During the past decade, M.W. Evans and his coworkers have been developing so-called “Evans” or “ECE theory” that intends to serve as an unified field theory. One of its predictions is an existence of a radiation magnetic field called a “B(3)-field” which should accompany a circularly polarized electromagnetic radiation. This field should affect free electrons in two ways: (1) the electrons should behave in the B(3)-field in the same way as in a classical magnetic field (i.e., Larmor precession) and moreover, (...) (2) the electrons should undergo quantum interaction with the B(3)-field with the formation of a spin connection resonance. This paper presents an experimental test of the B(3)-field existence by observing the changes in trajectories of free electrons in special detector, when strong (up to 200 W/m2) continuous circularly polarized microwave radiation of a frequency of 2.45 GHz is applied. We have not detected any sign of B(3)-field in presented experiment. It follows that if the B(3)-field really exists, it should be at least 4 orders of magnitude smaller than the Evans’ theory predicts. (shrink)

Na úvod připomínám medailon Josefa Zumra k Lubošovým šedesátinám ve Filosofickém časopisu 1995, jako doklad, že našeho tehdejšího vedoucího katedry si vážili nejen filosofové z Brna. Luboš se narodil ve stejném roce jako já, ale středoškolská studia stihl dokončit o rok dříve. Tak se stalo, že jsem se s ním v roce 1950 na Filosofické fakultě setkal jako s učitelem- -asistentem (na jeho přednášce z etiky) a on se mnou jako s jedním ze svých prvních univerzitních posluchačů filosofie. Když jsem (...) s ním od roku 1954 působil na jedné katedře, setkávali jsme se nejen „služebně”, ale i jako kamarádi mimo školu; nezapomenutelné mi zůstávají např. naše zájezdy na slovenskou chalupu k Pavlu Páclovi, kde jsem se utvrzoval v poznání, jak přirozeně Luboš umí být výborným společníkem i v takovém prostředí (nejen při karetních hrách, ale i když jsme se snažili přispět k údržbě Pavlovy chalupy a k její přípravě na zimní období). Pokusil jsem se povědět pár slov o Lubošově vztahu k rodině, v níž se narodil, k jeho vlastní rodině, k rodnému kraji, a ovšem i Lubošovi učiteli, všemi studenty oblíbeném a váženém. Muselo - bohužel - nakonec dojít i na slova obdivu k jeho statečnému zápasu s nemocí, které posléze podlehl. (shrink)

Na úvod připomínám medailon Josefa Zumra k Lubošovým šedesátinám ve Filosofickém časopisu 1995, jako doklad, že našeho tehdejšího vedoucího katedry si vážili nejen filosofové z Brna. Luboš se narodil ve stejném roce jako já, ale středoškolská studia stihl dokončit o rok dříve. Tak se stalo, že jsem se s ním v roce 1950 na Filosofické fakultě setkal jako s učitelem- -asistentem (na jeho přednášce z etiky) a on se mnou jako s jedním ze svých prvních univerzitních posluchačů filosofie. Když jsem (...) s ním od roku 1954 působil na jedné katedře, setkávali jsme se nejen „služebně”, ale i jako kamarádi mimo školu; nezapomenutelné mi zůstávají např. naše zájezdy na slovenskou chalupu k Pavlu Páclovi, kde jsem se utvrzoval v poznání, jak přirozeně Luboš umí být výborným společníkem i v takovém prostředí (nejen při karetních hrách, ale i když jsme se snažili přispět k údržbě Pavlovy chalupy a k její přípravě na zimní období). Pokusil jsem se povědět pár slov o Lubošově vztahu k rodině, v níž se narodil, k jeho vlastní rodině, k rodnému kraji, a ovšem i Lubošovi učiteli, všemi studenty oblíbeném a váženém. Muselo - bohužel - nakonec dojít i na slova obdivu k jeho statečnému zápasu s nemocí, které posléze podlehl. (shrink)

The main aim of this study is to explain passage 35b4-37a2 of Plato’s Timaeus which deals with three main topics: the mathematization of the world’s soul, its movement, and its binding to the world’s body. First, it is argued that the mathematical structure of the world-soul allows it to participate in and be sensitive to harmony, which is essential for the correct workings of its cognitive capacities. Second, the division of the world-soul to the circle of the same and the (...) circles of the different and its self-motion comes in. This allows it to ‘touch’ and cognize the forms and the material things, as well as rule the movement of the corporeal world and care for it. In this aspect, the world-soul continues the process that started with the original creative act of the demiurge. Third, it is argued that the description of the world-soul’s binding to the world-body entails its conception as a spatially extended entity, which, in turn, explains of the possibility of an interaction between the corporeal world and its soul. (shrink)

