Scholars from different disciplines have investigated the nature of love for centuries. It has been only in the past century that social psychologists have begun to scientifically investigate the complexity of love in comparison with other emotions (Hatfield & Rapson, 2009, for review). We laud Lamy (2016) for his thoughtful intentions to pursue this long-lasting tradition and extend his goal to better understand the definition and neural bases of love by focusing on recent scientific evidence from social psychology and (...) neuroscience. The better is our understanding of love, the greater is our respect for its significant role in mental and physical health. (shrink)

The law-governed world-picture -- A remarkable idea about the way the universe is cosmos and compulsion -- The laws as the cosmic order : the best-system approach -- The three ways : no-laws, non-governing-laws, governing-laws -- Work that laws do in science -- An important difference between the laws of nature and the cosmic order -- The picture in four theses -- The strategy of this book -- The meta-theoretic conception of laws -- The measurability approach to laws -- What (...) comes where -- In defense of some received views -- Some assumptions that will be in play -- The laws are propositions -- The laws are true -- The logically contingent consequences of the laws are laws themselves -- At least some laws are metaphysically contingent -- The meta-theoretic conception of laws -- Laws of nature, laws of science, laws of theories -- The first-order conception versus the meta-theoretic conception -- What is a law of nature? -- Some examples of meta-theoretic accounts -- The virtues of the meta-theoretic conception -- Weighing the virtues and shortcomings of the meta-theoretic conception -- An epistemological argument for the meta-theoretic conception of laws -- The discoverability thesis, the governing thesis, and the first-order conception -- The main argument -- The objection from bad company -- The objection from inference to the best explanation -- The objection from bayesianism -- The objection from contextualist epistemology -- The objection from the threat of inductive skepticism -- Laws, governing, and counterfactuals -- Where we are now -- What would things have to be like in order for the laws of nature to govern the universe? -- Lawhood, inevitability, counterfactuals -- What is it for a proposition to be inevitably true? -- What is it for a whole class of propositions to be inevitably true? -- What is it for lawhood to confer inevitability? -- NP and supporting counterfactuals -- The worry about context-variability -- A solution and a look ahead -- When would the laws have been different? -- Where we are now -- The God cases -- Other counterexamples to NP -- A moral-theoretic counterexample to NP -- Scientific contexts and non-scientific contexts -- Scientific God cases? -- Lewisian non-backtracking counterexamples -- Where things stand now -- How could science show that the laws govern? -- Why the law-governed world-picture must include the science-says-so thesis -- What is extra-scientific? -- How can the science-says-so thesis be true? -- NP as a consequence of the presuppositions in any scientific context -- Np as true in all possible scientific contexts -- But how could it be so? -- Attack of the actual-factualists -- Measurement and counterfactuals -- Where we are now -- Measurements, reliability, counterfactuals -- A general principle that captures the relation between measurement and counterfactuals -- What we can learn about lawhood from what we have learned about the counterfactual commitments of science -- A first-order account of laws or a meta-theoretic account of laws? -- What methods are presupposed to be legitimate measurement procedures? -- Why we must adopt a meta-theoretic account of laws -- What lawhood is -- Where we are now -- The measurability account of laws -- Brief review of the case for the mal -- A note about hedged laws -- How plausible is the mal? -- What if we don't care about the law-governed world-picture? -- Newton's God and Laplace's demon -- Beyond humean and non-humean -- Two views of laws -- Humean supervenience and the meta-theoretic conception -- Alleged counterexamples to humean supervenience -- Governing and non-trivial necessity -- How the mal lets us have it all -- Humeanism? non-humeanism? -- What is the significance of the idea of the law-governed universe? -- Where in the world are the laws of nature? -- Appendix: The mal in action : a few examples -- Of scientific theories and their laws -- Newton's theory as a paradigm example -- Classical special-force laws -- Geometrical optics and one of its laws -- Local deterministic field theories. (shrink)

