In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 371-397 [Access article in PDF] How the "New Science" of Cannons Shook up the Aristotelian Cosmos Mary J. Henninger-Voss [Figures]Approximately halfway through the "Second Day" of Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Galileo's mouthpiece, the mathematician Salviati, scoffs at his Aristotelian colleague Simplicio: "I see that you have hitherto been of that herd who, in order to learn (...) how matters such as this [motion] take place, and in order to acquire a knowledge of natural effects, do not betake themselves to ships or crossbows or cannons, but retire to their studies... to see whether Aristotle has said anything about them."1 Silly, simple Simplicio! He has been searching for natural philosophical wisdom in the books of natural philosophers rather than in the world of docks and arsenals. Indeed this quotation appears near the outset of Day Two wherein Salviati offers cannonshot as proof for the opposing Aristotelian position that the experience of projectiles proves the motionless state of the earth. Obviously, if the earth rotates toward the east, cannonballs shot point-blank to the west ought to travel much further than to the east. And clearly this is not so. Simplicio agrees that the new arguments offered by the cannon are excellent, "and now I see with how many elegant experiments nature graciously wishes to aid us in coming to the recognition of the truth," Simplicio enthusiastically enjoins. "What a shame there were no cannons in Aristotle's time!" exclaims the third interlocutor, Sagredo. "With them he would indeed have battered down ignorance, and spoken without [End Page 371] [Begin Page 373] the least hesitation concerning the universe."2 The irony here is not only that Aristotle might have used cannons in order to explain the workings of the universe but also that Galileo does so in the following pages. His demonstrations with reference to artillery demolish the Aristotelian position, but he has had Simplicio open the door for him by recognizing this most violent of artifices as an elegant experiment provided by nature.3The cannon provides a primary referent for Galileo's new mathematical physics of motion from his very first dialogue to his very last. The early De Motu culminated in a series of questions about the shot of cannons, while the conversation in his final masterwork, Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences, was set in the Venetian arsenal, and to it Galileo appended a table of the parabolic paths that could be expected from cannons shot at various elevations.4 In some sense Galileo turned inside-out a much older problem, one that had haunted military engineers of sixteenth-century Italy—and Galileo had been trained, and trained others, in military engineering.5 State organizers of war and captain generals were less interested in the implications the arts of fortifications and artillery held for the existing science of natural motion than in the necessity to reduce to a science, that is, a coherent body of knowledge, the rules for manufacturing cannons, planting artillery battery, aiming guns, and fortifying camps, cities, and castles.What Galileo gives us is recognizable as early physics, as a sophisticated mechanical science, a neat triumph of mathematical method in natural philosophy. But the ways and means by which mathematics came together with natural philosophy to address problems of both technology and nature are by no means neat. My claim is that attention to the military sphere will help us sort out some of those ways and means. The curious thing about the historiography on the relationship between early modern science and warfare is that the fact of a connection seems to have been taken for granted, while the implications have seldom been investigated.6 This essay is an attempt to trace those implications by [End Page 373] looking at a mathematician who specifically tried to reduce to a mathematical science the military arts, Niccolò Tartaglia.7 Tartaglia's story shows how the minutia of Aristotelian philosophy was transmuted in early attempts to understand cannonshot... (shrink)

What role does “discursive consciousness” play in decision-making? How does it interact with “practical consciousness?” These two questions constitute two important gaps in strong practice theory that extend from Pierre Bourdieu's habitus to Stephen Vaisey's sociological dual-process model and beyond. The goal of this paper is to provide an empirical framework that expands the sociological dual-process model in order to fill these gaps using models from cognitive neuroscience. In particular, I use models of memory and moral judgment that highlight the (...) importance of executive functions and semantic memory. I outline each model as it pertains to the aforementioned gaps in strong practice theory. I then use the models from cognitive neuroscience to create an expanded dual-process model that addresses how and when conscious mental systems override and interact with subconscious mental systems in the use of cultural ends for decision-making. Finally, using this expanded model I address the sociological debate over the use of interview and survey data. My analysis reveals that surveys and interviews both elicit information encoded in declarative memory and differ primarily in the process of information retrieval that is required of respondents. (shrink)

This study investigates whether the host personality and the primary alterpersonality of a woman with multiple personality disorder are controlled by the left and right hemispheres, respectively. Results support the hypothesis. Behavioral and preference measures indicate that Pe is strongly right handed and Pa is left handed. Verbal and musical dichotic tests show significantly greater accuracy for stimuli presented to the left ear for Pa and to the right ear for Pe. It is concluded that shifts in hemisphericity involve redistribution (...) of attentional resources and callosal suppression. “Conditional handedness” is proposed as a handedness subtype, characterizing persons who alternate personalities and consistently display alternate hand preferences linked to specific personality characteristics. (shrink)

Scholars have known that a variety of medieval theories on relation existed, but no full-length systematic study has been attempted until now. With this book Henninger fills an important gap in our knowledge of medieval philosophy. Dealing with such varied thinkers as Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Mediavilla, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, William of Ockham, and Peter Aureoli, the book will interest anyone concerned with late medieval philosophy and the transition to the early modern period.

