Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics and Time:Lévinas Between Kant and HusserlJoanna Hodge (bio)This article stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding. This article expresses the conviction that this source stems from the essential possibility of elemental evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western philosophy had (...) not sufficiently insured itself. This possibility is inscribed within the ontology of a being concerned with being—a being, to use the Heideggerian expression, "which in its own being is concerned with that being." Such a possibility still threatens the subject correlative with being as gathering together and as dominating, that famous subject of transcendental idealism that before all else wishes to be free and thinks itself free. We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve the authentic dignity for the human subject. Does the subject ever arrive at the human condition prior to assuming responsibility for the other in the act of election that raises him up to this height? This election comes from a god—or God—who beholds him in the face of the other, the neighbour, the original "site" of the Revelation.—Emmanuel Lévinas, 28 March 1990, introduction to "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism" (1934)1IntroductionThe intent of this essay is to establish the relevance of various divergent workings of time for an understanding of the difficulties distinctive of moral dilemmas and ethical doubt. It will introduce the thinking of Lévinas (1905-96) to bring into focus the differences entailed in addressing ethical contexts from various perspectives of time, whether in terms of past experience, present contingencies, or considerations of the future. It turns out to be necessary to distinguish between various conceptions of the future as well, in order to grasp the different construals of constraints on moral deliberation. A contrast may be drawn between the individualism and the collectivism, [End Page 107] respectively, of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's visions of the future;1 and between the religious determinacies of Lévinas's invocation of futurity and Derrida's more ascetic, formally indicative recasting of Lévinas's à-dieu.2 It is also the case that distinct conceptions of the past impose significant constraints on what human beings can hope to achieve in their moral efficacy. There is an important difference between the Greco-pagan past, invoked by Nietzsche and Heidegger, and the divine time of creation invoked in the opening pages of Genesis, which is the source of Lévinas's notion of an immemorial time, and which is subjected to deconstructive reading by Jacques Derrida in "The Animal Which Therefore I Am, to Be Continued" [see Derrida, "L'animal autobiographique"].I shall introduce a reading of the second part of Kant's treatise The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) [139-71], on the contest between philosophy and law, to suggest that for ethics, by contrast to concerns with aesthetics, metaphysics, and epistemology, a consideration of conceptions of futurity is especially pressing. This provides a context for responding to Lévinas's early article "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism" (1934), to which Lévinas wrote an introduction, including my opening citation, some sixty years later.3 Lévinas is not simply engaging with the problem of evil, in relation to the now well-known moral deficiencies of Heidegger's fundamental ontology.4 He is also warning, more generally, against delusions arising from theoretical abstraction, in both absolute idealism and, indeed, in a Nietzschean ethics. His own writings, from Time and the Other (1947) on, suggest that the deficiency arises from oversimplifications [End Page 108] in the thinking of time. Taking this as a clue, the main tasks of this essay are to show that the broadly historical notion of time, which appears oriented toward the past, requires a complementary reflection on futurity, if the ethical significance of different ways of relating to the past is to emerge; and, in relation to that futurity, to show that the broadly teleological, future-directed notions of self-formation, deliberation, and genesis require supplementation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Concept of MindJoanna ForstromLilli Alanen. Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. pp. xv + 355. Cloth, $65.00.Descartes's Concept of Mind takes as its task that of redressing "the distortions of Descartes's concept of human mind and thinking caused by the Cartesian myth that Ryle justly sought to correct, but that his gripping caricature has helped keep alive" (x). Offering a close reading of (...) the text in its philosophical and historical context and examining its place in contemporary literature, Alanen develops Descartes's philosophy of mind, broadly construed, with a focus on the embodiment of the human mind.Alanen sees Descartes's philosophy of mind as "the result of an ongoing struggle to adjust some basic views about human nature, thought and agency rooted in experience and tradition to the new picture of the universe" (8). Taking this perspective reveals a greater continuity in his fundamental views. Changes, she suggests, are a matter of emphasis, subject matter, and perspective. She grants Descartes's dualism and his view of the mind-body union and chooses to focus instead on the mind as embodied.In developing the analysis Alanen takes a somewhat chronological approach in her seven chapters. Chapter one is a prehistory of Descartes's philosophy of mind focusing on his unpublished, early writings. She looks at his early intellectual ambitions and interests beginning with mathematics and a science of nature and then expanding into metaphysics. The distinctive views of his later work are formed, according to Alanen, during this time. In chapter two, three different perspectives about the nature of man are distinguished: man as an object of mechanistic physics, man as mind or intellect and so an epistemic subject, and man as a real union between the mind and body. She focuses on the third, as it is the real union that has been overlooked or misconstrued by most. How this union is to [End Page 115] be conceived, and the epistemological implications of it are explored. By highlighting the consequences of Descartes's distinction between the mind and the body in terms of knowledge, Alanen directly confronts Ryle and his legacy. In short, because we cannot expect to have knowledge of the mind—body union, we cannot conceive it—there is no category mistake to be made. She elaborates much more in the chapter.Chapters three, four and five, are centered on the writings from 1637-44. Here Alanen focuses on Descartes's notion of thinking and modes of thoughts. The way that thinking is defined, its intentional and representative nature, and the status of sensations as mental phenomena are carefully explored in light of discussions of these issues in contemporary literature and in the literature of Descartes's time. The issues are complex, but the writing is clear and easy to follow. Her discussions of representation, sense perception, and material falsity are particularly good in these chapters.Chapters six and seven reflect the issues that Princess Elisabeth raised: emotions, will, and related moral issues. These two chapters are perhaps the most significant in the book. Chapter six centers on The Passions. The passions depend on the union of the mind and body and do not consist in thought alone. Alanen sees them as a subclass of thoughts. She examines carefully the intentionality of emotions, the distinction between action and passions, and the functions attributed to the body and the soul. She raises a number of questions, some of which chapter seven begins to answer, and others which are left to challenge the reader. Chapter seven is about free will and virtue. Alanen places Descartes's conception of the will and agency in the context of the debate between the voluntarists and the intellectualists. She considers the ancient and medieval antecedents, with a focus on the Stoics as she develops her analysis. She also includes a good discussion of Descartes's contemporaries, and their reactions to his work. Her inclusion of secondary literature is well done. One is left with a better understanding of the complexities of Descartes's understanding of human nature and free will.Overall, Alanen's book is an excellent contribution to... (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 46-48.

Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2013 Issue: 195 Pages: 197-248.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 55, Issue 6, Page 935-948, December 2021.

What is the proper unit of analysis in the psycholinguistics of dialog? While classical approaches are largely based on models of individual linguistic processing, recent advances stress the social coordinative nature of dialog. In the influential interactive alignment model, dialogue is thus approached as the progressive entrainment of interlocutors' linguistic behaviors toward the alignment of situation models. Still, the driving mechanisms are attributed to individual cognition in the form of automatic structural priming. Challenging these ideas, we outline a dynamical framework (...) for studying dialog based on the notion of interpersonal synergy. Crucial to this synergetic model is the emphasis on dialog as an emergent, self-organizing, interpersonal system capable of functional coordination. A consequence of this model is that linguistic processes cannot be reduced to the workings of individual cognitive systems but must be approached also at the interpersonal level. From the synergy model follows a number of new predictions: beyond simple synchrony, good dialog affords complementary dynamics, constrained by contextual sensitivity and functional specificity. We substantiate our arguments by reference to recent empirical studies supporting the idea of dialog as interpersonal synergy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response 4: The Summer of Our DiscontentCaroline EdwardsI write this response on the eve of another wave of industrial action in the UK in November 2022—the Universities and Colleges Union (UCU) “UCU Rising” campaign, the latest in a series of regular disputes over pay and working conditions, the gender and ethnicities pay gap, and casualisation that has been ongoing since 2018. In 2022’s “summer of discontent,” we’ve seen our (...) rail, maritime and transport workers, airport staff, bus drivers, telecommunications workers, postal workers, nurses, refuse workers, and higher and further education staff engage in ongoing industrial disputes with intractable bosses. Even criminal barristers continue with an indefinite, uninterrupted strike after years of government cuts and chronic underinvestment. Everywhere you look, there is a palpable sense of a country on its knees. It’s nearly 100 years since the last General Strike of 1926 and in the UK it’s looking increasingly likely that we will have another General Strike on our hands soon. In “Two Cheers for Blueprints, or, Negative Reasons for Positive Utopianism” Antonis Balasopoulos contextualizes this within the longer economic durée of the shift from Fordist production to so-called flexible accumulation after 1972, writing in this issue that “the turn of capital to the faster and higher [End Page 554] profits involved in financialization rather than infrastructural and industrial investment, form much of the objective, structural ground for what can only be described as the rapid rise of a dystopian structure of feeling in western societies since the early 1970s.” Antonis’s brilliant summary reminds us of the monumental scale of the challenges facing utopian thought and praxis in our current moment. Make no mistake—the “crisis ordinariness” of everyday life under late capitalism that Lauren Berlant identified in Cruel Optimism (2011) has intensified in the years following the Global Financial Crisis (2007–8), the wave of Occupy protests in 2011, and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–). “For some time now,” as Antonis writes, the utopian goals of “happiness, fulfilment, [and] emancipation... have been out of the question altogether.”It’s hard not to agree with this assessment, given the current chaos of life in the UK. Adam Stock’s roundtable contribution “Funding Utopia: Utopian Studies and the Discourse of Academic Excellence” focuses on the academy’s complicity with the neoliberal financialization of what were previously protected as public goods (education, our health service, transport infrastructure, and so on) over the past three decades. As Adam notes, the rhetoric of “excellence” that has come to dominate all areas of university life—teaching, research, public engagement, and the quantifiable “impact” of university research beyond the academy—is really just another way of using competition to mask the market logic of scarcity. Swingeing cuts to publicly funded research have led to a scarcity of resources in scholarly knowledge production, which is legitimated through the discourse of “excellence” and “prestige.” Only a handful of elite research leaders are granted awards and the value of all research becomes judged by its proximity to this distribution (concentration) of wealth within a small number of institutions. Defending education as a public good has long given way to the desperate, existential struggle for survival at UK universities. Numerous institutions are on the brink of bankruptcy, which was the goal all along for the ideologically driven Office for Students (OfS). Market exit, as they euphemistically term it, proves market efficiency.At my own institution, Birkbeck, University of London, the challenge to utopian thinking is all too violently clear. Birkbeck has a special place in the UK higher education system—a university founded nearly 200 years ago in the Crown and Anchor Tavern on the Strand (it was called the London Mechanics’ Institution back then) to offer education to working-class Londoners that [End Page 555] fitted around their busy working lives. As my colleague Joanna Bourke writes in Birkbeck: 200 Years of Radical Learning for Working People (2022), life expectancy in the poorest parts of London was just twenty-nine years; cholera, typhoid, and typhus were major killers; and illiteracy was widespread. At Birkbeck, we are the only university to teach evening classes and offer the requisite support... (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy is marked by a turn to 'practical rationality' in the face of the issues associated with relativism and foundationalism. This turn is visible in the work of gadamer and rorty (among others) and has recently been surveyed by richard bernstein. The paper shows that 'practical rationality' fails as a model for rational justification in both 'post-Empiricist' philosophy of science and philosophical hermeneutics. The popular appeal to "phronesis" is shown to be an abuse of the ancient notion.