We investigate the interactions of formula complexity in weak set theories with the axioms available there. In particular, we show that swapping bounded and unbounded quantification preserves formula complexity in presence of the axiom of foundation weakened to an arbitrary set base, while it does not if the axiom of foundation is further weakened to a proper class base. More attention is being paid to the necessary axioms employed in the positive results, than to the combinatorial strength of the positive (...) results themselves. (shrink)

The general recognition of the existence of atoms and molecules occurred only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many researchers contributed to this, but the ultimate proof of the molecular nature of matter that convinced even the last sceptics was the confirmation of Albert Einstein’s statistical-fluctuation theory of Brownian motion, a part of his comprehension of interdisciplinary atomism, by Jean Perrin’s experiments on colloidal gamboge particles. Einstein noticed a difference between the values of Avogadro’s constant derived from Perrin’s experiments (...) and Planck’s calculation from black-body radiation. Einstein assumed the incorrectly evaluated size of the gamboge spherules to be a culprit of the difference and asked Perrin to check the assumption with additional experiments and using the viscosity formula introduced in his own dissertation. The result was a discrepancy that neither Einstein nor Perrin settled any further. In this communication, based on the survey of developments in colloid and polymer science and their comparison with relevant experiments, an explanation of the dilemma is given that now, after more than a century, proves Einstein correct. The comparison was de facto possible during his lifetime. (shrink)

History and the philosophy of science have played a very important role in dialectical materialism; their results have been destined to support the correctness of the ideas of Marxist philosophers, especially in their application in historical materialism.From this point of view, the circumstances of the origin of the works of the Marxist classics cannot be neglected: Engels wrote hisDialectics in Nature in the period of classical physics, and Lenin published hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism at the beginning of the 20th century when (...) our modern physics first began: shortly before the publication of Lenin's book, Röntgen and Becquerel discovered new kinds of radiation, Balmer published his ideas concerning the regularity of the hydrogen spectrum, Plank wrote his first articles about the elementary quantum and Einstein published his three famous articles (1905). (shrink)

This study focuses on explaining the problem of cognition of the world soul through a detailed analysis of passage 37a2–c5 from Plato’s Timaeus. It is divided into three sections, each dedicated to interpreting a different part of the passage. First, the necessary conditions for the soul to be able to cognize correctly are discussed. Second, it is demonstrated that the world soul’s cognition is essentially discursive. It is further argued that the soul makes two different types of declarations that form (...) a single complex inner speech, allowing the soul to cognize both the corporeal and the intelligible. Finally, it is explained how specific cognitive acts arise from the soul’s inner speech. (shrink)

The successful early acquisition of reading literacy represents a crucial learning process determining the further course of academic development (Stanovich, 2009). During this process, interactions between children and their proximal social environment are of utmost importance. Therefore, we introduce a systemic framework for the development of learning potential (e.g., Mudrak et al., 2015, 2019, 2019b; Ziegler & Stoeger, 2017) and explore the interactions between the social and motivational processes associated with reading literacy development in school-age children. We base our analysis (...) on a representative Czech sample of fourth-grade pupils involved in the Progress in International Reading Literacy study (PIRLS, Martin et al., 2016). On the basis of the systemic framework, we hypothesized hierarchical relationships among family socioeconomic status, related developmental resources (including parental support, expectations, and reading resources), children’s reading motivation (including reading engagement and reading confidence), and manifested learning outcomes (including school grades and reading competence). We implemented three structural equation models to test the hypothesized relationships. The first model tested the direct effect of developmental resources on reading competence. The second model included the motivational variables as mediators between resources and competence. The third model included school grades as mediators between resources and motivational variables. Our analyses indicated the good fit of the proposed models. The final model explained 37.8 % of the variance in children’s school grades and 46.5 % of the variance in reading literacy test scores (compared to 34.8 % in the first model). Moreover, parental socioeconomic status was strongly associated with parental expectations, which were associated with reading confidence, partially through the effect of parental expectations on children’s school grades. Reading confidence was the main predictor of reading literacy within the model, followed by the direct effects of parental resources. The results illustrate complex processes through which the family environment affects the development of learning competencies such as reading literacy by providing children with the relevant social and material resources associated with their motivation and school outcomes. We discuss some of the reasons that these relationships may take place and consider their implications for educational practice. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories are often counter‐intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and (...) this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such ‘arguments from experience’ and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience‐based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly ‘corresponding’ metaphysical claims. An anti‐realist view of metaphysics will emerge. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind (...) of worries is mislead. Once we understand properly how our phenomenal experience as of passage and as of change, such as it is understood by specious present theorists, comes into being, the apparent phenomenologico-metaphysical conflict will disappear. In short, the mistake here is to presuppose that there is a link between phenomenology and metaphysics stronger than it actually is. Presentism is a metaphysical theory about what exists. Specious presentism is a phenomenological theory about how things appear to us in experience. As we will see, the two claims are not in conflict, and are in fact entirely orthogonal. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their (...) primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of "power" and "explanatory". (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...) controversial) reason to believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than universals. (shrink)

Deschamps, Léger Marie,1716-1774; enlightenment; utopias; art and philosophy; philosophy, modern; 18th century.

