu tak překvapivě není. Záměrem této statě je opřít distinkci rigidní / nerigidní o jasné pojmy, jmenovitě o pojem reference v určité sémantické teorii. V důsledku toho lze podat rigorózní definici pojmu rigidního designátoru individua. Tato definice je pak přímočaře adaptovatelná pro případ pojmu rigidního designátoru třídy individuí (apod.). Tímto je dosaženo nejen obecnosti, ale i vnitřní jednoty teorie rigidity.

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps : first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard (...) objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not be equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it's precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories are often counter‐intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and (...) this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such ‘arguments from experience’ and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience‐based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly ‘corresponding’ metaphysical claims. An anti‐realist view of metaphysics will emerge. (shrink)

The general recognition of the existence of atoms and molecules occurred only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many researchers contributed to this, but the ultimate proof of the molecular nature of matter that convinced even the last sceptics was the confirmation of Albert Einstein’s statistical-fluctuation theory of Brownian motion, a part of his comprehension of interdisciplinary atomism, by Jean Perrin’s experiments on colloidal gamboge particles. Einstein noticed a difference between the values of Avogadro’s constant derived from Perrin’s experiments (...) and Planck’s calculation from black-body radiation. Einstein assumed the incorrectly evaluated size of the gamboge spherules to be a culprit of the difference and asked Perrin to check the assumption with additional experiments and using the viscosity formula introduced in his own dissertation. The result was a discrepancy that neither Einstein nor Perrin settled any further. In this communication, based on the survey of developments in colloid and polymer science and their comparison with relevant experiments, an explanation of the dilemma is given that now, after more than a century, proves Einstein correct. The comparison was de facto possible during his lifetime. (shrink)

A widespread interpretation of Buddhist thought concerning the self makes a prominent place for the claim that there is no self. The idea is that this piece of Buddhist philosophy is best understood as being an eliminativist view about the self, sometimes called the "no-self view" or "non-self view". This claim is motivated, in Buddhist philosophy, by the idea that if there were a self, it would have to be a permanent entity that would be a "bearer" of individual psychological (...) states. But since, according to this line of thought, there is no such permanent bearer, then there is no self.Consider the following statements: There... (shrink)

The philosophical discussion about erotic art has often been understood in terms of the possibility of erotic art as a form of visual or auditory art. In this article, I focus on erotic experiences qua proprioceptive experiences and I defend the claim that, under the right circumstances, such experiences can bring about proprioceptive artworks.

Comment les objets matériels persistent-ils à travers le temps ? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire qu'un objet change tout en étant un et le même ? Peut-il y avoir un monde sans temps ? Le temps s'écoule-t-il même si rien ne change ? Et, le temps lui-même, qu'est-ce que c'est ? Consiste-t-il seulement en l'instant présent, ou le passé et le futur existent-ils également ? Est-il possible de voyager dans le temps ? Quelles propriétés le temps doit-il avoir pour permettre (...) le voyage dans le temps ? Est-il possible de changer le passé ? Ce volume recueille des traductions inédites de textes issus de la philosophie du temps des XXe et XXIe siècles. Ces contributions de R. M. Adams, Jiri Benovsky, David Braddon-Mitchell, Michael Dummett, Graeme Forbes, Mark Heller, Paul Horwich, Robin Le Poidevin, David Lewis, D. H. Mellor, Sydney Shoemaker, Theodore Sider, J. J. C. Smart, W. V. O. Quine, et Peter Van Inwagen offrent des manières différentes de réagir à ces interrogations (et bien d'autres encore). Elles permettent ainsi au lecteur de découvrir la richesse des débats contemporains en philosophie du temps. On découvre ici une variété de notions, d'arguments et de théories, telles que l'endurantisme, le perdurantisme, le relationnisme et le substantialisme, mais également d'importantes considérations en ce qui concerne la causalité, l'identité, le changement, ou encore l'analyse de similarités entre le temps et l'espace. Le problème du voyage dans le temps se voit consacrer une section spéciale dans ce volume, car il a ceci de particulièrement intéressant : il sert de cas limite offrant la possibilité de tester les théories et de soulever de nombreuses questions philosophiques sur la nature du temps et du monde. (shrink)

The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are more (...) like allies : they are much less different than what is usually thought, and some alleged points of central disagreement fall prey to closer scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to examine carefully all those points, and to call attention to the places where the real differences between these views lie. I will then turn to the perdurantist stage view, and claim that with respect to some central issues it is the view that is the most different from the other three, but that in some places the reason why it different is also the reason why it is less satisfactory. (shrink)