Resumen Al menos desde la publicación del clásico Ética en el Congreso. De la corrupción individual a la institucional de Dennis F. Thompson, el concepto de corrupción institucional ha recibido gran atención. Este tipo de corrupción se diferencia de la corrupción personal en que, entre otras cosas, la última requiere de la existencia de motivos morales personales. En este artículo exploro esta distinción y hago algunas observaciones críticas a la manera en la que Thompson la ha recientemente elaborado.At least from (...) the publication of Dennis F. Thompson’s classic Ethics in Congress. From Individual to Institutional Corruption the concept of institutional corruption has received great attention. This type of corruption is different from personal corruption in that, among other things, the latter requires the existence of personal moral motives. In this article I explore this distinction and raise some critical observations to the way in which Thompson has recently elaborated it. (shrink)

Zimbabwe's communal farmers are now less food secure than they were two generations ago. The roots of this decline lie not only in the confinement of Africans to marginal land but also in the historic forced replacement of their sustainable, indigenous farming system with one whose productivity now relies on the use of large amounts of expensive chemical inputs. Environmentally-friendly, traditional farming practices such as pyro-culture, minimum tillage, mixed cropping, and bush fallowing were completely wiped out and replaced with a (...) highly technical western or ganic farming system based on plough cultivation and continuous monocultures of commodity crops, that were supposed to be sustained by liberal amounts of green and animal manures. This gave rise to an effective agricultural hegemony that was due, mainly, to the zealous dedication of an American Mormon missionary whose motives were evangelical rather than scientific. (shrink)

BackgroundNational guidelines require programmes use subjective assessments of social support when determining transplant suitability, despite limited evidence linking it to outcomes. We examined how transplant providers weigh the importance of social support for kidney transplantation compared with other factors, and variation by clinical role and personal beliefs.MethodsThe National survey of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and the Society of Transplant Social Work in 2016. Using a discrete choice approach, respondents compared two hypothetical patient profiles and selected one for transplantation. (...) Conditional logistic regression estimated the relative importance of each factor; results were stratified by clinical role and beliefs.ResultsFive hundred and eighy-four transplant providers completed the survey. Social support was the second most influential factor among transplant providers. Providers were most likely to choose a candidate who had social support, always adhered to a medical regimen, and had a 15 years life expectancy with transplant. Psychosocial providers were more influenced by adherence and quality of life compared with medical/surgical providers, who were more influenced by candidates' life expectancy with transplant. For providers concerned with avoiding organ waste, social support was the most influential factor, while it was the least influential for clinicians concerned with fairness.ConclusionsSocial support is highly influential in listing decisions and may exacerbate transplant disparities. Providers’ beliefs and reliance on social support in determining suitability vary considerably, raising concerns about transparency and justice. (shrink)

The paper presents a scientific profile of Mieczysław Wallis in the perspective of the question of his intellectual status. The author looks for the answer within two areas that were the subject of Wallis’ interest: philosophy and history of art. She analyses the path of Wallis’ intellectual development and the formation of his creative interests: from his education (in Heidelberg and Warsaw) and inspirations, through his first intellectual concerns, to an analysis of his scientific output. In his youth, Wallis wrote (...) about the desire to create a philosophical system. Did this aspiration determine his scientific work, and to what extent? Did it set the course of his intellectual path? Was Wallis’ profile dichotomous in nature? For, as a philosopher, Wallis asked himself a fundamental question about the phenomenon of human being and its relation to the world. As a historian of art, he sought the answer by analyzing the world of man’s creative activity, his aesthetic experiences and artistic creations. Thus, on the one hand, the author emphasizes the role of philosophy in the development of Wallis’ intellectual views; on the other hand, she points to the philosophical depth of his achievements in the field of art theory. (shrink)

We show that there are continuum many different extensions of SCI (the basic theory of non-Fregean propositional logic) that lie below WF (the Fregean extension) and are closed under substitution. Moreover, continuum many of them are independent from WB (the Boolean extension), continuum many lie above WB and are independent from WH (the Boolean extension with only two values for the equality relation), and only countably many lie between WH and WF.