Major shifts in the field of model theory in the twentieth century have seen the development of new tools, methods, and motivations for mathematicians and philosophers. In this book, John T. Baldwin places the revolution in its historical context from the ancient Greeks to the last century, argues for local rather than global foundations for mathematics, and provides philosophical viewpoints on the importance of modern model theory for both understanding and undertaking mathematical practice. The volume also addresses the impact (...) of model theory on contemporary algebraic geometry, number theory, combinatorics, and differential equations. This comprehensive and detailed book will interest logicians and mathematicians as well as those working on the history and philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

John Taurek has argued that, where choices must be made between alternatives that affect different numbers of people, the numbers are not, by themselves, morally relevant. This is because we "must" take "losses-to" the persons into account (and these don't sum), but "must not" consider "losses-of" persons (because we must not treat persons like objects). I argue that the numbers are always ethically relevant, and that they may sometimes be the decisive consideration.

We introduce the notion T does not omit obstructions. If a stable theory does not admit obstructions then it does not have the finite cover property . For any theory T, form a new theory $T_{\rm Aut}$ by adding a new unary function symbol and axioms asserting it is an automorphism. The main result of the paper asserts the following: If T is a stable theory, T does not admit obstructions if and only if $T_{\rm Aut}$ has a model companion. (...) The proof involves some interesting new consequences of the nfcp. (shrink)

I describe a problem about the relations among symmetries, laws and measurable quantities. I explain why several ways of trying to solve it will not work, and I sketch a solution that might work. I discuss this problem in the context of Newtonian theories, but it also arises for many other physical theories. The problem is that there are two ways of defining the space-time symmetries of a physical theory: as its dynamical symmetries or as its empirical symmetries. The two (...) definitions are not equivalent, yet they pick out the same extension. This coincidence cries out for explanation, and it is not clear what the explanation could be. The Puzzle: Symmetries, Measurability and Invariance 1.1 The symmetries and the measurable quantities of Newtonian mechanics 1.2 The puzzle Two Easy Answers Another Unsuccessful Solution: Appeal to Geometrical Symmetries Locating the Puzzle The Relation between Laws and Measurability A Possible Solution CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

I argue that the most promising approach to understanding J.J. Gibson's "affordances" takes affordances themselves as ontological primitives, instead of treating them as dispositional properties of more primitive things, events, surfaces, or substances. These latter are best treated as coalescences of affordances present in the environment (or "coalescences of use-potential," as in Sanders (1994) and Hilditch (1995)). On this view, even the ecological approach's stress on the complementary organism/environment pair is seen as expressing a particular affordance relation between the world (...) and the analyst. That the world is parsed in any way among events and objects, perceivers and worlds, etc., reflects equally features of certain real or possible perspectives on the world and features of the world itself. In section 1, I begin by contending that, contrary to the apparent expectations of some in the field, the bare existence of affordances is surely quite uncontroversial. In section 2, I argue that the most reasonable approach to foundational ontology is a relativistic one. In section 3, I address the claim that affordances must be ontologically complemented by effectivities for the sake of completeness, and I shall argue against that claim on grounds that I take to reflect some of Gibson's most important insights. This work will help to clarify the way affordances are to be used in the fourth and final section, where I argue that ontological work, even within special sciences, should not be merely "regional," and that the most attractive general approach to ontological questions is one that is based on affordances, rather than upon things, events, surfaces, and the like. (shrink)

Hrushovski originated the study of “flat” stable structures in constructing a new strongly minimal set and a stable 0-categorical pseudoplane. We exhibit a set of axioms which for collections of finite structure with dimension function δ give rise to stable generic models. In addition to the Hrushovski examples, this formalization includes Baldwin's almost strongly minimal non-Desarguesian projective plane and several others. We develop the new case where finite sets may have infinite closures with respect to the dimension function δ. In (...) particular, the generic structure need not be ω-saturated and so the argument for stability is significantly more complicated. We further show that these structures are “flat” and do not interpret a group. (shrink)