Studie ukazuje, jak se problém vůle stával pro Heideggera v jeho zralém bytostně dějinném myšlení problematickým. Heidegger se pozvolna zbavoval (od poloviny třicátých let) voluntárního přístupu ke jsoucnu, v bytostně dějinném obratu spěl k ryzímu ne-chtění. Začal se rýsovat odstup od světa svévolné vědotechniky směrem k větší otevřenosti vůči bytí. K tomu je zapotřebí nacházet ryzí tubytí (Da-sein) a přibližovat se k původnímu bytí samému (Seyn). Tehdy se může otevírat ne-voluntární smysl uvlastňování bytí, kdy se překračuje novověka subjektivita a s (...) ní také technologický nihilismus doby; jde se spíše cestou "myšlení a básnění", cestou odevzdanosti (Gelassenheit) a ne-chtění. Jen tak se může otevřít zóna opravdového života, kdy člověka nesemele mechanismus technickéhop zjednávání (Gestell) a mechnaisticky subjektivistická vůle k moci a vůle k vůli. (shrink)

Cílem této studie je představení základních tezí sociálně-politické filosofie Karla Raimunda Poppera (jak je zachycena zejména v dílech Bída historicismu a Otevřená společnost a její nepřátelé) a dále kritické zhodnocení aplikace těchto tezí při výkladu Platónovy filosofie. Je probíráno zejména Popperovo obvinění Platóna z tzv. „biologického historicismu“, dále jeho označení platónské teorie spravedlnosti jako „totalitní“ a v neposlední řadě jeho interpretace dialogu Ústava jakožto Platónova „politického programu“ určeného k přímé implementaci v praxi vyvoleným filosofem-králem. V druhé polovině této studie je (...) pak nabídnuto alternativní čtení, v němž se Platónova Ústava vyjeví ve zcela odlišném světle, než v jakém ji vidí Popper. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the phenomenologically grounded dynamics of hearing and listening as a possible approach to our sonic experience. Its starting point is the studies of contemporary urban spaces devoted to their sonic experience. The results of these studies and their interpretation will serve as a starting point for the introduction of dynamics of hearing and listening. In the next part of this article, I will focus on the elaboration of this relationship with regard to (...) the critique of Husserl’s concept of activity and passivity in his late work Experience and Judgment and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of being-in-the-world. Based on this, in the end, certain common features will be shown, connecting the thematization of activity and passivity with the relationship of hearing and listening. (shrink)

A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial , it is possible for the individual to lack it ; and for any trivial property that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý’s original formulations of are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential . (...) To avoid such objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý’s definitions into viable ones. (shrink)

This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...) explanatory tool in order to account for the continuous and unfolding aspect of our experiences. In this article, I will raise some points of dissatisfaction with the very notion of the specious present, and while I shall not reject the specious present theories, I will argue that more is needed in order to have a proper understanding and explanation of our temporal experience. I will then discuss and defend a view of temporal experience whose basis can be found in Locke's Essay, and which, given some amendments and further development within a contemporary framework, provides us with a very good analysis of our experience of movement, change, and time – a view that helps us to avoid some burdensome commitments incurred by specious present theories and that can be fruitfully combined with these theories in order to yield a complete and more informative picture of the phenomenon of temporal experience. (shrink)

Přehledová studie sleduje a analyzuje proměny pojmu sociální inovace. Na základě silné společenské poptávky se z původně dílčí, teoreticky nediskutované a nefixované kategorie stává kategorie obecná. Pokrývá širokou oblast nemateriálních inovací a zároveň se profiluje jako aktivita normativní a intencionální, zaměřená na obecně uznávané sociální cíle. Co do ideově-hodnotových orientací současných koncepcí sociálních inovací studie identifikuje kromě mainstreamu, který zůstává u otevřených hodnotových charakteristik, ještě směr emancipačně-mobilizační a sociálně-tržně odpovědný. V epistemologické rovině se teoretici sociálních inovací hlásí především k praktickému (...) experimentování, pragmatismu, teorii komplexnosti a principům transdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Pavel Materna proposed valuable explications of concept and conceptual system. After their introduction, we contrast conceptual systems with (a novel notion of) derivation systems. Derivation systems differ from conceptual systems especially in including derivation rules. This enables us to show close connections among the realms of objects, their concepts, and reasoning with concepts.

