Es ist heute eine allgemein anerkannte These, dass in der Rechtsphilosophie nicht nur die Geschichte, sondern auch die Geschichtlichkeit berucksichtigt werden muss. Diese Arbeit geht einen Schritt weiter: sie versucht, die Geschichtlichkeit in die Rechtstheorie einzubeziehen. Nicht nur das Anwendungsfeld der Rechtsprinzipien, die sog. Rechtsmaterie, ist geschichtlich, auch die Rechtsprinzipien selber mussen als geschichtlich betrachtet werden. Anhand einiger konkreter Falle wird der Ansatz zu diesem neuen Rechtsverstandnis verdeutlicht.

Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul examines Kilwardby’s role in conciliating Aristotelian and Augustinian views on the soul, soul-body relation, and cognition.

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.

Espero defender la tesis de que la lingüística contemporánea se ha ido consolidando como una ciencia estable. Para ello analizaré, en los conocidos términos de Hempel, casos concretos de explicaciones nomológico-deductivas y probabilístico-inductivas brindadas por la teo-ría generativa y por la teoría sistémico-funcional. Estas explicaciones so-bre hechos del lenguaje son muy superiores a las “no-científicas” : Se sostienen en leyes universales y probabilísticas, cumplen con los requi-sitos de contrastabilidad y pertinencia explicativa y, fundamentalmente, sirven para establecer o comprender las predicciones. (...) Finalmente, el problema de la incompatibilidad manifiesta entre los supuestos de una teoría “biologista” y los de una teoría “sociológica” , puede interpretarse en función de la vieja idea de que en la ciencia no hay experimentos cruciales.In this paper I shall argue that contemporary linguistics has developed as a stable science. I will use Hempel’s well known concep-tual apparatus in my analysis, and apply it to concrete examples of no-mologic-deductive and probabilistic-inductive explanations provided both by the generative and the systemic-functional theory. The expla-nations of concrete linguistic facts yielded by these theories are much better than “non-scientific” explanations : they are based on universal and probabilistic laws, they satisfy the requirements of contrastability and explicative relevance and, more importantly, they are useful in es-tablishing or understanding predictions. Finally, the manifest incom-patibility between the assumptions of a “biologist” theory and those of a “sociologic” theory can be analyzed in terms of the old idea that there are no crucial experiments in science. (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush’s claim that an account of knowledge based on probabilistic tracking (...) faces a version of the problem of generality. I argue that the problems she raises are specific to her account, and do not affect the version of the view that I have advanced. I then consider Brandom’s argument that the cases that motivate reliabilist epistemologies are in principle exceptional. I argue that he has failed to make a cogent case for this claim. I close with the suggestion that the representationalist approach to knowledge that I endorse and Brandom rejects is in principle compatible with the kind of pragmatist approach to belief and truth that both Brandom and I endorse. (shrink)

We consider, from a physical perspective, the case where the interface between an organism and its environment becomes large enough that it acts as a buffer regulating their matter and energy exchanges. We illustrate the physiological and evolutionary role of buffers through the example of lungfish estivation. Then we ponder the relevance of buffers of this kind to the quest for a general definition of concepts like niche construction, the extended phenotype, and related ones, whose meaning is conveyed at present (...) mostly through particular examples. Finally, we comment on the potential significance of buffers to organism—environment codetermination in the sense originally suggested by Lewontin. (shrink)

Silence is a term of a physico-acoustic character but integrated as an essential feature of musical composition and poetic word. Its importance is broadened throughout 20th century both in terms of meaning and on the horizon of moral reflection of various musical and literary works, bringing it closer to horror, nothingness, outness, and senseless. This text presents a brief itinerary through this double formal and ontological nature of silence in several essential artworks of modernity.Keywords: silence, non-sense, nothing, emptiness, artistic creation, (...) musical work, absurd, literature. (shrink)

Unlike most American novels on the Iraq wars, which tend to be either celebratory or redemptive, Iraqi-born Sinan Antoon’s The Corspe Washer bears witness to the traumatic effects of destitu...

There is a question that has not been raised in the literature on Japan's regionalism: Why does it have a strong tendency toward making the boundary of the proposed East Asian community fluid? By looking back beyond the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1940s, a method hitherto untried, the paper shows that this Japanese propensity was also present in the first half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, both then and now, Japan did (...) not and does not have a firm adherence to an ideology. These are two similarities between the pre-World War II period and the present (from the 1960s). On the other hand, Japan's present international situation is very different from its pre-World War II position. The paper uses the logic of the comparative method, which states that in two cases that are different in most aspects but the same in some, one or some of the similarities may explain the other similarity or similarities. It concludes that in both periods, the lack of a firm commitment to an ideology explains Japan's prejudice toward boundary fluidity. This explanation has the potential to contribute to a more comprehensive, if not yet a general theory of Japan's approach to regionalism because it applies not only to the present, but to the past as well. And it has to be stressed, the past refers not only to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1940s but also to the decades before. (shrink)

When the conquerors arrived in the Valley of Mexico, they were amazed at the creations of the culture inherited from the Toltec tradition. With the prurpose of acknowledging this culture, this paper points out that words such as truth, thinking, and doubt have a very different connotation in modern European philosophy, to the Anahuac culture, which flourished in the Valley of Mexico between the 9th and 16th centuries. This writing presents a comparison of the process to obtain true knowledge according (...) to the rationality of the Nahua world of the 16th century and three authors of European modernity: Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Modernity is found to present a dominant and egocentric subject with self-referential thinking. In the Nahua culture the ideal is the man with a "heart of stone" and a "wise face" who seeks what is true, what has roots, and expresses it through poetry, “the flower and the song”. (shrink)