The current study explores the effects of a brief training program on complex problem solving (CPS) and dynamic decision making (DDM) performance in two computer-simulated tasks with different task characteristics, ChocoFine (N = 76) and WinFire (N = 99). Half of the participants in each simulation group received a brief training on 16 frequent CPS and DDM errors. We hypothesized that participants who received the training in errors would show better performance, report fewer errors, and show fewer behavioral errors compared (...) to those who did not receive the error training prior to the start of the simulated tasks. The results showed that participants in both training groups had better performance scores. Participants in the training condition reported fewer self-reported errors compared to the no-training group only in the ChocoFine simulation. Regarding behavioral errors, status-quo bias was related to weaker performance in both simulations. These findings have implications for leaders who are prone for the status-quo bias and for organizations which could implement trainings programs for DDM and CPS. (shrink)

Ce manifeste propose d’étudier des situations où des objets issus de la « Pop culture » mondialisée sont accidentellement mis au rebut puis réappropriés par des communautés dans des localités bien particulières. Au-delà de l’analyse d’un simple réemploi, le présent postulat est que la friction entre des évènements industriels et les imaginaires de la culture populaire contribue à éclairer la déliquescence des infrastructures qui les distribuent, grâce à des communautés qui documentent ces situations par des récits situés. Cet article propose (...) le terme de zombie props pour qualifier ces artefacts qui sont médiés par des acteurs locaux comme des objets souvenirs de paysages ayant subi de plein fouet la mondialisation, qui entrent en ruines. (shrink)