The practice of attributing aesthetic properties to scientific and philosophical theories is commonplace. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of such an aesthetic judgement about a theory is Quine's in 'On what there is': "Wyman's overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes". Many other philosophers and scientists, before and after Quine, have attributed aesthetic properties to particular theories they are defending or rejecting. One often hears (...) that a view is "elegant", "attractive", "beautiful", or even "sexy". [...] The general claim that aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties is a largely debated one. In this paper, I wish to address this issue from an angle which has not been really explored so far: I shall neither concentrate on cases of artefacts nor of natural objects, like the beauty of a painting or the beauty of a sunrise, rather, my main centre of attention will be the somewhat more special, theoretical case of the beauty of philosophical theories (with a focus on metaphysical theories). As we will see, there are some interesting issues concerning claims that attribute aesthetic properties to theories, in part because, even if such claims are commonplace in philosophy and in science, little has been said about the nature of the relevant supervenience basis – that is, about what it is exactly that the beauty of a theory is supposed to supervene on. Moreover, we shall see that aesthetic properties of theories play a crucial role in theory choice and evaluation. Indeed, it seems that the aesthetic properties of a theory can be appealed to in theory evaluation and when it comes to preferring one theory over another. But before we ask ourselves what role the attribution of aesthetic properties to theories can play, I will adress the question how theories come to have their aesthetic properties in the first place. (shrink)

How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...) examined in turn, in order to see which combinations are appealing and which are not. It is argued that the 'worm view' variant of eternalist perdurantism is superior to the other alternatives. In the second part of the book, the same strategy is applied to the combinations of views about persistence across possible worlds (trans-world identity, counterpart theory, modal perdurants) and views about the nature of worlds, mainly modal realism and abstractionism. Not only all the traditional and well-known views, but also some more original ones, are examined and their pros and cons are carefully weighted. Here again, it is argued that perdurance seems to be the best strategy available. (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of reality (...) is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with a reductionist/eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to point out the problem that started in the 2018 US Open final between Naomi Osaka and Serena Williams. During this final match, there was a conflict between the player S. Williams and the chair umpire C. Ramos, which involved a violation of rules related to coaching during the match. Subsequently, C. Ramos was banned from officiating the Williams sisters' matches at the next 2019 US Open. The authors of the article believe that the (...) tennis organizations USTA and WTA did not judge the dispute between chair umpire C. Ramos and S. Williams in accordance with their rules, as the rules allow for the sanctioning of a player who is coached during a match. While the written rules and their application during play must be taken into consideration, so must the subjective interpretation and application of the rules by a particular umpire. If our arguments are correct, C. Ramos's application of the rules during this game was in no way inconsistent with his past practice or the rules themselves. Thus, C. Ramos was a victim of the entire incident, which was also influenced by the gender narrative after the match. (shrink)

This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is (...) little reason for preferring one theory over the other. It is not interested in this claim only for the sake of the debate between trope theory and the theory of universals. Indeed, the reasons why it claims that it is so difficult to choose one theory over the other can be applied to other cases as well (where they might lead to claims of metaphysical equivalence). (shrink)

Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.

Monadic MV-algebras are an algebraic model of the predicate calculus of the Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic in which only a single individual variable occurs. GMV-algebras are a non-commutative generalization of MV-algebras and are an algebraic counterpart of the non-commutative Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic. We introduce monadic GMV-algebras and describe their connections to certain couples of GMV-algebras and to left adjoint mappings of canonical embeddings of GMV-algebras. Furthermore, functional MGMV-algebras are studied and polyadic GMV-algebras are introduced and discussed.

The paper discusses Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves, phenomena and noumena, and the problem of affection. The difference between appearances and things in themselves is understood as a methodological difference between two manners in which an object can be viewed: either as an appearance, or as a thing in itself. The author claims that this double-aspect view is a consequence of Kant’s conception of space and time as a priori forms of sensibility. The difference between phenomena and (...) noumena, on the other hand, cannot be explained only by the double-aspect view; Kant understands it also as an ontological difference between two different kinds of objects. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem of affection. The author claims that this problem is a pseudo-problem if we understand the difference between appearances and things in themselves as double-aspect view. Kant had maintained only an empirical affection. Passages in which Kant seems to advocate a transcendental affection can be brought in line with Kant’s critical philosophy. (shrink)

Inferencialismus idealizuje proces získání významu v komunikaci. K tomu snadno najdeme protipříklady. Zcela zde chybí nějaká, zejména pojmová analýza a také nějaké rozhodovací (meta)pravidlo pro získání významu.

1. Směry, osobnosti, problémy -- 2. Biograficko-bibliografický slovník.