An argument for an updated definition of 'human being'.

Laurent Henninger intervenant sur les « révolutions militaires » (notion située au carrefour du débat historique lancé dans les années 1980 par Geoffrey Parker – en polémique avec Jeremy Black – et du débat stratégique américain dans les années 1990) souligne que les avancées dans l’art de la guerre ont été depuis cinq siècles une des composantes majeures de la barbarisation et du totalitarisme. La notion de « révolution militaire » est aujourd’hui contestée par ceux qui y voient un (...) outil interprétatif de trop longue durée et lui préfèrent l’idée de « mutations militaires » (selon laquelle l’accumulation de changements millimétriques sur la longue durée débouche sur des ruptures). Après avoir passé en revue la première révolution militaire – XVe-XVIIe siècles – fondée sur la mise à distance de la cavalerie grâce à l’infanterie nouvelle, à l’artillerie du champ de bataille, Henninger s’interroge sur le critère discriminant pour qualifier les nouvelles guerres de la Renaissance (l’hyperviolence n’en est pas un à ses yeux) et voit dans les armes à feu la vraie rupture car elles influent de façon radicale sur la peur et le courage des combattants et sont source d’une véritable « inhumanité » dans la mesure où leur feu est « imparable ». Il insiste sur l’émergence d’un nouveau type de courage guerrier non archaïque et plus « stoïcien » marqué par l’acceptation de la mort. Dans cette perspective, l’« inhumanisation » technique porterait en elle la possibilité de la barbarisation. L. Henninger développe ensuite cette thèse à partir de l’examen des guerres mécanisées de la période 1860-1950 en s’attardant sur la guerre de Sécession puis sur la Grande Guerre. Il relie aussi la question du totalitarisme à la réflexion sur les « bombardements stratégiques massifs » et les débuts de la dissuasion nucléaire (terme qui ne s’impose que vers 1960). Il conclut en insistant sur le fait que, selon lui, la brutalisation des conflits naît toujours d’un retard de la pensée de la guerre et sur le paradoxe d’une culture occidentale qui produit en même temps barbarie de la guerre et codes qui tentent de l’enrayer. (shrink)

A complete critical edition of the later work of the medieval philosopher and theologian Henry of Harclay is here published for the first time, together with an English translation prepared in collaboration with Raymond Edwards. The Quaestiones Ordinariae introduce students to the key problems of medieval philosophy, as well as enabling scholars to deepen their knowledge of the debates of this period. A further volume will publish Questions 15-29.

What is human freedom? By addressing a number of theological 'limit situations', Robert Greystones, while at Oxford University in the 1320s, developed his own philosophical theory. This volume is the first Latin critical edition, with a clear English translation. There is an extensive introduction describing his life and teaching on human freedom.

This chapter contains sections titled: Ontology: universals and relations Morality: the virtues and the will Conclusion.

In this article, the problem of the ontological status of real relations is first examined as it was generally formulated by the scholastics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, that is, within a solid and defining Aristotelian substance/attribute framework. I then examine John Duns Scotus’s strong realism on relations, giving his key arguments for his teaching, as also his arguments against the rival non-realist, conceptualist view. This latter view was championed most strongly and extensively by Peter Auriol, and I examine (...) both his arguments for his novel conceptualist theory of relations, along with his counter-arguments to Scotus’s criticisms. I conclude by showing how some early fourteenth- century thinkers were beginning to reject key traditional assumptions of the scholastic debate. (shrink)

As with the problem of universals, late medieval thinkers were very concerned with the ontological status of relations, for they were central to numerous theological and philosophical problems. These relations were of various types: relations of identity, qualitative similarity, quantitative equality, causal relations, and intentional relations, such as those between knower and the object known. Each of these relations was taken to be an Aristotelian accident. Does it differ from the substance which is related? Broadly speaking, I have discovered four (...) alternative theories: as sentence of the form "a is related by a real relation R to b" is true only if the relation R is an extra-mental thing really distinct from a and b ; R only exists as a concept in a mind ; a and b exist in a certain real way ; the term "R" is connotative, signifying a directly and connoting b . Using printed sources and my critical edition of various codices, I ask the following thinkers whether a real relation is distinct from that which is related: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, Hervaeus Natalis, and Peter Aurioli. (shrink)

