The main aim of the French logician and philosopher Petrus Ramus was to provide a method of teaching the liberal arts enabling the completion of the undergraduate program of studies in 7 years. This method was based on a new logic, in which the complex structure of Aristotle’s Organon and of the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain is reduced to two main doctrines: the invention of arguments, by which it is possible to find the notions for reasoning and disputing (...) in any discipline, and the disposition of arguments in judgment, i.e., in propositions and syllogisms. Since this logic applies both to demonstrative and to probable reasoning, Ramus and Rudolph Agricola, who first introduced it, labeled it as dialectic. Ramus completed this twofold dialectic with a method, according to which disciplines have to be taught by providing general definitions, to be explained by subsequent dichotomous divisions. According to Ramus, this method ensures a well-ordered hierarchy and division of disciplines, and an efficient means to teach them in a shorter time than in the pedagogical programs of Juan Luis Vivès, Johann Sturm, and Philipp Melanchthon. This method had its main diffusion in the pre-university institutions such as the German gymnasia and gymnasia illustria (e.g., of Herborn), while in Reformed and Catholic universities the acceptance of Ramism was hindered by the predominance of the Aristotelian curriculum. (shrink)

This article provides an original reappraisal of the notion of Minnemystik in the work of the 13th-century Flemish beguine Hadewijch of Antwerp, with specific reference to its Trinitarian and Christological orientations. After an introduction to the nature and origins of Hadewijch’s work, relating to the discovery of four extant manuscripts in Belgium in 1838, followed by an elucidation of the experience-driven epistemology of the Victorians Richard of St Victor and Hugo of St Victor as her key early scholastic influences, Hadewijch’s (...) Minnemystik is distinguished from Wesenmystik, as encountered in the mystical work of her French contemporary and beguine counterpart, Marguerite Porete. From this discursive basis, Hadewijch’s Minnemystik is reassessed and represented as pertinently Trinitarian and Christological in orientation, and therefore as a theological presentation from the 13th century. (shrink)

These selections provide a brief but comprehensive introduction to Fichte’s philosophical system and his place in the history of German Idealism. In addition to some of Fichte’s most influential texts, such as the First and Second Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and The Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, Breazeale has translated, for the first time into English, several other writings from the same period, including Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, Other short essays, (...) including Fichte’s replies to the charge of atheism, extend the discussions of the Introductions and respond to criticisms. Breazeale’s substantial Introduction supplies the context needed for a sound appreciation of Fichte’s enterprise and achievement. (shrink)

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient (...) philosophers, above all Aristotle, though ‘experience’ does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the ‘new rhetoric’, aims to fill the gap thus created. (shrink)

This article addresses the underestimation of Medieval philosophy in the contemporary curriculum by engaging its very origins in the ‘postmodern’ dislocation of philosophy. The leading question is what would be the prospects in the 21st century of reorienting Western philosophy from its idea-historical sources, which would include its ancient traditions and the Medieval exposition, as well as the Renaissance elucidation thereof. Critically engaging the works of numerous ‘postmodern’ philosophers as well as critics of the ‘postmodern’ departure from traditional philosophy, this (...) article argues for the re-establishment of the late Medieval notion of sensus communis, both as common sense and community sense. Against this backdrop, the article reappraises Medieval thought within the context of sensus communis to combat the contemporary dislocation of philosophy, by raising the possibility of the presentation of first-order judgments via sensus communis in a new pursuit for wijsbegeerte. (shrink)

The article examines how Gadamer reads, interprets and critiques Dilthey inTruth and Method. The author proposes to reconstruct this reading, placing it the contemporary hermeneutic debate, according to three transversal views : first relative to Dilthey’s position in the history of hermeneutics ; second relative to the criticism of methodological hermeneutics ; and third relative to the diltheyen contribution to a philosophy of life. The main thesis is that Gadamer’s relation to Dilthey is not univocal, even if Dilthey is quite (...) central to appreciate the scope ofTruth and Method. There is a problem of Diltheyenne inspiration that animates the project of this work — through a questioning on the foundation of the sciences of the spirit — but Gadamer gives a response of Heideggerian inspiration. (shrink)