This thesis consists of four essays on aesthetic cognitivism. Aesthetic cognitivism says that artworks can have significant cognitive value and that the arts constitute a significant body of understanding. This thesis formulates and defends aesthetic cognitivist positions on central debates in philosophical aesthetics and works towards a comprehensive aesthetic cognitivist account of our aesthetic practices. In essay one, ‘Aesthetic Communication’, I defend the view that the purpose of a central form of aesthetic communication is sharing an aesthetic understanding of the (...) distinctive aesthetic character and value of artworks (and inculcating this aesthetic understanding in others). I argue for this view by setting out a novel account of the nature of aesthetic communication and of the criteria of communicative success in aesthetics. In essay two, ‘Aesthetic Cognitivism and Aesthetic Normativity’, I set out an aesthetic cognitivist answer to three normative questions. Why appreciate artworks? What does appreciation aim at? Which artworks is there weightiest reason to appreciate? Aesthetic cognitivism says that there is weightiest reason to appreciate artworks that are aesthetically valuable in virtue of the rich perspectives they bear to their subject matters. It says that the appreciation of these artworks aims at the sensitive exploration of their distinctive aesthetic value (i.e., of the rich perspectives they bear). It says there is reason to appreciate these artworks because they are aesthetically valuable. In essay three, ‘The End of Pleasure in Aesthetics: Aesthetic Cognitivism Revived’, I argue for an aesthetic cognitivist account of what it is to be responsive to aesthetic value. I argue that aesthetic responsiveness consists in a motivationally self-sustaining cognitive exploration of the distinctive aesthetic value of an artwork. I contrast my account with a pleasure theoretic account. In essay four, ‘Artistic Honesty’, I describe how honesty serves as a standard that guides and governs the creative process and provide an account of the property we attribute to artworks when we judge them to be honest. I argue that for an artwork to be honest is for it to confront a truth that it is epistemically and/or emotionally difficult for us to confront (individually and as a community). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading with FeelingDavid NovitzReading with Feeling, by Susan Feagin; viii & 260 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, $27.50.There are things that critics and philosophers love to burble on about, and literary appreciation is one of them. Susan Feagin puts an end to our burbling. Even if one does not always agree with Feagin, it is a singular merit of her book that it points to the problems (...) that need to be addressed in order to offer a passable theory of appreciation. Her book is subtle, considered, and perceptive, and offers an account that is demanding yet informative and helpful.To appreciate a literary work, we are told, is “not merely to recognize that a work has certain properties,” still less that it has a specific value. Rather, it is to [End Page 201] interact with the work in a way that “gets the value out of it,” where “this involves being affectively or emotionally moved” by the fiction (p. 1).The account of appreciation that follows aims first to explain how affective responses to fiction are possible—where this involves describing in a detailed explanatory way, the activity of appreciation and what it necessarily involves. Second, it aims to explain what it is that warrants or justifies an affective response to literature.Although interpretation is related to, perhaps intertwined with, appreciation, Feagin is adamant that the two activities are entirely different. An interpretation is the end-result, the product, of a certain activity, and gives us the meaning of a work or its parts. Appreciation, by contrast, is the successful exercise of an ability—namely that of interacting appropriately with a text—and does not result in any end product (pp. 34–37). Hence the desire to appreciate a novel is the desire to do various things with it, and in the process to exercise an acquired ability, namely that of responding appropriately to it. The crucial thing about this desire, Feagin suggests, is that it does not involve the mental representation of its object: it is not, for instance, the desire to have experiences of a certain sort. It is what she calls a “no-rep desire” (pp. 51–58).One has to wonder about this. When I buy and sit down to read my next Joanna Trollope novel, I do so partly because I have a pretty good idea of the delights that lie in store. In Feagin’s terms, I wish to exercise a certain ability, and interact appropriately with the text, but in this case I desire to do so because of a well-founded idea that I am going to engage with a certain subject matter: with the personal lives of people in traumatic relationships, and with a range of subtle perceptions and observations about human frailties. While perhaps not fully “rep,” this is far from being a no-rep desire; yet it seems wrong to deny that I desire to appreciate the work.In the three chapters that follow, Feagin looks closely at the activities involved in appreciating a work. As we read, our psychological sensitivity to what we read next is changed, and we move into “different mental gears.” Here Feagin emphasizes the slides and shifts, and the repeated reconfigurations that enter into the appreciation of a text (chap. 3). Such cognitive and affective shifts are to some degree automatic, to some degree under the reader’s control, even though we do not formulate intentions to move into them. But either way, they are what Feagin calls sensitivities—that is, a psychological readiness to respond in certain ways to events in the fiction. Crucially, they introduce into appreciation a temporal dimension, since our sensitivities are enhanced or diminished by what precedes them, and this, as we shall shortly see, is of considerable significance when deciding whether our affective responses to a work are warranted.These mental shifts and slides are required for an empathetic engagement with fictional characters. Feagin’s approach here is largely based on contemporary work in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. As a result, [End Page 202] she suggests in chapter 4 that empathizing involves simulating another’s mental states; something that... (shrink)