How do I live a good life, one that is deeply personal and sensitive to others? John T. Lysaker suggests that those who take this question seriously need to reexamine the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. In philosophical reflections on topics such as genius, divinity, friendship, and reform, Lysaker explores "self-culture" or the attempt to remain true to one's deepest commitments. He argues that being true to ourselves requires recognition of our thoroughly dependent and relational nature. Lysaker guides readers (...) from simple self-absorption toward a more fulfilling and responsive engagement with the world. (shrink)

This article examines cognitive process models of human sentence comprehension based on the idea of informed search. These models are rational in the sense that they strive to find a good syntactic analysis quickly. Informed search derives a new account of garden pathing that handles traditional counterexamples. It supports a symbolic explanation for local coherence as well as an algorithmic account of entropy reduction. The models are expressed in a broad framework for theories of human sentence comprehension.

Leo Strauss’ reading of al-Farabi is a meditation on the issue of how philosophers speak beyond their time and place. They must speak in such a way that they can be understood by the enlightened but avoid persecution by the vulgar masses. According to Strauss, al-Farabi recognized that the philosopher can be happy in the imperfect city democratic city because of its freedom of thought, while the masses can be truly happy only in the virtuous city. This leads him to (...) consider the possible role for the philosopher to advise the "enlightened prince" and to participate in the manipulation of the beliefs of the masses toward some enlightened goal – what we are now witnessing in our think-tank politics. But if we consider a truer reading of al-Farabi’s philosophy, it in many ways recognizes the importance of imperfections, ambivalences, and frontiers. Our intellectual and religious ideals are often beyond our reach – Plato’s “city in speech” – but yet these ideals can orient us and give us a sense of place even in our imperfect situations. For al-Farabi, the democratic city is the best of the imperfect cities, because its imperfections and freedoms allow for new possibilities. Today most of us live in this imperfect city, but this is precisely what allows us to maintain our connections with the past, and project many possibilities for the future. And it is what allows this conference to take place. (shrink)

This presentation of a system of propositional logic is a foundational paper for systems of illocutionary logic. The language contains the illocutionary force operators '' for assertion and ' ' for supposition. Sentences occurring in proofs of the deductive system must be prefixed with one of these operators, and rules of take account of the forces of the sentences. Two kinds of semantic conditions are investigated; familiar truth conditions and commitment conditions. Accepting a statement A or rejecting A commits a (...) person to accepting some statements (the symbol '' marks this value), to rejecting some statements (), and will leave the person uncommitted with respect to others (). Commitment valuations assign the values to sentences of ; such a valuation is conceived as reflecting the beliefs/knowledge of a particular person. This paper explores the relations between truth conditions and commitment conditions, and between semantic concepts defined in terms of these conditions. (shrink)

What is the reason for the continued interest in Newman’s theology? This article’s reply that Newman was a contextual theologian is based on a consideration of three questions:Was Newman a theologian? What was the context of his theology? What are the reasons for Newman’s theological longevity?

Why do we so often defend the very social systems that are responsible for injustice and exploitation? In A Theory of System Justification, John Jost argues that we are motivated to defend the status quo because doing so serves fundamental psychological needs for certainty, security, and social acceptance. We want to feel good not only about ourselves and the groups to which we belong, but also about the overarching social structure in which we live, even when it hurts others (...) and ourselves. Jost lays out the wide range of evidence for his groundbreaking theory and examines its implications for our communities and our democracy. Drawing on twenty-five years of research, he provides an accessible account of system justification theory and its insights. System justification helps to explain deep contradictions, including the feeling among some women that they don’t deserve the same salaries as men and the tendency of some poor people to vote for policies that increase economic inequality. The theory illuminates the most pressing social and political issues of our time—why has it been so hard to combat anthropogenic climate change?—as well as some of the most intimate—why do some black children prefer white dolls to black ones and why do some people stay in bad relationships? Jost’s theory has far-reaching implications, and he offers numerous insights that political activists and social justice advocates can use to promote change. (shrink)

