Algorithmic predictions are promising for insurance companies to develop personalized risk models for determining premiums. In this context, issues of fairness, discrimination, and social injustice might arise: Algorithms for estimating the risk based on personal data may be biased towards specific social groups, leading to systematic disadvantages for those groups. Personalized premiums may thus lead to discrimination and social injustice. It is well known from many application fields that such biases occur frequently and naturally when prediction models are applied to (...) people unless special efforts are made to avoid them. Insurance is no exception. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of algorithmic fairness in the case of insurance premiums. We ask what “fairness” might mean in this context and how the fairness of a premium system can be measured. For this, we apply the established fairness frameworks of the fair machine learning literature to the case of insurance premiums and show which of the existing fairness criteria can be applied to assess the fairness of insurance premiums. We argue that two of the often-discussed group fairness criteria, independence (also called statistical parity or demographic parity) and separation (also known as equalized odds), are not normatively appropriate for insurance premiums. Instead, we propose the sufficiency criterion (also known as well-calibration) as a morally defensible alternative that allows us to test for systematic biases in premiums towards certain groups based on the risk they bring to the pool. In addition, we clarify the connection between group fairness and different degrees of personalization. Our findings enable insurers to assess the fairness properties of their risk models, helping them avoid reputation damage resulting from potentially unfair and discriminatory premium systems. (shrink)

Die Beiträge zur Altertumskunde enthalten Monographien, Sammelbände, Editionen, Übersetzungen und Kommentare zu Themen aus den Bereichen Klassische, Mittel- und Neulateinische Philologie, Alte Geschichte, Archäologie, Antike Philosophie sowie Nachwirken der Antike bis in die Neuzeit. Dadurch leistet die Reihe einen umfassenden Beitrag zur Erschließung klassischer Literatur und zur Forschung im gesamten Gebiet der Altertumswissenschaften.

This chapter proceeds from the standard picture of the relation between intuitions and experimental philosophy: the alleged evidential role of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and experimental philosophy’s challenge to these judgments, based on their variation with philosophically irrelevant factors. I will survey some of the main defenses of this standard picture against the x-phi challenge, most of which fail. Concerning the most popular defense, the expertise defense, I will draw the bleak conclusion that intuitive expertise of the envisaged kind is (...) largely a myth. Next, I will consider the mischaracterization objection, which has mainly been developed by Deutsch and Cappelen on the basis of textual evidence: that philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their case judgments, but instead argue for them. This would render the x-phi challenge mostly irrelevant, due to its focus on intuitions about hypothetical cases. I will then consider a few instructive replies to the mischaracterization objection, which are all unconvincing on further inspection. Finally, I will discuss some potential normative consequences of the mischaracterization objection, and I will argue that it recommends a shift away from the excessive focus on intuitions about cases in metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy, towards more work on the role of argumentation in the method of cases. More speculatively, I claim that philosophers should always argue for their case judgments, even if they have strong intuitions about them, because an argument-based methodology would be more transparent and philosophically fruitful than one that mainly relies on intuition. (shrink)

Voltaire, 1694-1778 -- Guizot 1787-1874 -- Burckhardt 1818-1897 -- Lamprecht 1856-1915 -- Huizinga 1872-1945 -- Ortega y Gasset 1883-1955.

This book does not only attempt to clarify concepts used in the context of dialectical reasoning but also develops an epistemological theory by answering the question: What does it mean to possess a language? The epistemological theory then is used to ground the basis of social science in the logic of our common-sense language. This logic is viewed as more comprehensive than traditional formalized logic, which is viewed as only one though an important aspect of the more general and basic (...) logic of our common-sense language. (shrink)