Edgar Page; XI*—Neonates, Persons and the Right to Life, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 165–178, https://doi.or.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Symbolic Mathematics and the Intellect Militant: On Modern Philosophy’s Revolutionary SpiritCarl PageWhat makes modern philosophy different? My question presupposes the legitimacy of calling part of philosophy “modern.” That presupposition is in turn open to question as regards its meaning, its warrant, and the conditions of its applicability. 1 Importance notwithstanding, such further inquiries all start out from the phenomenon upon which everyone agrees: philosophy running through Plato and Aristotle (...) looks significantly different from philosophy running from Descartes to Kant.My concern in this essay is with the phenomenon of the difference itself, rather than with the second-order questions associated with how properly to assign it historical meaning. I take the difference between ancient and modern philosophy to be as significant as differences in philosophy’s history can be: modern philosophy rests on a new interpretation of the nature and fulfillment of human reason, and disputes about the nature of human reason are the ultimate battles of philosophy. But the general thesis is not my main point. 2 The focus of this essay falls on what may be called the integrity of the phenomenon, on the specific interpretation of human reason that lends modern philosophy its peculiar face. [End Page 233]Modern philosophy’s strikingly revolutionary spirit is my point of departure. When Descartes writes in the first of his Meditations that “it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last,” 3 he reveals the same enthusiasm for total reform later found in Kant: “This attempt to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionizing it in accordance with the example set by the geometers and physicists, forms indeed the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason.” 4 How exactly did philosophy become so convinced that its central tradition—a sprawling, disorganized, ugly city, as Descartes has it in the Discourse (I:116)—needed razing to the ground in the interest of some rational town-planning? Moreover, the calls for revolution have not abated, despite contemporary disillusionment with both Cartesian rationalism and Enlightenment philosophy in general; they have grown more shrill. The confidence with which rationalism, foundationalism, universalism, logocentrism, Platonism, and so on are currently set at naught for the sake of contingency, particularity, and difference reveals the same revolutionary and totalizing spirit that marks the earlier phase of philosophy’s modernity. Such enthusiasm is reason’s freedom taken to an extreme. 5 What inspires this march of the intellect militant? What, if anything, justifies its hubristic self-assertions in the domain of philosophy? These are the questions I address.Descartes is commonly identified as the father of modern philosophy. While the full story of modern philosophy’s parentage is more complicated than this, it is fair to say that in Descartes self-consciousness of a new mode of doing philosophy emerges with a focus and revolutionary sense of purpose that caught philosophical imagination in his own time and continues to do so in ours. 6 Motifs of modern philosophy may be found in many places—Machiavelli, Hobbes, Francis Bacon, Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Jakob Boehme—nonetheless, Descartes’s intensely single-minded, even jealous advocacy commends itself to all but the most stubborn antiquarian mentality as modernity’s almost perfect philosophical representative. [End Page 234]That Descartes stands on a remarkable philosophical cusp is apparent in the contrast between the title and the subject matter of his most influential philosophical work: Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae (1641). To that point prima philosophia or First Philosophy had been construed as the metaphysics. It was not concerned with the critical question of how metaphysical sciences are possible and was not directly related to any doctrine of the human soul—except perhaps on the one point of the divinity of nous, the human soul’s highest part. In Descartes’s Meditations, on the other hand, the landscape has altered. Doubt, certainty, knowledge, the ego cogitans and its stream of representations are the new subject matter. What is first in philosophy is no longer what... (shrink)

We show that there are continuum many different non-Fregean sentential logics that have adequate models. The proof is based on the construction of a special class of models of the power of the continuum.

If we are to ensure the persistence of species in an increasingly warm world, of interest is the identification of drivers that affect the ability of an organism to resist thermal stress. Underpinning any organism's capacity for resistance is a complex interplay between biological and physical factors occurring over multiple scales. Tropical coral reefs are a unique system, in that their function is dependent upon the maintenance of a coral–algal symbiosis that is directly disrupted by increases in water temperature. A (...) number of physical factors have been identified as affecting the biological responses of the coral organism under broadscale thermal anomalies. One such factor is water flow, which is capable of modulating both organismal metabolic functioning and thermal environments. Understanding the physiological and hydrodynamic drivers of organism response to thermal stress improves predictive capabilities and informs targeted management responses, thereby increasing the resilience of reefs into the future. (shrink)

The subject of the current study is the process of implementing the social housing policy and its impact on increasing the quality of life of vulnerable people. The analysis is related to the Social Housing Program introduced by the city of Gdańsk. The study has been carried out using the case study method with the use of document analysis, analysis of existing data, and five in-depth interviews with program managers. The theoretical framework has been developed around three major explicatory perspectives: (...) multi-level governance, QOL, and social exclusion. Meeting the housing needs is one of the primary tasks of local governments. If such a policy is to be called positive, it should be combined with social policy tasks related to social inclusion, and it should be carried out through partnerships forming housing cooperation networks. A characteristic feature of the cooperation is the cross-sectoral nature of the actors. The results have revealed a significant positive relationship between the use of social housing tools and the quality of satisfying the living needs of the residents. This study contributes to the discussion by revealing the role of social work and social and professional activation in meeting housing needs. The results suggest that a combination of housing and social policy measures can help vulnerable people develop social competencies conducive to housing maintenance and increase the social cohesion of local environments. (shrink)