While there are numerous differences between the approaches taken by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and James J. Gibson, the basic motivation of the two thinkers, as well as the internal logic of their respective views, is extraordinarily close. Both were guided throughout their lives by an attempt to overcome the dualism of subject and object, and both devoted considerable attention to their "Gestaltist" predecessors. There can be no doubt but that it is largely because of this common cause that the subsequent development (...) of their ideas is so similar. It is not my objective in what follows merely to demonstrate a similarity between two lines of thought. Instead, I will try to show that each approach gains considerably from attention to the other. There are numerous ways to begin such a project, each about as arbitrary as the next. For present purposes, I shall take as of central importance the question of the character of the perceived world, both in relation to the traditionally opposed mental and material "substances", and in relation to its identification and individuation of things vis a vis one another and vis a vis ourselves. This will implicate especially Gibson's "affordances" and Merleau-Ponty's thesis concerning the "materiality of meaning.". (shrink)

There is a great deal that might be said about justice in property claims. The strategy that I shall employ focuses attention upon the initial acquisition of property -- the most sensitive and most interesting area of property theory. Every theory that discusses property claims favorably assumes that there is some justification for transforming previously unowned resources into property. It is often this assumption which has seemed, to one extent or another, to be vulnerable to attack by critics of particular (...) justifications of property. Nevertheless, this assumption is frequently left undefended by property theorists, and where it is defended, the defense is often remarkably weak. That some initial claim to property be defensible is required by any theory which holds that certain present distributions may be justified, that certain transfers of property are justified, or that restitution ought to be made for previous injustice in transfer or acquisition. The initial acquisition of property, and its justification, is crucial to the remainder of property theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle On MetaphorJohn T. KirbyMuch Madness is divinest Sense—To a discerning Eye——Emily DickinsonOurs is an age of metaphor. Wayne Booth, in his inimitable fashion, remarks,There were no conferences on metaphor, ever, in any culture, until our own century was already middle–aged. As late as 1927, John Middleton Murry, complaining about the superficiality of most discussions of metaphor, could say, "There are not many of them."... Explicit discussions of (...) something called metaphor have multiplied astronomically in the past fifty years.... students of metaphor have positively pullulated.1In the postmodern era philosophers of language, particularly those outside the analytic tradition, tend to think more and more in terms of all language as being metaphorical. This trend, however, is not a new one; it seems to have its roots back as far as Heraclitus, and, in the modern world, was certainly espoused by Giambattista Vico in his Nuova Scienza (1725). What we may call the Viconian tradition was embraced on the continent by Nietzsche, and, in the Anglo–American world, by Ivor Richards.2 Nietzsche's thought had far–reaching consequences in terms of its influence on the work of Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, who in the late 1960s and the 1970s found themselves in the center of a vortex of controversy over the notion of "deconstruction," and its interrogation not only of Western metaphysics but also of human language and thought generally. Now, it seemed, such simple formulae as "This X is Y" called into question the whole process of naming and predication. But even among those for whom this is an unconvincing position, the problem of metaphor continues to be a fascinating one. How to define [End Page 517] it? What are its uses? What is its relation to literal, or nonfigured, language? And what its relation to human cognition?3Booth goes on to say, "there have been many more discussions of what people from the Greek philosophers on called metaphor than any bibliography could show."4 That being so, a sustained study of Aristotle's concept of metaphor needs no further justification, since it is to him that we owe the terms in which the debate was framed for many hundreds of years. Indeed, here as often, even those who wish to propose new or different parameters for the analysis of metaphor must do so against the grain of the Aristotelian tradition.5 This, if nothing else, is a measure of the tremendous influence Aristotle has had on the history of Western rhetoric and poetics.As on many other topics, it is now fashionable to condescend to Aristotle for the limitations of his study of metaphor, or—more aggressively still—to find fault with its parameters. Certainly he did not preempt any further discussion on the issue; nor, I imagine, would he have wanted to. But I surmise that there is more to be learned from an appreciative study of his methods here than one might initially suppose. In this study, then, after a few remarks on recent studies of metaphor, I propose to examine the state of the question before Aristotle, and then [End Page 518] to look at what he has to say about metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric.In their attempts to cope with the notion of language generally, and specifically with the questions of literal versus figurative language, scholars over the last hundred years or so have themselves appropriated a number of metaphors purporting to describe the phenomenon. These include (above all) models based on comparison and interaction. The comparison model, it is typically said, conforms more to the classical approach to metaphor, whereas those based on interaction stem primarily from the work of Richards and Black.6 Indeed it is from this notion of interaction that the terms "tenor" and "vehicle" were born, the former referring to the underlying idea that is illustrated or illuminated by the latter, which is "applied" to it; and Richards is right both to point out [1] that the word "metaphor" is sometimes used to signify what he means by "vehicle," and sometimes to mean the symbiosis resulting from the conjunction of tenor and vehicle, and [2] that... (shrink)