Denjenigen, die mit der im Titel angesprochenen Thematik und Problematik auch nur halbwegs vertraut sind, fällt in der Regel sofort das Verdikt Fichtes über das Judentum aus dem Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die französische Revolution von 1793 ein. Es gilt als eines der frühesten Dokumente eines Übergangs vom religiösen Antijudaismus zum politischen Antisemitismus avant la lettre. Nimmt man nun noch die Tatsache hinzu, daß derselbe Philosoph nach verbreitetem Verständnis mit seinen Reden an die deutsche Nation von (...) 1807/8 auch als einer der frühesten Begründer des Nationalismus in Deutschland gilt, so sehen viele Interpreten den weiteren Weg, der schließlich im chauvinistschen Rassenantisemitismus der NS-Zeit endete, geradezu zwanghaft vorgezeichnet. Ein Beispiel für viele andere, die man in der Einleitung meines Buches Fichtes Idee der Nation und das Judentum, das im Oktober 2000 bei Rodopi/amsterdam erschienen ist, zu Hauf finden kann, ist Léon Poliakov: Im 5. Band seiner großen Antisemitismusstudie versteigt er sich zu einer Aussage wie: Fichtes »nationalsozialistische Ausleger hatten es nicht nötig, diese Texte [= der Reden an die deutsche Nation] allzu sehr umzubilden, um den Nachweis erbringen zu können, daß er der erste Prophet der nationalsozialistischen Gottgläubigkeit und des ›arischen Glaubens‹, jenen Eckpfeilern der nebulösen Metaphysik Hitlers gewesen ist.« Nebenbei gesagt: Weder diese beiden Begriffe, noch was immer sie bezeichnen mögen, kommen auch nur entfernt bei Fichte vor, aber das hat weder Poliakov noch andere Fichte-Kritiker, die im Tenor ähnlich geurteilt haben, je gestört. (shrink)

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all genuine (...) philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

One way of shedding light on the distinctions drawn between various crimes against property - all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object - is by considering the victim's participation in the deprivation. First, it may be the case that the victim does not participate in this deprivation at all, for example, because he is not present when it occurs. Second, it may be that the victim is in a situation of necessitas simplex seu absoluta at the time (...) of the deprivation, because he is physically unable to prevent it, even though he may be present and actually observing it occur. Or, he may assist or tolerate the deprivation in an ignorantia facti , not recognizing that he is being depossessed of his own property. Third, the victim, though actually participating in the deprivation, may be either in a situation of necessitas cum adiunctione or acting under ignorance parallel to ignorantia iuris , because he is deceived as to the economic reasonableness of transferring the object to the depossessor. Leaving out the uninteresting first group of cases, the article claims that the differences drawn between the crimes committed by the depossessor depend upon why the victim's participation cannot be imputed to him. In the second group of cases, the victim's presence or his apparent participation cannot be imputed to him on the first level of imputation, because he has not willfully tolerated or participated in the depossession. In the third group of cases, the victim's participation in the depossession can be imputed to him on the first level of imputation but not on the second level, because, although the victim has willfully participated in the depossession, he has not acted voluntarily. The article first discusses the structures of imputation, which were primarily developed during the eighteenth century. It sketches the differences between two levels of imputation and between ordinary and extraordinary imputation, indicating the reasons for excluding ordinary imputation. The article then considers various types of property crimes, all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object. The claim is made that these crimes can be distinguished on the basis of whether the victim's participation can be imputed to him on the first or second level of imputation. Contemporary German law differentiates between Diebstahl, Erpressung and Betrug thus covering most of the relevant cases in the three groups. Diebstahl generally covers the cases in groups one and two. Erpressung and Betrug cover most of the relevant cases in the third group. Yet the offense definitions of these crimes are historically accidental. Accordingly, they are neither systematically complete, nor do they cover all of the relevant cases. In addition, the article includes a discussion of the differentiation between Raub and räuberische Erpressung. (shrink)

With the late Author’s kind permission, the present text is published here in a somewhat abbreviated and modified translation that has been given appropriate subheadings and supplemented with an extensive bibliography. Its German original from 1996 has been translated into French and English. The purpose of the present translation is to make the Polish reader acquainted with the important and innovative account of Plato’s philosophy that has been put forward by the Tübingen School whose one of the most prominent co-founders (...) was Hans Joachim Krämer. While this text is devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, it also presents Plato’s agrapha dogmata as an important supplement to the written dialogues. A fuller overview of the major assumptions of this new interpretation is to be found in the recently published Gesammelte Ansätze zu Platon. (shrink)

A book review of Emmanuel Alloa, Looking through Images: A Phenomenology of Visual Media. Translated by Nils F. Schott. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021, xiv + 392 pp. ISBN 9780231187923.

Starting from a political controversy and a wide-ranging media-discussion, the article examines the evolution of German national holidays from the "Kaiserreich" to the reunited Federal Republic. The author lists the dates and attributes of the national festivities and asks to what extent national days can contribute to a collective identification with the given state and its political system. In the process of change one identifies a long run from emotional festivity towards a rather rational attitude in celebrating the National Day. (...) The future of the current German national holiday in the frame of a 'democratic culture' is far away from being settled. (shrink)