This article presents the interpretation of Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer (1899-1986) of Medieval philosophy during his career as a lecturer and professor of philosophy at the University of South Africa (UNISA) from 1951 to 1964. The study is done regarding De Vleeschauwer's publications and unpublished manuscripts relating to Medieval philosophy, as filed in Archive MSS Acc 32 at the UNISA Institutional Repository. Essentially, De Vleeschauwer was one of only two South African university lecturers in the 20th century who consistently included (...) the Middle Ages in the philosophy curriculum (the other was Martin Versfeld at the University of Cape Town, from 1937 to 1972). When précising his work in Medieval philosophy at UNISA for the designated period, it becomes clear that De Vleeschauwer's nuanced defence of Thomism was the matrix of his interpretation. This cornerstone, and his numerous other published and unpublished texts relating to the Middle Ages, show that De Vleeschauwer was an erudite commentator, competent lecturer and skilled specialist researcher in Medieval philosophy, as he was in early modern and modern philosophy (especially on Kant and Geulincx). As a scholar of Medieval philosophy, in particular, De Vleeschauwer had no equal in the 20th century South African context. CONTRIBUTION: This article contributes to the ongoing assessment of the characteristic and curious inattention to Medieval philosophy at South African (especially the historical Afrikaans) universities during the course of the 20th century. (shrink)

L’objet de la présente contribution vise moins à analyser tel aspect de la Philosophie de la volonté élaboré par Ricœur que de repérer, dans son œuvre ultérieure, les structures de transition (et le sens de leur articulation) entre une phénoménologie d’abord centrée sur l’ eidos d’une volonté bien solitaire à une philosophie du co-agir qui débouche sur le souci de l’autre et des institutions. On peut ainsi, dans une perspective très panoramique, pointer trois structures de transition complémentaires venant initialement de (...) traditions philosophiques hétérogènes, d’une part, la socio-phénoménologie couplée avec la philosophie hégélienne de la Sittlichkeit, d’autre part, la tradition chrétienne du socius et du prochain couplée avec une philosophie politique néo-aristotélicienne, enfin une sémantique de l’action issue des courants analytiques. (shrink)

This article, by analysing, annotating en interpreting the most recent research in all relevant departments, provides a fresh and updated overview of the Neoplatonic metaphysics of Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500). After providing an introduction to Dionysius’ metaphysics in terms of the contributions of Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, the article explores his broader philosophical system. A number of traits that are uniquely Dionysic-metaphysical, are eventually isolated: the interpretation of transcendence as bound to immanence; the affirmation of God’s transcendence in the world (that (...) is, a metaphysics of ‘creation as teophany’; following E.D. Perl); the radical transcendence and simultaneous radical immanence of God (that is, God as ‘Beingness’); fundamental restrictions of language and the analogical ‘Naming’ of God; creation as a system of dialectical symbols about God; the analogical participation of the subject in creation; and unification (reditus, the ‘flowing of things back to God’). These traits are utilised to reappraise the metaphysics of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) in a subsequent article. (shrink)

La présente contribution met en confrontation une double figure contradictoire de la démesure. Celle de la figure nietzschéenne de l'excès de vie contre tout ce qui risque de soustraire sa puissance. Celle de la figure lévinassienne de la démesure du visage comme injonction éthique. Il y a bien chez Nietzsche et chez Levinas une "grammaire commune" et une réhabilitation iconoclaste de l'excès (à l'encontre de sa longue condamnation et damnation dans l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale). Mais à travers cette réhabilitation, (...) l'ontologie nietzschéenne de la vie et l'éthique lévinassienne demeurent incompossibles et se regardent comme des soeurs ennemies. (shrink)

Mit dem Entwurf eines merkantilistischen, autarken und sozialen Ständestaates liefert Fichte eine der geschlossensten Konkretisierungen seiner rechtspolitischen Ideen, nämlich das erste Modell einer sozialistischen Planwirtschaft. Zugleich berührt das Werk ein Kernproblem von Fichtes praktischer Philosophie: Wie läßt sich die freie Selbsttätigkeit der Einzelnen mit der alle auf ein Ideal verpflichtenden Hoheit des Vernunftsstaates vereinigen?

In the winter of 1807, while Berlin was occupied by French troops, the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte presented fourteen public lectures that have long been studied as a major statement of modern nationalism. Yet Fichte's _Addresses to the German Nation_ have also been interpreted by many as a vision of a cosmopolitan alternative to nationalism. This new edition of the _Addresses_ is designed to make Fichte's arguments more accessible to English-speaking readers. The clear, readable, and reliable translation is accompanied (...) by a chronology of the events surrounding Fichte's life, suggestions for further reading, and an index. The groundbreaking introductory essay situates Fichte's theory of the nation state in the history of modern political thought. It provides historians, political theorists, and other students of nationalism with a fresh perspective for considering the interface between cosmopolitanism and republicanism, patriotism and nationalism. (shrink)