The existence of "undermining futures" appears to show that a contradiction can be deduced from the conjunction of Humean supervenience (HS) about chance and the Principal Principle. A number of strategies for rescuing HS from this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper, a novel way of defending HS from the threat is presented, and it is argued that this defense has advantages not shared by others. In particular, it requires no revisionism about chance, and it is equally available (...) to defenders of HS who hold HS to be necessary and those who hold it to be contingent. (shrink)

We use κ-free but not Whitehead Abelian groups to constructElementary Classes (AEC) which satisfy the amalgamation property but fail various conditions on the locality of Galois-types. We introduce the notion that an AEC admits intersections. We conclude that for AEC which admit intersections, the amalgamation property can have no positive effect on locality: there is a transformation of AEC's which preserves non-locality but takes any AEC which admits intersections to one with amalgamation. More specifically we have: Theorem 5.3. There is (...) an AEC with amalgamation which is not (N₀, N₁)-tame but is 2(N0, ∞)-tame; Theorem 3.3. It is consistent with ZFC that there is an AEC with amalgamation which is not (≤ N₂, ≤ N₂)-compact. (shrink)

I elaborate and defend an interpretation of Leibniz on which he is committed to a stronger space-time structure than so-called Leibnizian space-time, with absolute speeds grounded in his concept of force rather than in substantival space and time. I argue that this interpretation is well-motivated by Leibniz's mature writings, that it renders his views on space, time, motion, and force consistent with his metaphysics, and that it makes better sense of his replies to Clarke than does the standard interpretation. Further, (...) it illuminates the way in which Leibniz took his physics to be grounded in his metaphysics. (shrink)

Previous discussions of addiction have often focused on the question of whether addiction is a disease. This discussion distinguishes that question – the disease question – from the question of whether addiction is a disability. I argue that, however one answers the disease question, and indeed on almost any credible account of addiction, addiction is a disability. I then consider the implications of this view, or why it matters that addiction is a disability. The disease model of addiction has led (...) many to see addiction as primarily a medical problem, and to make medical treatment of the addicted person the first priority in addressing addiction. Once addiction is viewed as a disability, different concerns are foregrounded. The problem of addiction resides not only in the addicted person, but also in the social environment in which the addicted person finds herself. The fundamental ethical question about addiction is not how addicted persons can be treated or otherwise changed, but how a just society can make reasonable accommodations for addicted persons. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to examine our imagination of the unity of the earth and the process of globalization by contrasting it with the early origins of mapping and measuring the globe. I will pay particular attention to the work of Abū Rayḥān Al-Bīrūnī. I will demonstrate that the assumptions which allowed for Al-Bīrūnī’s advances in the measurement of the globe were based upon a certain understanding of the relationship of place within the sacred order of the cosmos and (...) the role of reason in this connection. This carries over to his anthropological works which considers the history of other religions and cultures. It shows an approach where objectivity in scientific investigation can stand alongside a diversity of religious faiths or visions. I wish to use these insights to consider the positions of such Western writers on the philosophy of globe-formation, such as Carl Schmitt and especially Peter Sloterdijk. Sloterdijk understands the development of our imagination of the globe as a singular history which was achieved primarily through conquest. Comparing these thinkers is important because our understanding of geopolitics and globalization often involves imposing one definition of humanity, reality or the sacred, which marginalizes or vilifies those with differing views. I hope to demonstrate by these contrasts that a unified imagination of the earth through globalization poses extreme dangers, and that the fragmentation of the globe through many religious and secular and artistic projections is the only possibility for a future. That is: the possibility of a future is dependent upon many opposing images of a future. It is only by a return to the initial impulses which led such scientists as Al-Bīrūnī that a true relationship of the human to the earth can be preserved. (shrink)