We investigated the contribution of bilingual experience to the development of cognitive reserve when compared with other, traditionally more researched, CR proxies, in a sample of cognitively healthy senior bilingual speakers. Participants performed in an online study where, in addition to a wide inventory of factors known to promote CR, we assessed several factors related to their second language use. In addition, participants’ inhibitory executive control was measured via the Flanker Task. We used Structural Equation Modeling to derive a latent (...) composite measure of CR informed by traditional CR proxies. We examined whether bilingualism may act as a mediator of the effects of such proxies on cognitive performance therefore assessing the unique contribution of dual language use to CR. First, our analyses revealed facilitatory effects of both L2 age of acquisition and L2 proficiency on the executive performance. Second, our analyses confirmed the moderating role of bilingual experience on the relationship between other factors known to promote CR and cognitive integrity, revealing a strong contribution by bilingualism to CR development. Our findings provide further support to the notion that bilingualism plays an important role in mitigating cognitive decline and promoting successful aging. (shrink)

We present a dual tableau system, RLK, which is itself a deterministic decision procedure verifying validity of K-formulas. The system is constructed in the framework of the original methodology of relational proof systems, determined only by axioms and inference rules, without any external techniques. Furthermore, we describe an implementation of the system RLK in Prolog, and we show some of its advantages.

This article presents the ethical implications for social science research emerging from our study on interpersonal communication after a laryngectomy. By tracing the evolution of our approach through specific research experiences and participant feedback, we provide empirical support for a flexible, multidimensional, and relational understanding of key ethical concepts, such as vulnerability and the researcher-participant relationship. Our approach has shifted from institutionally imposed rigid categorizations and somewhat stereotypical treatment of both the research group and the researcher-participant relationship to an emphasis (...) on building relationships founded on mutual care and rapport. We argue that this revised perspective fosters ethical collaboration that is beneficial and secure for all parties involved, and we offer practical examples of its implementation in research practice. (shrink)

During an initial palliative care assessment, a dying man discloses that he had killed several people whilst a young man. The junior doctor, to whom he revealed his story, consulted with senior palliative care colleagues. It was agreed that legal advice would be sought on the issue of breaching the man’s confidentiality. Two legal opinions conflicted with each other. A decision was made by the clinical team not to inform the police.In this article the junior doctor, the palliative medicine specialist, (...) a medical ethicist, and a lawyer consider the case from their various perspectives. (shrink)

A growing body of research is exploring corporate communication in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on social media (SM). Nonetheless, while these studies have shown that SM communication may be an effective tool for reaching and engaging various stakeholders, how the design of corporate CSR communication engenders trustworthiness has yet to be examined. To address this gap, we suggest that SM communication may include important signals related to trust; thus, we investigate whether companies use sources of trustworthiness (reputation, (...) performance, and appearance) while communicating with stakeholders and the response of the latter to such communication. Our empirical analysis is based on a database containing over 66,000 CSR-related messages from eight companies focusing on communication extracted from Twitter. These data are coded according to three sources of trustworthiness and two dimensions of CSR communication (social and environmental). Our findings indicate that all three attributes of trustworthiness are used by companies in their CSR social media communication. We also document how corporate efforts to use CSR communication that engenders trustworthiness influence stakeholder engagement. Our study therefore contributes to the literature on trust in relation to CSR by illustrating the importance of signaling that includes different sources of trustworthiness or their combination in corporate communication. By analyzing how the various trust attributes included in CSR communication affect SM reactions, we also identify which attributes lead to greater stakeholder engagement overall, particularly for the two analyzed dimensions of CSR communication. (shrink)