The main aim of this study is to explain passage 35b4-37a2 of Plato’s Timaeus which deals with three main topics: the mathematization of the world’s soul, its movement, and its binding to the world’s body. First, it is argued that the mathematical structure of the world-soul allows it to participate in and be sensitive to harmony, which is essential for the correct workings of its cognitive capacities. Second, the division of the world-soul to the circle of the same and the (...) circles of the different and its self-motion comes in. This allows it to ‘touch’ and cognize the forms and the material things, as well as rule the movement of the corporeal world and care for it. In this aspect, the world-soul continues the process that started with the original creative act of the demiurge. Third, it is argued that the description of the world-soul’s binding to the world-body entails its conception as a spatially extended entity, which, in turn, explains of the possibility of an interaction between the corporeal world and its soul. (shrink)

This paper is about what counts as a photograph and what does not. One way in which this question arises stems from new technologies that keep changing our way of producing photographs, such as digital photography, which not only has now widely replaced traditional film photography but also challenges the very limits of what we count as a photograph. I shall discuss below at some length different aspects of digital photography, but also want to focus here on a new striking (...) type of photographic camera, announced in early 2012 by Lytro, Inc., namely, the so-called ?Light Field Camera?, which is said to represent a revolution in the photographic world. Indeed, unlike in the case of any previously available cameras, the photographs produced by a Light Field Camera can be re-focused after the photograph has been taken, which harbours many interesting consequences with regard to the resulting image and the way we interact with it. But of course, the initial question also arises in the case of traditional film photography as well as ?traditional? digital photography. The question amounts to asking about what the essential features of photographs are ? in short, what their nature is. (shrink)

Přehledová studie sleduje a analyzuje proměny pojmu sociální inovace. Na základě silné společenské poptávky se z původně dílčí, teoreticky nediskutované a nefixované kategorie stává kategorie obecná. Pokrývá širokou oblast nemateriálních inovací a zároveň se profiluje jako aktivita normativní a intencionální, zaměřená na obecně uznávané sociální cíle. Co do ideově-hodnotových orientací současných koncepcí sociálních inovací studie identifikuje kromě mainstreamu, který zůstává u otevřených hodnotových charakteristik, ještě směr emancipačně-mobilizační a sociálně-tržně odpovědný. V epistemologické rovině se teoretici sociálních inovací hlásí především k praktickému (...) experimentování, pragmatismu, teorii komplexnosti a principům transdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.

This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...) explanatory tool in order to account for the continuous and unfolding aspect of our experiences. In this article, I will raise some points of dissatisfaction with the very notion of the specious present, and while I shall not reject the specious present theories, I will argue that more is needed in order to have a proper understanding and explanation of our temporal experience. I will then discuss and defend a view of temporal experience whose basis can be found in Locke's Essay, and which, given some amendments and further development within a contemporary framework, provides us with a very good analysis of our experience of movement, change, and time – a view that helps us to avoid some burdensome commitments incurred by specious present theories and that can be fruitfully combined with these theories in order to yield a complete and more informative picture of the phenomenon of temporal experience. (shrink)

The paper discusses Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves, phenomena and noumena, and the problem of affection. The difference between appearances and things in themselves is understood as a methodological difference between two manners in which an object can be viewed: either as an appearance, or as a thing in itself. The author claims that this double-aspect view is a consequence of Kant’s conception of space and time as a priori forms of sensibility. The difference between phenomena and (...) noumena, on the other hand, cannot be explained only by the double-aspect view; Kant understands it also as an ontological difference between two different kinds of objects. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem of affection. The author claims that this problem is a pseudo-problem if we understand the difference between appearances and things in themselves as double-aspect view. Kant had maintained only an empirical affection. Passages in which Kant seems to advocate a transcendental affection can be brought in line with Kant’s critical philosophy. (shrink)

The study discusses Kant’s doctrine of lasting peace contained in his essay Toward Perpetual Peace (1795). First, the historical-political circumstances surrounding the genesis of Kant’s essay are described. Kant’s preliminary measures, which in his opinion must be accepted if lasting peace is to be ensured, are also discussed. Great attention is paid to the very core of Kant’s essay: his proposal for a comprehensive reform of law, which should apply to state, international, and cosmopolitan law. This is followed by an (...) exposition of Kant’s reflections on the feasibility of his doctrine of lasting peace in history. And finally, Kant’s view of the public as an institution is summarized. The originality of Kant’s approach is seen by the author above all in the fact that, from the point of view of the philosophy of law, the doctrine of lasting peace in Toward Perpetual Peace is connected with a consideration regarding its realizability in history. He also draws attention to the fact that though this detail is known, it is often marginalized in secondary literature. (shrink)