Simulation modeling, the core thesis of Calculated Surprises, is transforming the established conception of mathematical modeling in fundamental ways. These transformations feed back into philosophy of science, opening up new perspectives on longstanding oppositions. The book integrates historical features with both practical case studies and broad reflections on science and technology.

The paper is a critical comment on D. Hoffman. The Scrambling Theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition, 2006, 15, 31–45.

An increasing number of studies indicate that changes in cytosolic free Ca2+ ([Ca2+]c) mediate specific types of signal transduction in plant cells. Modulation of [Ca2+]c is likely to be achieved through changes in the activity of Ca2+ channels, which catalyse passive influx of Ca2+ to the cytosol from extracellular and intracellular compartments. Voltage‐sensitive Ca2+ channels have been detected in the plasma membranes of algae, where they control membrane electrical properties and cell turgor. These channels are sensitive to 1,4‐dihydropyridines, which in (...) animal cells specifically affect one class of voltage‐regulated plasma membrane Ca2+ channel. Ca2+‐permeable channels with different pharmacological properties have been found in the plasma membrane of higher plants. Recent evidence suggests the existence of two discrete classes of Ca2+ channel co‐resident in the vacuolar membrane (tonoplast) of higher plants. The first is gated by inositol 1,4,5‐trisphosphate, and bears a number of similarities to its animal counterpart which is located in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER). The second tonoplast Ca2+ channel is voltage‐operated. However, the specific roles of these tonoplast channels in signal transduction have yet to be elucidated. (shrink)

Both thought experiments and simulation experiments apparently belong to the family of experiments, though they are somewhat special members because they work without intervention into the natural world. Instead they explore hypothetical worlds. For this reason many have wondered whether referring to them as “experiments” is justified at all. While most authors are concerned with only one type of “imagined” experiment – either simulation or thought experiment – the present chapter hopes to gain new insight by considering what the two (...) types of experiment share, and what they do not. A close look reveals at least one fundamental methodological difference between thought and simulation experiments: while thought experiments are a cognitive process that employs intuition, simulation experiments rest on automated iterations of formal algorithms. It will be argued that this difference has important epistemological ramifications. (shrink)

According to Jon Elster, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences. In the absence of laws, moreover, mechanisms provide explanations. In this paper I argue that Elster’s view has difficulties with progressing knowledge. Normally, filling in the causal picture without revising it should not threaten one’s explanation. But this seems to be Elster’s case. The critique is constructive in the sense that it is built up from a (...) discussion of a mechanism that might explain ‘unwarranted’ risk taking in connection with swimming—a mechanism that is mirrored in the proverb: The best swimmers drown. (shrink)

The physical activity-related health competence model assumes that individuals require movement competence, control competence, and self-regulation competence to lead a healthy, physically active lifestyle. Although previous research has already established some measurement factors of the three dimensions, no attempts have so far been made to statistically aggregate them on the sub-competence level. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to test two additional factors for PAHCO and subsequently model the second-order structure with two samples from the fields of rehabilitation (...) and prevention. We conducted two questionnaire surveys with persons with multiple sclerosis and teaching students undergoing a basic qualification course in physical education. After performing exploratory items analysis, we used second-order confirmatory factor analysis and multidimensional scaling to investigate whether the scales could be bundled in accordance with the PAHCO model. The CFAs with 10 factors demonstrated a good model fit. In contrast, the second-order analysis with a simple loading structure on the three sub-competencies revealed an unacceptable model fit. Instead, a second-order model variant was preferred [comparative fit index = 0.926, root mean square error of approximation = 0.048, standardized root mean square residual = 0.065] in which body awareness and self-efficacy had theory-conform cross-loadings. The results of multidimensional scaling were in line with the extracted second-order structure. The present results suggested that the extension of the measurement instrument to 10 first-order factors was psychometrically justified for the two populations. The results from the second-order analyses provided the basis for the creation of sum scores, representing manifest indicators of movement competence, control competence, and self-regulation competence. Future studies are needed that cross-validate the extended measurement model with other populations and that relate the sub-competencies of PAHCO to indicators of health-enhancing physical activity. (shrink)

This book highlights some of the conceptual problems that still need to be solved and points out a number of fresh philosophical ideas to explore.

We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion.

Isaac Levi is more interested in inquiry and how it progresses than he is in metaphysics. Questions concerning the role of disposition predicates in inquiry are more central to him than those concerning the nature and reality of dispositions. It has not stopped him from giving me and others very useful metaphysical advice. Currently, where empirical metaphysics is in vogue, there is every reason to see whether the two forms of philosophical interest might interlock substantially. Levi has stimulating ideas indeed (...) on the two forms of philosophical interest, and has recently summarized them in the slogan: “The reality of dispositions is a work in progress”. We can learn much about what kinds of dispositions are acceptable from tracing and comparing the histories of successful and less successful disposition predicates in scientific inquiry. Levi explores one route along which dispositions become real. His idea is that the introduction of dispositions facilitates covering law explanation by increasing the number of laws. The successful disposition predicate eventually becomes integrated in scientific theory, much like an ordinary theoretical term, whereas the unsuccessful does not. My impression is that Levi thinks that this is the only way a disposition can become real. To evaluate this claim, an alternative course suggested by Jon Elster is introduced. I then try to bring out the differences between Levi's and Elster's views on dispositions, partly by suggesting that they resemble two aspects of full explanations discussed by Wesley Salmon. But more about that below. (shrink)

This clear and concise book investigates the relation between materiality and the subject in Marxism, (post-)structuralism, and material semiotics. It introduces the three approaches in an accessible way and serves as an introduction to different kinds of materialism and theories of the subject. For each approach, the modalities of materiality of the respective materialism are defined and the relationship between these multiple materialities and the subject are presented as specific to the theoretical approaches discussed. Beetz argues for a non-reductionist materialism, (...) which conceives of materiality as more than matter or matter in motion. In such a materialism the subject is seen as an effect of material conditions, relations, processes, and practices. He shows how the constitution and decentering of the subject is conceptualized in the approaches presented and highlights the role of material instances in these processes. (shrink)

The article starts by observing a parallel between the identification of Christ's humanity and universal human nature, for which Harnack repudiates some church fathers, and David Strauss' claim, in his Life of Jesus, that the subject of the Incarnation must be all humanity. It is argued that this oppositional stance is indicative of fundamental philosophical and theological differences between the Tübingen School and the Ritschl School. Those differences, however, are then explained as emerging from what is ultimately a common project (...) of a radical form of historical theology. This project, it is argued, Ritschl took over from Baur while correcting it in crucial ways. Taken together, the two central theological schools of the 19th century thus illustrate the potential and the limits of christian theology within the historicist paradigm. (shrink)

Kant offered a subtle theory of consciousness and self-knowledge which articulated the intuition that consciousness is a mode of being in a mental state, as opposed to a property of that state. This paper develops this theory and argues that McDowell's treatment of these issues in "Mind" and "World" overlooks the resources of Kant's views. McDowell conflates consciousness and self-consciousness, leading him to formulate too demanding a constraint on rational concept use. Kant's theory can be developed so as to avoid (...) this unfortunate corollary. The paper concludes by comparing Kant's account to contemporary approaches to the problem of consciousness. (shrink)