Traditional scientific views of the conscious self and world we live in are challenged by an unprecedented outburst of emerging new paradigms, theories of consciousness, perceptions of reality, new sciences, new philosophies, epistemologies, and a host of other transformative approaches. This still expanding outburst can be traced, on both logical and chronologic grounds, not to chaos theory, ecology, the new physics, or dozens of other currently ascribed sources, but rather to the cognitive (consciousness) revolution that immediately preceded. These new approaches (...) all share one key feature in common, namely, they all depend, directly or indirectly, upon a refutation and successful overthrow of the long dominant materialist paradigm. This is what was required to shift consciousness from an acausal or "eliminable" status to a functionally indispensable role. Traditional "bottom‐up" micro‐determinism had to be supplemented by a reciprocal, "top‐down" control exerted by mental emergents over lower‐level components. This does not dispose of behaviorism or reductionism, as methodology, but simply incorporates these within a more comprehensive explanatory framework. With the long reign of materialist constraints finally broken, other antireductive views have proliferated but with little regard for what the new paradigm allows. (shrink)

This volume is a continuation of Robert Greystones on the Freedom of the Will: Selections from His Commentary on the Sentences. From this, five of the most relevant questions were selected for editing and translation in this timely volume. This edition should prompt not just a footnote to, but a re-writing of the history of philosophy.

In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.

Many poor and oppressed people wish to leave their countries of origin in the third world to come to affluent Western societies. This essay argues that there is little justification for keeping them out. The essay draws on three contemporary approaches to political theory - the Rawlsian,the Nozickean, and the utilitarian - to construct arguments for open borders. The fact that all three theories converge upon the same results on this issue, despite their significant disagreements on others, strengthens the case (...) for open borders and reveals its roots in our deep commitment to respect all human beings as free and equal moral persons. The final part of the essay considers communitarian objections to this conclusion, especially those of Michael Walzer. (shrink)

John McDowell and Hubert L. Dreyfus are philosophers of world renown, whose work has decisively shaped the fields of analytic philosophy and phenomenology respectively. Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate opens with their debate over one of the most important and controversial subjects of philosophy: is human experience pervaded by conceptual rationality, or does experience mark the limits of reason? Is all intelligibility rational, or is there a form of intelligibility at work in our skilful bodily rapport with the (...) world that eludes our intellectual capacities? McDowell and Dreyfus provide a fascinating insight into some fundamental differences between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, as well as areas where they may have something in common. Fifteen specially commissioned chapters by distinguished international contributors enrich the debate inaugurated by McDowell and Dreyfus, taking it in a number of different and important directions. Fundamental philosophical problems discussed include: the embodied mind, subjectivity and self-consciousness, intentionality, rationality, practical skills, human agency, and the history of philosophy from Kant to Hegel to Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty. With the addition of these outstanding contributions, Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World is essential reading for students and scholars of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. (shrink)

What must the United States do to remain the global superpower and stop alienating the rest of the world? The author of the bestselling "The Paradox of American Power" has one clear answer: soft power.

(1) The average Mum has 2.4 children. (2) The number of Argle’s fingers equals the number of Bargle’s toes. (3) There are two possible ways in which Joe could win this chess game. In the right contexts, and outside the philosophy room, all the above sentences may be completely uncontroversial. For instance, if we know that Joe could win either by exchanging queens and entering an endgame, or by initiating a kingside attack then, if ignorant of Quine’s work on ontology, (...) we would take (3) to be uncontroversially true. (shrink)

There is an idea, extremely common among social contract theorists, that the primary function of social institutions is to secure some form of cooperative benefit. If individuals simply seek to satisfy their own preferences in a narrowly instrumental fashion, they will find themselves embroiled in collective action problems – interactions with an outcome that is worse for everyone involved than some other possible outcome. Thus they have reason to accept some form of constraint over their conduct, in order to achieve (...) this superior, but out-of-equilibrium outcome. A social institution can be defined as a set of norms that codify these constraints.1 Simplifying somewhat, one can then say that social institutions exist in order to secure gains in Pareto-efficiency. (shrink)

The nature of biological order.--The deployment of biological order.--The hierarchical continuity of biological order.--Bibliography (p. xvi-xvii).

Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that (...) may be buttressed by an examination of the ordinary person’s views of truth. Then, I address a concern raised by Tarski’s contemporaries who saw Næss’ results as refuting Tarski’s semantic conception. Following that, I summarize Næss’ results. Finally, I will contend with a few objections that suggest a strict interpretation of Næss’ results might recommend an overturning of Tarski’s theory. (shrink)

Suggests that illegal immigrants should be offered a path to citizenship.

It is sometimes argued that medical professionals should protect a future child's rights by prohibiting disabled parents from using technology to deliberately have a disabled child because disability is taken as an inevitable, severe threat to a child's otherwise “open” future. I will first argue that the open future that allegedly protects a child's future autonomy is precluded by the very conditions needed to develop that future autonomy. Any child's future will be narrowed as they are socialized in a way (...) that gives them the capacity for autonomous choice. However, oppressive master narratives can diminish a future child's autonomy by distorting their narrative identity and constricting their agency. In fact, the open future argument does just this by advancing one of the most damaging master narratives about disability: that disability inevitably and severely restricts a person's autonomy and closes their future. (shrink)