Subcreative sets, introduced by Blum, are known to coincide with the effectively speedable sets. Subcreative sets are shown to be the complete sets with respect to S-reducibility, a special case of Turing reducibility. Thus a set is effectively speedable exactly when it contains the solution to the halting problem in an easily decodable form. Several characterizations of subcreative sets are given, including the solution of an open problem of Blum, and are used to locate the subcreative sets with respect to (...) the complete sets of other reducibilities. It is shown that q-cylindrification is an order-preserving map from the r.e. T-degrees to the r.e. S-degrees. Consequently, T-complete sets are precisely the r.e. sets whose q-cylindrifications are S-complete. (shrink)

Subcreative sets, introduced by Blum, are known to coincide with the effectively speedable sets. Subcreative sets are shown to be the complete sets with respect to S-reducibility, a special case of Turing reducibility. Thus a set is effectively speedable exactly when it contains the solution to the halting problem in an easily decodable form. Several characterizations of subcreative sets are given, including the solution of an open problem of Blum, and are used to locate the subcreative sets with respect to (...) the complete sets of other reducibilities. It is shown that q-cylindrification is an order-preserving map from the r.e. T-degrees to the r.e. S-degrees. Consequently, T-complete sets are precisely the r.e. sets whose q-cylindrifications are S-complete. (shrink)

Studies in the neurobiological underpinnings of social information processing bypsychologists, neurobiologists, psychiatrists, radiologists, and neurologists, using methods thatrange from brain imaging techniques to comparative analyses.

I argue that the standard way of formalizing the fine-tuning argument for design is flawed, and I present an alternative formalization. On the alternative formalization, the existence of life is not treated as the evidence that confirms design; instead it is treated as part of the background knowledge, while the fact that fine tuning is required for life serves as the evidence. I argue that the alternative better captures the informal line of thought that gives the fine-tuning argument its intuitive (...) plausibility, and I show that the alternative formalization avoids all of the most prominent objections to the fine-tuning argument, including the objection from observation selection effects, the problem of old evidence, the problem of non-normalizable probability measures and a further objection due to Monton. I conclude that the alternative formalization is the one that attention should be focused on. (shrink)

I try in this essay to accomplish two things. First I offer some first thoughts toward a clarification of the ethical foundations of private property rights that avoids pitfalls common to more strictly Lockean theories, and is thus better prepared to address arguments posed by critics of standard private property arrangements. Second, I'll address one critical argument that has become pretty common over the years. While versions of the argument can be traced back at least to Pierre Joseph Proudhon, I'll (...) focus on a formulation given it by Jeremy Waldron. The basic idea is that the only sound arguments for private property rights lead to the conclusion that society has an obligation to insure that every citizen possess private property. In Waldron's formulation, what is justifiable is a general, rather than a special, right to private property. I shall try to suggest that this conclusion is unwarranted. (shrink)

CHAPTER 1 Combinatorial Geometries and Infinitary Logics In this chapter we introduce two of the key concepts that are used throughout the text. ...