A presente tradução que ora se apresenta ao público brasileiro, realizou-se no seio do Projeto de Investigação «A recepção da Revolução Francesa pela Filosofia Alemã do final do século XVIII e início do século XIX», financiado pela Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia de Portugal, e fora realizada pela equipe de investigação composta por: Prof. Carlos Morujão, Profa. Inês Bolinhas, Prof. Miguel Santos Silva, Profa. Cláudia Oliveira e Profa. Teresa Pedro. Indicamos, entre parêntesis rectos, a paginação da edição da Gesamtausgabe (...) de Fichte, Tomo I/1.. Email de contato: [email protected]. (shrink)

This important new book by a major voice in the Social Imaginaries movement offers the most systematic attempt to establish conceptual and historical links between the idea of modernity as a new civilization and the notion of multiple modernities. Arnason demonstrates a theory of globalization that is still compatible with the emphasis on unity and diversity of modernity as a civilization.

This article responds to a critical research challenge in Medieval philosophy scholarship regarding the internal periodisation of the register. By arguing the case for ‘post-scholasticism’ as an internal period indicator (1349–1464, the era between the deaths of William of Ockham and Nicholas of Cusa), defined as ‘the transformation of high scholasticism on the basis of a selective departure thereof’, the article specifies a predisposition in the majority of introductions to and commentaries in Medieval philosophy to proceed straight from 1349 to (...) 1464, understating 115 years of pertinent Medieval philosophical discourse. It is argued that in the modern account of Medieval philosophy, this understatement is manifested in either a predating of Renaissance philosophy to close the gap between 1349 and 1464 as far as possible or in proceeding straight from 1349 to Renaissance philosophy. The article presents five unique philosophical themes from this delicate period, indicating that ‘post-scholasticism’ was indeed a productive period in late Medieval philosophy, which should not be bypassed as an inconsequential entrance to Renaissance philosophy. The period 1349–1464 should accordingly be appreciated for its idiosyncratic contributions to the history of ideas in the late-14th and early-15th centuries, with reference to the political intensification of the via moderna, the pivotal separation of philosophy and theology and the resulting independence of the natural sciences, in res critique of institutions, transforming pragmatics and the rise of philosophical materialism. Contribution: This article contributes to methodological development in Medieval philosophy by responding to a critical research challenge regarding the internal periodisation of the later Middle Ages. Arguing the case for ‘post-scholasticism’ as an internal period indicator (1349 to 1464 in Medieval philosophy, the article presents unique philosophical themes from the period, indicating that it was a productive stage in late Medieval philosophy which should not be bypassed as an inconsequential entrance to Renaissance philosophy. (shrink)

Bd. 1-2. 1. Abth. Zur theoretischen Philosophie.--Bd. 3-4. 2. Abth., A. Zur Rechts- und Sitteniehre.--Bd. 5. 2. Abth., B. Zur Religionsphilosophie.--Bd. 6-8. 3. Abth. Populärphilosophische Schriften.

This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that (...) animals are capable only of (mechanical) behaviour, not of (intentional) action. (shrink)

Mit seiner zweifellos wichtigsten religionsphilosophischen Abhandlung unternahm Fichte den Versuch, seine Wissenschaftslehre einem breiteren Publikum wenigstens in ihren zentralen Aussagen zugänglich zu machen und das Verhältnis von gelebtem Glauben und wissenschaftlicher Reflexion klar zu bestimmen.

Human oversight has become a key mechanism for the governance of artificial intelligence (“AI”). Human overseers are supposed to increase the accuracy and safety of AI systems, uphold human values, and build trust in the technology. Empirical research suggests, however, that humans are not reliable in fulfilling their oversight tasks. They may be lacking in competence or be harmfully incentivised. This creates a challenge for human oversight to be effective. In addressing this challenge, this article aims to make three contributions. (...) First, it surveys the emerging laws of oversight, most importantly the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (“AIA”). It will be shown that while the AIA is concerned with the competence of human overseers, it does not provide much guidance on how to achieve effective oversight and leaves oversight obligations for AI developers underdefined. Second, this article presents a novel taxonomy of human oversight roles, differentiated along whether human intervention is constitutive to, or corrective of a decision made or supported by an AI. The taxonomy allows to propose suggestions for improving effectiveness tailored to the type of oversight in question. Third, drawing on scholarship within democratic theory, this article formulates six normative principles which institutionalise distrust in human oversight of AI. The institutionalisation of distrust has historically been practised in democratic governance. Applied for the first time to AI governance, the principles anticipate the fallibility of human overseers and seek to mitigate them at the level of institutional design. They aim to directly increase the trustworthiness of human oversight and to indirectly inspire well-placed trust in AI governance. (shrink)