Thesis: The exclusion of organized labor/management issues from the principal arenas for business ethics study and discussions needs to be remedied. The paper develops this thesis in three steps: 1) Exclusion: A careful examination of select textbooks, journals, and conferences provides evidence as to the virtual absence of unions and such crucial organized labor/management issues as labor organizing and collective bargaining; 2) Inclusion: A series of brief arguments favoring inclusion of these issues in business ethics based on the notion of (...) privileged institutions, adversarial posturing, the societal benefits, and globalization; 3) Suggestions: Some practical, cooperative initiatives involving the academy, management and labor, such as, labor officials as guest speakers and members of business school committees, internships in labor organizations, training workshops in business ethics for labor leaders, fora for joint management/labor discussions of issues each group faces in the economy and the legislatures. (shrink)

I propose understanding CP-law statements as statements that assert the existence of vague statistical laws, not by fully specifying the contents of those laws, but by picking them out via a description that is both self-referential and self-locating. I argue that this proposal validates many common assumptions about CP-laws and correctly classifies many examples of putative CP-laws. It does this while avoiding the most serious worries that motivate some philosophers to be skeptical of CP-laws, namely the worry that they lack (...) non-trivial truth conditions and that it is impossible for empirical evidence to disconfirm them. (shrink)

Sensation should be understood globally: some infant behaviors do not make sense on the model of separate senses; neonates of all species lack time to learn about the world by triangulating among different senses. Considerations of natural selection favor a global understanding; and the global interpretation is not as opposed to traditional work on sensation as might seem.

In this paper we study abstract elementary classes of modules. We give several characterizations of when the class of modules A with is abstract elementary class with respect to the notion that M1 is a strong submodel M2 if the quotient remains in the given class.

We provide a general framework for studying the expansion of strongly minimal sets by adding additional relations in the style of Hrushovski. We introduce a notion of separation of quantifiers which is a condition on the class of expansions of finitely generated models for the expanded theory to have a countable ω-saturated model. We apply these results to construct for each sufficiently fast growing finite-to-one function μ from 'primitive extensions' to the natural numbers a theory T μ of an expansion (...) of an algebraically closed field which has Morley rank 2. Finally, we show that if μ is not finite-to-one the theory may not be ω-stable. (shrink)

We give a general account of the goals of axiomatization, introducing a variant on Detlefsen’s notion of ‘complete descriptive axiomatization’. We describe how distinctions between the Greek and modern view of number, magnitude, and proportion impact the interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry. We argue, as did Hilbert, that Euclid’s propositions concerning polygons, area, and similar triangles are derivable from Hilbert’s first-order axioms. We argue that Hilbert’s axioms including continuity show much more than the geometrical propositions of Euclid’s theorems and (...) thus are an immodest complete descriptive axiomatization of that subject. (shrink)

The growing power of communication and information technologies and their reliance on systems, poses great challenges to cultural and religious diversity, and even education. Will these technological systems continue to homogenize cultures and religions? Will this process lead to increasing strife? Or is there a possibility of maintaining both identity and diversity in a peaceful manner? This paper explores an early attempt to consider this problem. It will focus on the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā and their attempt to construct an encyclopedic system (...) to coordinate knowledge during the flowering of Islamic Civilization in the tenth century. It will primarily deal with Epistle or Rasā'il twenty-two – a fable concerning a debate between the humans, the animals and the Jinn. It will discuss their debate and show how the major concern for the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā was not only to embrace the diversity of knowledge but also the need to navigate through this diversity. I would like to suggest through this analysis that a culture gains its richness and identity by recognizing perfections outside of their own identity. This is analogous to the way that the individual human being gains meaning and dignity by reaching beyond its individuality. It also shows the importance of cultural and religious diversity and how the world cannot be unified by a single all-encompassing system. This approach is important because it shows the possibility of maintaining cultural and religious identity while participating in a technological world involving the flow of information on one hand, and global cultural diversities on the other. (shrink)

This essay, which was originally presented at the first Coloquio Internacional at the Guadalajara Campus of the Universidad Panamericana, Mexico, October 8-10, is a short introduction to Newman’s writings in six areas—autobiography, philosophy, theology, literature, education and spirituality—along with some suggestions for additional reading, particularly for those beginning Newman studies.

Newman was a prolific writer, but one who usually wrote on “call”; sometimes these calls were unexpected, but at other times they were a pastoral responsibility. Such was the case with his sermons, which exhibit four characteristics: biblically based, theologically grounded, circumstantially relevant, and spiritually insightful. As such, his sermons still appeal to readers today.